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2. 
Several scholars have investigated contributions that medical 
theorists made during the 19 th cent:ury to the discovery of the 
conservation of energy. This thesis investigates such contribu-
tions, particularly in Britain and Germany, in greater dc::tDil 
than has been done hitherto. Beginning with ideas on POW8L of 
17th and 18th century British philosophers, the development of an 
interest in dynamics is traced through the writings of some two 
dozen British medical theorists between about 1760 and 1860. 
Gradually th8ir ideas on pm",'er or .force - -:.:.hese t.wo word8 "J<2:ce 
usually synonymous - became sharper, and by the l830s the parallel 
studies on force in the physical sciences were influencing them 
considerably. Thus, in the 1840s William Robert Grove's (1811-
1896) formal enunciation of the correlation of forces seemed to 
give physiologists extra confidence in their ideas, especially 
on the correlation of physical and vital forces and the non-
creatibility and indestructibility of power in the living 
organism. Two physiologists in particular have been discussed 
as illustrations of how readily the formally enunciated principles 
of the correlation of forces and the conservation of energy were 
applied to their physiology in the 1840s and 1850s. 
Part II of the thesis discusses the growth of dynamical 
physiology in Germany, focussing on some half dozen physiologists. 
Since these men were influenced strongly by 18th century German 
philosophy, particularly by NaturphiZosophie, a chapter has been 
given to sketching their philosophical heritage from Benedict 
Spinoza (1632-1677) to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Like WUȘÙŊŸĚ
British contemporaries, their dynamics were often vague, but by 
the l830s they too benefitted from the dynamical studies in 
physics. Finally, several of these German physiologists 
enunciated clearly their own form of the conservation prinCiple; 
Julius Robert Mayer (1814-1878), Hermann Helmholtz (1821-1894) and 
Justus Liebig (1803-1873) are the best known of them. 
The conclusion of this thesis is that there were physiologists 
. B· t· d th th ŸŪĚ ŲŸĚ ŠŸŪĚan Germany during the late 18 and early 19 
centuries whose interests in the dynamics of life crystallized in 
the closely related principles of the correlation of forces and 
the conservation of energy. 
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3. 
APOLOGIA 
Since a handful of lengthy studies have been 
done by historians of science during the last two 
decades on the discovery of the principle of the 
Conservation of Energy, it might well be asked: 
Why another? In order to answer that, let us 
enumerate those studies. One of the earliest was 
a monograph entitled Concepts of force. A study in 
the foundations of dynamics; by Max Jammer in 1957. 
Jammer was interested more in what we nowadays call 
force rather than in energy, but his analysis was 
thought-provoking and broad enough to have been a 
useful stimulus for this Thesis. Two years later there 
was published T.S. Kuhn's paper on 'Energy conse!'vation 
as an example of simultaneous discovery,2 which, in 
my opinion, achieved three things. Firstly, it 
assembled what was known already about several individual 
contributors to the Energy principle so as to form a 
quite impressive thesis, namely simultaneous discovery; 
secondly, as almost all scholarly studies must, it broke 
ŪŲŸHĒĚ ground, pn;;,enting thitherto ignored perspectives on 
several individuals - particularly on Justus Liebig 
(1803-1873); thirdly, it posed stimulating questions for 
further research. 
Several papers came out in the 1960s that had some 
relevance, though often only en passant, to the Energy 
Conservation question. The next major work was Yehuda 
Elkana's The discovery of the conservation of energy3 in 
4. 
1974, and this was followed immediately by R.B. 
Lindsay's Energy: historical development of the 
ȘŬŪȘŤŮWŸĚ Both these later studies concentrated 
on the contributions that mathematicians, physicists 
and engineers had made and, like Jammer's study, 
they largely ignored the possibility that medical 
theorists might have contributed significantly. 
Perhaps this is unfair to Elkana, whose study is 
much more scholarly and historical than Lindsay's, 
since he included one chapter on that aspect; but 
one feels that little, if any, research was done for it. 
To my knowledge, no systematic study on whether 
medical theorists contributed significantly to the 
Energy conservation theory has been published. As is 
well known, several of the major enunciators of the 
theory in the l840s were medical men, namely Julius 
Robert Mayer (1814-1878) and Hermann Helmholtz (1821-
1894); but no-one has enquired how deeply their Energy 
ideas were rooted in their medical training, or whether 
there had been a tradition in medical theory of which 
Mayer and Helmholtz were the culmination. Admittedly, 
a dissertation 'das published in 1941 by one Rudolf 
Cierpka, entitled Das Gesetz von der Erhaltung der 
Energie in seiner AUBwirkung auf die Physiologie in 
De 7,ltschZand; but Cierpka was interested almost 
exclusively in the impact that the Energy principle 
had on physiology after its formal enunciation, that 
is post-l845. The earliest physiologist he mentioned 
was Johannes MUller (1801-1858), and that was only a 
5. 
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mention. Cierpka's study is still worth reading 
but it has been superceded by more recent studies, 
some of which are excellent but do not concern this 
present one. 
This thesis takes its cue from Kuhn's paper: 
since Energy Conservation was a classic case of 
simultaneous discovery, and at least two of its 
discoverers were medical men, should we not enquire 
whether other medical theorists contributed too? 
It would not be unreasonable to expect some positive 
results. The following is the fruit of such 
expectation. 
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Introduction 
On reading Justus Liebig's Animal chemistry; I was 
struck by his preoccupation with force. Vital, chemical 
and physico-mechanical forces were obviously central 
concepts in his science; indeed so central that the 
passages in Animal chemistry where he discussed force 
were sometimes not far short of pure poetry. Force had 
fired his imagination as well as his intellect. 
Whilst enquiring into Liebig's interest in force, I 
read some papers written by his contemporaries on animal 
chemistry and physiology, and also some recent historical 
studies on his and his physiological contemporaries' ideas 
on force. Especially useful among the secondary literature 
were papers on Liebig's vitalism by ØÙŸŌWUXĚLipman 2,3and 
papers on the school of Johannes MUller by Paul ȘŲŠŪŤȚÙŤŨTŸHĪĚ
Also worthy of mention were the lengthier studies by June 
Goodfield6 and Everett Mendelsohn? One impression that 
emerged from reading these studies ''las that Liebig and others 
must have owed something to a dynamical tradition within 
physiology for their interest in force or energy. (Please 
see end of this introduction for a comment on the various 
meanings of force, energy, power and Kraft). If one 
follows up the references to medical and physiological 
treatises that Liebig, Helmholtz, Emil ŸŬÙVĤŎŤXÜŬŪTĚ
(1818-1896), Muller and others made in their dynamical 
discussions, one realizes that there was a host of less 
well known medical figures in the late 18th and first half 
th 
of the 19 century, who participated in the discussion 
on force and might have contributed to the idea of its 
conservation. Of course, most references \.,rere to 
German studies, but a goodly proportion was to British 
researches. It seemed, therefore, that a promising 
task would be to investigate whether the British and 
German medical traditions, beh'leen c .1770 and 1850, 
contributed significantly to the emergence of the concepts 
of energy, vis-a-vis that of force, whether they contributed 
to the idea of its conservation, and whether there was a 
significant interaction between them on the energy theme. 
It was clear that merely the German and British 
material would be too much to handle with full satisfaction 
in two and a half years; this thesis is therefore far from 
exhaustive. As it was, the field expanded, for the medical 
writers seem to have been influenced significantly by the 
ideas on power and causality of 17th and 18th century 
philosophers, particularly John Locke (1632-1704), David 
Hume (1711-1776), Thomas Reid (1710-1796) and Dugald 
Stewart (1753-1828) in Britain, and Benedict Spinoza 
(1632-1677), Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716), Immanuel Kant 
(1724-1804), Johann Fichte (1762-1814) and Friedrich 
Schelling (1775-1854) in Germany. Indeed, so influential 
were those philosophers, that it seemed necessary to allot 
two portions of this thesis to their ideas on power, force 
and causation; one portion precedes the chapters on the 
British physiologists; another portion precedes the 
chapters on German physiologists. 
11. 
Most of the published material of about 40 British 
physiologists has been examined for this thesis. Most 
of them were practising physicians; often they were 
academics too. It shall be argued that many of their 
physiological ideas focussed on the forces that were 
believed to operate in and upon the animal economy, 
particularly in the fields of nutrition, animal heat, 
muscular motion, physical exhaustion and fever, that 
some of them asserted that there was a fundamental 
correlation among the forces of Nature and that force in 
general was subject neither to creation nor destruction 
within the living system. All this occurred before the 
mid 1840s, often considerably earlier. Indeed, several 
of those physiologists, namely William Carpenter (1813-
1885), Peter Mark Roget (1779-1869), whom Kuhn discussed 
at some length in the first, unpublished draft of his 
ŮŠŮŤŲŸĚSouthwood Smith (1788-1861) and Orson Squire Fowler 
(1809-1887) arrived at the energy conservation principle 
independently by c.1840 or even earlier, and entertained 
it not merely as a likely speculation, but as a sober, well 
substantiated doctrine. 
The chapters on German contributors focuss only on 
major physiologists, in contrast with the British figures 
of whom some ŘŸŤŲŤĚ decidedly second rate, largely because 
of the limitation of my time. It will be argued that 
Christoph Wilhelm Hufeland (1762-1836), Johann Friedrich 
Blumenbach (1752-1840), Friedrich Tiedemann (1781-1861), 
Johannes Muller, Justus von Liebig, Hermann Helmholtz 
and Karl von Reichenbach (1788-1869), who is the only 
12. 
minor German figure in this thesis, all derived their 
ideas on energy and its conservation largely from 
their physiological backgrounds. 
Indeed, it seems that the pressure that was exerted 
constantly on physiologists to explain exactly what they 
understood by the terms "vitality" and "vital force(s)", 
to justify the appellation of "science" for medicine and 
physiology (anatomy was obviously "scientific"), and to 
defend their ideas against reductionists (on which 
Lipman, Cranefield, Owsei Temkin9 and ÓÙÛẀŨŠŸĚTeichlO 
have \'lritten most useful papers), forced them to think 
deeply upon the general concept of force or energy, and 
to gather their evidence from all areas of natural 
philosophy - indeed, from theology and natural theology 
too. One especially important aspect of vital force 
that was put under pressure was the question of purpose 
or teleology; as Temkin showed as long ago as 1946, 
physiologists like Theodore Schwann (1810-1882) who 
roundly denounced purpose in biology, only used downright 
teleological language in large sections of their own 
writings;l so that some aspects of force or causation in 
biology were ŮŠWŤŪWŨQŸÙŪŮŬVVÙŞŨŤĚ to treat rigorously 
despite the pressure to do so. Nonetheless, it seemed 
13. 
to some physiologists that to crack the problem of vitality, 
they had to crack the larger problem of force in all its 
forms; only by resolving the larger problem could they 
feel satisfied with their solution of the smaller, 
physiological one. Consequently, when the larger one 
had been solved officially by the late 1840s, some of 
them almost literally heaved sighs of relief and self-
congratulation; instances of this were William Carpenter's 
long, triumphant paper 'On the mutual relations of the 
vital and physical forces,12 read before the Royal 
Society in 1850, and Richard Fowler's lecture 'If 
vitality be a force having correlations with the forces, 
chemical affinities, motion, heat, light, electricity, 
magnetism, gravity, so ably shown by Professor Grove to 
be modifications of one and the same force,;3 which he 
gave in 1849 at the age of 84. 
It is hardly surprising that phYSiologists - a 
breed which, in the modern sense, came into being only in 
the mid 18th century - should have interested themselves 
in dynamics. As soon as medical men focussed on process 
and function in the animal economy, rather than on 
anatomical structures, they were bound to think in terms 
of agents, forces and powers; force was an absolute 
necessity because, as Joseph Needham put it, a deus 
always had to be found for a ÜŠŠUÙŪŠŸÏĚ Having posited 
forces, it was inevitable that their interrelations 
would become a subject for theorizing: Robert Whytt 
(1714-1766) discussed their 'sympathies' with one 
another, Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802) discussed their 
'catenations', Johann Blumenbach discussed their derivation 
from the 'nisus formativus', and William Carpenter, 
Richard Fowler and a few others discussed their 'correl-
ŠWÙŬŪVHŸĪĚ Other examples could be given, but the point 
has been made. Such physiologists also hankered after 
14. 
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laws by which their forces acted, in the hope that they 
might do for physiology what the semidivine Newton had 
done for natural philosophy with his law of gravitation; 
it seemed that the organic agents could be studied 
profitably vis-a-vis the inorganic agents which drove 
Nature at large, the hope being that a comprehensive 
concept of force might thus be constructed. Several 
physiologists fulfilled that hope, arriving at a view of 
force identical to that of physical philosophers like 
Nilliam Robert Grove (1811-1896) and James Prescott Joule 
(1818-1889) • Of course, to clinch the argument on force 
or energy, on its correlations and conservation, it had 
to be expressed mathematically. That was the achievement 
of a physiologist, Hermann Helmholtz. 
This introduction would be incomplete without 
mentioning certain difficulties that have beset me 
throughout. Firstly, there has been the constant 
possibility that our modern understanding of an expression 
might not accord with its 18th century meaning; occasionally 
a particular expression required research on that score, 
and one such was 'animal oeconomy'. It is well known 
that by the 1830s it was being replaced by the word 
'physiology', but did animal oeconomy in 1770 mean the 
same as physiology in 1830, so far as professional medical 
men were concerned? A perusal of the definitions of 
these two terms in medical cyclopaedias between cl770 and 
1830 showed that they had very similar meanings, and that 
their differences are not worth mentioning; only in the 
political sense did the word oeconomy change significantly 
during that period. Another source I found useful for 
this particular etymological query was the popular 
literature of that period; for instance, Tobias Smollett 
(1721-1771), who was a physician as well as a novelist, 
used the word oeconomy in the medical content quite 
often in his novels;6and he clearly had in mind very much 
what an English physician in the 1830s would have by 
physiology. 
Other expressions which required scrutiny were 
agent, force, power, Kraft, vis viva, nisus, correlation, 
vital force, and balance. Take this last word, which 
was used in the sense of an equilibrium between what an 
animal ingested and what it excreted, some physiologists 
sa\'l this as a purely material equilibrium between the 
foodstuff that an animal absorbed and the dead stuff that 
it ejected, others saw it as a dynamical equilibrium 
bet\'leen the chemical and physical forces that entered an 
animal via its food, sunlight and ambient temperature, 
and the forces that it released as animal heat, thought, 
sensation and movement. Sometimes a physiologist 
envisaged both material and dynamical equilibria: Liebig 
was a prime example of this, and it is important for the 
hist:orian to understand which equilibrium he had in mind 
in particular passages, in other words, whether he was 
thinking of chemical substances or physico-chemical forces. 
Another persistent problem was to understand what 
was meant by the \'lords force, power, energy and Kraft. 
By the second half of the 19th century, physicists were 
16. 
differentiating between force as a propensity or cause 
within a system to undergo some activity, and the 
energy that a system had to possess whereby it actually 
acted and which was measurable solely by that activity. 
But even Helmholtz failed to differentiate satisfactorily 
between what we now call force and energy, for in 1887 
the G5ttingen Philosophical Faculty offered a prize for 
an essay clarifying the relationship between Helmholtz's 
Er'haZtung der Kl'aft and the principle of energy conserv-
ation as it had become established by then. If Helmholtz 
failed, it is scarcely surprising that his predecessors 
in the study of Kraft failed too. Yet simply because 
of that, they should not be dismissed as non-contributors 
to the concept of energy, as we define it today, for even 
in modern physics there is an essential relation between 
force and energy, and in order to treat of the latter one 
needs to have considered the former. It seems to me to 
be historically inconceivable that the mid-late 19th 
century refinement of the concept of energy could have 
occurred without a prior, profound interest in the concept 
(however vague) of force or Kraft. Similarly, as Jammer17 
has assertod on th9 c(")[1cept of :'orce itself, primitive 
man's brute awareness of his own physical abilities was 
an awareness of a 'force' even though it could not be 
articulated in the form of P=m a. 
This question of what was meant by force, energy, 
power and Kraft is not a merely semantic point, since 
the concept of the conservation of energy is truly 
distinctive and mathematically applicable only when 
17. 
energy has become differentiated from force, when 
energy is considered equivalent to the amount of doing 
that a force does, or in modern terminology, when 
energy has become associated with vlOrk. 
Most of the physiologists discussed in this thesis 
did not trouble to differentiate among these words and 
often used them interchangeably. However, it is possible 
sometimes to distinguish when they meant force in action, 
or the quantity of its doing, from when they meant a 
mere propensity towards action or a vis mortua (to use 
Leibniz's phrase). One physiologist who sought such 
differentiation was John Brown (1735-1788) although, as 
we should expect, his differentiation was rough and ready 
and could easily be dismissed as unimportant by an 
historian who is not primarily interested in this aspect 
of his physiology. 
Elkana and others have suggested that it is often 
better to retain the original word Kraft without 
differentiation or translation when writing in English 
about this period. If I were writing only about German 
physiologists I would follow that suggestion, but since 
this thesis discusses English physiologists too, and 
often in the same chapters as the German ones, it would 
be clumsy to use Kraft and force simultaneously; Kraft 
has therefore been translated as force or energy, and, 
wherever possible, the word has been chosen to accord 
with the apparent sense of the original context; where 
ambiguity has been irresolvable, the German original 
has been included in parentheses. There is no easy way 
for an historian to handle this particular etymological 
problem, for the interpretation by one scholar will 
undoubtedly be challenged eventually by another: for 
instance, Goodfield took great care in analysing Liebig's 
various uses of Kraft in his Animal Chemistry, yet 
Elkana has objected quite strongly to her analysis. 
Finally: the development of physiologists' ideas 
on force was a complex historical process and much 
remains to be investigated. There is a vast amount of 
French and Italian primary sources yet to be studied; 
there is also the necessity of appreciating the 
involvement of natural theology and metaphysics in this 
field: for instance, philosophers, physiologists and 
physical scientists often wound up their discussions on 
force with the question of the ultimate origin of all 
force. Whence heat, light, electricity, magnetism, 
motion and vitality? Their answer was usually GOD, 
whose DIVINE WILL was the original power which became 
manifest in the physical, chemical and vital powers that 
inform the material world; ultimately therefore, all 
forces were but correlations of one another through 
their common origin in the DIVINE WILL, and "thy will be 
done on earth as it is in heaven" was not only a pious 
hope but also expressed the physical, dynamical dependance 
of the world upon God. Sober scientists saw fit to 
include such theological ideas in their scientific papers; 
we must remember that until the mid 19th century a man 
could be more of a natural philosopher than a scientist, 
and it is historically infelicitous to disregard his 
19. 
extra-scientific ideas. We should also not ignore 
the possible relevance of externalist factors to our 
energy theme, such as the general social interest in 
power and its efficient utilization in industry. 
Having mentioned a few of the possible approaches 
to our theme of energy and its conservation, it must 
now be admitted that this thesis can be only a limited 
contribution to a large field. All that may be claimed 
for it is that the physiologists' interest in energy has 
been investigated at a depth hitherto unattempted, and 
that a few new insights into the energy theme might be 
offered to fellow historians. 
20. 
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CHAPTER 1. On Power and Force in 17th and 18th century 
British philosophy. 
John Locke (1632-1704): Locke has justly been called the 
founder of philosophical liberalism and of empiricism in 
the modern theory of knowledge; in both these roles, he 
exerted a strong influence in his own country and on tLe 
Continent, especially in ŃŲŠŪȘŤŸĚ Here, we shall be 
concerned only with his theory of knowledge and almost 
solely with his medical manuscripts and his An essay 
concerning human ẀŪTŤŲVWŠŪTÙŪŦŸĚ first published in 1690. 
Several historians have studied Locke's association 
with leading exponents of the Mechanical Philosophy in 
th 3 late 17 century Bngland. Thus, it is well known that 
he was a close friend of Robert Boyle (1627-1691) and 
Thomas Sydenham (1624-1689), that he was interested in the 
application of Boyle's corpuscular theory to medicine, and 
ŸĨĦĚ
that he was an early member of the Royal Society. However, 
despite some excellent studies on this issue, notably by 
Patrick ŎŬÜŸŪŤŨŨĚ4 and Kenneth Dewhurst; it remains a moot. 
point whether he influenced significantly the vlay in \"lhich 
contemporary natural philosophers did their research. 
The field of empirical research that we \-lOuld most 
expect Locke to have influenced would surely be medicine, 
for he practised as a physician throughout his life. 
1949, a Swedish philosopher, Gunnar Aspelin, published a 
6" h" h h d paper ŸŪĚw ŸȘĚ e rew attention to the striking analogies 
between the writings of Locke and Sydenham. Since then, 
several papers have been published on Locke qua physician, 
and one of the most interesting was Romanell's 'Locke 
and Sydenharn'; in which he argued that Locke influenced 
Sydenham's medical theory (though, we might add, not 
necessarily his medical practice); one major piece of 
evidence for this thesis was that the first edition of 
Sydenham's treatise on fevers (1666) was considerably more 
dogmatic and less philosophically cautious than the third 
edition (1676), and since the two men first became well 
acquainted only in about 1667, Romanell suggested that it 
was probably Locke's criticism and advice which caused the 
change. That Sydenham thought highly of Locke is attested 
by the 'Epistle dedicatory' of the third edition, where 
Locke was praised as a man who "has, amongst the present 
generation, few equals and no VẀŮŤŲÙŬŲVĒŸĚ It has also 
been argued that Locke was indebted to various physicians 
for the growth of his empirical philosophy. Maurice 
Cranston pOinted out9 that Richard Lower (1631-1691) 
24. 
introduced him to the study of medicine, and Romanell argued 
that it was primarily Sydenharn who kept him interested in 
the subject. With this latter point, one can hardly agree, 
since Locke filled his journals and common-place books 
assiduously with data relating to medicine and natural 
philosophy even during those years in France and Holland, 
\>lhen he had scarcely any contact with Sydenham. ŸŨŬŲŤĚ
plausible and thought-provoking are Romanell's suggestions 
that from Sydenharn, Locke learned i) to appreciate the 
empirical method in actual practice, for instance, by 
attending 'variolous patients' together in London. (It 
is probable that c.l669 they were planning to write a 
joint treatise on smallpox which would have drawn from 
their clinical experiences WŬŦŤWUŤŲĞŸĚ and ii) that even 
if one cannot know the essence or ultimate cause of any 
disease, it is still the responsibility of the physician 
to attempt to ȘẀŲŤŸĚ that one must therefore pursue the 
useful, even if one cannot discover the truth. Sydenharn's 
own motto in medicine was "vlhatever is useful is good"}O 
and this accorded well with the general tenor of Locke's 
philosophy as it appeared in the Essay. 
As a result of these historical studies, it is 
reasonable to propose that among the various sources for 
Locke's philosophy, the two following were significant: 
25. 
the religious source, as evidenced by Locke's ÒŤWWŤŸĚ
concerning toleration, and the medical; and that to 
understand Locke's thought-processes, we must never forget 
that he thought with a medical mind, in contrast to DesCartes, 
for instance, who philosophized with the mind of a geometer. 
Thus, of the four eminent natural philosophers whom he 
honoured in the epistle to the reader in the Essay, namely 
Boyle, Sydenham, Huygenius and Newton, the most influential 
was probably "the great genius of physick Dr. Sydenham", 
although Boyle made a strong impact on him too and continued 
to correspond and collaborate with him until 1691 when 
Boyle died, leaving his manuscript on A general UÙVWŬŸXĚof 
the air in Locke's care for publication. As for the 
other two philosophers: Newton entered Locke's life almost 
certainly too late to affect his philosophy, and vice versa; 
Christiaan Huyghens (1629-1695) is more difficult to comment 
upon, for we know from Jean-Theophile DAsaguliers (1683-1744), 
one of Newton's immediate circle of followers, that Locke, 
realizing he would never understand the mathematics in 
Newton's Principia, asked Huyghens whether the mathematics 
were reliable; once assured, he studied the general 
arguments of the Principia and was hthe first who became 
a Newtonian philosopher without the help of ŦŤŬÜŤWŲXŨŨŸŨĚ
All this shows that Locke was acquainted with leading 
physicians and natural philosophers, and that there must 
have been a rapport between him and men like Boyle and 
Sydenham. However, the problem of estimating the 
intensity of that rapport, and especially of discerning 
whether he exerted any lasting influence on the theories 
and working programmes of those men, has not yet been 
tackled satisfactorily. There are doubts and lacunae to 
be resolved: one small one, for instance, is that in his 
'Brief ŸÙẂŤVHĚ John Aubrey (1626-1697), who was a veritable 
magpie for biographical details of the men who moved in the 
same circles as did Locke, barely even mentioned him. 
Perhaps the best assessment we can make at present is that, 
as in his political philosophy;2 so in his theory of 
knowledge, Locke reflected a significant portion of the 
spirit of his age. 
'ive are on safer ground in discussing the impact of 
his empiricism on British natural philosophers in the 18th 
and 19th centuries, for throughout that time he was read 
widely and most of the physiologists, for instance, who 
were interested in power and causality cited his Essay 
extensively. Whether that Essay actually moulded their 
ideas, or merely bolstered what they had decided already, 
is impossible to say; but they undoubtedly believed that 
26. 
Locke's theory of knowledge had been seminal, had 
invoked a new approach in natural philosophy, and well 
deserved citing. 
One of the longest chapters in the Essay is that 
13 
'Of Power'. It was cited frequently by later writers 
on power or force and, though Locke discussed only two 
manifestations of power, namely thinking and motion, 
they saw in that chapter certain key ideas of general 
import to their dynamics: to wit, that the creation of 
motion, and thus of any action, is denied by all our 
experiences of Nature; that we can envisage only transfer 
of motion, either from matter to matter or mind to matter; 
that if there ever appears to be creation of motion, it 
occurs when a mind wills a body to move, since only minds 
can produce corporeal motion in apparent excess over the 
original cause; and that we cannot acquire a rigorous 
notion of power itself. 
This last proposition was important in subsequent 
discussion on dynamics. Locke proposed it because he 
believed that men could never know the physical nature of 
things, but merely the relations between ideas of things, 
or between ideas and things in Nature. As one Locke 
scholar has summarized it;4 Locke's view of knowledge, as 
the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, 
can be divided into four categories: of identity and 
diversity, of relation, of coexistence or necessary 
connexion, and of existence. Relations therefore 
constituted much of the data for human knowledge; indeed 
they were the only characteristics of Nature on which 
27. 
human understanding could acquire any certitude. As 
Locke ""rote, 
"This further may be considered concerning 
relation, that though it be not contained 
in the real existence of things, but some-
thing extraneous and super-induced, yet 
the ideas which relative words stand for 
are often clearer and more distinct than 
of those substances to which they do belong • 
•.• The ideas, then, of relations are capable 
of at least being more perfect and more 
distinct in our minds, than those of VẀŞVWŠŪȘŤVHHŸĪĚ
This spirit of agnosticism applied equally to the 
question of causality, for although Locke believed in the 
reality of causal relations, he doubted that the nature of 
any particular cause could be known. 16 In one place, he 
wrote of causality being the most comprehensive relation 
that could exist between ideas in the human mind; thus the 
agent of causality, namely power, was one of the most 
important of man's primary or original ideas. Power was 
therefore a pivotal point in Locke's effort to discover 
the limitations of human understanding; it was also to 
become so for natural philosophers in the future. However, 
Locke himself did not attempt to investigate the rOle of 
power in natural philosophy, since his concern, qua 
philosopher, was to study the psychological mechanism 
whereby man acquires knowledge, and not to investigate the 
physical causes of man's ideas or to study any particular 
branch of natural philosophy. He said this explicitly in 
his chapter on power: 
28. 
"I shall not, contrary to the design of this 
Essay, set myself to inquire philosophically 
into the peculiar constitution of bodies, and 
the configuration of parts, whereby they have 
the power to produce in us the ideas of their 
'bl -- l't' 1117 sensl. e qna l. l.es • 
29. 
Throughout the 18th and first half of the 19th centuries, 
those who discussed the relations between physical, chemical 
and vital agents cited Locke as one of their authorities 
for disclaiming knowledge of such agents in themselves, for 
studying relations rather than things, and for their ideas 
on causality. When some of them arrived at the theory of 
the correlation of all forces one to another, they saw 
themselves fulfilling Locke's injuction to study relations 
rather than things and were convinced that their theory 
could be valid despite their ignorance on the essential 
natures of forces. 
The principle of causality was to be debated by most 
of the writers on power or force for the following reason: 
if two agents or phenomena always appear concomitantly, as 
do heat and light in sunlight, or life and heat in animals, 
one could ask whether they are two distinct agents, or 
whether one is the cause of the other. If the latter is 
true, how can it be proved? A third possibility is that 
those two agents might themselves be the effects of a more 
fundamental agent, in which case all three might be said 
to be correlated. Such questions vis-a-vis heat and light 
taxed James Hutton (1726-1795), the physician-turned-geologist 
whose Dissertation upon the philosophy of ŨÙŦUWŸĚ heat and 
fire 18was regarded quite highly in the early 19th century 
in Britain; they were discussed too by the young Humphrey 
Davy (1778-1829) at Bristol, and by John William Draper 
(1811-1882) at New York, whose writings on plant and 
animal physiology were concerned greatly with energy and 
its conservation. Perhaps the most explicit use of the 
philosophic discussion on causality by a contributor to 
the energy conservation theory was Mayer; "causa aequat 
effectum,,19was a foundation stone of his theory. 
In the next few pages we shall examine briefly one 
philosopher whose ideas on power and causation were 
essentially the same as Locke's, namely Isaac Newton, 
one whose ideas challenged Locke's, namely Hume, and two 
philosophers who set themselves the task of refuting Hume. 
Isaac Newton (1642-1727): British physiologists,anxious 
to establish their subject on a rigorous, quantitative 
basis, looked constantly to the example of Newton whose 
mathematical laws and physical experments had given such 
assurance to astronomy and optics. Indeed, by the mid 
18th century, Newton had become the figure of inspiration 
for all branches of natural philosophy in Britain, and 
his words had acquired the potency of oracles. This was 
especially true of the 'Quaeries' that were appended to 
his ÕŮWÙȘÛVŸÕĚin which he had felt safe enough to air his 
many, and changing, ideas on the ultimate structure of 
matter and the means whereby it moved, means which seemed 
sometimes to be an imponderable ether and at other times 
to be pure forces. Newton's 'Quaeries' and the evolution 
of his ideas on ether and force have been analysed by 
several scholars, and I am particularly indebted to A.R. 
30. 
21 
and M.B. Hall's work. 
To their analyses I cannot add anything at all 
worthwhile; but it is worth emphasizing how seriously 
some physiologists took certain passages in the 
'Quaeries' which had an especial appeal to medicine, 
th 
and that from the late 18 century onwards they quoted 
those passages as authorizing their interest in force. 
The following ŮŸVVŠŦŤVĚ in the 'Quaeries' and Principia 
were quoted most often, and their physiological relevance 
is obvious. 
"And now we might add something concerning 
a certain most subtle spirit which pervades 
and lies hid in all gross bodies; by the 
force and action of which spirit the particles 
of bodies attract one another at near distances, 
and cohere if contiguous; and electric bodies 
operate to greater distances, as well repelling 
as attracting the- neighbouring corpuscles; ••• 
and all sensation is excited, and the members 
of animal bodies move at the command of the 
will, namely by the vibrations of this spirit, 
mutually propagated along the solid filaments 
of the nerves, from the outward organs of sense 
to the brain, and from the brain into the 
22 
muscles" . 
"Have not the small particles of bodies powers, 
virtues or forces, by which they act at a 
distance, not only upon the rays of light for 
reflecting, refracting and inflecting them, 
but also upon one another for producing a great 
part of the phaenomena /sic/ of Nature? For 
its well known that bodies act upon one another 
by the attractions of gravity, magnetism, and 
electricity; and these instances shew the tenor 
31. 
and make it not and course of Nature, 
improbable that there 
23 powers than these". 
may be more attractive 
"There are therefore agents in Nature able 
to make the particles of bodies stick 
together by very strong attractions. And it 
is the business of Experimental Philosophy to 
find them out,,:4 
In his long and immensely influential quaery 31, when 
discussing the phenomenon we nowadays call capillary 
attraction, ÔŸŴWĲŪĚsuggested that by the same principle, 
"a sponge sucks in water, and the glands in the bodies of 
32 .. 
animals, according to their several natures and dispositions, 
suck in various juices from the blood,,:5 This concerned 
the processes of secretion and absorption which were such 
. th th important themes ln 17 and 18 century medicine, and for 
which all physiologists busily sought explanatory 
mechanisms. Generally, by the mid 18th century, physiologistf 
were no longer employing Newton's rather rough and ready 
physiological speculations in their own theories without 
considerable modification; they took him for their general 
guide, rather than as their arbiter on finer points. But, 
26 
as Arnold Thackray has shown, there were medical theorists 
in the late 17th and early 18th centuries who modelled their 
systems explicitly and in detail upon his published work -
men like Archibald Pitcairne (1652-1713), George Cheyne 
(1671-1743), Richard Mead (1673-1754), James Keill (1673-
1719) and John Freind (1675-1728). Perhaps the best 
known physician to take Newton as his guide and mentor was 
Hermann Boerhaave (1668-1738). th Throughout the 18 
century, medical writers cited Newton's writings 
enthusiastically and obviously wished to emulate him 
by discovering mathematical relations and fundamental 
forces for the animal oeconomy. A few physiologists were 
fair mathematicians, one of the most able being Peter 
33 
Mark Roget who was a central figure in Britain in enunciating 
the conservation of energy (see chapter 6) and who, though 
a practising physician, was elected to the Royal Society of 
London on the strength of a very elegant mathematical paper. 
David Hume (1711-1776): Like Locke, Hume made the analyses 
of power, causality and relation important aspects of his 
philosophy. Like Locke, he denied the possibility of 
understanding the essential nature of any power or any 
causal relation; unlike Locke, he was sceptical of even 
the objective reality of power and causality and, to the 
horror of most of his contempories, seemed to reduce all 
things to being mere perceptions, and man himself to being 
a mere bundle of perceptions. 
Hume'sarguments appeared in several major philosophic 
treatises, in his Histopy of EngZand27 and in various 
letters, some of which were published during his life. 
Here, we shall deal largely with his two principal philos-
ophical works, the Treatise of human nature 28 (1739 and 
d .. . h d d· 29 1740), an An ŸŪŰẀŸŲXĚ ŬŬŪŬŤŲŪŸŪŦĚ uman un erstan ŸŪŦĚ
(1777). In the Inquiry, three out of the twelve sections 
were devoted to power and causality; the first attack was 
on causality which, he argued, was merely a pattern of 
thought in man's mind; so far as the real world was 
concerned, therefore, every effect was a distinct event 
from what man arbitrarily denominated its cause, and 
the causes of natural phenomena, 
"these ultimate springs and principles, are 
totally shut up from human curiosity and 
inquiry. Elasticity, gravity, cohesion of 
parts, communication of motion by impulse -
these are probably the ultimate causes and 
principles which we shall ever discover in 
,,30 
nature •••• 
In his assertion of the inscrutability of gravity and 
other powers, Hume was following Newton explicitly. One 
Hume scholar, Norman Kemp Smith, has shown that of the 
half dozen or so philosophers who influenced Hume 
31 
significantly, one was Newton. To take but two examples: 
Firstly, Hume modelled his method on Newton's in his 
proposal to develop a statIcs and dynamics of the mind, 
in which the association of ideas was envisaged as 
itA kind of ATTRACTION, which in the mental 
world will be found to have as extraordinary 
effects as in the natural, and to shew itself 
in as many and as various ȚŬŲÜVHHŸÎĚ
By means of his statics and dynamiCS, Hume claimed 
to be able to give a naturalistic, mechanistic account 
of the human constitution and ethics, a claim that he 
never fulfilled. (Needless to say, Newton would not have 
condoned his attempt, for in the closing words of the 
34 
Optioks he had asserted that a religiously inspired ethics 
was the sole legitimate supplement to his natural philosophy). 
Secondly, Hume's ideas on ultimate causes agreed 
with Francis Hutcheson's (1694-1746) manner of stating 
ethical problems; Hutcheson, who had taught moral 
philosophy at Glasgow and published several major treatises 
in the l720s, asserted that in the moral as well as the 
physical sphere there are certain ultimate experiences, 
and that although they rest on conditions of human nature 
which are not discernible by us, they may be considered 
by us as effectively ẀŨWÙÜŠWŤŸĨĚ As this illustrates, 
Hutcheson had been influenced greatly by Newton's 
epistemology; particularly influential was Newton's Quaery 
31, where he had contrasted natural phenomena with their 
hidden and occult causes: 
"These principles (such as inertia, gravity, 
cohesion of bodie) I consider, not as occult 
qualities, supposed to result from the specifick 
forms of things, but as general laws of Nature, 
by which the things themselves are formed; their 
truth appearing to us by phaenomena, though 
their causes be not yet discovered. For these 
are manifest qualities, and their causes only 
34 
are occult". 
As Kemp Smith has shown, Hutcheson exerted a powerful 
influence on Hurne, and Hurne's formulation of his own 
method in the Treatise obviously had both him and Newton 
in mind, particularly on power and causality. Though 
Hume did not acknowledge his intellectual debts very 
35 
readily, he lavished praise on Newton in his History of 
EngZand: there we see what the crux of Newton's achievement 
was, in Hume's opinion: 
---_._-_ .. __ .... --
"Cautious in admitting no principles, but 
such as were founded on experiment; but 
resolute to adopt every such principle, 
however new or unusual .. ŸĪĚ
Returning to Hume's own conclusions, there is a 
forceful and wonderfully succinct statement of the 
problem of power in the Treatise; it was simply that 
"There are no ideas which occur in metaphysics 
more obscure and uncertain than those of 
'power', 'force', 'energy' or 'necessary 
connection I, of which it is every moment 
necessary for us to treat in all our dis-
, 't' ,,36 qUl.Sl. l.ons • 
Hume attempted to fix the exact meanings of these 
ideas, failed, and in so doing taught an important lesson 
about power and force: namely, that our ideas of them 
derive essentially from our own sensations and exertions, 
(what Hume called collectively, our 'passions'); that the 
first idea of power that man possessed was the power of 
himself to do things; and that so persuasive was this 
idea, that man extrapolated it into the world around him. 
Therefore, power could not be said to exist outside of 
ourselves; the objective reality of power was therefore 
denied. On the other hand, since the sole phenomena of 
which men could be sure were their perceptions, and since 
power was a perception, power had as much reality as any-
thing else. 
36 
As we might imagine, there were theological implications 
of Hume's critique on power, which he discussed unflinch-
ingly; for instance, that one of the objects to which men 
attribute power unphilosophically is God, and that men's 
------ ------- ._- -"------
ideas of Divine Power, providence and God himself are 
mere extrapolations from human experiences. Against 
such passages many natural philosophers, as well as 
theologians, objected, and in formulating their objections 
they were obliged to think deeply on power, causality 
and allied issues. One English scholar in the 19th 
century, Leslie Stephen, discussed Hurne's influence 
beautifully: having mentioned how his first book fell 
"still-born from the press", and that the great dictators 
of the 18th century literary world, men like William 
warburton (1698-1779) and Samuel Johnson (1709-1784) 
castigated him mercilessly, he added that 
"If Burne impressed men of mark so slightly, 
we are tempted to doubt whether he can have 
affected the main current of thought. Yet, 
as we study the remarkable change in the 
whole tone and substance of our literature 
which synchronized with the appearance of 
Hurne's writings, it is difficult to resist 
the impression that there is some causal 
relation 
The explanation of the apparent contra-
diction must doubtless be sought partly in 
the fact that Hurne influenced a powerful 
though a small class. He appealed to a 
few thinkers, who might be considered as the 
brain of the social organism; and the effects 
were gradually propagated to the extremities of 
the system,,:7 
In his Treatise, Hurne gave only one section to a 
thorough analysis of power and causality; that was section 
14, 'Of the idea of necessary connection'. There, he 
called the question of power and efficacy of causes one 
of the most sublime questions in philosophy and all the 
37. 
sciences; it was an intricate question, since the terms 
of efficacy, agency, power, force, energy, necessity, 
connection and productive quality seemed to him to be 
nearly synonymous and therefore useless for defining one 
another. The only solution he could admit would be an 
experimental one, the task being to discover some natural 
effect where the operation of a cause could be conceived 
clearly without any danger of obscurity or mistake. 
However, since no-one had succeeded in this Newtonian 
task, Hume's conclusion was devastating: 
"All ideas are derived from and represent 
impressions. We never have any impression 
that contains any power or efficacy. We 
never, therefore, have any idea of ŮŬŴŤŲHHŸĮĚ
As he pointed out, this conclusion differed from 
Locke's. Whereas Locke had accepted that men could have 
a valid idea of power, though no idea of the essential 
nature of any particular power, Hume denied the possibility 
even of the former; he discussed Locke's argument, only to 
dismiss it as "more popular than philosophical", for 
reason alone could never give rise to an original idea, and 
38. 
reason, as distinct from experience, could never demonstrate 
that a cause was absolutely requisite for each event of 
coming-to-be. Hume declared that 
"As the necessity which makes two times two 
equal to four, or three angles of a triangle 
equal to two right ones, lies only in the 
act of the understanding, by which we consider 
and compare these ideas; in like manner, the 
necessity of power, which unites causes and 
effects, lies in the determination of the mind 
to pass from the one to the other. The 
efficacy or energy of causes is neither 
placed in the causes themselves, nor in 
the Deity, nor in the concurrence of these 
two principles; but belongs entirely to 
the soul, which considers the union of two 
or more objects in all past instances. It 
is here that the real power of causes is 
placed, along with their connection and 
ŪŤȘŤVVÙWXHHŸĲĚ
In this and other passages, Hume seems to have 
differentiated between a force or cause on the one hand, 
and an energy or power on the other. Thus, despite his 
above-mentioned warning that such terms are nearly 
synonymous in their common usage, he at least seems 
to have envisaged within the terms of power and energy 
the concept of doing or activity; for him, power was not 
synonymous with force but was that "which unites causes li.e. 
ȚŬŲȘŤŸĦĦİĚ and effects". 
Hume's Treatise may have fallen "still-born from 
the press", but those who came after him could not afford 
to ignore it; this applied equally to many natural 
philosophers as to philosophers proper. Those who 
abhorred his ideas could do three things: they could 
dismiss him as an atheist; they could scrutinize his 
arguments to discover his weak points, as did the two 
Scottish philosophers, Thomas Reid (1710-1796) and 
Dugald Stewart (1753-1828); or they could hope that their 
own researches would show that forces, for instance, do 
exist, and that power and causality are real. The 
physiologists obtained a bumper crop of forces or powers; 
yet some of them heeded Hume's critique and would not call 
their forces real, preferring to leave the questions 
of their nature and number open. What Burne's influence 
on natural philosophy was has not been gauged. Yet he 
. th th did influence workers ŸŪĚ the late 18 and early 19 
centuries, if only by being read widely_ Take George 
Calvert Holland (1801-1865) who wrote several quite 
respected physiological treatises between c.1820 and 1835; 
he cited Hurne for his own physiological method: 
"Here, then, is the only expedient from which 
we can hope for success in our philosophical 
researches; to leave the tedious lingering 
method, which we have hitherto followed; and 
instead of taking now or then a castle or a 
village on the frontier, to march up directly 
to the capital or centre of the sciences, to 
human nature itself; which, being once masters 
of, we may everywhere else hope for an easy 
victory. From this station we may extend our 
conquests over all those sciences which more 
intimately concern human life, and may afterwards 
proceed at leisure, to discover more fully those 
which are the objects of pure ȘẀŲÙŬVÙWXĒŸÕĚ
40. 
Holland certainly did his physiology as Hurne recommends 
here for the study of hurnan nature - which must be why 
Holland soon fell into oblivion. However, Holland's 
ideas did stimuldte a few major physiologists like William 
Carpenter and John William Draper, who were deeply involved 
in the question of energy and its conservation. 
The question of Hurne's influence on 19th century 
natural philosophy is complicated by several factors, of 
which two might be mentioned here. Firstly, there was 
a considerable number of writers who, though their piety 
or sense of sobriety, could not admit any debt to him, 
for his philosophy was considered generally atheistic 
and even dangerous; besides, there was reason to doubt 
that he had been in a suitable frame of mind when composing 
his works, for in Book 1, Part 4 of his Treatise he had 
written of his "philosophical melancholy and delirium", 
and of his finding no remedy against the "chimeras" of 
the study except in yielding himself to the carefree 
pursuits of everyday life. How often throughout the 
th th late 18 and early 19 centuries, his critics gleefully 
quoted his confession: 
"I dine, I playa game of back-gammon, I 
converse, and am merry with my friends; and 
when .•. I would return to those speculations, 
they appear so cold and strained and ridiculous, 
that I cannot find in my heart to enter into 
41 them any farther". 
The intention of those critics, such as James Beattie 
(1735-1803) (who, paradoxically, drew certain important 
passages of the Treatise to Kant's attention), was to 
depict Hume as having taught that man must believe one 
thing by instinct or custom, yet the contrary by reason; 
that the human understanding subverts itself entirely, 
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and that by argument nothing can be proved. Need it 
be said that they misrepresented Hume? For he had 
argued that man's understanding is fed by both reason 
and custom, but that custom is king. 
Secondly, Hume's impact on the 19th century was 
complicated by his own dissatisfaction with the Treatise 
and the consequent omission of several of its themes when 
he came to compose the Inquiry. The latter was un-
41 
doubtedly the maturer presentation of his ideas, yet one 
theme he omitted was the causal axiom. We know now 
that he did not alter his views on causality significantly 
between the two treatises, and that his omission was more 
accidental then deliberate; but such omissions could 
confound his readers' understanding of his work, as indeed 
happened with Kant; Kant, though long acquainted with the 
ŅŪŰẀÙŸXHĚwas not able to trace for himself Hurne's far-
reaching consequences on certain themes, of which causality 
was one; and only by reading Beattie's Essay, where the 
relevant passage from the ØŸŤŠWÙVŤĚwas quoted, did he 
reappraise Hurne. 
Thomas Reid (1710-1796): Hurne's Treatise is a difficult 
and puzzling work. The youthful ardour of mind and 
variability of mood in which it was written, its loose 
terminology and other flaws, made it open to criticism as 
soon as people took note of it. One of its earliest, 
major critics was Thomas Reid. 
Reid had studied philosophy, mathematics and theology, 
was ordained, and in 1752 received the chair of philosophy 
at Aberdeen. There, he set about tackling the challenges 
that Hurne had set, and in 1764 his first important 
refutation of Hurne was published as an Inquiry into the 
. d 43 human mt.n • Unlike some of Hume's critics, Reid 
acknowledged an enormous debt to him, writing in the 
Dedication to his Inquiry that 
" ••• I never thought of calling in question 
the principles commonly received with regard 
to the human understanding, until the Treatise 
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of human nature was published in 1739". 
Reid's analysis of hypotheses, the human mind, power, 
force and causality came to be cited frequently by British 
philosophers, natural philosophers and medical theorists. 
His study of sense perception was to be regarded especially 
important for, as one dictionary of philosophy and 
psychology in 1901 put ÙWŸÏĚhe was the first English writer 
to attempt a precise definition of perception, and his 
views, so far as they were psychological and not epistemol-
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ogical, agreed substantially with those of modern psychologists, 
Reid's main criticism of Hume concerned the latter's 
doctrine of ideas. As Kemp Smith and others have shown, 
the opening section of Hume's Treatise was a modified 
exposition of Locke's theory of ideas, which"Hume went on 
to incorporate into his own system. Reid, and in more 
popular form, his colleagu,e James Beattie, depicted Hume 
as having done no more than deliver his successors from a 
bondage concerning ideas, to which he himself remained 
bound. Hume, who was eulogized elsewhere by Reid as 
having been so analytical and thorough, had supposedly 
constructed his Treatise on a foundation which he had not 
been bothered to examine. Reid's view of that foundation 
was that three laws of association of ideas, joined to a 
few original feelings, were used to explain the whole 
mechanism of sense, imagination, memory, belief and passions 
of the mind. At first sight, he admitted, it was plausible: 
"It shows tolerably by candle-light, but, 
brought into clear day, and taken to pieces, 
it will appear to be a man made with mortar 
and a trowel .•.• I see myself, and the 
whole frame of Nature, shrink into fleeting 
ideas, which, like Epicurus's atoms, dance 
about in ŤÜŮWÙŪŤVVHHŸĪĚ
Reid's interpretation of Hurne's Treatise gained 
wider currency through Beattie's Essay on the nature and 
immutabiZity of truth in opposition to sophistry and 
VȘŸŮWÙȘÙVÜĚ (1770), which went through twelve editions 
during its first decade and was twice translated into 
German before the end of the century. Hore than any 
other work, it has determined the common conception of 
Hurne's ÖUÙŨÕŐÕŮUXŸĬĚ
Turning now to Reid's discussions of power, causality 
and related themes, power features prominently in several 
of his essays; it was divided into several categories -
the power of man to think and do, God's power to will and 
do, and the powers of Nature. His essays most concerned 
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with power were 'Of active power in general', 'Of the 
liberty of moral agents,48 and 'Essay on ŰẀŠŪWÙWXHŸĲĚ He 
was one of the clearest exponents of the theological aspect 
of the powers of Nature, on which physiologists inter alia 
were to cite him not infrequently. 
Inevitably, his ideas seem often to be identical to 
Locke's and Hurne's. For instance, he was reluctant to 
define power, since it was a thing so much of its own kind, 
and so simple in its nature, as not to admit of logical 
TŤȚÙŪÙWÙŬŪŸÕĚ Like Hume, he recognized the defects in 
Locke's investigations, but he stopped well short of Hurne's 
extremes: for instance, in 'Of active power in general', 
having denied that power can ever be an object of the 
senses or conSCiousness, he still admitted its existence 
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behind the scene. His argument was briefly that men 
can be conscious of a conception or idea of power, even 
though they might never be conscious of possessing power. 
Hence 
"I cannot help repeating my apology for 
insisting so long in the refutation of so 
great an absurdity. It is a capital doctrine 
in a late celebrated system of human nature, 
that we have no idea of power, not even in the 
Diety; .•. To support this important doctrine, 
and the outworks that are raised in its defense, 
a great part of the first volume of the Treatise 
of human nature is ŤÜŮŨŬXŤTHHŸŨĚ
Reid's task concerning power, against Hume, was to 
demonstrate that men can properly possess ideas of power 
and cause, and that such ideas are so obviously inherent 
in the nature of the human mind that they precede whatever 
we might obtain by sense-perceptions. Such agents are 
real, he argued, though inscrutable F and to bolster his 
arguments, it was given a strong theological connotation: 
"But as to the real causes of the phenomena 
of Nature, bow little do we know! All our 
knowledge of things external must be 
grounded upon the information of our senses; 
but causation and active power are not objects 
of sense; .•. It is to this day problematical, 
whether all the phenomena of the material 
system be produced by the immediate operation 
of the First Cause, according to the laws which 
his wisdom determined, or whether subordinate 
causes are employed by him in the operations of 
Nature; and if they be, what their nature, 
their number, and their different offices are? 
45. 
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And whether in all cases they act by 
commission, or in some, according to 
their discretion?,,52 
Reid's importance in the debate on power, so far 
as British physiologists at least were concerned, was 
that he was the first powerfully to refute Hurne and to 
uphold the validity of powers and forces. His work was 
regarded well: for instance, his earliest published 
paper (1748), was an attempt at reconciling Leibnizean 
and Newtonian dynamics, on which Sir William Hamilton, 
who edited a complete collection of his work in 1803, 
commented 
" it is curious that Kant should, in the 
preceding year, have ushered into the world 
his first regular work, and on a similar 
subject; that work, too, containing a re-
futation of the Leibnizean estimate of ẂŤŨŬȘÙWXẀŸĨĚ
Of other similarities between Reid and Kant, Hamilton 
asserted that each, in a different sphere, "was at the 
head of a great scientific determination", and that both 
were distinguished rather for their philosophical ingenuity 
and independence, than for the extent of their philosophical 
learning. 
From the point of view of this thesis, namely our 
interest in the emergence of a fairly precise concept of 
energy and its laws, Reid is also noteworthy for his 
attempts, though unsophisticated 'by modern standards, to 
differentiate among force, power and activity. For example, 
"Our conception of power is relative to its 
exertions or effects. Power is one thing, 
its exertion is another. It is true there 
/ 
can be no exertion without power; but there 
may be power which is not ŤẄŤŲWŤTĒŸÏĚ
These attempts to differentiate were taken up by 
Reid's pupil, Dugald Stewart. 
Dugald Stewart (1752-1828): Stewart was cited frequently 
by British physiologists in the first half of the 19th 
century. He was a prominent academic figure in Edinburgh 
for much of his life, succeeding Adam Ferguson to the 
chair of moral philosophy in Edinburgh in 1785 and holding 
it until his death. Having studied under Reid in Glasgow, 
where Reid held the moral philosophy chair, his philosophy 
reflected Reid's and it comes as no surprise, therefore, 
that Sir William Hamilton also edited Stewart's works -
a magnificent ten volume collection, first published ÍĮĪĪŸĪĚ
Despite his allegiance to Reid, there were significant 
differences between them. Firstly, Stewart, being of the 
next generation to Reid, could discuss newer developments 
in philosophy and natural philosophy_ Secondly, he 
examined certain developments within the physical and 
medical sciences which were to influence greatly scientific 
development. 'l'he mos t significant of these were the 
hypotheses of Roger Joseph Bosovich (171l-l787), James 
Hutton, David Hartley (1705-1757), Joseph Priestley (1733-
1804) and Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802). 
To review the similarities between Stewart's and 
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Reid's ideas on power and force, Stewart's argument occurred 
succinctly in his treatise on The philosophy of the aetive 
56 
and moraZ powers of man, Book 3. There, he defended the 
reality of the active powers of man and of Nature against 
Hume's denial of them and of causality. His argument 
was that, simply because we cannot trace our idea of 
power to any of our senses does not imply that power is 
non-existent; the question to be asked was whether we 
annex any notion to power, different from that of constant 
succession; he decided that these terms are not synonymous 
and also followed Reid in distinguishing between power 
and force: 
"It must, indeed, be acknowledged, that after 
having had experience of our own power, we 
come to associate the idea of foree, or of an 
animal nisus, with that of cause; and hence, 
some have been led to suppose that our only 
idea of cause is derived from our bodily 
exertions.... The idea of cause, however, 
and of power, are more general than that of 
force, and might have been acquired although 
we had never been conscious of any bodily 
exertions whatever. There is surely no 
impropriety in saying that the mind has power 
over the train of its ideas, and over its 
various faculties, as well as over the members 
of the ŞŬTXHHŸİĚ
48. 
Stewart's defence of causality was curious and important: 
he took Hume's argument against it, asserted that Hume 
should have distinguished between metaphysical or efficient 
causes on the one hand, and physical causes on the other, 
and declared that then Hume's argument would actually support 
causality by keeping the Deity always in view, not only as 
the first cause, but also as the constantly operating 
efficient cause in the material ŴŬŲŨTŸĮĚ
49. 
Stewart was cited often by 19th century physiologists 
for his defence of power and causality and his discussion 
of the theological aspect of power, which he developed to 
its ultimate conclusion by asserting that the most important 
feature of power is its derivation from God, and that all 
exertions of power in man and Nature are basically acts 
of God. stewart felt obliged to mention various opponents 
to his idea - Aristotle, Lucretius, DesCartes, Leibniz, 
Boyle and Cudworth - but he could cite two powerful allies 
- Samuel Clarke and Alexander Pope (1688-1744). Clarke 
had said that all natural phenomena are done either 
immediately by God, or mediately via intelligent agents; 
that matter, being devoid of any active principles itself 
and possessing only one principle of motion, namely 
inertia, it was absurd to attribute the laws of gravitation 
etc., to any source other than God's continuously acting 
on ÜŠWWŤŲŸĲĚ pope put this more elegantly in his oft-
quoted lines that 
"All are but parts of one stupendous whole, 
t'Jhose body Nature is, and God the soul; 
That changed through all, and yet in all the same, 
Great in the earth as in th' etherial frame, 
Harms in the sun, refreshes in the breeze, 
Glows in the stars, and blossoms in the trees; 
Lives through all life, extends through all extent, 
Spreads undivided, operates unspent"?O 
Turning to Stewart's discussions of recent theories 
in natural philosophy, the most important was probably that 
of Boscovich. Boscovich, a Jesuit, diplomatist, 
mathematician, astronomer and poet, had published a new 
theory of natural philosophy in 1758, in which he accounted 
for all natural phenomena by two types of force -
attraction and repulsion - that operated between atoms, 
atoms which were mere mathematical points rather like 
Leibniz's monads. Furthermore, he constructed a 
mathematical model whereby the attractions and repulsions 
were reduced to being only different fOnm5_ofa single force, 
which alone acted throughout Nature. Boscovich saw his 
theory as a logical development of Newton's ideas, for 
Newton had written 
"And as in algebra, where affirmative quantities 
vanish and cease, there negative ones begin; 
so in mechanicks, where attraction ceases, there 
a repulsive virtue ought to succeed,,?l 
Boscovich also took heed of Newton's first "regula 
philosophandi" in the second and subsequent editions of 
Prinaipia, where he had asserted that philosophers ought 
to admit no more causes of natural things than are both 
true and sufficient to explain their appearances, for 
Nature is simple. 
Since Boscovich's theory was elegant, simple and of 
thoroughly Newtonian pedigree, it became influential among 
the cream nfthe natur3.1 philosophers in the late 18th 
and first half of the 19th ȘŤŪWẀŲÙŤVŸĚ it never became 
popular among second rate theorists. To the lists of 
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scholars whom he influenced, given by whyte62 and ØUŠȘÛŲŠXŸĨĚ
I would add James Hutton, John Playfair (1748-1819) and 
several physiologists: for instance, one Samuel Farr 
(1741-1795) published a curious work in 1771 called A 
philosophiaal enquiry into the ŪŠWẀŲŤŸĚ origin and extent 
of animal motion 64which was quoted not infrequently by 
th physiologists in the early 19 century, and which had 
strong Boscovichean undertones. Boscovich's belief in 
force (indeed, that was all he believed in), accorded 
well with Stewart's own philosophy, which was probably 
why Stewart discussed him with such eviden'c regard in 
his dissertation 'On the idealism of ŁŤŲÛŤŨŤXHŸĪĚ It 
would be interesting to know if Stewart read Boscovich's 
Theoria before formulating his own ideas on power and force. 
At any rate, Stewart held him in high regard, called him 
"that profound and original philosopher", and in addition 
to his Theoria had read his Supplements to the didactic 
poem De Sys temate Mundi of Benedictus Stay, from which 
he gleaned Boscovich's more metaphysical ÙTŤŠVŸĬĚ
Two especially interesting features of Stewart's 
discussion of Boscovich are i) his implication that even 
by c.18l0, his theory was scarcely known in Britain, 
except by an inner circle of natural ÖUÙŨŬVŬŮUŤŲVŸİĚ
(This raises the question of whether Stewart's discussion 
of it actually helped it to become better known). And 
ii) his discussion of James Hutton, who had not only done 
seminal work in geology but had written two profound 
treatises on light and heat, and one on philosophy, all 
of which evinced Boscovichean influence. Stewart 
admitted that 
"In the foregoing remarks on Boscovich's theory, 
considered in contrast with that of Dr. Berkeley, 
I have had an eye chiefly to some speculations 
of the late Dr. Hutton, a philosopher eminently 
distinguished by originality of thought ...... 68 
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He examined Hutton's ideas on hardness and in-
compressibility, which Hutton had thought agreed with 
Berkeley's metaphysical argument against the existence 
of things external to mind; Stewart asserted that between 
the physical arguments that Hutton and Boscovich had used, 
and the metaphysical ones of Berkeley, there was actually 
no similarity, and therefore that Hutton's and Boscovich's 
championings of force were acceptable; on the other hand, 
Berkeley's philosophy was not acceptable to Stewart, for 
it "tends to unhinge the whole frame of human understanding"?9 
The question of Stewart's in£luence on his successors 
is difficult to answer. According to the Dictionary of 
b . h 70 h f th t d d d national ŸŬŦŲŠŮĚ y, e was one 0 e ÜŬŸĚ regar e an 
influential academics of his day in Britain. His influence 
was partly due to his affiliation to Reid; together they 
provided formidable opposition to Hume's sceptical philosophy, 
and as 'empiricists' in philosophy they appealed quite 
naturally to a fair proportion of natural philosophers, 
th 
which was largely why they were cited by many of the 19 
century physiologists in this thesis. Stewart's influence 
was also due to his personal charm and eloquence - Henry 
Cockburn (177:1-1854) I said that "there was eloquence in 
his very spitting", and James Mill (1773-1836), though 
opposed to his philosophy, declared that neither Pitt nor 
Fox were nearly so eloquent. In political economy he 
exerted considerable influence, for Sydney Smith (1771-1845), 
Frances Horner (1778-1817), and Lords Henry Brougham (1778-
1868), Henry Palrnerston (1784-1865), Henry Petty (1780-
1863) and John Russell (1792-1878) were pupils of his, and 
all went on to become eminent public figures. However, 
a man's personal charm dies with him, and by the mid 
19th century Dugald Stewart's philosophy was becoming 
rapidly forgotten. 
Summary 
The five philosophers discussed in this chapter were 
quoted often by physiologists for their treatment of power, 
force and causality, but often for different reasons. 
Locke was praised as the first to analyse the human 
understanding critically and usefully. Newton was 
quoted often, not only because he had demonstrated, more 
clearly than anyone else, that a particular force existed, 
but also because of the fertility of his ideas, especially 
the 'Quaeries'. Hurne was quoted with reservations, for 
despite his obvious skill, it was thought generally that 
he had gone too far in denying both the reality of power 
and the usefulness even of the concepts of power and 
causality. Hurne made many natural philosophers un-
comfortable, for they believed that any system of natural 
philosophy had to employ power and force, if only as 
heuristic models. Reid was regarded as the first vigorous 
champion of those models against Hurne's scepticism, and 
Dugald Stewart was seen as consolidating Reid's arguments. 
In addition to his pupils mentioned above, Stewart was 
well acquainted with several young physiologists who 
were to become quite eminent; William Pulteney Alison 
(1790-1859) was professor of physiology at Edinburgh 
during his career there, and at least three of his 
53. 
pupils who went on to contribute significantly to 
19th century medical science attended and thought 
highly of Stewart's lectures. Those three were 
William Benjamin Carpenter, Peter Mark Roget and 
John Reid (1809-1849). Reid became a fine experi-
mental physiologist, and might have done more but for 
71 his early death. Carpenter and Roget shall be 
discussed later, for they were to contribute considerably 
to the energy conservation theory. 
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Chapter 2. On power in the physiologies of 
William Cullen and his pupils, John 
Brown and Benjamin Rush. 
One of the most influential of the 18th century 
scottish physiologists was William Cullen (1710-1790), 
vlho held chairs in chemistry and the institutes and 
practice of physic first in Glasgow, then in Edinburgh, 
from 1751 until 1789. As well as being deeply interested 
in chemistry, (one of his proteges was Joseph Black, who 
succeeded him to the Glasgow chair), he wrote a seminal 
work on nosology and constructed an essentially dynamical 
theory of physiology and pathology which was influential 
well into the next ȘŤŪWẀŲXŸĚ Its influence was partly 
due to the teachings of two of his students, John Brown 
and Benjamin Rush, whose own theories, though differing 
sometimes markedly from his, retained several of its basic 
concepts. 
As T.S. Hal1 2 has mentioned, Cullen derived many of 
his ideas, particularly on the body-soul relation and on 
power, from slightly earlier ideas that had been developed 
on the continent; he envisaged, as had Hieronymus Gaubius 
(1705-1780), Boerhaave's successor at Leyden, and hierarchy 
of powers in the animal oeconomy: it began with an 
animal power in the brain, which excited a nervous power 
in the nerves, which in turn excited a power inherent in 
muscles, namely the vis insita or irritability of Haller. 
6I. 
cullen willingly acknowledged his debts to men like 
Boerhaave, Gaubius and Haller; and on the whole, Comrie's 
assertion3 that his influence during his own lifetime 
was largely due to his personal qualities as a physician 
and teacher, rather than to great originality, seems to 
be correct. 
Nonetheless, Cullen was not simply an eclectic, 
and power was one theme on which he had original ideas. 
He appreciated, as did other medical theorists, the 
philosophical ambiguity in the word 'power'; thus, in 
discussing the nervous system, though wanting to use the 
term 'nervous power', he realized that no precise meaning 
could be given to it and he opted for the term 'nervous 
fluid' which seemed to be a more useful expression1 unlike 
Boerhaave, he did not envisage anything substantial by it. 
Cullen considered his greatest problem to be the mechanism 
of muscle action; in solving that, he used the Gaubian 
hierarchy of powers in the animal oeconorny, and speculated 
that the nervous and muscular powers might be correlated 
at a fundamental level with the animal power; precisely 
what the animal power was, "whether you consider it as a 
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sentient princIple or 5 a mechanical energy", he did not know. 
In envisaging this fundamental correlation of the vital 
powers he was disagreeing with Haller, who had insisted 
on a distinction between the vis insita and vis nervea; 
and in seeking a semi-quantitative expression for that 
correlation he developed a view of the animal oeconomy as 
a balance between the power put into it and the power that 
it exerted. Thus, vital power was not sui generis, but 
arose from the energy of an external stimulus impinging 
on the organism: 
"The force of contraction, or the vigour 
of muscular fibres, will be always as the 
force of stimulus and the vigour of the 
animal, nervous and inherent powers taken 
6 together" • 
Muscle activity always required the energy of a 
stimulus to activate a type of potential energy residing 
in the organism, and during such activity the animal 
oeconomy would lose some of its energy_ The consequence 
of that loss, in Cullen's system, was that a state of 
rest, such as sleep, was necessary for the restoration 
of the vital powers? Like a machine, the animal was not 
a perpetuum mobile. 
Another aspect of Cullen's dynamical physiology was 
the topic of 'sympathy' which dealt with the apparent 
cooperation and sensitivity one to another of the parts 
of the animal body_ Theories of sympathy were usually 
dynamical ones, and Cullen rejected them because they gave 
too ready a credence to the reality of powers; such powers 
as in the theories of Friedrich Hoffmann (1660-1742), 
Henri Joseph Rega (1690-1754) and Robert Whytt were, in 
his opinion, 'occult qualities', and as Newton had said, 
they were to be exorcised. Yet Cullen simply had to use 
the terminology of power, force and sympathy because of 
its heuristic value; he wrote of the animal oeconomy 
essentially as a closed system of powers which were 
interrelated at a fundamental level, and which could break 
out of their closed system, namely by doing work and 
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expending themselves, only when stimulated by an external 
agent or by the mind. The explanatory competence of 
his theory can be seen in his account of fevers: 
"The remote causes are certain sedative 
powers applied to the nervous system which, 
diminishing the energy of the brain, there-
by produce a debility in the whole of the 
functions, and particularly in the action of 
extreme vessels. Such, however, is at the 
same time the nature of the animal oeconomy, 
that this debility proves an indirect 
stimulus to the sanguiferous system; whence 
••• the action of the heart and larger 
arteries is increased and continues so, 
until it has had the effect of restoring 
the energy of the brain, of extending this 
energy to the extreme vessels, of restoring 
therefore their action, and thereby overcoming 
the spasm affecting WUŤÜĒŸĚ
Out of the question of 'excitability' of the vital 
parts .arose a great deal of trouble between Cullen and his 
former pupil, John Brown. Brown was especially critical 
of his ideas on spasm and his frequent use of anti-
phlogistic regimens, (whereby the physician tried to 
weaken the patient in the hope of removing 'excesses' from 
his system); in his satirical poem, The Brunoniad, Brown 
depicted his former and kindly teacher in a ghastly light: 
"Say, what's the plan when patients weak 
and poor 
Nauseate and vomit? Yet to weaken more. 
When the pure stream, by rushing torrents 
fed, 
Flows copious from the labouring bosom? 
Bleed. 
If the dread foe uninjured still remain, 
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What next shall quell the deluge? Bleed 
again. 
What general rules shall fleeting life 
preserve? 
Vomit and purge and bleed and sweat and 
starve • 
••. When baleful febris with unhallowed 
breath, 
Breathes on the panting wretch the blast 
of death, 
Ask what sad cause contracts his aspect 
wan, 
•.• 'Tis spasm, 'tis spasm, th'exulting 
hero cries, 
And rolls in majesty his awful ŤXŤVĒŸĚ
That Cullen was not a dogmatic theoretician on fever, 
spasm or anything else, so far as his clinical work was 
concerned, has been shown by Guenter Risse in a recent 
10 paper. Brown's invective was the product of his own 
ill temper. One idea, however, on which Cullen stood 
firm was that in physiology, causes and powers were to be 
considered to operate solely "from a physical ŪŤȘŤVVÙWXŨŨŸŨĚ
Hence, the Stahl ian ideas on the body-soul relation were 
dismissed as being incompatible with the useful practice 
of medicine; and even more significantly, since he owed 
so much to Gaubius, Cullen declared that 
" ••• whatever I say in joining with Dr. 
Gaubius with regard to the soul having 
a power of beginning motion, yet in 
matters of physic we must entirely 
abstract from ÙWĒŸÎĚ
Power and force were to be studied in so far as they 
could be investigated on a physical level, and though he 
wrote sometimes as a fully committed vitalist, Cullen 
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also gave the impression that physiology would have to 
deal equally with inorganic and organic powers, since 
both appeared to be indispensable for life. This 
philosophy was taken up by John Brown. 
John Brown (1735-1788) 
Brown studied philosophy and theology at Edinburgh, 
and then medicine. At Edinburgh he was befriended by 
Cullen and even lived in his home; however, within a few 
years they fell out and Brown became vituperatively 
critical of Cullen's work. Indeed, Brown became critical 
of all medical theories, the only man to receive his praise 
being Joseph Black for his work in ȘUŤÜÙVWŲXŸĨĚ
By and large, Broun's theory of physiology was 
original although it owed something to Cu1Ien ' s. Both 
were dynamical theories, but as T.S. Hall has asserted;4 
cullen's had a more physiological, Brown's a more patho-
logical, orientation. Brown's system is difficult to 
summarize, for his own explanation of it was often unclear 
and, although he had a posthumous following on the 
continent, it was rare for his followers to support his 
theory in its entirety. Consequently, the following 
analysis of his system will be more succinct and un-
complicated than Brown himself would wish, althoughit is 
worth emphasizing that his followers were impressed by 
its simplicity. 
Brown envisaged the animal oeconomy as a wholly 
dynamical system. It contained powers which he called 
'excitabi1ity'; whenever an external power or stimulus 
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struck this system, the excitability would be roused 
and work or activity would ensue; such activity was 
called 'excitement'. Health occurred when a suitable 
balance was kept among the stimuli, excitabilities and 
excitements. Diseases could arise in two ways: if 
the stimuli were too strong they would consume too much 
excitability, too little exc itability would remain in 
the oeconomy and 'sthenic' diseases or diseases of 
'indirect debility' would occur; if the stimuli were 
weaker than usual, excitability would accumulate in the 
system and 'asthenic' diseases or diseases of 'direct 
debility'would result. Sthenic diseases were curable 
with an anti-phlogistic regimen, namely with weak and 
scanty food. Asthenic ones were curable with a phlogistic 
regimen, namely with nourishing and abundant food and 
d . k l5 rln • The novelty and appeal of this scheme was that 
thitherto in medical practice, physicians had tried 
generally to weaken the animal system by bleeding, cupping 
and other evacuant measures, whereas Brown declared 
that 
" in all diseases, in which others had 
supposed there was an abundance of blood, 
there was a deficiency, that the real 
causes of these diseases was debility, 
arising from defect of blood and other 
stimuli; and that stimulants, given in 
proportion to the degree of the cause, 
were the proper ŲŤÜŤTÙŤVĒŸĬĚ
In fact, he said that 97 out of every 100 ailments 
were caused by debility, and the phYSician's duty was 
immediately to restore the patient's strength. He 
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criticized the debilitating diets usually given to 
hospital patients, touching a cord of popular sentiment 
in declaring that such diets killed as many people as 
dl'd' d d' 17 pOlsons an lsease. 
Among the principal and sometimes useful features 
of his theory were the following: 1) His analysis of 
the concepts of power and force. 2) His attempt to 
express his theory quantitatively. 3) His attempt to 
interrelate, even correlate, physico-chemical, mental 
and organic powers. 4) His emphasis on caring not only 
for a patient's body, but also for his mind. Taking 
these in order: what he wrote about power was apparently 
not obvious to his contemporaries; he felt obliged to 
emphasize that a force or stimulus acting on the animal 
oeconomy could have only a positive effect, that it 
could only cause more work to be done, and never less; 
thus, there could never be a power which, in acting upon 
the animal oeconomy, did not have a stimulating effect, 
since all powers caused expenditure of power when they 
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acted. Some powers were more stimulating than others, 
and if the mean between stimuli and excitability was 
disturbed, disease occured. This Platonic doctrine of 
the mean was an integral part of his attempt to express 
his theory rigorously; it is best explained in his own 
words: 
"The accumulation, increase or abundance 
of excitability, take any term you please, 
is not occasioned by any action or operation, 
but by the want of action, the want of 
operation. To form an adequate idea of it, 
suppose a scale of excitability of 80 degrees, 
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as in the line here drawn. 
EXCITING POWER 
o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 
EXCITABILITY 
At the commencement of life, the sum 
total assigned is understood to be 80, because 
no part as yet is wasted by the action of 
stimuli. Next, it is wasted in proportion as 
these are applied from the beginning to the 
end of the scale. Its wasting is therefore 
ĬŸĚ.. 
80 
o 
owing to action and operation, but its accumul-
ation to the reverse, the want of action or 
operation of the exciting powers, as is expressed 
by the numbers placed above those first mentioned. 
Thus one degree of exciting power applied takes 
off one degree of excitability, and every 
subsequent degre'e impairs the excitability in a 
proportion exactly equal to its degree of force. 
Thus, a degree of stimulant or exciting power 
equal to 10 reduces the excitability to 70. 20 
to 60; 30 to 50; 40 to 40; 50 to 30; 60 to 20; 
70 to 10; 80 to O. And on the contrary, the 
subtraction of stimulant power allows the 
excitab:Llity to accumulate. Thus, when the 
excitement is at 79, constituting only 1 degree 
of life, take off 1 degree of exciting power, 
and 2 degrees of excitability will arise •••• 
Hence, death takes place from nothing positive, 
but from the negation of the only means by which 
life is supported; which are the several 
exciting or stimulant powers, now fully explained,,:9 
Life was therefore proportional to the stimuli acting 
upon the organism plus the excitability within it; from the 
tenor of his writing Brown seems to have believed this 
system not to be a perpetuum mobile, and life not to be 
sui gener'is. To support this interpretation, however, 
the historian has to discover ,"1hence, in Brown's opinion, 
the power of excitability arose. Unfortunately, Brown 
never asked that question; the closest he got was to say 
that excitability needs periodic restoration - during 
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sleep. The mechanism of that restoration was not 
discussed; and the reason for that omission was probably 
that he was reluctant to philosophize about causes, 
particularly those of powers and forces, "as being in 
general incomprehensible, and as having ever proved the 
21 bane of philosophy". 
Our problem is perhaps resolvable, for a follower 
of Brown, a r1r. Christie, did explain what he understood 
of Brown's theory; and in his account, the powers of 
excitability came from a source outside of the animal 
oeconomy, which he compared with a household fire. The 
grate of the fire represented the human frame; the fuel 
in the grate represented 'the matter of life', the 
'excitability' of Brown's system and the 'sensorial power' 
of Erasmus Darwin; the shute whereby the fresh fuel is 
supplied to the fire represented the power of living 
systems to reproduce excitability; the air denoted the 
stimuli that act on living systems; and the flame 
represented life, namely lithe product of the exciting 
powers acting upon the ŤẄȘÙWŠŞÙŨÙWXŨŨŸÎĚ Christie's 
surranary was 
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ĒĻŸĚDr. Brown has described life to be a 
'forced state', it is fitly represented 
by a flame, forcibly drawn forth from fuel 
little disposed to combustion, by the 
constant application of streams of air 
poured into ÙWĒŸĨĚ
Whether this analogy was faithful to Brown's 
intention might be debated; but it was approved by Thomas 
Beddoes (1760-1808) who was Brown's first editor, who 
thought that Christie had explained admirably the great 
paradox at the core of the Brunonian system, namely that 
" food, drink and all the powers applied 
to the body, though they support life, yet 
consume it; for he will see that the application 
of these powers, though it brings forth life, 
yet at the same time it wastes the excitability 
or matter of life, just as the air blown into 
the fire brings forth more flame, but wastes 
the fuel or matter of ȚÙŲŤŪŸÏĚ
Thus, Brown regarded the living system just as most 
natural philosophers regarded mechanical systems - that 
the power output was always dependent on the input. 
Although this view must be admitted as akin to a rough 
idea of the conservation of energy, it was still far from 
that; for instance, when physiologists wrote about a 
balance of powers between an animal's intake and its 
output, they often thought in terms of a material balance 
too; they rarely drew a rigorous distinction between 
dynamics and chemistry, and they rarely declared their 
theories to be wholly dynamical. Brown seems to have 
held an almost wholly dynamical view of the living system, 
71. 
(which makes Christie's analogy infelicitous), but the 
impression of his ideas and the complexity of the topic 
precluded him from sensing that any grand principle of 
power was in the offing. 
Another feature of his system was its quest for 
simplicity. In seeking this, he proposed that all powers, 
organic and inorganic, are derived from a common source 
and are interconvertible. His proposal began with the 
axiom that a particular cause always has a particular 
effect, and each particular effect has a particular cause; 
secondly, since all stimuli which act on living organisms 
produce one particular effect, life, those stimuli must 
be fundamentally identical agents; thirdly, denying any 
inherent power peculiar to living systems, and holding 
that all living actions are the result of stimuli, he 
equated organic with inorganic powers. 
And 
"Whatever thing produces the same effect as 
another, or several other things, must be 
the same thing as each of them, each of them 
the same thing as it, and every individual 
of the whole set the same as every other 
ÙŪTÙẂÙTẀŠŨHHŸĪĚ
"All powers which support any sort of life are 
the same ••.• All the powers, therefore, that 
support any state of life are the same in kind, 
only varying in TŤŦŲŤŤHHŸĬĚ
Clearly Brown was using the same maxim as Mayer would 
some seventy years later, namely aausa aequat effeatum; 
by defining life as a single, indivisible effect, each 
cause of it would be logically identical in kind. Mayer, 
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as is '..,ell knmvn, contemplated not the qualitative 
implication of the maxim (which Brown did), but rather 
its quantitative implication, namely the net conservation 
of causal agents. 
A fourth feature of Brown's system was its concern 
with the whole person, body and mind, which resulted 
from the idea that life is the effect solely of the 
stimuli, whatever their nature, which act on the vital 
oeconomy; emotions and mental stimuli were as important 
as physical stimuli, and they were all within the 
province of the physician. 
Despite the impressive features of Brown's physiology, 
it met stiff resistance, especially in Britain. One 
reason was probably that given by the historian Charles 
Darernberg, "rien de plus VÙÜŮŨŤŸĚ et par consequent rien 
de pZus fausse"1 7 Brown's critics often felt his system 
was too simple to be true. A second reason was his 
abraisive personality; one historian has called him lithe 
disputatious and disreputable Brown ll ;8 and another has 
called him "a coarse man of low UŠŞÙWVHHŸĲĚ A third 
reason was that he handled the intricate subject-matter 
of physiology with insufficient care, so that his critics 
found it easy to pick holes in his system; thus, Beddoes 
recounted how John Hunter had felt obliged to correct 
Brown's confusion between excitement and strength: 
"In the first promulgation of his doctrines, 
Dr. Brown did not sufficiently distinguish 
between the actions of the living body and 
its powers. Excitement and strength were 
first considered by him as synonymous terms; 
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and on the state of excitement, his 
distinction of diseases was entirely 
founded.... After many discussions 
of his doctrine, in which the distinction 
between the powers and actions of the living 
body ••• was pressed upon him, he adopted 
the term excitability to express the dis-
position to action, and to replace the 
terms irritability, sensibility and inability, 
which he had discarded from his VXVWŤÜĒŸÕĚ
According to the Dictionary of national biography, 
the useful features of Brown's dynamical system passed 
eventually into common medical theory3land his system as 
such faded away by c.1820. One lasting influence it did 
exert was to insist so strongly on the total dependance 
of life upon outside forces. The great paradox of those 
forces was that, though they formed and maintained life, 
they also produced its dissolution; as Brown himself wrote, 
" ••• life, the prolongation of life, its 
decay and death, are all /dynarnical/ states 
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equally natural". 
Benjamin Rush (1745-1813) 
As "fell as being the most eminent physician in North 
AQerica during the late 18th and first decade of the 19th 
century, Rush was one of its most influential social 
reformers and an energetic pamphleteer. He was a 
signatory of the Declaration of Independence, a close 
friend of Tom paine;3 and from 1799 until his death was 
treasurer of the national mint. His academic career was 
equally impressive: having begun his medical education 
at the College of Philadelphia, he was sent to Scotland 
74. 
to study under William Cullen and Joseph Black, and 
then to London where he spent a while with William (1718-
1783) and John (1728-1793) Hunter. Heanwhile, he had 
been assured that on his return to Philadelphia he ,,'ould 
be made the first incumbent of the chair of chemistry; 
this duly happened, and when in 1791 the college became 
a university, he was made its first professor of the 
Institutesand Practice of Medicine. 
A sizeable number of papers have been written by 
American medical historians on Benjamin Rush. They 
d h ' d t' 34 '11 d· 1 k' have discusse lS e uca lon, especla y un er B ac ln 
Glasgow and Cullen in Edinburgh where, of course, he came 
under the influence of Boerhaaveian chemistry; his academic 
ȘŠŲŤŤŲŸĪĚhis work as a physician, especially during the 
Philadelphia yellow fever epidemic of ÍİĲĨŸĬĚ and his 
work as a psychiatrist;7 with which his own last public-
ation, Medical inquiries and observations upon diseases 
of the mind, dealt. Some of these papers discussed the 
similarities between Rush's physiology and the systems 
of Cullen and John Brown, but none, to my knowledge, have 
focussed on his concept of power vis-a-vis the animal 
mechanism. 
Of the two - Cullen and Brown - the latter seems to 
have made his mark more strongly on Rush's physiology even 
though, as Shryock has pointed out;8 Rush strongly denied 
that Brown had been his chief guide and mentor. The 
similarities between their systems, however, were just 
as obvious to Rush's American contemporaries as they are 
to us today: for instance, his physiology was largely 
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dynamic, and the key ideas of stimulus, excitability 
and excitement were used in exactly the same sense for 
the animal oeconomy as Brown had used them. (Indeed, 
one might even call his physiology vlholly dynamic, for, 
although he enthusiastically advocated the application of 
chemistry to physiology, whenever it came down to 
fundamental theorizing, the paradigms he used were 
stimulus, excitability and power and rarely chemical 
terminology. This point has been too rarely appreciated 
by students of his work) • Rush put into practice Brown's 
emphasis on treating the whole person - body and mind. 
thus, he was thus one of the earliest American physicians 
to devise occupational therapies for the mentally ill and 
to encourage analytical conversation with such patients. 
He developed especially Brown's idea that life is 
proportional to, and always dependent on, the stimuli 
impinging upon the organism: indeed, he stated explicitly 
that the living organism is a mechanism whose energy output 
absolutely depends on its energy intake, that organic power 
is only a modification of inorganic power, and that a 
perpetuum mobile cannot exist either in life or in Nature. 
We find the3e ideas expressed most succinctly ŸŪĚa 
lecture of 1799: 
"Life is the EFFECT of certain stimuli 
acting on the sensibility and excitability, 
which are extended in different degrees 
over every external and internal part of 
the body. These stimuli are as necessary 
to its existence, as air is to flame. 
Animal life is truly (to use -the words of 
Dr. Brown) 'a forced state'. I have said 
the words of Dr. Brown; for the opinion 
lb. 
was delivered by Dr. Cullen in the University 
of Edinburgh in the year 1766, and was 
detailed by me in this school many years 
before the name of Dr. Brown was known as 
a teacher of medicine. It is true Dr. Cullen 
afterwards deserted it; but it is equally true, 
I never did; and the belief in it has been the 
foundation of many of the principles and modes 
of practice in medicine which I have since 
adopted. In a lecture which I delivered in 
the year 1771, I find the following words, 
which are taken from a manuscript copy of 
lectures given by Dr. Cullen on the institutes 
of medicine: 'The human body is not an auto-
maton, or self-moving machine; but is kept 
alive and in motion by the constant action of 
stimuli upon it.' In thus ascribing the 
discovery of the cause of life, which I shall 
endeavour to establish, to Dr. Cullen, let it 
not be supposed that I mean to detract from the 
genius and merit of Dr. Brown. To his intrep-
idity in reviving and propagating it, as well 
as the many other truths contained in his 
system of medicine, posterity, I have no doubt, 
will do him ample justice, after the errors 
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that are blended with them have been corrected ••• ĒŸĲĚ
As had Cullen and Brown, Rush discussed two types of 
stimuli - ŤẄWȚŸȘÍŠŨĚ Flnd internal - as the primary causes ,.;r 
life. On external stimuli, he found especial delight in 
a saying of Antoine Lavoisier (1743-1794) which was to be 
quoted frequently by British and American physiologists in 
the first half of the 19 th century. So powerfully did 
this saying impress physiologists that it is worth quoting: 
"Organization, sensation, spontaneous motion 
and life exist only at the surface of the 
earth, and in places exposed to light. We 
might affirm that the flame of Prometheus's 
torch was the expression of a philosophical 
truth that did not escape the ancients. 
Without light, Nature was lifeless, inanimate 
and dead. A benevolent God, by producing life, 
has spread organization, sensation and thought 
over the surface of the ŤŠŲWUĒŸÕĚ
If any physical agent was thought of as the primary 
cause of life, it was light; in this, Lavoisier merely 
articulated a belief of many a physiologist. But whereas 
Lavoisier almost certainly envisaged this light-life 
relation as a material one, Rush seems to have had an 
essentially dynamical dependence in view: thus, he wrote 
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of life being the effect of impressions upon peculiar species 
of matter, "as sound is of the stroke of a hanuner upon a 
bell, or music, the motion of the bow upon the strings of 
a ẂÙŬŨÙŪHHŸŨĚ Hence, he proscribed the various entelechies 
of Whytt, Stahl and others, the vis ÜŤTÙŤŠWŮÙŸĚof Cullen 
and the vital principle of John Hunter. For him, life 
was purely the effect of stimuli and it was "as truly 
mechanical 3S the movements of a clock from the pressure 
of its GÙGŨŤÙŦUWVH·ŸÎĚ
Rush rounded off his ideas on life and power with 
a theological exposition. Of course, this is not 
surprising if one bears in mind the tradition of discussing 
power in a theological context (which Chapter 1 discusses), 
and Rush's own deeply religious background. His dynamical 
physiology harmonized perfectly with his belief in God the 
Father and the Son as the only beings capable of self-
existence and self-motion. St. John had written 
"For as the Father hath life in himself, so 
hath he given to the Son to have life with-
in UÙÜVŤŨȚHHŸĨĚ
And Rush wrote 
swmnary 
"To suppose a principle to reside necessarily 
and constantly in the human body, which acted 
independently of external circumstances, is 
to ascribe to it an attribute which I shall 
not connect, even in language, with the 
creature man. Self-existence belongs only to 
God •••• 
The doctrine I have taught cuts the sinew 
of this error; for, by rendering the continuance 
of animal life, no less than its cornrnencement,on 
the effect of the constant operation of divine 
power and goodness, it leads us to believe that 
the whole creation is supported in the same 
44 
manner" • 
In the physiologies of vlilliam Cullen and two of his 
eminent pupils, John Brown and Benjamin Rush, there was an 
essentially dynamical view of the living oeconomy. Prom 
this exclusive interest in the powers of the organism, vis-
a-vis the powers of Nature, they enunciated the important 
ideas of 1) A fundamental interrelation between organic 
and inorganic powers, which Brown and Rush envisaged as an 
actual correlation; and 2) The living oeconomy as a piece 
of mechanism, whose expenditure or manifestation of power 
is strictly proportional to its power intake. 
79 .. 
It can be argued that Cullen, having held these 
ideas, rescinded them by introducing his vis medicatrix 
natupae. Nonetheless, Brown and Rush inherited them 
from him; and although Brown only implicitly developed 
them into the idea that the organism never creates its 
own power, Rush made this idea explicit. Strictly 
speaking, neither of them enunciated a full-blooded 
principle of conservation of power; they never asked 
whether power is lost or destroyed in its transmission 
through the living oeconomy; but they surely saw no need 
to ask that question, since their aim was only to show 
that life cannot be sui generis and cannot entail the 
creation of power. Of the two components of conservation 
of power - namely, its non-creatibility and indestruct-
ibility, it was the former that Brown, Rush, and maybe 
Cullen, propounded in their physiological theorizings. 
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Chapter 3. On Power and Causality in the physiologies 
of Erasmus Darwin, Samuel Parr and Gilbert 
Blane 
Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802) is one of those figures in 
the history of science whose work \Olill be open always to 
very varied assessment. Few historians today would call 
him a major figure in the development of British science, 
yet several of his ŨŤŸŤTĚcontemporaries regarded him most 
highly, and he was a founder member and driving spirit of 
H4. 
the Lunar Society of Birmingham. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 
the poet, despite his dislike of Darwin, admitted that he 
possessed "perhaps a greater range of knowledge than any 
other man in Europe, and is the most inventive of philosophical 
men" • 
The differences among historians' assessments of 
Darwin's work in natural philosophy arise largely from his 
being "the most inventive of philosophical men". On the 
one hand, he has been dismissed as a mere visionary, whilst 
on the other hand, he has been likened to Leonardo da Vinci 
and Goethe for his excellence in both practical and 
theoretical work in a wide range of topics; It seems to 
me that a balance'between these extremes is most likely to 
be valid. 
Darwin was much quoted by late 18th and early 19th 
century natural philosophers and especially by naturalists 
and physiologists. Like John Brown, whose ideas his own 
often resembled, he was admired by some, ridiculed by others, 
and praised by many for the penetration of some of his 
ideas. Although his speculative turn of mind and poetic 
turn of phrase will always seem alien to the scientific 
spirit, there were and always will be reasons to take his 
scientific ideas seriously. Firstly, he was undoubtedly 
recognized as one of the finest medical practitioners of 
his day. Secondly, his wide reading in medicine and 
natural philosophy, his willingness to quote and acknowledge 
the work of other men, his perceptiveness and his ability 
to ask really stimulating questions gave his writings 
considerable authority and kept his ideas generally within 
the respectable currents of natural philosophy. 
Darwin's belief in a wholly dynamical physiology was 
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one instance of his agreement with certain other physiologists, 
which was supported by fairly sober theorizing and empirical 
evidence and impressed later workers. His ideas on power 
and causality were, however, intricate and were often 
presented alongside other ideas. For instance, in Zoonomia 
he discussed the origin of ideas alongside the question of 
the origin of animal motion; and his solution of the former 
_ namely, that ideas cannot be created de novo - was 
presented as a parallel to his solution of the latter -
namely, that animal motion cannot arise de novo. This 
parallel between mind and body was a basic feature of his 
physiology and earned him the reputation of a ÜŠWŤŲÙŠŨÙVWŸĚ
since the agent which moved the body, which he called 
'the spirit of animation', was of the same genre as heat, 
electricity, magnetism and allied agents. 
Darwin enumerated six fundamental laws of animal 
oeconomy, in which we can see his closeness to, and 
departure from, the physiologies that were being developed 
by Cullen and Brown. 
"1) The fibres which constitute the muscles 
and organs of sense possess a power of 
contraction ..•• 
2) The spirit of animation is the immediate 
cause of the contraction of animal fibres, it 
resides in the brain and nerves, and is liable 
to general or partial diminution or accumulation. 
3) The stimulus of bodies external to the 
moving organ is the remote cause of the 
contractions of animal fibres. 
4) A quantity of stimulus produces irritation, 
which is an exertion of the spirit of animation 
exciting the fibres into contraction. 
5) A certain quantity of contraction produces 
pleasure; a greater or less quantity, if it be 
perceived at all, produces pain; these con-
stitute sensation. 
6) A certain quantity of sensation produces 
desire or aversion; these constitute ẂŬŨÙWÙŬŪĒŸĚ
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Darwin sought a semi-quantitative connection between 
vital actions and the external stimuli on which they 
depended; thus, all muscular activity was supposed to be 
strictly proportional to "the energy of the sensation that 
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excites them and the quantity of sensorial power". 
Similarly for muscular motion arising from volition. His 
theory of health rested on a balance or crasis between 
stimuli and sensorial powers (or the spirit of animation) 
on the one hand, and vital activity on the other; excessive 
activity would exhaust the power of the vital oeconomy, 
whilst rest, respiration and food were required to 
replenish that power1 the vital oeconomy was therefore 
no perpetuum mobile. 
One ambiguity in Darwin's theory is what he meant 
th by 'power' and 'spirit'. Several early 19 century 
commentators thought that he meant something substantial 
and material, akin to Newton's 'subtile aether', and that 
power and force in the wholly dynamic sense were no part 
of his scheme. He himself gave good grounds for this 
interpretation, asserting that the spirit of animation 
'resided' in the brain and nerves and was 'secreted' from 
them. Yet such terminology was also used by Cullen, as 
we have seen, even though he would not commit himself to 
any theory on the nature of the vis nervea. Darwin was 
equivocal about power and spirit simply because he knew 
how indefinable such terms were; a reply he gave to someone 
who urged him to become a Christian reveals his, and his 
contemporaries', difficulties with power: 
"Before I do that, you Christians must all 
be agreed. The other morning I received 
two parcels; one containing a work of Dr. 
Priestley's proving there is no spirit. 
the other a work by Berkeley, Bishop of Clayne, 
proving there is no matter. What am I to 
believe amongst you all?,,6 
That Darwin tended greatly towards a dynamical 
philosophy can be seen in a discussion on causality at the 
close of volume 1 of Zoonomia. This discussion is also 
notable since it was a rare instance of his use of theology 
to bolster a scientific argument, (Darwin was not a 
Christian, but neither was he an atheist as some 19th 
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century philosophers asserted), and because it proposed 
something implicit in earlier sections of Zoonomia, 
namely that an effect could never be greater than its 
cause. 
"These causes may be conveniently divided 
into two kinds, efficient and inert causes, 
according to the two kinds of entity supposed 
to exist in the natural world, which may be 
termed matter or spirit The efficient 
causes of motion or new configuration consist 
either of the principle of general gravitation, 
which actuates the sun and planets; or of the 
principle of particular gravitation, as in 
electricity, magnetism, heat; or of the 
principle of chemical affinity, as in combustion, 
fermentation, combination; or of the principle 
of organic life, as in the contraction of 
vegetable and animal fibres. 
This perpetual chain of causes and effects, 
whose first link is rivetted to the throne of 
God, divides itself into innumerable diverging 
branches which, like the nerves arising from 
the brain, permeate the most minute and most 
remote extremeties of the system, diffusing 
motion and sensation to the \vhole. As every 
cause is superior in power to the effect which 
it has produced, so 0' x idea of the power of 
the Almighty Creator becomes more elevated and 
sublime as we trace the operations of nature from 
cause to cause, climbing up the links of these 
chains of being, till we ascend to the Great 
Source of all things"? 
Thus, Darwin adhered to the powerful tradition, which 
was supported by the 18th century philosophers (discussed 
in Chapter I), that the powers of Nature are ultimately 
one with the power of God and that they cannot be created, 
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for creation belongs to God alone; all activities of 
power are manifestations of His Will. 
Darwin's greatest departure from contemporary 
physiology was his application of dynamics to a detailed 
study of plants; and despite his polemic ideas in that 
field, for instance that plants could think and possess 
passions, his assertion that physiologists should test 
their ideas in botany as well as in the animal oeconomy 
th 
was not lost on early 19 century physiologists who, 
when wishing to justify their comparative approach to 
physiology, often cited him. 
There were other physiologists who, like Darwin, had 
a dynamical view of the organism, were much cited during 
the late 18th or early 19th century, and were clearly 
intent on discovering a comprehensive theory of life. 
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They often freely used speculation instead of experimentation, 
and for that reason they were quite forgotten by the mid 
1800s, although their systems were well known and regarded 
in their own day. Only two of those medical theorists 
shall be discussed: Samuel Farr (1741-1795) and the 
eminent physician Gilbert Blane (1749-1834). 
Farr had studied medicine at. Edinburgh, graduated at 
Leyden, and served as a physician in the Bristol Infirmary 
from 1767 until 1780. He published several medical works 
that were highly esteemed; most dealt with the problems he 
faced as a working physician, but his second treatise was 
a curious, wholly philosophic or speculative venture into 
animal physiology, of the same genre as the treatises of 
th 
the early 18 century overtly Newtonian physicians like 
Archibald Pitcairne, George Cheyne and John Freind. 
Farr's treatise was A philosophical enquiry into the 
ŪŠWẀŲŤŸĚ origin and extent of animal ÜŬWÙŬŪŸĚ deduced 
from the principles of analogy and ŲŤŠVŬŪŸĚ first published 
in 1771. He took his cue from Newton, especially from 
the .' Quaeries' which he thought had not been sufficiently 
respected by medical theorists. He aimed to construct a 
theory whereby the powers and motions of the inorganic 
and organic worlds could be reduced to a single power, 
namely repulsion; repulsion was supposed to be the original 
state of Nature, and upon it all the laws of gravitation 
and attraction TŤŮŤŪTŤTŸĚ This universal principle of 
repulsion and its resultant motions were further reduced 
to being the effects of the mind, and the powers of the 
mind were attributed to God as the primary cause of all 
ŮŬŴŤŲŸÕĚ Several features of the theory were traditional 
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and accorded with contemporary natural philosophy and 
theology; Farr's originality lay in his enunciating such 
ideas more boldly and eloquently than most fellow physicians 
cared to do. Moreover, although his theorizing was 
sometimes excessively speculative, it was difficult to 
disagree with the general tenor of his analysis. 
Farr argued that many somatic diseases originate in 
mental disorders. He also implied that there was a 
rigorous connection between the powers of the mind and 
those of the body, citing reputable authorities like 
Hippocrates, Whytt and Cullen. Indeed, as most physicians 
were generally agreed that mental conditions could power-
fully influence the body, they were well disposed to his 
assertion that, since passions are dynamical agents, 
major ailments could be caused by them. Farr mentioned 
cancers, rheumatism, gout, phthisis c£=:t:he ŨẀŸHĚhydro-
phobia, apoplexy and palsy among such psycho-somatic 
disorders tl and as Pedro La'ln-Entralgo' s monograph12on 
the mind-body problem has shown, there would have been 
strong philosophical and religious reasons, leaving aside 
the physiological ones, for Farr's contemporaries to give 
such ideas a hearing. 
His ideas on animal functions, particularly those 
concerning the power of the mind over the body, led into 
a dynamical theory of opposites: that attraction not 
only depends upon repulsion, but that they actually 
necessitate each other; otherwise there would be universal 
and never-ending activity, and activity without rest would 
be as deleterious for the world as never-ending stagnation. 
Farr therefore proposed a fundamental principle or power 
of 'universal activity', whose basic physical manifestation 
was repulsion, yet which could also manifest itself as 
t ' 13 attrac lone One of his assumptions, though never 
explicated, was that power could never be created since it 
derived ultimately from God, via the mind. Therefore, 
there was no place for vital powers; the nature of animal 
motion was a consumption of the 'universal activity', 
interspersed with periods of rest during which that 
14 
activity could be restored by the agency of food. 
Farr's ideas often resembled Boscovich's, Cullen's 
and Brown's, although he was extremely reluctant to admit 
any indebtedness. His contemporaries realized how well 
his theory fitted current trends in natural philosophy 
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and physiology, and they referred to him not infrequently 
as 'ingenious'; some of them even accorded him as much 
attention as they did to Erasmus Darwin, and to some 
extent he meritJed as much, for his practical medical 
treatises were excellent and showed how speculative 
physiology could be reconciled with sound practice. 
Similar ideas to Farr's were expounded in a lecture 
delivered in 1788 by Gilbert Blane. Blane had studied 
and graduated in Edinburgh, and through Cullen's recommend-
ation became associated with ŸGŨÙŨŨÙŠÜĚHunter in London. 
In the l780s he served as a physician to the British fleet 
in the l'lest Indies, becoming head of the Navy Medical 
Board in 1795. In the l790s he was responsible for the 
compulsory use of lemon juice throughout the British navy, 
and in recognition of his work was elected to several 
learned societies, was knighted and became George IV's 
physician. Among his several published works, two are 
t th ' th' h' L t ŸĚ t' 15 relevant 0 1S eS1S: 1S ea ure on ÜẀVŠẀ ŠŲĚmo ŸŬŪHĚ
read to the Royal Society of London in 1788 and published 
as a book in that year, and his oft-cited Elements of 
mediaal logiak 16Lsi£l, 1819. 
The lecture is a fine example of how a physician, in 
studying the mechanism of muscle action, felt obliged to 
study the nature of motion generally and even the nature 
of matter. Being unable to discover absolute rest 
ŠŪŸŨUŤŲŤĚ in Nature, Blane's primary axiom was therefore 
that motion is an original and natural property of all 
matter. The causes of motion, namely attraction and 
repulsion, \'lere to be considered a single simple agent; 
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"And' it is so universal an agent in nature, 
that some modern philosophers have made it 
absorb, as it were, every other power and 
property of matter. The late Father Boscovich 
of Milan, about forty years ago, advanced a 
very bold doctrine to this effect, alledging 
with great strength of argument, illustrated 
by geometrical reasoning, that there does not 
exist in nature any such thing as impenetrable, 
extended particles •••• Whether this hypothesis 
is founded in truth or not, it would appear from 
the reasonings made use of, that all the relative 
properties of matter may be accounted for, though 
we abstract from every other consideration but 
attraction and ŲŤŮẀŨVÙŬŪĒŸİĚ
This scheme of inorganic powers gave him a model for 
the organic ones. Thus, he proposed a wholly dynamical 
view not only of muscle action, but of the animal oeconomy 
generally, in accordance with Boscovich's 'bold doctrine'. 
He even proposed a fundamental relation between organic 
and inorganic powers. 
"It would appear, therefore, that there is 
a coordinance or preesmblished harmony, as 
it were, between the faculties of animals 
and the laws of external matter, which is 
the foundation of all the instinctive habits 
of animals, as well as the rational conduct 
of man; and it is impossible sufficiently to 
admire that sublime contrivance by which the 
frame of animated beings is thus in all 
points adapted to the constitution of in-
animate ŪŠWẀŲŤHHŸĮĚ
This view was not of a strict correlation between 
organic and inorganic powers, but Blane believed it was 
an important and somewhat original idea of the universal 
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fabric of God, Man and Nature. In a republication of 
the lecture in 1822, Blane added a philosophical foot-
note to this passage, in which he emphasized how Leibniz's 
view of the mind-body relation differed radically from 
the view that the British philosophers of the 18th 
century had constructed. The latter had proposed a 
fundamental unity of the mental and bodily powers, and 
though Blane did not explicitly declare it, his view was 
almost identical to theirs. Of his own view, he wrote 
in the footnote that 
"The learned reader need not be told that 
the author here refers to the popular 
doctrine of Leibniz, and that he means 
merely to allude to it figuratively, without 
approving or adopting it. This celebrated 
philosopher held that the obedience of muscles 
to the will is not to be ascribed to any 
physical connection between the mind and body; 
but that the deity has so preordained it that 
the actions of the mind and body should proceed 
by a parallel but independent series of move-
ments, like two distinct machines, which 
without any mutual agency are so constructed 
as to correspond simultaneously in their 
. ,,19 
mot1ons . 
Why did Blane add this footnote thirty-four years 
after the lecture was first read? One likely reason was 
that in the meanwhile he had become deeply impressed by 
Dugald Stewart who had tackled the question of the mind-
body relation vis-a-vis their powers, in the Locke-Reid 
tradition. In 1819, Blane had dedicated his most 
philosophical medical treatise, Elements of medical togick, 
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to Stewart, admitting his intellectual debt to "particularly 
Bacon, Locke, Reid, and above all, Professor Dugald Stewart, 
the most profound metaphysician, as well as one of the most 
20 
elegant writers of this age". 
Whereas in his 1788 lecture, Blane had not delved 
deeper into the causes of animal motion than merely 
proposing a general attractive power for which no further 
cause could be discovered, in his EZements he intended a 
deeper investigation. However, so intricate was the 
problem that he believed it could be solved solely by a 
thoroughly inductive, philosophical approach, with scarcely 
any room for experimentation; he began with a defence of 
causality as a sine qua non for all philosophy and for the 
practice of physick. 
"The sound state of the mind in Physick, as 
well as in all other practical pursuits in 
life, must ȘŬŪVÙŸWĚ in conceiving clearly and 
correctly the reciprocal relations of cause 
and effect; for it is upon such knowledge 
alone, that the adaptation of means to ends, 
in which we have defined art to consist, can 
be founded •••. ,,21 
So universally valid was causality, that he developed 
his 1788 conception of a coordinance or pre-established 
harmony between organic and inorganic powers into a firm 
theory - namely, that since causality appears to be a law 
both of Nature and the human mind, it indicates that 
" not only every organ and function of 
the body, but every faculty of the mind, 
is co-relative with, or represents and 
reflects, as it were, the elements and 
laws of universal ŪŠWẀŲŤHHŸÎĚ
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For Blane, the truths of causality and of a 
correlation between the elements (i.e. the dynamical 
agencies) of mind and Nature, guaranteed the reality of 
power. In Lockean vein he wrote 
"We become assured of the reality of such 
agencies by finding that, in imitating the 
sequences of nature, we can adapt means to 
ends, so as to bring about certain proposed 
results. It seems to be that in this way we 
acquire our first idea of ŮÜŒNŎĒŸĨĚ
Apparently, he had given that explanation of men's 
idea of power as early as 1771, in a discourse designed 
to refute Hume's doctrines, particularly that of custom 
being the sole source of our idea of ȘŠẀVŠŨÙWXŸÏĚ
96. 
The next step in his EZements was to group physiological 
phenomena into categories, with a specific dynamical agent 
as the cause or power for each category. There were nine 
categories of vital energy, which were supposed to be the 
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ultimate facts of physiology and pathology. They were 
the generative, conservative, temperative, assimilative, 
formative, restorative, motive, sensitive and sympathetic. 
This system was considered by most contemporaries as an 
idiosyncracy and too hypothetical to be useful. Nonethe-
less, it did fit into the general interest in dynamical 
physiology of that time and did have some similarity with 
the systems of Cullen, Brown and John Hunter. What was 
idiosyncratic was its firm denial that the vital energies 
might be reduced to a simpler hypothesis containing only 
one or two energies; it seems as if, having toyed with the 
Boscovichean theory in his early years, Blane decided later 
that such simplicity could never characterize the animal 
oeconomy, and that a string of galenic-type faculties 
was nearer the mark. Hence he di sagreed 'Y1i th Brown. 
"The errors of this ingenious man seem to 
have consisted in his having erected a system 
on the narrow foundation of only one of the 
principles of the animal oeconomy, and in 
pushing that to an ŤẄWŲŤÜŤHHŸĬĚ
Clearly, Blane may not be called an early contributor 
to the conservation of energy. Nonetheless, he is an 
excellent example of a physician who felt compelled to 
examine the ideas of causality and power in order to form 
his own physiological ideas. His defence of causality 
and power was to be cited approvingly by physiologists like 
William Carpenter and Peter Roget who needed to assert that 
these are real, in order to develop their own dynamical 
physiology. Indeed, what Reid and Stewart did to re-
instate causality and power in pure philosophy, Blane did 
within the aegis of physiology. In the first chapter of 
his Elements, power was made the central doctrine of 
physiology. consequently, that chapter was cited often 
long after his ideas on the nine vital energies had fallen 
into oblivion. 
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Chapter 4. On power in the \'lorks of Jar.-,es Hutton, 
John Playfair and Humphrey Davy 
This chapter examines three natural philosophers who 
were immensely influential in the late 18th or early 19th 
century. None of them is now regarded as having 
contributed significantly to physiology, although Hutton's 
discussions of light, heat and respiration, and Davy's 
earliest publication on the same topics and on the chemistry 
of life, related to current problems in physiology and were 
cited by physiologists. These three men appear in the 
same chapter because their ideas on the centrality of power 
or force in natural philosophy were very similar; indeed, 
as Charles Gillispie has said; Playfair was Hutton's Huxley 
in championing his theory of the earth; Davy also derived 
many of his ideas during his early years from Hutton, and 
for several years after his appointment at the Royal 
Institution he lectured on geology. 
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It will be argued that all three contributed significantly 
to the emergence of the conservation of energy. In Hutton's 
case, the argument will also be that his ideas on power and 
in geology owed much to his medical background, and that 
though he hardly ever practised as a physician, his outlook 
on the physical world revealed a mind that had been trained 
to think about vital activity, and whose thought-patterns 
were essentially those of a physiologist. The only historian 
who, to my knowledge, has proposed this interpretation of 
Hutton's world-view has been ŃŲŠŪŸŬÙVĚNŨŨŤŪŞŤŲŦŤŲŸĚ
James Hutton (1726-1795) 
Hutton studied humanities and then medicine at 
Edinburgh, eventually taking his doctorate at Leyden. 
For twenty years he devoted himself to farming and in 
1768 returned to Edinburgh " ••• giving his undivided 
attention from that time to scientific ŮẀŲVẀÙWVŨŨŸĚ Though 
he never acquired an academic position, he became a member 
of the cool, dispassionate circle of Edinburgh philosophers 
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- men like Joseph Black, Dugald Stewart, Adam Smith (1723-
1790). James Watt (1736-1819) and John Robinson (1739-1805) -
who were the life-blood of the 'Scottish Enlightenment'. He 
quickly acquired a reputation as a chemist and, slightly later, 
as an enquirer into the history and structure of the Earth. 
He published a handful of works in philosophy and natural 
philosophy, some of these appearing in the Transactions of 
the RoyaZ Soaiety of Edinburgh, of which he was a member. 
Hutton's doctoral dissertation Dissertatio physiao-
mediaa inauguaZis de sanguine et airculatione miaroaosmi 4 
contained ideas which became fundamental to his natural 
philosophy and geology. Particularly important were: 
1) His belief in the validity of final causes in natural 
philosophy. This category of cause was still thoroughly 
respectable in the life-sciences, and Hutton's belief in its 
universal validity was vindicated for him by its clear rOle 
in vital phenomena. For instance, he was to write in his 
Theory of the earth that 
liThe circulation of the blood is the 
efficient cause of life; but life is the 
final cause, not only for the circulation 
of the blood, but for the revolution of the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
globe: without a central luminary and a 
revolution for the planetary body, there 
could not have been a living creature 
upon the face of this ŤŠŲWUĒŸĚ
2) His belief in cycles throughout Nature. A large 
proportion of his dissertation discussed organic cycles, 
namely the perpetual circulation of the blood and UẀÜŬẀŲVŸĚ
, I t' f t 't' 7 t' 8 d d' t' 9 the ȘŸŲȘẀĚa ŸŬŪVĚ 0 nu ŲŸĚ ŸŬŪHĚ secre 10n an ŸŦŤVĚ10n, 
and the exchanges which occur between the three realms of 
Nature - mineral, vegetable and animal - which constitute 
, l' , th 10 a ȘŸŲȘẀĚŠWŸŬŪĚ ln e macrocosm. Indeed, the dominant 
theme of his dissertation was that the cycles within the 
microcosm of the vital oeconomy resemble and relate to the 
cycles in Nature at 11 large. Of course, this was not a new 
idea, but Hutton moulded it after his own fashion to lie 
at the very foundation of his geology. 
3) His belief not only in cycles, but in perpetual and in 
a sense self-sustaining cycles. Thus, despite his aim to 
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treat the organism mechanistically in the spirit of Boerhaave, 
whose influence on his dissertation is obvious;2he departed 
from a rigorous mechanistic explanation of life, declaring 
that 
" the blood and its humours present us 
with a great vital circle, a very fine 
example of a perpetuum mobiZe, matter which 
moves itself without a material cause, 
procuring for itself - on the fertile earth 
whatever its needs require, and restoring 
its decline each day, even as an effect of 
its own destructive ȘŠẀVŤĒŸĨĚ
103. 
4) His view of the earth as an organism, and that natural 
philosophy should employ the concepts and method of the 
physiologist. His dissertation dwelt upon the perpetual 
cycle of the elements, uniting the organic and inorganic 
realms; vegetables nourish themselves on the mineral world, 
animals feed on vegetables, and by putrefaction the animals 
reconstitute the mineral ŴŬŲŨTŸÏĚ Just as life was 
obviously a set of processes, indeed of perpetual cycles, 
so too was Nature or the macrocosm seen as a dynamic system 
and ever active. 
The following analysis of Hutton's post-dissertation 
writings will consider two themes: the concepts of organism 
and power in his geology; and their role in his treatises 
on light, heat and allied topics. Inevitably, organism and 
power were complementary ideas; the former facilitated a 
dynamic view of Nature, and in constructing that view Hutton 
expounded a theory of matter in which natural phenomena, and 
even substance itself, depended solely on the interactions 
of a general force of attraction and a general force of 
repulsion; that theory resembled Boscovich's and if we believe 
15 Dugald Stewart, Hutton wanted to reconcile Boscovichean 
physics with Berkleyan metaphysics. 
There were three publications of Hutton's geological 
theory during his lifetime. In 1785 he read a paper before 
the Royal Society of Edinburght6 this was printed as an 
abstract of thirty-two pages for private circulation. 
There he asserted that the earth is a 'regular' system, in 
which matter is thrust up continuously from the bowels of 
the earth by tI ••• the active power of fire and the 
expansive force of heat ll , that land is eroded continuously, 
and that this cycle, so far as human observation is 
concerned, 17 II .•• has neither a beginning nor an end ll • 
He did not analogize that system explicitly with an 
organism, (which he did in his later accounts), but life 
was upheld as the final cause of the entire scheme: 
IIAn endeavour is then made to support the 
theory by an argument of a moral nature, 
drawn from the consideration of a final 
cause ••• and an argument is formed, upon 
the supposed wisdom of nature, ȚŬŲŸWUŤĚ
justness of a theory in which perfect order 
is to be perceived. For, according to the 
theory, a soil adapted to the growth of 
plants is necessarily prepared and carefully 
preserved; and in the necessary waste of 
land which is inhabited, the foundation is 
laid for future continents, in order to 
support the system of this living ŴŬŲŨTĒŸĮĚ
In 1788 Hutton enunciated his theory a second time; 
in the Transactions of the ŎŬXŠŸĚSociety of Edinburgh of 
1 h d d . t' 19 that year, near Y a un re pages were ŦŸẂŤŪĚ 0 It. He 
began .lith the reasons for a dynamic, ever active, vie\'11 of 
the earth, namely that where so many living creatures ply 
their respective powers in pursuing the ends for which they 
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were made, Nature could hardly ever be quiescent, and matter 
itself must always be in motion. A fine illustration of 
the earth ever active was the rOle of the atmosphere: it 
was a necessary condition for the sustenance of fire, the 
breath of life to animals, an instrument in vegetation, a 
giver of fertility and health and a protection against the 
noxious effects of putrefaction. It was also "the proper 
means of circulation" for the earth, by raising up the 
water of the oceans, and releasing water over dry land. 
That was the mechanism of the earth. 
He considered next "some of those powers by which 
motion is produced, and activity procured to the mere 
ÜŠȘUÙŪŤŨŨŸÕĚ The two most immediately effective powers were 
light or heat, and cold or condensation. Other powers 
were required to modify those two primary ones "in the 
oeconomy of life and system of our changing WUÙŪŦVHHŸŨĚ His 
beliefs in the paramounce of power and the living nature 
of the earth, whereby its form and essence remain un-
changing, led him to ask what happens to power during the 
earth's cycles. 
"Has the globe within it such an active power 
as fits it for the renovation of that part of 
its constitition which may be subject to 
decay? Are those powerful operations of fire 
or subterraneous heat ••. to be considered as 
always having been? Are they to be concluded 
as proper to every part of the globe, and as 
continual in the system of this earth?" 22 
Clearly, to maintain 'a regular system', in which 
there was no vestige of a beginning nor prospect of an end, 
the balance between the attractive and repulsive forces, 
(namely, gravity and heat), had to be constant; moreover, 
in the absence of any contrary evidence, Hutton proposed 
that the total power, and not merely its balance, is always 
conserved. Only this could fully satisfy his belief that 
in Nature there is wisdom, system and consistency. 
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Hutton's own last exposition of his theory was in 
book form: Theory of the earth (1795). There, he 
discussed the place of power and the earth's living nature 
more fully and poetically than anywhere else. His aim 
was simply to investigate 'form, quality or active power,23 
in Nature; his achievement, which he called "this great, 
this interesting view", was to establish unequivocally the 
living, organismic nature of the earth. 
"But is this world to be considered thus 
merely as a machine, to last no longer 
than its parts retain their present position, 
their proper forms and qualities? Or may it 
be also considered as an organized body? 
Such as has the constitution in which the 
necessary decay of the machine is naturally 
repaired, in the exertion of those productive 
powers by which it had been formed. 
This is the view in which we are now to 
examine the globe; to see if there be, in the 
constitution of this world, a reproductive 
operation by which a ruined constitution may 
be again repaired, and a duration or stability 
thus procured to the machine •••• If no such 
reproductive power, or reforming operation, 
after due inquiry, is to be found in the con-
stitution of this world, we should have reason 
to conclude that the system of this earth has 
either been intentionally made imperfect, or 
has not been the work of infinite power and 
ŴÙVTŬÜHHŸÏĚ
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To deny his view of the earth was therefore to deny the 
traditional attributes of God. To accept his view accorded 
well with theology. This was an important point for Hutton 
and for the future reception of his theory since, as various 
scholars have discussed ŲŤȘŤŪWŨXŸĪWUŤŲŤĚwere strong theological 
objections that could legitimately, and were, raised 
against his theory, especially against his conclusion 
that "we find no vestige of a beginning, no prospect of 
an end". 
Hutton also believed that his system permitted a 
wider methodology for science than mere induction, namely 
. ' 26 by uSlng flnal causes. And when he wrote about the 
efficient causes in his system, he did not inquire into 
their essential natures, but was interested solely in 
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whether they were agents natural and necessary for the earth: 
"The answer to this is plain: These operations 
of the globe remain at present with undiminished 
activity, or in the fullness of their ŮŬŴŤŲHHŸİĚ
Although this conclusion about the persistence of the 
earth's powers was important, it was concerned only with 
the effects of power; as he wrote in his 1788 paper, 
"We do not now enquire into the nature of those 
powers, or investigate the laws of light and 
heat, of cold and condensation, by which the 
various purposes of this world are accomplished; 
we are only to mention those effects which are 
made sensible to the common understanding of 
. d ,,28 
mankln ..•. 
A full analysis of the nature of those powers came in 
his treatises on light and heat. 
One of Hutton's most explicit discussions of the 
organismic nature of the earth concerned the four levels 
in Nature: first was the animal system, then the vegetable 
the system of the earth, and finally the mineral system, 
system. Each system or level could perpetuate itself by 
using any parts that it required of the other systems; each 
'I 
, 
I 
, 
system was alive; Hutton therefore proposed to 
" .•. consider how men of science, in examining 
the mineral state of things and reasoning from 
those appearances by which we are to learn the 
physiology of this earth, have misled themselves 
with respect to physical ȘŠẀVŤVĒŸĲĚ
In the final chapter of his treatise, he left no doubt 
about the physiological anchorage of his world-view. in 
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the circulation of the matter of the globe, in its beautiful 
oeconomy, in its parts being repaired as soon as they are 
wasted, it was exactly like the body of an animal. In 
saying that his theory employed ideas which were essentially 
physiological, and which had featured in his medical 
dissertation, I do not mean that there were no other sources 
for such ideas than his own medical background. One 
30 particularly probable source was Plato, for as Ellenberger 
has pOinted out, Hutton was well read in classical literature. 
He must have known those passages in the Timaeus where Plato 
wrote of the Ii ving vlOrld, a \'lorld ever active: 
Also 
"On this wise, using the language of probability, 
we may say that the world came into being - a 
living creature endowed with soul and intelligence 
by the providence of God. 
This being supposed, let us proceed to the 
next stage: In the likeness of what animal did 
the Creator make the world?"3l 
" the body of the world was created, and it 
was hannonized by proportion, and therefore 
has the spirit of friendship; and having been 
reconciled to itself, it was indissoluble by 
the hand of any other than the ȚŲŠÜŤŲĒŸÎĚ
Another of Plato's requisites for the earth was " ••• that 
it should be free from old age and unaffected by TÙVŤŠVŤHHŸĨĚ
And Plato's complete view was that " ••• The world has 
received animals, mortal and immortal, and is fulfilled 
with them, and has become a visible animal containing the 
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visible - the sensible God who is the image of the intellectual, 
the greatest, best, fairest, most perfect - the one, only 
34 begotten heaven". 
In emphasizing Hutton's organismic view of the earth, 
d th ' "135 I have one no 1ng or1g1na • ŸGŨUŠWĚ I have attempted, which 
no-one else seems to have done, has been to show that his 
physiological pattern of thought was so persistent through-
out his geological system, that it most probably arose from 
his medical education and especially from certain paradigms 
contained in his doctoral dissertation; and that his thoughts 
about the animal oeconomy either generated, or at least 
guaranteed, his system of the earth - a system which (as 
the next section will show) was essentially one of maximum 
economy of power, and where matter did not exist as hard, 
particulate substance. 
In addition to his geological works, Hutton published 
three others: D'tssertations of different subjects in natural 
philosophy ĜŨİĲÎĞŸĬĚ A dissertation upon the philosophy of 
RÙŦUWŸĚ heat and fire (l794);7and a very long philosophical 
treatise called An ÙŪẂŸVWÙŦŠWÙŬŪĚof the principles of 
knouJZedge, and of the pY'ogress of ŲŤŠŎŬŪŸĚ from sense to science 
and philosophy ĜŨİĲÏĞŸĮĚ In the two treatises on natural 
philosophy the main topic was heat, for he believed that the 
main challenge facing both science and philosophy was to 
investigate what happens whenever we experience light, 
heat and cold. For this he had two reasons. Firstly, 
much experimentation had been done recently on heat: 
Joseph Black's study of latent heat intrigued Hutton and 
they had become firm friends; later, Horace Benedict de 
Saussure (1740-1799) and Marc-Auguste Pictet (1752-1825) 
experimented on heat and Pictet apparently showed that cold 
could be reflected, a startling claim since cold was 
commonly supposed to be only a low degree of heat and not 
an agent in its own right; Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728-
1777) and Jean Andre de Luc (1727-1817) had asserted that 
heat is material, and in Hutton's opinion this had also 
been a gross error of the French anti-phlogiston chemists 
and was one reason why he remained a staunch phlogistonist, 
despite his recognizing the skillfullness of Lavoisier and 
his followers. Secondly, heat was indispensable for 
Hutton's geological theory and he therefore felt obliged 
to study its nature and origin. In this sense, his 
treatises in natural philosophy were essentially footnotes 
to his Theory of the earth. 
Having examined all the major studies recently done 
on light and heat, Hutton concluded that the primary source 
and form of these two agents was sunlight; he sometimes 
used 'solar emanation' and 'solar substance' as synonymous 
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terms for this force of sunlight. Light, heat, electricity 
and sunlight seemed to him to be 'commutable' agents, all 
different manifestations of solar VẀŞVWŠŪȘŤŸĲĚ Such agents 
were attributable to two fundamental types of power of 
force; in the 1794 Dissertation he wrote 
Ill. 
"In thus considering natural bodies as 
composed of principles which have power 
and energy, we may now observe that there 
are fixed and incommutable powers or 
principles in bodies, as well as those 
which are more or less changing and 
commutable • ••• the final and incommutable 
principles of bodies are, first, that of 
gravitation and cohesion; and secondly, 
that of concretion.... The moveable and 
commutable principles, again, are the two 
different species of heat, that is, the 
heat of fluidity and the heat of expansion •••• 
But those commutable principles of body are 
also mutable in relation to the general system 
of bodies, in the regulated motions of which 
we percieve design and ŴÙVTŬÜĒŸÕĚ
Nature thus ran upon two types of force - attraction 
and repulsion. The former, which Hutton often called 
'gravitating matter', existed in three forms - the Newtonian 
force of gravitation, the force of cohesion which held the 
elemental components of a substance together, and the force 
of concretion. The repulsive force, whose generic name 
was 'solar substance', occurred as light, specific and 
latent heats, and the agents of electricity and fluidity. 
Since Hutton ŞŤŨŸẂŤTĚheat to be a power, he was sharply 
critical of the French anti-phlogiston theory and gave an 
impressive defence of phlogiston; but by phlogiston he 
meant no material, albeit imponderable, body, but a power 
41 derived from the 'solar substance'. There were at least 
four important, and sometimes radical, conclusions that he 
reached on light and heat and that were to be commented 
upon by other natural philosophers: 1) That the universe 
consists ultimately of only two principles - the powers 
of attraction and repulsion in their several forms. This 
theory resembled Boscovich's though Hutton rarely even 
mentioned him. 2) That some of men's common ideas in 
natural philosophy would have to be revised; one such was 
weight, others were inertia and momentum. For instance, 
since he denied the existence of hard, impenetrable matter, 
weight could not be a just measure of the absolute quantity 
of matter in any body; indeed, 
" .•• it may only indicate the quantity of 
gravitation which is not then opposed and 
balanced by the separating power; ••• Here, 
then, would be a principle of levity,. by 
which bodies might be affected, as well as a 
principle of ŦŲŠẂÙWXĒŸÎĚ
In his analysis of inertia, Hutton used as his basic 
premise nothing short of the conservation of force. This 
was the only occasion when he stated that principle so 
explicitly and envisaged it so clearly as more than just 
the Cartesian idea of conservation of motion. Moreover, 
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he attempted, albeit in very rudimentary form, a distinction 
between what we would call force and energy_ So important 
is this passage as an illustration of Hutton's deep concern 
over dynamics, ·that it merits lengthy quotation: 
"Inertia is properly a quality of natural 
bodies, in like manner as is weight. It is 
not a moving, nor a resisting, power properly 
speaking, but a capacity for persevering in a 
state, whether of motion or of rest, but with-
out having an active, power to resist a change. 
Without making this distinction between power 
and capacity, it is impossible to understand 
the nature of inertia. 
Inertia is a law of action and passion, 
by which motion is translated from one body 
to another, as well as continued in the body 
which has been made to change its place • 
..• let us suppose a certain species of matter, 
which did not gravitate, to have inertia. 
What would be the nature of this thing? If, 
according to the common notion of matter, this 
be a thing which is extended, then it is a body 
with magnitude and figure, and now we may consider 
it in relation to gravitating bodies which have 
inertia and momentum. 
Let the body which does not gravitate be 
impelled by the body moving with momentum; I 
ask, In what manner, or according to what rule, 
is the velocity of the moving body to be divided 
between the two bodies? According to the rule 
of our experience, the gravitating body should 
move the opposing body, without losing any of 
its own velocity; and this would be the creation 
of motion without a cause, or the action of one 
body upon another without any reaction, which is 
inconsistent with the actual course of nature. 
113. 
Let us again suppose the gravitating body 
at rest, impelled by the body which moves with 
inertia but without momentum. In that case, the 
two bodies must either move together, or both 
rest. If the bodies move, here is motion created, 
and momentum, from nothing If again, the 
two bodies do not move, but remain at rest in 
conjunction, here is motion annihilated, or 
action ended without reaction or effect. Thus we 
are led into conclusions which cannot be admitted 
It has now been shown that this thing, 
moving only with inertia, could not move any of 
the bodies of the material universe, without 
creating foraa which it has not, as having no 
ŴŤÙŦUWHHŸĨĚ
That this argument applied to other processes as 
well as to velocity and momentum, was apparent from his 
adding that neither heat nor light act by their weight, 
figure or volume, and that they are not physical bodies, 
but powers. 
3) In addition to his belief in the non-creation of 
power, Hutton believed that all powers of attraction are 
commutable or correlated by virtue of their common origin 
in 'gravitating matter', and that all repulsive powers are 
correlated by virtue of their common origin in 'solar 
44 
substance'. 4) He concluded that heat is not a direct 
product of fire, but that phlogiston or solar substance is 
produced first, and then heat. Much of the non-theological 
criticism of his geological theory, as various scholars 
45 have shown recently, focussed on the nature of his heat. 
His idea that heat was a power, sometimes dormant, sometimes 
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active, which could become manifest without the accompaniment 
of combustion struck some contemporaries as sheer fantasy; 
one critic46 complained that his entire theory of the earth 
depended upon the supposition of a perpetual central heat, 
capable of melting limestone and elevating continents, yet 
generated and supported without combustion - a substance 
with which the critic, at least, had never had any 
acquaintance. This criticism was inaccurate, for Hutton 
had asserted that the earth's heat derived initially from 
sunlight, and that the commutations of solar substance, 
the earth's heat and animal and vegetable life were the 
principal functions of the macrocosmic oeconomy, whose 
grand final cause was life itself. The following extract 
from his 1794 Dissertation illustrates his vision admirably: 
"It is the light of the sun which is here 
stored up on the substance of vegetable 
bodies, as fixed light or phlogiston, the 
principle of fire. Consequently, however 
this light of our fire may appear to differ 
in some small respects from that which comes 
immediately from the sun, we cannot suppose 
them as any way essentially different, but 
must conclude that they are fundamentally 
the same, that the light of the sun ••• is 
continually flowing into this planet, for 
the purpose of actuating the terraqueous 
system of this earth, and for enlivening 
animal and vegetable ŞŬTÙŤVĒŸİĚ
Despite the criticisms of Hutton's ideas on heat and 
his theory of the earth, his consuming interest in dynamical 
agents was firmly within the British tradition which had 
grown from Newton's work, which had been and was still 
discussed by British philosophers, (one of whom, Dugald 
Sterart, was in Edinburgh contemporaneously with Hutton), 
th 
and which had been an important feature of 18 century 
British chemistry (to wit, the works of John Keill, Stephen 
Hales (1677-1761) and Joseph Black), and of British 
physiology. One scholar suggested recently that the 
interest in latent heat during the late 18th century among 
British natural philosophers was partly responsible for 
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f . h . 48 the success 0 BOSCOV1C eanlsm. Latent heat, which Hutton 
probably learned of directly from Joseph Black, became an 
integral part of his earth theory and therefore helped to 
avail him of the Boscovichean tradition for constructing 
his own theory of matter. Not only did his matter accord 
well with certain key ideas in his doctoral dissertation, 
but it may reasonably be suggested to have been at the 
foundation of his theory of the earth. Although his 
matter theory never became popular, it did impress a few 
natural philosophers, of whom John Playfair and Humphrey 
Davy are now to be discusserl. 
John Playfair (1748-1819) 
Playfair moved in the same academic circles in 
Edinburgh as Hutton, and was professor of mathematics 
there when he published his IZZustrations of the Huttonian 
theory of the earth 49 in 1802. Playfair greatly admired 
Hutton's earth theory. However, what historians have 
not pointed out was Playfair's admiration of, and indebted-
ness to, his theory of matter, which can be seen in 
Playfair's own OutZines of natural ŮUÙŨŬVŬŮUXŸÕĚ Despite 
the fact that many parts of that work read like a didactic 
textbook of physics (which is largely what was intended). 
the author did raise some polemic and philosophical points. 
Tucked away among the definitions and terse statements of 
physical principles, there were propositions which revealed 
Playfair's own matter theory, which resembled Hutton's 
and Boscovich's. For instance, in section 2, 'Properties 
of matter', there was that seminal sentence from Newton's 
Optiaks: 
"It is probable that even in the densest 
bodies, the quantity of solid matter is 
very small, compared with the quantity of 
51 
empty space". 
Playfair developed Newton's speculation in his section 
on dynamics, where he proposed that bodies could be treated 
52 quite satisfactorily as mere pOints of power. But the 
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nature of pm.,er or force was itself an enigma, and 
the best that Playfair could do was to give a kinematic 
definition, F = v , adding that 
. 
t 
"It has been disputed, whether this expression 
of the force be a necessary truth, or one 
known only from experience. LD'Alembert, Elemens 
de Phil. Melanges, tom. 4, p.197/. It seems, 
however, to be a definition, or an assumption, 
and not a theorem. We have no distinct idea 
attached to the word FORCE, which we can compare 
with that which is conveyed by the formula • , v 
in order to see whether there is a t 
necessary agreement or not. But as the 
gllimtity ŸĚis of great importance, and of frequent 
-;-
t occurence in mechanical investigations, 
it is convenient to have a term to denote it •••• 
The Vlord FORCE has in reality, in dynamics, no 
other signification than this; ••• and an entire 
treatise of dynamics might be written, in which 
the word FORCE would not once ŬȘȘẀŲĒŸĨĚ
Playfair rounded off his treatise with a philosophical 
analysis of force, examining in particular the question 
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that Newton had posed - whether gravitation with its inverse 
square law is an essential property of all matter. 
all attempts to reduce gravitation to something more 
fundamental had failed, Playfair believed it to be an 
Since 
essential and true agent.in Nature. But that was not the 
end of the issue, for in the very last paragraph of the 
treatise he forecast what future investigations into power 
would yield. That forecast was soon to be fulfilled 
magnificently. 
"If, on the other hand, we consider 
how many different laws seem to regulate 
the other phenomena of the material world, 
as in the action of Impulse, Cohesion, 
Elasticity, Chemical Affinity, Crystallization, 
Heat, Light, Magnetism, Electricity and 
Galvanism, the existence of a principle more 
general than any of these, and connecting 
all of them with that of Gravitation, appears 
highly probable. 
The discovery of this great principle may 
be an honour reserved for a future age, and 
Science may again have to record names which 
are to stand on the same levels with those of 
NEWTON and LAPLACE. About such ultimate 
attainments, it were unwise to be sanguine, 
and unphilosophical to TŤVŮŠÙŲĒŸÏĚ
If Hutton's theory of matter, or one very similar 
to it, influenced Playfair's own ideas on matter, why did 
he not cite Hutton? Why did he cite Boscovich once only 
in his Outlines, and then on a tame point which had nothing 
to do with his dynamics? And why was his most readily 
acknowledged mentor in dynamics, especially in the 
philosophical principles of that science, Leibniz? The 
first point to realize is that Playfair's treatise was a 
text in science, and not one in natural philosophy; it was 
full of succinct definition, mathematical formulae and 
careful, unspeculative discussion. Clearly, he believed 
that whatever merits lay in the theories of Hutton and 
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Boscovich - and he must have been well acquainted with them -
the problem of power and force Vlould require mathematical 
investigation if a lasting solution was to be found. 
That was surely why he cited Newton, Leibniz, Laplace, 
D'Alembert and Euler, but never Hutton, and Boscovich 
only once, and why, though he hinted at a Huttonian or 
Boscovichean-type theory of matter, it was not discussed 
seriously except at the very end. Even then, Hutton and 
Boscovich were not mentioned explicitly, for he predicted 
that the discoverer of the all-embracing principle of 
power would be another Newton or Laplace, namely, a 
philosopher who could handle the issue with the rigour of 
mathematics. 
The next philosopher to be discussed did not approach 
the problem of power in the rigourously mathematical way 
that Playfair predicted, but he did contribute enormously 
to its experimental and theoretical analysis. 
philosopher was Humphrey Davy. 
Humphrey Davy (1778-1829) 
That 
Davy's introduction to science had been his reading 
of Lavoisier's ØŲŠÙWŸĚ NŨŸÜŤŪWŠÙŲŤĚ de Chemie in the 
original French at the age of nineteen, while apprentised 
to a surgeon-apothecary in Cornwall. Thereafter, Davy 
educated himself in natural philosophy and particularly 
in chemistry. From October 1798 until February 1801 he 
worked under Dr. Thomas Beddoes (1760-1808) at his 
experimental medical institute in Bristol, and Beddoes' 
approach to medicine, specifically his interest in the 
curative qualities of gases, inevitably influenced Davy. 
Davy's earliest published papers appeared in a book edited 
by Beddoes in 1799; they were 'Experimental essays on heat, 
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light and the combinations of light, with a new theory 
of respiration, and observations on the chemistry of 
ŨÙȚŤHŸĪĚand 'Experimental essays on the generation of 
phosoxygen (oxygen gas), and on the causes of the colours 
. b' ,56 of organ1c e1ngs. Those essays will be discussed first, 
to show how certain major issues of his later writings, 
particularly power, occurred already in his first public-
ation, and also to show that he had studied Hutton's 
theory of matter by 1799 and had found it stimulating. 
Then, Davy's Elements of chemical philosophy (l8l2)57Will 
be discussed, where his earlier views, particularly on the 
composition of matter, became much more explicit. Thirdly, 
his Bakerian lectures to the Royal Society of London will 
be discussed vis-a-vis the evolution of his ideas 'on power 
and matter from 1806 until 1826. His final stand on those 
themes will be shown in extracts from his last work, 
Consolations in travel ĜÍĮĨÌĞŸĮĚ
Davy's essay on heat, light and the combinations of 
light was remarkable. Though only twenty years old, he 
showed considerable skill at discussing fundamental 
problems in natural philosophy, and despite his poetic, 
Romantic background and consequent willingness to give vent 
to his fertile imagination, he described many careful 
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experiments that he and o1:hers had done. These experimental 
details must have given considerable authority to the 
hypotheses he advanced in the essays. One of these 
hypotheses was the purely dynamic nature of heat. Like 
Hutton, he considered heat a manifestation of light under 
certain conditions of motion, and he rejected Lavoiser's 
theory of combustion for much the same reasons as Hutton 
had: namely, that heat was not material and that the 
French chemists had neglected the role of light in 
combustion and respiration. Davy considered atmospheric 
oxygen, which he called 'phosoxygen', to be a combination 
of elemental oxygen plus light, and that the initial event 
in combustion was liberation of light; heat was a secondary 
event, dependent on the release of ŨÙŦUWŸĲĚ Hutton, whom 
Davy cited60for his combustion theory, had espoused a 
slightly different explanation, namely, that light occurred 
in combination with combustible matter and was released in 
various forms from it - and not from the oxygen. They both 
emphasized the central role of light, not only in combustion 
but in other natural phenomena too. Indeed, for Davy, 
light was a sort of protean spirit which related all 
Nature's agen-ts and phenomena one to another: 
"Bodies perfectly black must subtract so 
much of the repulsive motion of light, as to 
deprive it of its repulsive projectile form. 
The electric fluid is probably light in a 
condensed state, that is, not supplied with 
the repulsive motion sufficient to give it 
repulsive projection. Its chemical action 
upon bodies is similar to that of light, and 
when supplied with repulsive motion by friction, 
or by contact of bodies from which it is 
capable of subtracting it, it takes the 
repulsive projectile form, and becomes 
perceptible as light. It is extremely probable 
that the great quantity of this fluid almost 
everywhere diffused on our earth, is produced 
by the condensation of light, from the sub-
traction of its repulsive motion at the poles, 
by the revolution of the earth on its axis, 
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and given off in the form of repulsive, projectile 
light, whilst a quantity equal to that 
given off frofl its equilibrating principle 
is supplied continually from the other parts 
of the globe. No more sublime idea can be 
formed of the motions of matter, than to 
conceive that the different species are 
continually changing into each other. The 
gravitative, the mechanical, and the repulsive 
motions appear to be continually mutually 
producing each other, and from these changes 
all the phenomena of the mutation of matter 
probably arisen?l 
As had Hutton, Davy saw light as the primum movens in the 
oeconomy of Nature, as that agent which united the organic 
and inorganic realms, and as that field in which the most 
important discoveries would be made?2 Davy's vision of 
the universal power of light was even broader than Hutton's; 
it embraced Man as well as Nature, and led him to God, whose 
Will was the ultimate law and source of power. 
"Light enters into the composition of living 
bodies. To understand these combinations is 
of infinite importance to man. On the 
existence of this principle in organic compounds, 
perception, thought and happiness appear to 
depend. 
Life, then, may be considered as a 
perpetual series of peculiar corpuscular 
changes; and the living body as the being in 
which these changes take place. Perceptions, 
ideas, pleasures and pains are the effects of 
these changes. They are consequently found 
to be continually varying. The laws of mind, 
then, probably are not different from the laws 
of corpuscular motion. Every change in our 
sensations must be accompanied by some 
correspondent change in the organic matter of 
the body. These changes, an extensive and 
philosophic chemistry may enable us to estimate. 
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Thus, essential then is LIGHT to 
perceptive existence. All organic sensitive 
beings with which we are acquainted appear 
totally unable to exist without phosoxygen. 
We may consider the sun and the fixed 
stars ••. as immense reservoirs of light destined 
by the great ORGANISER to diffuse over the 
universe organization and animation. And thus 
will the laws of gravitation, as well as the 
chemical laws, be considered as subservient to 
one grand end, PERCEPTION. Reasoning thus, it 
will not appear impossible that one law alone 
may govern and act upon matter: an energy of 
mutation, impressed by the will of the Deity, a 
law which might be called the law of animation, 
tending to produce the greatest possible sum of 
perception, the greatest possible sum of 
UŠŮŮÙŪŤVVHHŸĨĚ
These ideas on the unity of Nature, the conunutability 
of the powers of the universe, the vast scope for chemistry 
and its potential benefit to mankind, remained with Davy 
throughout his life and were discussed in even his most 
rigourously experimental writings. The sources for these 
ideas would take a whole book to discuss?4 May it suffice 
here to mention three sources: Firstly, Davy had access to 
various libraries during his years in Cornwall before 
working under Deddoes; according to one of his recent 
65 biographers, he read Locke, Hume, Hartley, Berkeley and 
123 
other Scottish philosophers, including Hutton, and apparently 
delighted in metaphysics. Secondly, at Bristol he became 
a close friend of Coleridge and Robert Southey (1774-1843), 
and from their circle he acquired a Naturphilosophie vision 
66 
of Nature. Like them, he had a poet's view of things, 
which was for him no less valid and no less verifiable than 
, ŸĚ
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thecareful constructs of the scientist. Thirdly, Thomas 
Beddoes' inspiring ideas on the role of natural philosophy, 
which he elaborated in his introductory essay to the 1799 
treatise, greatly impressed Davy. For instance, Beddoes 
asserted that 
"The science of human nature is altogether 
incapable of division into independent 
branches •••. the moralist and the metaphysician 
will each to a certain extent encroach upon the 
province of the physiologist. Every code of 
morals must ground its precepts on a comprehensive 
view of the la\'1s that regulate feeling, and 
deliver the conditions of an offensive and de-
fensive league, having for its object the well-
being of individuals. Without accurate ideas, 
therefore, of the causes that affect the personal 
condition of mankind, how is it possible to 
conceive any progress in genuine morality? And 
will not every addition to this brance of 
knowledge necessarily tend to purify morals -
that is, to introduce into the social compact 
covenants more beneficial to the parties? 
ŸẂÙĚthout reference to the body, it is equally 
impossible to unfold the nature of the mind. 
Physiology therefore - or more strictly, biology -
by which I mean the doctrine of the living 
system in all its states, appears to be the 
founda-l:ion of ethics and- ŮŪŤẀÜŠWŬŨŬŦXHHŸİĚ
The aim of Beddoes' book was to promote man's knowledge 
of himself, in the belief that education was an apprentice-
ship to UŠŮŮÙŪŤVVŸĮĚ Davy shared that belief. 
One ambiguity in Davy's essay was the constitution of 
matter. Powers were important, but he also employed material 
corpuscles. Unlike Hutton, who used the word 'substance' 
much as we today use the word 'something', namely to 
denote any existent whose nature need not be specified, 
Davy clearly meant something substantial whenever he used 
'substance', 'corpuscle' or 'body'. For that reason, 
he was emphatic when he believed something to be immaterial, 
such as heat?9 Light he considered corpuscular, often 
calling it 'repulsive projectile motion'; in this he 
differed from Hutton, citing Erasmus Darwin's Zoonomia, 
Newton's Opticks and some experiments of his own for 
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support. However, it is worth repeating that he cited 
Hutton whenever he wished to refute Lavoisier's combustion 
theory, Lavoisier's error having been " ••• the assumption 
of the imaginary fluid caloric, and the total neglect of 
l ' It,,71 1.g 1 • 
Davy's second essay in Beddoes' collection was totally 
different from the first, being concerned largely with 
experimental chemistry and scarcely with the problems of 
light, heat etc. Together, these essays show that he 
was a corpuscularian, though acquainted with the arguments 
of at least one recent dynamical philosopher, Hutton. 
One Davy scholar, D.M. OŪÙŦUWŸÎUŠVĚshown that he was still 
a corpuscularian during his early years at the Royal 
Institution, although he was then becoming acquainted with 
Boscovicheanism: for instance, his predecessor in the 
chair of chemistry, Thomas Garnett (1766-1802) was 
discussing Boscovich in his lectures in 1801: 
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"Our ideas of impenetrability less certain 
than we we have suspected. It is highly 
probable that the tangible particles of 
matter are not in contact, but are connected 
by mechanical forces, which, like gravity, 
act at a distance. Theory of Father Boscovich,,?3 
In the same year, the Philosophical Magazine published 
a brief biographical article on Boscovich, and Priestley had 
earlier discussed his work. According to Knight, by his 
first Continental tour in 1815 with Lady Davy and his 
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assistant, Michael Faraday (1791-1867), Davy was a convinced 
Boscovichean. Here, we shall see certain stages in the 
development of his theory of matter. 
In his Elements of Chemiaal Philosophy (1812), Davy 
used his previous key ideas on the constitution of matter, 
though modified by recent and important experiments. The 
main cause of these modifications was the new experimental 
study of the voltaic apparatus. Davy was one of the earliest 
investigators of voltaic electricity, and by 1806, when he 
gave his first ŁŠŸÛŤŲÙŠŪĚ lecture, he had become the great 
authority on it. His studies showed that a strong 
connection, indeed a rigorous quantitative one, existed 
between voltaic action or power and its various effects of 
heat, light and chemical change. As he wrote in his 
historical introduction to the Elements, 
"Bodies combine with a force, which in many 
ways is correspondent to their power of 
exhibiting electrical polarity by contact; 
and heat, or heat and light, are produced 
in proportion to the energy of their 
combination. Vivid inflammation occurs in 
a number of cases in which gaseous matter is 
I 
1 
not fixed; and this phenomenon happens 
in various instances without the interference 
74 
of free or combined oxygen". 
As in 1799, he was eager to emphasize the importance 
of power in his dualistic view of matter; for instance, the 
127. 
greatest praise went to Newton for "his distinct philosophical 
elucidation of the powers which produce the changes and 
apparent transmutations of the substances belonging to the 
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earth" . Later in the book he returned to this transmutation 
theme, calling it a "sublime chemical speculation, sanctioned 
by the authority of Hooke, Newton and Boscovich"?6 This 
was his only mention of Boscovich, but Boscovichean ideas 
occurred elsewhere, as in the introduction where he asserted 
that whether matter is corpuscular, or merely physical points 
endowed with attraction and repulsion, still the same 
conclusions would be reached about the powers and quantities 
whereby reactions occur. 
Davy suspected strongly by now that Nature's powers 
were correlated with one another, for his electrochemical 
researches indicated this. One important consequence was 
that he now suspected light was a wholly dynamical phenomenon; 
he cited an experiment by Rumford, who 
" ••• has lately shewn that the quantity of 
light emitted by a given portion of inflammable 
matter in combustion is proportional in some 
high ratio to the elevation of temperature; and 
that a lamp having many wicks near each other, 
so to communicate heat, burns with much more 
brilliancy in proportion to the consumption of 
oil than the Argand's lamps in common use,,?7 
Davy ""as still unwilling to corruni t himself to a 
theory of light; he quoted a long passage from Newton's 
Opticks showing how well a corpuscular theory accounted 
for phenomena like double refraction. Nonetheless, his 
new readiness to discuss light as a dynamical agent was 
a significant departure from 1799 and brought him more in 
line with Hutton. Moreover, his opposition to the French 
anti-phlogistonists had become even stronger, for recent 
researches seemed to show that no peculiar substance, or 
form of matter, was necessary for light, that it was a 
general result of the reactions of any substances possessing 
strong chemical or electrical properties, and that it was 
always consequent on intense motion. There was a clear 
kinship between this view and Hutton's combustion theory, 
(although Hutton was not cited explicitly in the EZements) : 
Hutton had also asserted that the source of light and heat 
was within the combustible matter itself, and not in the 
oxygen; that this source, which he called 'solar substance', 
was essentially the chemical power vlhich held combustible 
matter together; and that light and heat \'lere powers of 
common origin, though not themselves identical. 
If Davy's ideas were so similar to Hutton's, why did 
he not admit his indebtedness? One reason might have 
been that Hutton was not an experimentalist, whereas Davy 
valued experimentation and used it to check his Romantic 
exuberance. 'l'his was what set him apart from his friends, 
Shelley, Coleridge and Wordsworth, and whilst Wordsworth 
wrote that 
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"Poetry is the breath and finer spirit of 
all knowledge; it is the impassioned 
expression which is the countenance of all 
sCience,,:8 
Davy proposed that 
"A few undecompounded bodies, \'/hich may 
perhaps ultimately be resolved into still 
fewer elements, or which may be different 
forms of the same material, constitute the 
whole of our tangible universe of things. 
By experiment they are discovered, ••• and 
experiment is, as it were, the chain that 
binds down the Proteus of Nature, and obliges 
it to confess its real form and divine origin"?9 
Davy was willing to entertain ingenious hypotheses and 
b-cr 
metaphysical speculations, but these had to be ȘŬŲŲŬŸŠWŤTĚ
by experimental evidence before being admitted to his 
serious chemical writings. Where he was not writing as 
a chemist, but as a philosopher, he did commit such ideas 
to print more readily, as in his posthumous Consolation in 
travel; or the Zast days of a philosopher (1830). There, 
in dialogue VII, Eubathes said 
"On the hypothesis of Boscovitch, which is 
well explained in the Institutio Physica 
of Mako, matter, as well as I recollect, is 
supposed to be composed of indivisible 
pOints endowed with attraction and repulsion, 
which are assumed to be both physical and 
chemical elements". 
To which the Unknown, who stood for Philo-chemicus, 
replied: 
"You mistake me if you suppose I have adopted 
a system like the HOMOOIA of Anaxagoras, and 
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that I suppose the elements to be 
physical molecules endowed with the 
properties of the bodies we believe 
to be indecomposable. On the contrary, 
••. I consider them, with Boscovitch, 
merely as points possessing weight and 
attractive and repulsive powers; and 
composing, according to the circumstances 
of their arrangements either spherules or 
regular solids, and capable of assuming 
either one form or the ŬWUŤŲŨŨŸÕĚ
Turning back to Davy's Bakerian lectures to the 
Royal Society of London, of which he gave six between the 
years 1806 and 1826 and in which he described the latest 
state of electrochemistry, we find that his principal 
persistent problem was to explain the source of voltaic 
power. volta's own explanation of how his 'pile' and 
'crown of cups' worked was that electricity was generated 
and maintained by the mere contact of dissimilar metals; 
since no activity could be discerned in a state of contact, 
volta's hypothesis implied that the electrical effect 
might be sui generis and its continuance might be an 
instance of perpetual motion. Volta wisely did not 
elaborate much on this implication, but he did express 
't81 excitement at 1 • 
Repeatedly, Davy was to refute this implication of 
volta's hypothesis j and in so doing he inquired into the 
primary source of all phenomena associated with electricity 
- of electricity itself, of electrochemical activity, light 
and heat. His thoughts are to be found especially in 
those sections of the Bakerian lectures where he discussed 
the theoretical infrastructure of his work. Repeatedly, 
l3C 
he suggested that a single power subsumed the different 
phenomena and powers exhibited in electrochemistry; 
he also warned that that hypothesis was unproven and 
would probably long remain so. So, in the first lecture 
he said: 
"In the present state of our knowledge, it 
would be useless to attempt to speculate 
on the remote cause of the electrical 
energy, or the reason why different bodies, 
after being brought into contact, should 
be found differently electrified; its 
relation to chemical affinity is, however, 
sufficiently evident. May it not be 
identical with it, and an essential property 
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of matter?" 
In the third lecture (1809), he ended on the same 
theme: 
"I venture to hint at these notions; but I do 
not attach much importance to them; the age 
of chemistry is not yet sufficiently mature 
for such discussions; the more subtile powers 
of matter are but just beginning to be 
considered; and all general views concerning 
them must as yet rest upon feeble and 
imperfect £ŬẀŪTŠWÙŬŪVĒŸĨĚ
His most sanguine discussion of this theme came in 
the last lecture (1826). By then, he had the satisfaction 
of knowing that the electrochemical hypothesis he had 
proposed twenty years earlier was still viable, and in 
view of the recent discoveries of Hans Christian Oersted 
(1777-1851) and Domenico Morichini (1773-1836) he believed 
that electrochem.stry could be connected with a whole new 
range of phenomena, and that 
1_-, , .j .•• 
II many of the complicated phenomena 
of corpuscular changes, now obscure, will 
ultimately be found to depend upon the 
same causes, and to be governed by the 
same laws; and that the simplicity of 
our scientific arrangements will increase 
with every advance in the true knowledge 
of ŪŠWẀŲŤŨŨŸÏĚ
Even in that sixth lecture, Davy felt it necessary 
to refute again Volta's original contact hypothesis, 
which was so opposed to his own belief in the inter-
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dependence of Nature's powers. 
Another feature of Davy's Bakerian lectures, and one 
which is a major reason for including him in this 
TÙVVŤŲWŸŬŪHĚwas that whenever he discussed the future 
applications of electrochemistry, the foremost were in 
animal and plant physiology. This is hardly surprising, 
since his first ambition was to study medicine, and in 
1804 he was enrolled as a commoner at Jesus College, 
Cambridge, for that purpose. The medical and physiological 
poten-tial of his work \-las often in his mind, as his first 
lecture shows: 
"As acid and alkaline substances are capable 
of being separated from their combinations 
in living systems by electrical powers, there 
is every reason to believe -that by converse 
methods they may be likewise introduced into 
the animal economy, or made to pass through 
the animal organs: and the same thing may 
be supposed of metallic oxides; and these 
ideas ought to lead to some ne\" investigations 
in medicine and ŮUXVÙŬŨŬŦXŨŨŸĬĚ
Davy himself did electrochemical experiments on 
plant and animal tissue, particularly on the Mediterranean 
torpedo fish, and his prediction of the impact of 
electochemistry on medicine and physiology was to be 
fulfilled amply. 
He concluded his first lecture with an inspiring 
vision of the universality of electricity, a vision in 
keeping with his Romantic background and which revealed 
his keen awareness of the sheer power he was putting into 
man's hands: he could easily imagine a limit to the 
electrical energies that natural substances possessed, 
whereas the powers of man's electrical instruments seemed 
capable of indefinite increase; Nature would soon be at 
87 
man's mercy. Indeed, Davy was a magnificent vindication 
of Bacon's belief that in acquiring knowledge, man would 
acquire power. Davy was exhilarated by it; man would 
become Prometheus, and thus would his divine parentage 
(Adam 't'las created in the image of God) be fulfilled. He 
put these aspirations most eloquently in dialogue V of 
the Consolationa in travel; the dialogue was called 'The 
Chemical Philosopher', and in the words of the Unknown 
he said 
"How different is man in his highest state 
of cultivation! every part of his body 
covered with the products of different 
chemical and mechanical arts ..• extracting 
metals from the rude ore and giving to them 
a hundred different shapes for a thousand 
different purposes; ..• making the winds 
carry him on every part of the immense ocean; 
and compelling the elements of air, water and 
even fire, as it were, to labour for him; 
ÍJŸĨĚ.. : 
concentrating in small space materials 
which act as the thunderbolt and 
directing their energies so as to destroy 
at immense distances; blasting the rock, 
removing the mountain, carrying water 
from the valley to the hill; perpetuating 
thought in imperishable words, rendering 
immortal the exertion of genius and 
presenting them as common property to all 
awakening minds - becoming, as it were, the 
true image of divine intelligence receiving 
and bestowing the breath of life in the 
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influence of civilization". 
"In short, in every branch of the 
common and fine arts, in every department 
of human industry, the influence of this 
science Lchemistr.ll is felt, and we may find 
in the fable of Prometheus taking the flame 
from heaven to animate his man of clay, an 
emblem of the effects of fire in its application 
to chemical purposes in creating the activity, 
and almost the life, of civil VŬȘÙŤWXHHŸĲĚ
That power was in the offing, above all else, can be 
seen in this final extract: 
"And the inventions connected with the steam 
engine, at the same time that they have greatly 
diminished labour of body, have tended to 
increase power of mind and intellectual 
resources. "Adam Smith well observes that 
manufacturers are always more ingenious than 
husbandmen: and manufacturers who use machinery 
will probably always be found more ingenious 
than handicraft ÜŠŪẀȚŠȘWẀŲŤŲVĒŸÕĚ
The dialogue of 'The Chemical Philosopher' was nothing 
short of a paean of praise to power, power in both a purely 
scientific and a sociological setting. From the powers 
of Nature, Davy saw man with his chemical skills and his 
knowledge of the correlations among those powers, making 
and wielding his own personal power. Man did not create 
his own power, for it existed already as Nature's powers; 
in this respect, man would always be below the gods, and 
like Prometheus he could borrow their powers for his own 
ends. Such was the glittering prize that Humphrey Davy, 
the dying philosopher, had won and was bequeathing to 
mankind. 
Various scholars have examined the way in which 
Michael Faraday took up certain of Davy's ideas. D.M. 
Knight9land Peirce Williams;2in particular, have examined 
Faraday's conversion to Boscovicheanism; and although 
it is tempting to discuss their work here, we must desist, 
for we would be straying too far from the purpose of this 
thesis. Besides, the physiologists who will be discussed 
in the following chapters were far better acquainted with 
Davy's speculations on the nature of matter than with 
Faraday's. Faraday's first public indication of his 
Boscovicheanism was in 1844, which is close to the end 
of the period covered by this thesis. 
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Chapter 5 On power or force in the physiologies 
of six British physiologists of the early 
th 19 Century: John Bostock (1773-1846), 
Charles Bell (1774-1842), Thomas Bateman 
(1778-1821), Thomas Southwood Smith (1788-
1861), Marshall Hall (1790-1857) and 
William Pulteney Alison (1790-1859). 
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This chapter discusses the dynamical physiologies of 
several figures who were well-known and widely-read in their 
day. Their ideas on power were not identical, though one 
idea they held in common was that power or force, (which 
were usually still regarded synonymously), was the central 
concept in the animal oeconomy, and therefore that to 
comprehend that concep-t, especially vis-a.-vis its operations 
in the inorganic world, would unfold the basis of life. 
Almost without exception, these physiologists eschewed non-
dynamical explanations of life; they had little time for 
chemical explanations of vital functions, though they did 
appreciate the skillfullness of the chemical researches 
of Antoine Lavoisier (1743-1794), William Prout (1785-1850), 
Friedrich Tiedemann (1781-1861) and Leopold Gmelin (1788-
1853); to them, chemistry did not seem a penetrating enough 
tool in physiology. One oft-cited example they gave of 
the limitations of chemistry was the study of 'animal heat'; 
Dulong and Despretz had shown that about 80% of an animal's 
\'Tarrnth could be generated by the chemical process of 
respiration, but that left 20% unaccountable except by 
essentially dynamic agents like vital or nervous forces. 
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These physiologists were conspicuous for their 
reliance on experimentation done by their contemporaries 
and immediate precursors, and occasionally by themselves, 
for their avoidance of speculation and metaphysics, and 
for their reticence before advocating their own hypotheses. 
Even those of them who were not experimentalists took note 
of other men's experiments and were much less ready to 
theorize than men like Erasmus Darwin, Cullen and Brown had 
been. Physiology had become sober, if not quite a science, 
by the 1820s. However, they still used philosophical 
principles to bolster their physiological ideas, and Locke, 
Reid and Stewart were cited often to support their scientific 
arguments. The methods of the natural philosopher were not 
obsolete. 
Their use of power will be discussed in three contexts, 
namely, in theories of fever, muscle action and blood 
circulation; these were key themes in their physiologies, 
and powers or forces seemed to be especially useful in 
elucidating them. 
John Bostock, a Liverpool physician, was the first of 
the group to write a comprehensive treatise on physiology. 
As early as 1804 he began to gain a reputation with his 
This was a careful review of recent 
British and Continental researches, in which Bostock 
endorsed the Lavoisierean doctrine. Despite the work that 
had been done on respiration, Bostock felt that physiology 
as a whole had scarcely progressed, and the purpose of his 
three-volume Elementary system of physioZogy2 (1824, 1826 
and 1827) was to promote "asystematic and connected view 
of modern physiology": a deficiency which surprised him 
in view of the distinguished part which he believed 
British physiologists had played in unravelling the 
animal oeconomy. As one historian has mentioned ŲŤȘŤŪWŨQŸĚ
Bostock pitted himself vigourously against vitalism. 
consequently, he was interested in the relations between 
vital functions and external, physico-chemical powers. 
The question, whether vital activity could be explained 
by either purely inorganic agents or by some basic form 
of power common to both living and inorganic systems, 
directed the whole treatise. In the light of current 
knowledge he admitted, regretfully, that the correlation he 
had been seeking could not be proven. However, he did 
assert that vital activity was critically dependent on 
inorganic powers; in discussing muscular contractility, he 
pointed out that 
" ••• this power is never exercised without 
the agency of some direct, independent 
cause, to which the name of a stimulant has 
been applied; and we arrive at this conclusion, 
not merely from the general principle that 
every effect in nature must have its appropriate 
cause, .•• but from actually observing that 
when we see muscular contraction taking place, 
and have an opportunity of examining all the 
previous circumstances, we can assign the 
exact event that has produced the ȘŬŪWŲŠȘWÙŬŪĒŸĚ
To establish the need for an external stimulus for 
muscle activity was not, of course, to say that the size 
of the muscular action depended rigourously on the size of 
the stimulating power. To that end, he reviewed the 
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caloric, chemical, electrical and other hypotheses of 
contractility, concluding that there was strong evidence 
for 
Hence, 
II a very intimate connexion between 
the chemical composition of the fibre 
and its contractile power. But they do 
not prove anything besides this; they 
demonstrate that a connexion exists between 
the two circumstances, not that one is the 
cause of the ŬWUŤŲŨŨŸĚ
" ••• in the present state of our knowledge, 
contractility ought to be regarded as the 
unknown cause of known effects, a quality 
attached to a particular species of matter 
possessed of properties peculiar to itself, 
and which we are not able to refer to any 
general principle"? 
Although this conclusion denied that contractility 
was correlatable with chemical forces, it also denied its 
correlation with any general power of vitality. For 
Bostock, the source of contractility was an important 
question, still beyond the competence of physiology. 
However, he did imply that it is not a power sui genepis, 
but depends somehow on the chemistry of muscle fibre and 
always needs a stimulus to effect it. However, unlike 
Cullen and Brown, he did not seem to enquire into the 
nature of that dependence. It could be said that in his 
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assertion above, that every effect must have its appropriate 
cause, he envisaged a truly quantitative relation, whereby 
the size of the effect would equal the size of the cause. 
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In short, what did he mean by 'appropriate'? Cullen 
and Brown had been groping towards a semi-quantitative 
principle of dependence, but Bostock is more doubtful. 
But we can say that he did not write as if he thought the 
animal oeconomy was a ŮŤŸŮŤWẀẀÜĚmobile; he was much 
interested in the interdependence of the powers and activities 
of the organism and toyed with the idea of all those powers 
depending on a single, fundamental, not necessarily vital, 
power; for instance, 
"The circulation has been stated to be the 
prime ȘŠẀVŸĚof all the rest, for it is that 
which carries to every part of the body the 
fluid which endows it with its vital properties 
and its appropriate ŮŬŴŤŲVĒŸĚ
The possibility of an overall correlation of the vital 
powers with one another and with inorganic ones became 
most evident in his discussion of the mind-body relation, 
in which he asked if mental phenomena could be put in the 
same class as material ones. His conclusion was cautious 
and revealed his aspirations for physiology and the scope 
of the doctrine of power. 
"Upon the same grounds, therefore, that we 
conceive ourselves justified in supposing 
gravitation to be a property different from 
chemical affinity, I should maintain that 
mental are essentially different from physical 
phenomena .... But in the same way that we 
have discovered galvanism and magnetism to be 
modes of electricity, so future discoveries 
may assimilate mind to matter •••• I will not 
presume to prescribe limits to our discoveries, 
either in physical or metaphysical philosophy, 
but it may be fairly argued that until such 
discoveries are made, ••• the cause of truth 
and knowledge is more effectually served by 
arranging phenomena according to their actually 
ascertained differences, than by attempting to 
generalize possible, or even imaginary, 
ŲŤVŤÜŞŨŠŪȘŤVŨŨŸĚ
It is surely reasonable to suggest that, had Bostock 
been alive when the conservation of energy was enunciated 
formally in the late l840s and when his professional 
acquaintances, Richard Fowler and William Carpenter, drew 
attention to its application to the vital economy, he 
would not have been surprised; for those ideas were emerging 
in his own physiology. Moreover, Bostock had been a close 
friend of Peter Roget during their student years in 
Edinburgh and they remained on close terms when practising; 
Roget \'Ias asserting the correlation and conservation of 
forces, especially with regard to the vital economy, during 
the 1830s. Bostock's Elementary system of physiology was 
one of the most popular textbooks in Britain until Baly's 
translation of Muller's Physiology (1840)p he was therefore 
a central figure in British avitalistic, dynamical 
physiology, but he was sufficiently critical and 'scientific' 
to realize that the time was not ripe to declare a fully 
reductionistic theory of organic powers. He died a few 
months before Helmholtz read his paper 'Ueber die Erhaltung 
der Kraft'. 
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Charles Bell is an example of a medical theorist who 
acquired considerable reputation for experimental skill, 
and whose ideas therefore on the animal economy carried 
considerable weight among the critical physiologists of 
his day_ Unlike the other theorists in this chapter, he 
rejected all hypotheses on connexions between organic and 
inorganic power, believing that the organism is truly a 
creator and destroyer of power. However, he deserves 
discussion in this thesis to show what arguments were pitted 
against the trend in physiological dynamics that I am WŸXÙŪŦĚ
to trace; to show how power was an important issue for him 
and constituted the basic distinction between living and 
inanimate matter; and because one of the contexts in which 
he discussed power, namely the circulation of the blood, 
was discussed by one of his eminent colleagues, Marshall 
Hall, and it will be instructive to compare their views. 
Bell's two treatises to be discussed have deliberately 
not been chosen from his neurological work, for that has 
d ' dId b d' I h' t ,10 , , 1 been stu ŸŤĚ a rea y y me ŸȘŠĚ ŸVĚ ŬŲŸŠŪVŮĚ a more ŬŲŸŦÍŪŠĚ
contribution would be to discuss two less studied treatises: 
his An essay on the forces which circulate the blood (1819)11 
and his beautifully written Animal ÜŤȘUŠŪÙȘVŸĚ or proofs of 
design in the animal frame ĜÍĮÎĮĞŸÎĚ
In the Essay, Bell declared himself a vitalist and 
went to great lengths to show that in the vital oeconomy 
God suspends the usual laws of inorganic mechanism. The 
most persuasive instance was the blood circulation, for if 
one considered the extent to which the body's tissues and 
the walls of the blood vessels exerted their attractive 
ÍĪÌĦŸHĚ
forces of chemical affinity and cohesion upon the blood, 
Bell thought that the heart would have to exert a greater 
force than it does, to keep the blood in motion. Therefore, 
" ••. are we to suppose that this universal 
attraction of the fluids and solids is 
negatived in the vessels of the living body, 
that the great Architect, instead of accumul-
ating forces to overcome the vast resistance, 
has annihilated it, and rendered a smaller 
force sufficient to the end ••• ?"13 
His reply was 'Yes'; that the physico-chemical powers 
within the organism are ruled by its needs; that the living 
body can originate its own notions, which ought "to lead 
us to consider it in a very different light from the 
class of inanimate objects around us ll t4 and that in the 
circulation of the blood, man surveys a new world, where 
velocity and impetus have no sufficient cause and to which 
15 the laws of familiar things do not extend. 
It is worth emphasizing that, in denying sufficient 
causes for living motions, Bell implied that this contrasted 
with the dynamics of the inorganic world, where all effects 
should have sufficient causes. This contrast was discussed 
in his Animal mechanics, a work of natural theology as well 
as anatomy and physiology. That treatise shows us that 
Sir Charles Bell, (as he was by then), not only understood 
his subject as an experimentalist, but had contemplated 
it deeply and saw himself continuing the tradition of John 
Ray (1627-1705), William Derham (1657-1735), FranQois 
Fenelon (1651-1715), William Paley (1743-1805) and William 
Wollaston (1660-1724) in natural theology. Indeed, he 
tackled his topic as persuasively and elegantly as any of them. 
The analysis of power began in part two of the 
treatise, entitled 'Showing the application of the living 
16 forces'. Having received the purely mechanical 
operations of living forces, he set out to show how the 
origins of living motions were different from those of 
mechanical forces, and how the former exhibited power and 
design far superior to anything predictable from the mere 
mechanical adjustments of living parts. Bell asserted 
that the connexion between vital and inorganic powers was 
nought, that eventhe various forms of vital power were not 
interconvertible or correlated with one another, and that 
though there was an inscrutable sympathy among living 
tissues, vitality could not be transferred from one part 
to another. These ideas were put most succinctly in a 
b 1 " . d "k 17 comparison etween a lVlng system an aJac stone: 
"The jackstone produces motion in one part 
of a machine; that, varied by mechanical 
influence, is communicated to a second; .... 
But what a base notion it is to suppose that 
the mere property of weight in the jackstone 
is like the influence of life! 
The weight is the power, in the language 
of mechanicians; but it does not reside in 
the parts of the machine, nor does it exhibit 
different qualifications in these parts. 
Separate them, and they are nothing. On the 
contrary, no one part of an animal body is in 
this manner dependent on another for its 
property of life. The property is inherent in 
the part itself, and the wonderful thing is 
that each property in the several organs 
corresponds with the others, so as to form a 
circle of vital operations. There is no 
transmission of power, in all this, from part 
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to part - no train of connection to be 
traced as from the jackstone or the spring 
along the parts of the machine. There is 
therefore, in truth, no resemblance between 
machinery and the influences in operation 
in a living ŞŬTXĒŸĮĚ
Bell had utter contempt for all hypotheses proposing 
an analogy between mere mechanism and life; the useful 
philosopher then became, in his opinion, "a very indifferent 
ŮUXŐÙŬŨŬŦÙVWHHŸĲĚ The fashionable galvanic hypotheses 
came equally mercilessly under his hammer; none of the 
powers that had been investigated outside of the vital 
oeconomy were to be countenanced. With parts of his 
argument many contemporaries must have agreed; for instance, 
how true it is that: 
"Whatever notions have prevailed in the 
schools at different epochs, of heat, 
electricity, or galvanism, we find an 
attempt to explain the phenomena of life 
by an application of the powers, with which 
they have been successful in their i.lhysical ÙŲŲĤŲẀÙŲÙŤVĒŸÕĚ
Besides, he had the authority of Newton and most 
British philosophers from Locke onwards to support his cry: 
"We here reach the limit of philosophical 
inquiry. Hitherto, all has been flattering 
to the pride of the creature. but we must 
now humbly acknowledge the inscrutable ways 
of the Creator; and ceasing to trace the 
origin of life, more than we do that of 
gravitation, we should be occupied in 
observing its laws, not in exploring its 
21 
source" • 
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Like most physiologists, Bell was fascinated by the 
continuous wearing away and restoration of the body. 
This cycle of life and death of bodily parts was 
envisaged in two ways. Almost all physiologists in the 
first few decades of the 19th century envisaged a material 
cycle, vlhereby the anatomical frame of the organism was 
conserved. But by the 1830s, a few physiologists also 
thought of a dynamic cycle, whereby the body's powers, as 
well as its particles, were conserved. By the l840s, 
some thoroughly sober physiologists were holding the 
dynamical vieT,V' in preference to the material one - much 
as Brown had done, though with much more reliance on 
empirical and experimental evidence. To this category 
belonged William Carpenter, Peter Roget and John William 
Draper of the British school, and Julius Mayer and Hermann 
Helmholtzof the German one. 
Bell belonged to the first category, for although 
power was a key idea in his physiology, it was not used 
in his view of the wearing-down and restoration of the 
organism. In this sense, T.S. Hall's assertion22that, 
even more than the marvellous architecture of the body, 
it was the intimate dynamics of vital processes that 
convinced Bell of the continuance of God's creative power 
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and guidance, needs to be qualified. Bell, it seems to me, 
was interested more in structures and movements than in 
true dynamics, when seeking God in physiology; indeed, 
his view was that of an anatomical architect, thinking of 
pillars and kingposts (his analogues of hollow bones) and 
the foundation stones of the Eddystone lighthouse (his 
analogue of the bone structure of the human foot), rather 
than of the preservation of power in the vital oeconomy. 
The same architectural spirit informed his other works 
in natural theology, namely his Bridgewater treatise on 
The hand (1832)23and his Essays (1841-1842) 24which were 
meant as appendices to Paley's Natural theology. 
Marshall Hall a colleague of Bell and an equally renowned 
neuro-anatomist and physiologist, also published a treatise 
on blood circulation; the manuscript was written by 1831 
but published only in 1844 as A critioal and experimental 
essay on the ŬÙŲŬẀŸŠWÙŬŪĚof the ŞŨŬŬTŸĪĚ Like Bell, Hall 
was interested in the powers moving and retarding the blood, 
he also tackled the phenomena of 'sympathy'. Unlike Bell, 
he did not think that vital effects could proceed from 
insufficient causes, and though emphasizing the unique, 
vital nature of the animal oeconomy, he did not condemn 
attempts to find correlations between its powers and those 
of inorganic nature. 
On the mutual connections among the vital powers, 
particularly vis-a-vis the heart and circulation, Hall used 
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Darwin's model of intertwining rings. The model illustrated 
how there was a mutual connection among the living parts, 
each part (or ring) supporting others, and the health of any 
one affecting the others. The three main rings in Hall's 
scheme represented the nervous, vascular and organic ȘÙŲȘŨŤVŸĬĚ
Throughout the essay Hall seemed to be seeking a semi-
quantitative expression of the interrelations of these 
circles. He thought he succeeded in a paper he read 
to the Royal Society of London in 1832, concerning a 
'Theory of the inverse ratio which subsists between the 
respiration and irritability in the animal ÛÙŪŦTŬÜHŸİĚ
There, he tried to give rigour to his dynamical physiology, 
and in so doing he hinted at a tight connexion - even a 
correlation (though he did ,not use that word) - between 
the powers of inorganic nature, (namely the chemical powers 
in respired air), and the powers of organic nature, (in 
the forms of irritability and contractility). In some 
features, his theory was reminiscent of Brown's, but it 
was considerably more scientific in its reliance on an 
extensive survey of comparative physiology, whose range 
and thoroughness reminds one of Vv.F. Edwards' treatise 
De Z'in!Zuence des agents physiques sur les ŮUÏŪŬÜŸŪŤVĚde 
la vie ĜÍĮÎĲĞŸĮPUÙĿUĚ in the 1830s and 1840s was a classic 
in both British and Continental comparative physiology. 
In fact, Hall cited "the extraordinary works of LEGALLOIS 
and M. EDWARDS". 
Hall's theory, which he considered of seminal 
importance, asserted that the exhaustion and restoration 
of irrito-contractility depends critically on the 
quantity of stimulus which the organism receives; that 
excessive stimulus uses up irrito-contractility, and vital 
activity is dependent on, or even correlated with, physico-
chemical stimuli - for instance, he wrote that vital 
activity " . • •• .1. S the pure effect of high VWÙÜẀŨẀVŨŨŸĲWUŠWĚ
when irrito-contractility is exhausted, rest is required 
to restore it - therefore, the animal oeconorny was not 
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considered a perpetuum mobile, although Hall did not 
enquire into the source of restoration of the irrito-
contractility; and that similarly quantitative relations 
between organic and inorganic power would be found for 
other vital functions, in addition to muscle activity. 
He aimed 
" to trace a peculiar law in the animal 
economy, through the various series, forms 
and conditions of animated being. This law 
may be announced in the following terms: 
The quantity of the respiration is inversely 
as the degree of the irritability of the 
muscular fibre":O 
He did not mean a strict mathematical relation, simply that 
when respiration is great, the degree of irritability is 
low, and vice versa. He envisaged life as a purely 
dynamic balance, resulting from stimuli impinging on parts 
endued with irritability, the principal stimuli being air, 
food and heat, the principal and corresponding organs of 
irritability being the heart, stomach and general muscular 
system. Throughout the animal kingdom, this inverse ratio 
of respiration to stimulus obtained; birds and mammals 
possessed great respiration but low muscular irritability, 
whilst reptiles, batrachia and fish possessed little 
respiration but high irritability. 
Hall was a fine experimentalist and took great care 
in constructing his instruments to measure respiration 
and irritability. He was also cautious in drawing 
conclusions, but so impressed was he by the broad inductive 
basis of this investigation that he proposed his inverse 
ratio law as the most important one for preserving ŨÙȚŤŸĚ
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it appeared to him "to constitute a chain which links 
together all the phenomena of the animal economy. I 
believe it to be the most general and inclusive in 
ÖUQŐÙŬÍÌŦXŨŨŸÍĚ
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Like Bostock, Hall would surely not have been surprised 
at the physiological applications of the correlation and 
conservation of forces, made by Fowler and Carpenter in the 
late l840s. However, I have not yet found any comments 
by him on their work. 
William Pulteney Alison studied medicine at Edinburgh, 
where he became a keen follower of Dugald Stewart who wanted 
him as his successor in the chair of moral philosophy. 
However, he remained in medicine and became an enormously 
popular and respected figure in Edinburgh medicine. As a 
physician to the New Town Dispensary he undertook a special 
study of fevers, and his reports to the Edinburgh Medical 
Journal from 1817 to 1819 were important contributions to 
febriologYi in those reports he also advocated Edward Jenner's 
(1749-1823) smallpox vaccination, which was still an unusual 
technique. From 1820 to 1855 Alison held medical chairs 
in Edinburgh and took a great interest in social conditions 
in Scotland, especially among the poor; his recommendations 
were largely embodied i.n the Poor Law of 1845. Alison is 
remembered today for his work in social medicine, but in 
his own day his OutLineR of physioZogy was quite widely read 
and with that we are concerned in this chapter. 
Comrie's assessment 320f Alison's Outlines was that it 
was largely concerned with his ideas on vital attraction 
and repulsion, which he considered to be characteristics 
of life as exhibited by the tissues. This in itself gives 
no indication of the quality of his work, and for the 
purpose of this thesis we might notice the following 
features: Alison did not seek a correlation between organic 
and ÙŪŬŲŦŠŸGȘĚpowers and he was not an experimentalist. 
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Yet he merits discussion, because power was a central concept 
in his physiology, and perhaps more than any other writer 
of his time he realized that the paradigm of power was the 
main factor distinguishing the old physiology from the 
new. He believed WUŸWĚ a true science of physiology had 
begun only when men like Cullen had focused on "The primary 
moving powers of the animal ŤȘŬŪŬÜXHHŸĨĚ Moreover, several 
of his pupils went on to become solid physiologists in 
British medical schools and took his faith in dynamical 
physiology with them. One idea of his is especially 
interesting, namely that the chemical reactions between the 
body's tissues and the blood actually aid its circulation, 
and that these reactions constitute a vis-d-fponte which 
draws the blood along. This idea was totally opposed to 
Bell's view of the circulation (see above), but it \Olas taken 
up by John William Draper in America and incorporated into 
his rather idiosyncratic and wholly dynamical physiology 
(see chapter 8). 
Despite his firmly vitalist philosophy, Alison never 
used vital force as an explanatory device in physiology; 
he was what T.S. Hall calls "a vital ÜŠWŤŲÙŠŨÙVWĒŸÏĚ in that 
the uniqueness of life simply seemed to be the logical 
induction that he could make from surveying certain 
.L 
combinations of chemical elements. He used his vitalism 
cautiously; for instance, having mentioned the apparent 
irreducibility of many organic phenomena, he concluded that 
r1oreover, 
" In so far as we can ascertain this to 
be the case, we can say that these phenomena 
are effects of the Vital Principle, or of 
Vitality; and that is our definition of these 
terms. They are the general expression for 
those of the changes occurring in living bodies, 
which we judge to be peculiar to them; and 
stand in the same relation to the science of 
physiology, as the terms chemical affinity, 
electricity, gravitation, to other departments 
of physical VȘÙŤŪȘŤĒŸĪĚ
"Of such first principles in science, we can 
give no other account, than that they depend 
on the l'Jill of the Author of Nature" ŸĬĚ
Though Alison did not explicitly champion a single, 
all-encompassing vital force, he came close to championing 
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vital affinity - the organic analogue of chemical affinity -
for that office. In his Outlines of physiology he proposed 
that when blood enters the capillary vessels of living 
tissue, it comes under the laws by which movements of 
nutritive fluids occur in both animals and vegetables, in 
addition to the propulsive power of the heart and arteries. 
Those laws were due to vital affinities, which curiously 
led him to a most. avi talistic-sounding mechanism for blood 
circulation, namely, that when the chemical changes between 
air and blood are arrested in the lungs, the heart and 
arteries fail; the circulation therefore had at its root a 
37 
chemical process. 
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Vital affinity, as well as the other powers of the 
animal economy, were discussed at even greater length in 
his OutZines of physioZogy and pathoZogy (1833). There 
too, vital affinity was exalted, albeit cautiously, as the 
most fundamental organic power: 
"Its existence will always be an ultimate 
fact in physiology; but the limits of its 
agency, and the laws according to which it 
modifies the chemical relations of substances 
subjected to it, may be ascertained; and their 
development will probably constitute the next 
great discovery in this VȘÙŤŪȘŤHHŸĮĚ
Alison thus believed the investigation of power to be 
the primary programme for physiology. For this he praised 
Haller, Cullen and John Hunter. 
"This principle was recognized in the favourite 
position of CULLEN, that medical science must 
be founded on a knowledge of the 'moving powers 
of the animal econClI!1Y' . But I think it certain that 
Cullen misunderstood the nature of these moving 
powers in one essential particular, viz. in 
supposing that the vital power of muscular 
parts is essentially dependent on an influence 
derived from the ŞŲŠÙŪHHŸĲĚ
In Alison's opinion, the truth would be found by 
investigating the powers associated with the motions of the 
blood and other fluids, and not by investigating the nerves. 
Though a vitalist, Alison clearly hoped to discover connexions, 
perhaps even correlations, bet\</een vital and physico-chemical 
powers, and thus to treat the vital economy with more rigour 
than had been possible hitherto. 
Alison's most interesting and fundamental discussion 
of power came in his chapter on the mental faculties. 
There, he considered power as the first step in natural 
theology, since it was truly an attribute of mind. In 
opposition, he cited Dr. Thomas Brown (1778-1820)40who had 
argued that no further idea could be attached to power 
than mere 'invariable antecedence', and that the notion 
of causality arose simply from appearances of contrivance 
or adaptation of means to ends. Brown's argument was 
clearly based on Hume. Alison thought that Dugald Stewart 
had answered that particular point, but that he had only 
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partially redeemed power, for his view of natural philosophy 
had been that 
" the only foundation of much of our 
belief, and the only source of much of 
our knowledge, is to be found in the 
constitution of own ÜÙŪTVĒŸŨĚ
Alison developed Stewart's view, by asserting that 
sense or perceptions were also important means for acquiring 
understanding, even of such an abstract agent as power. 
Hence, he admired both the scholastic maxim, 'Nihil in 
inteZZectu quod non fuerit in sensu', and Leibniz's addition 
thereto 'Nisi intJlZectu8 ipse'. Ultimately, just as 
Leibniz had, (see chapter 10 in this thesis), Alison based 
his belief in the reali-ty of power on the Nill of ŇŬTŸÎĚ If 
one believed in IIis Will - which Alison did, it would be 
fully meaningful to use the concept of power - which Alison 
and other physiologists were doing, and the great goal of 
science vlOuld be to understand the laws, perhaps even the 
very nature, of power - which Alison called 'the first step 
in natural WUŤŬŨÕŸQGĦĚ On the other hand, if one was aware 
of the difficulties in the interpretation of sense-
perceptions and the acquisition of knowledge generally, 
which Alison was, one would appreciate the magnitude of 
man's uncertainty de rerum natura: this was why the 
philosophers were quoted so often by Alison and his fellow 
physiologists when they wrote upon the senses. Clearly, 
162 •. '
Alison and his contemporaries believed that the pure sciences 
of physiology, physics and chemistry could never give them 
understanding of sense-perception, unless the insights of 
pure philosophy were also employed. The British physiologists 
were not alone in this belief. At the same time, similar 
ideas were alive in Germany; for instance, a brilliant 
young physiologist in Bonn was investigating sense-perceptions 
experimentally as well as philosophically; his conclusions 
were to be seminal and were, in the opinion of one of his 
future pupils, to lay the foundation for a new era in 
physiology. That young physiologist was Johannes Muller; 
his pupil was Hermann Helmholtz. They both contributed 
greatly to the physiological discussion of power. 
Neither Alison nor his pupils developed the study of 
sense perceptions, particularly vis-a-vis its philosophical 
consequences, in the magnificent way that the Germans did. 
However, John William Draper, in America, was impressed by 
Alison's pointers for future physiological research and 
developed the dynamical study of the blood and the sap of 
plants. That was one of the most fruitful consequences of 
Alison's work. 
, I 
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Thomas Southwood Smith studied first for the ministry, with 
the encouragement of William Blake (1773-1821), the poet 
and social reformer. In 1812, he began medical studies 
at Edinburgh; he practised as a Unitarian minister there 
until his graduation in 1816 when he moved to London. In 
London he busied himself in medical practice and natural 
philosophy, was one of the projectors of the Westminster 
Review, was appointed physician to the London Fever Hospital, 
and was a founding member of the Society for the Diffusion 
of Useful Knowledge. For the Society he wrote several 
treatises and contributed articles on anatomy, physiology 
and medicine to its Penny cyclopaedia. He became an ardent 
follower of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), and after Bentham's 
death he took an active part in the social reform movement. 
For the next thirty years, he devoted himself to philanthropic 
works, particularly the investigation of sanitary conditions, 
writing reports on epidemics and the promotion of the 
General Board of Health. He was clearly following the same 
steps as his Edinburgh contemporary, Alison. 
In the 1830s, Smith published some excellent physiological 
works, two of which will be discussed here: The philosophy 
of health; or an exposition of the physical and mental 
constitution of' man, UJ1:-tiL a VielJ to the promotion of human 
longevity and UŠŮŮÙŪŤVVĜŨĮĨĬĞŸĨŠŪTĚAnimaZ physioZogy ĜÍĮĨĮĞŸÏĚ
which appeared in the same volume of Th.e library of useful 
knowledge as Charles Bell's Animal mechanics. Between the 
mid 1830s and 1860, his public health work left him no time 
to continue his study of physiology and natural philosophy, 
and it was not until 1865 that a revised edition of Philosophy 
of health appeared. With that edition, too, we will be 
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concerned. 
The primary concept in Animal physiology was clearly 
force or power. The vital economy differed from inorganic 
ones primarily by virtue of its dynamical qualities, for 
it consisted essentially of circles of action and reaction, 
an idea akin to Erasmus Darwin's and Marshall Hall's. 
Like several of his colleagues, Smith used the words 
'vitality' and 'vital economy' without envisaging any special 
vital force; such words merely expressed the manifest 
distinction between life and non-life. The main distinction 
concerned the generation of power. In his section on the 
properties of primitive tissues he contrasted primitive 
cellular tissue, v1hich had the purely passive power of 
elasticity, against primitive muscle tissue, which had its 
own vital source of power, namely contractility; he also 
compared inorganic mechanism, in which power could never be 
generated, with organic mechanism, in which power could be 
generated. Muscle, with its property of contractility, 
" is the generator of power. It is not 
only not a mechanical property, but it possesses 
nothing in the slightest degree analogous to 
any mechanical force. In the best contrived 
machinery there is no real generation of 
power: there is merely an application of pre-
existing pmver to some specific object. In the 
reaction of an elastic body, in the recoil of a 
spring, there appears to be an actual production 
of power; but the effect thus apparently 
produced is the mere reaction of the force 
originally employed in compressing the spring. 
The force of the recoil can never be greater than 
the force employed to compress it, and the 
moment this power is expended, all 
capacity of motion is at an end. In 
muscular contraction, on the contrary, 
there is a real generation of power. 
If a heart be pricked gently with a 
needle, the ventricle will instantly 
contract with such force as to propel 
the needle deeply into its substance •.•. 
There is thus an actual production of 
pOvler, because the effect bears no proportion 
to its mechanical cause. There is, then, 
not only no identity, but no analogy, between 
this power and any of the great principles 
of nature, which are the original sources of 
mechanical force. And of this, the complete 
proof is that its most powerful effects are 
produced without the intervention of any 
mechanical cause - by an agent which has no 
relation to any physical property of matter, 
namely by volition. This power, therefore, 
is distinct from any other in nature and is 
I ' t l' f ,,,45 pecu lar Ole • 
Smith attributed the peculiarity of life not to a 
special vital force, but tv its construction by God, the 
grand mechanician. Like William Paley, the philosopher 
and theologian, he was at pains to assert that the living 
system is a superb piece of mechanism, but a mechanism of 
such stupendous skill and power, that it could only be 
accounted for by reference to a superb designer. Vital 
force could have no place, for Smith, in such a machine, 
for it would undermine its dependence on its designer for 
b t d f 't f t' 46 V't 1 the harmony, eau Y an power 0 1 S unc lons. 1 a 
force as an ultimate cause of motion was therefore rejected 
as a pagan concept, and the primary purpose of his Animal 
physiology vIas to deal a death-blow to that concept. 
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Smith was not the only medical theorist of his time 
to consider the theological implications of vital force. 
As T.S. Hall has ÜŤŪWÙŬŪŤTŸİWUŤVŤĚ implications were being 
considered by several British and Continental writers; 
in Britain, Hall mentioned James Cowles Prichard (1786-
1848) who wrote an incisive and useful work called A 
review of the doctrine of a vitaZ principle (1829)1 8 
Prichard concluded that the basic functions of life are 
merely the effects of organization of matter, whilst the 
processes of embryonic development are too complex and 
wonderful to be attributed to any agency save the Deity. 
(Prichard will be discussed in the chapter on Johann 
Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840), for he was a principal 
presenter of Bltmenbach's theory of the 'Bildungstrieb' 
to the English medical world, and his ideas are best 
discussed in the light of Blumenbach's). 
Although refuting vital force as a distinct entity 
superimposed on matter, Smith denied that the idea of 
non-creatibility of power in inorganic mechanism could 
apply to the living machine. Nonetheless, he did not 
believe that the machine operated or generated power at 
random, for that would destroy any hope of a rational 
science of physiology. He 'saved the phenomena' by 
envisaging the organism as a set of circles of actions 
and reactions, so that whatever happened in one part 
necessitated a specific, and hopefully quantifiable, 
change in another. 
"A circle of actions is established within 
the body, by which certain processes are 
accomplished which counteract decomposition 
166. 
and retain it in the peculiar condition 
which, as far as our observations go, 
is necessary to life. Thus, internal, 
or as they are often termed, intestinal 
actions, counteracting the ordinary 
action of physical agents, afford the 
first distinctive character of ŨÙȚŤĒŸĲĚ
In Smith's opinion, the main task of physiology was 
to account for that circle of actions. This task was also 
tackled in his Philosophy of health, but in a different 
context, for this treatise had been commissioned by The 
Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge and, in 
keeping with the spirit of the society, Smith aimed to 
illustrate the theological conclusions to be drawn from 
physiology. This had also been Bell's brief for his essay 
on animal mechanics. Philosophy of health was also 
intended as a physiological contribution to Benthamism. 
Bentham had wanted Smith to lead his movement after his 
death, and the introduction to the book reflected Smith's 
Benthamite allegiance as well as the vision for science 
that men like Beddoes and Davy had held - namely, that a 
knowledge of the human constitution would benefit society 
in general, and .. .,as indispensable to lithe barrister, the 
judge, the magistrate and the ŨŤŦÙVŨŠWŬŲĒŸÕĚ Actually, 
Bentham himself was greatly interested in medicine, 
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especially the organization of medicine, as Benjamin Spector 
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has discussed in a recent paper. He even left his body 
to medical research. 
As in Animal physiology, the primary concept in the 
Philosophy was power. There, Smith emphasized not only 
the circles of action and reaction, but also the dependence 
of organic functions on external, inorganic powers. He 
seemed to seek a fundamental connexion between organic 
and inorganic powers, whose conjoined operation would 
constitute life. The inorganic agents were primarily 
air, water, heat, cold, electricity and light; and 
"Without the living organ, the physical agent 
can excite no vital action: without the 
physical agent, the living organ can carry 
on no vital process. The plant cannot 
perform the vital process of respiration 
without the leaf, nor with the leaf without 
the air. The physical agent acts upon the 
living organ; the living organ reacts upon 
the physical agent, and the action between 
both is definite .... In this manner, the 
change in the physical agent is definite and 
uniform; and the change in the living 
substance is equally definite and ẀŪÙȚŬŲÜHHŸÎĚ
"It is this determinate interchange of action 
between the living organ and the physical 
agent that constitutes what is termed a vital 
S3 process" • 
Indeed, the totality of an organism's vital phenomena 
comprised the changes that living organs and physical 
agents effected upon one another. Physical and chemical 
attractions Vlere supposed to be "controlled and modified" 
and converted into the dynamical or material basis of life. 
Although the creation of organic power dp. novo was not 
denied explicitly, that denial seems implicit in Smith's 
argument, at least with regard to the 'organic' functions, 
that is all the functions and powers of plants and the 
'involuntary' functions and powers of animals. Animals 
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possessed another category of functions, 'animal functions', 
to which the afore-mentioned dynamical laws did not apply. 
Thus, in both Animal physiology and Philosophy of heaZth, 
Smith differentiated between animal powers, which appeared 
to be sui generis, and the inorganic, purely mechanical 
powers which he considered to be subject to neither creation 
nor annihilation. 
"The force exerted by the heart is vi tal. 
It is distinguished from mechanical force, 
in being produced by the very engine that 
exerts it. In the best constructed machinery 
there is no real generation of power. There 
is merely concentration and direction of it. 
In the recoil of the spring, in the reaction 
of condensed steam, the energy of the 
expansive impulse is never greater than the 
force employed to compress or condense, and 
the moment this power is expended, all capacity 
of motion is at an end. But the heart produces 
a force equal to a pressure of 60 lbs. by the 
greatest application of a bland fluid. Here, 
no force is communicated, to be given out again, 
as in every mechanical moving power; but it is 
new power, power really and properly generated; 
and this power is the result of vital action, 
and is never in any case the result of action 
that is not ẂÙWŠŨĒŸÏĚ
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Smith was acquainted with several careful, experimental 
studies on the blood circulation; he cited Stephen Hales, 
Albrecht von Haller, the Abbe Spallanzani (1729-1799), John 
Hunter and Jean poiseuille (1799-1869); consequently, his 
belief in self-moving powers in the animal economy was 
supported by a thorough review of the topic; like Bell and 
John Hunter, he saw no escape from admitting -that blood is 
alive. 
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Smith's vital economy differed from Bell's, in that 
he insisted on a tight interdependence of its several 
circles of power. Whereas Bell asserted that vital powers, 
though sympathetic to each other's levels of activity, 
were essentially independent and could not be transformed 
into any other form of power, Smith believed the transformation 
or correlation of vital powers to be the cornerstone of 
physiology. He wrote of three great centres or circles of 
power, namely respiration, circulation of the blood, and 
the nervous VXVWŤÜŸĪÌȚĚorganic life, the lungs and heart 
were the primary seats; of the animal, the brain and spinal 
cord. Between them all, the bond was so close that any 
lesion of one affected another, and none could exist without 
the support of the others. Indeed, " ••• they form a triple 
chain, the breaking of a single link of which destroys the 
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whole". 
Such ideas were not ŪŤŴŸİĚ But what was fairly unusual 
was Smith's discussion of respiration as the most essential 
of the three dynamical centres; to discern the relation of 
respiration to the other functions was to take the most 
comprehensive view of the economy. Indeed, he seemed to 
imply that even the animal powers depend on a prior, in-
organiC source of power, namely, the chemical energy entailed 
in respiration, and that the heart and nuscles do not possess 
power sui generia and do not constitute a perpetuum mobile. 
Thus, 
liThe first and most important use of the 
function of respiration is to maintain the 
action of the organs of the animal life. 
It has been shown (vol.l, ch.2) that the 
organic is subservient to the animal life, 
and that to build up the apparatus of the 
latter, and to maintain it in a condition 
fit for performing its functions, is the 
final end of the ȚŬŲÜŤŲĒŸĮĚ
Such support of the animal functions by the organic 
was, of course, easy to envisage as a material process, 
whereby the air and blood contribute the particles out of 
which the body is constructed. Smi th held this material 
view of the body's maintenance, but also a dynamical view 
whereby respiration "endows the blood with the power of 
maintaining the contractility of the muscular ȚÙŞŲŤHHŸĲĚ
This dynamical view was supported by experimental studies 
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which indicated that an animal's heat was directly proportional 
to the quantity of air which reacted with the blood. 
One important consequence of his view of respiration 
was that it suggested a funqamental connexion, even a 
dependence, between vital and inorganic powers, and that 
physiologists should seek quantitative expressions of that 
connexion. Already, the quantitative study of respiration 
by Dulong and Despretz had shown that c.80% of an animal's 
heat was attributable to chemical energy in its food and 
inspired air, and it was a clarion 'call to experimental 
physiologists to see whether there might be a total correlation. 
Though Smith did not contribute any experimental research to 
that issue, he realized how important it was; in his preface 
to PhiZosophy of health, he wrote that by studying the effects 
of air, water, heat, light and electricity on organized bodies, 
the physiologist would deduce the rules for the management of 
food, clothing, sleep, exercise and all other agents which 
affect man's physical and intellectual powers and their 
due balance. All this had a grand, practical end in 
view: 
"The investigation, in this manner, of the 
properties and powers of the entire organism, 
in its relation to external nature, can alone 
afford in a sense satisfactory and useful to 
the philosopher, the educator and the legislator, 
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a knowledge of human nature". 
The investigation of the organism's dynamic relation-
ship with the outside world was therefore of paramount 
import, not solely for medical science but also for ethical 
and socio-political sciences. Hence, he promised his 
readers a full account of the action of physical agents 
on the living organism, with particular regard to the 
development of the physical and mental powers of man. 
Clearly, Smith had imbibed Bentham's teachings thoroughly. 
As Spector's paper shows, Bentham had had a long interest 
in medicine, in the way it was organized, taught and fitted 
into his philosophy of maximum happiness and utility. 
Bentham had asserted that to understand and ameliorate 
human society, one had first to understand the human 
organism. Smith remained true to that Benthamite ideal 
throughout his career, as evidenced by his physiological 
writings. 
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A third volume of PIn: Zosophy of hea Z tit had been intended 
from its inception, to discuss the nervous and muscular 
systems. Not until the 1860s, for the eleventh edition, 
did Smith find time to compose it; he died before the 
new edition went to press, so that its arrangement was 
handled by his grandson. The new edition did not deviate 
essentially from the first; again, the heart and artery 
walls were generators of their own power, though it was 
emphasized repeatedly that their activity was never 
haphazard and depended always on the action of external, 
inorganiC agents. Indeed, it is difficult to determine 
exactly how vital the organiC powers were thought to be, 
for their dependence on inorganic agents had become even 
greater than in earlier editions. 
liThe exciting bodies are called stimulants, 
and the actions they produce, since they 
take place only in organized and living 
structures, are called vital. Without 
the structure, without the stimulus, there 
is no action: both must combine and co-
operate. Life consists of vital actions, 
sustained in organized structures by the 
excitement of VWÙÜẀŨŠŪWVŨŨŸŨĚ
Despite the new material in the eleventh edition of 
Smith's Philosophy, one finds no basic physiological 
premises which were not in the first. This was partly 
because Smith was now too old to change the ideas of a 
lifetime; he did not mention Liebig, Helmholtz or a 
number of other workers who had contributed meanwhile to 
experimental physiology. It might also have been because 
the dynamical physiology that he had championed in the 
1830s seemed to him to be holding up so well. Indeed, the 
Philosophy, which had been so up to date and stimulating 
at its first publication, was still a useful text in 1865, 
and one of its principal aims was still to further the 
investigation of power, in both its organic and inorganic 
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forms. Therein, in his opinion, lay the future of physiology 
and natural philosophy_ 
Thomas Bateman. One of the most comprehensive and 
highly regarded of the British encyclopaedias during the 
th first half of the 19 century was Ree's cyclopaedia, or 
The new cyclopaedia or universal dictionary of arts and 
. 62 
VȘŸŤŪȘŤVĦĚ The first volume appeared in 1802; it was 
completed in forty-six volumes, plus six volumes of plates, 
in 1820. Abraham Rees, D.D., (1743-1825) persuaded a host 
of experts to contribute articles on their own subjects; 
consequently the standard of many entries was remarkably 
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high. The entry on fever was written by a London physician, 
Thomas Bateman, who, after studying in Edinburgh, moved to 
London and became a physician at the Fever Institution. 
In London he had worked under Robert Willan (1757-1812), 
whose speciality was skin disease; in 1819 Bateman made 
Willan's work known in a highly regarded treatise called 
Practical synopsis of cutaneous diseases according to the 
arrangement of Dr. PÙRŨŠŪŸĨĚ Of all Bateman's writings, his 
article on fever was the most penetrating and discursive on 
physiological theory, and it will be his only work discussed 
here. It was a remarkable article in that it was exception-
ally long for an encyclopaedia - 62 quarto double-columned 
ŮŠŦŤVŸÏĚ It was crammed with historical and current data on 
the theory and treatment of fever, and must have impressed 
its medical readers for it was cited frequently in physiological 
treatises throughout the 1820s and 18303. 
discussion in this thesis, for . or 1t ȘŬŲŲŬŞŸWŤVĚ
I have been making ahout late 18
th 
and early 
It merits 
several assertions 
th 19 century 
physiologies, in particular the importance of power. 
Early in his article, Bateman made a simple point 
about the symptoms of fever, namely that these have always 
been recognized as abnormal degrees of heat and cold, 
shivering and augmented pulse?5 The most conspicuous 
of these was the heat; hence the word ØŅǾŸNØÕÕHĚ from ØŅǾŸHĚ
fire, had been the Greek appellation for fever, and 
'febris' had been the Latin one. If one agrees with this 
discussion of fever VXÜŮWŬÜVŸĬŬŪŤĚwould surely agree that 
fever must always have been difficult to account for in 
terms of static agents, or at least that it would always 
have been amenable to quasi-dynamical explanation. Thus, 
once the concept of power or force had been given a 
reputable ŸŲŸWŠŨĚand philosophical foundation (by 
Newton, Locke and the post-Newtonian philosophers with the 
exception of Hurne), and the hurno/ral, iatro-chemical and 
iatro-mechanical hypotheses were found wanting, fever would 
have become an obvious candidate for the application of 
dynamics. This is borne out by the fact that the only 
18th century theories of fever that Bateman considered worth 
detailed discussion were all dynamical. 
Bateman thought of fever as the immediate consequence 
of a disturbance of nervous power, such disturbance having 
repercussions on all the other functions and powers of the 
vital economy. rEhe symptoms of the onset of fever, namely 
the cold stage, were due to diminution of nervous energy; 
the symptoms of the later hot stage were due to a recoiling 
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of the nervous power. Nervous power was the primary form, 
with which all other powers of the vital economy were 
correlated. 
ÍİĪŸĚ
j 
"We cannot think much and use strong exercise 
at the same moment. Both these powers, there-
fore, seem to depend alike on the nervous 
energy, and the simultaneous diminution of 
both implies the diminished state of that 
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energy" • 
The question of what caused the disturbance of nervous 
power, what was the proximate cause of fever, could not be 
answered unequivocally. Rejecting humoural pathology and 
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Cullen's contagion and miasm hypothesis for idiopathic fevers, 
Bateman thought that three recent dynamical hypotheses had 
come close to the truth; these had focussed on the functions 
and powers of the vital economy, particularly the sensorial 
powers; they had taken their cue, in his opinion, from the 
ideas of Thomas Willis (162l-l675), Friedrich Hoffmann (1660-
1742), and especially fron. the 4 thedi.tion of Boerhaave' s 
Aphorisms where he had introduced the 'nervous fluid' which, 
in communicating a sluggishness to arterial blood, constituted 
a proximate cause of intermittent fevers. Bateman wrote 
that since Boerhaave's day, 
" ..• the phenomena resulting from the sensorial 
functions in disease became the subject of more 
attentive investigation, and hence have arisen 
3 modern systems, in which the nature of fever 
is explained by a reference to these functions 
•••. These are the theories of Cullen, Brown 
and Darwin. The theory which Dr. Cullen 
promulgated ... almost rivalled that of Boerhaave 
in the extent of its ŲŤȘŤŮWÙŬŪŸĚ and even 
continues to be adopted by some later writers • 
••. The Brunonian fever theory is not particularly 
prominent in the general system of its author • 
. .• That. of Dr. Darwin is more complex, but much 
more comprehensive in its application to the 
varieties of fever; it is obscure, however, 
from the peculiar language in which it is 
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expressed II • 
Darwin's theory, like Cullen's and Brown's, depended 
on excitability, but he added the idea of association or 
sympathy, thus calling it the 'sympathetic theory of fever'. 
Bateman considered the two most useful and general laws 
that Darwin and Brovm had enunciated for physiology to be 
that i) All excitement or activity of an organism occasions 
a diminution of its power, ('excitability' in Brown's 
terminology, 'sensorial power' in Darwin's), according to 
the degree of the excitement; and ii) Rest or abstraction 
of the usual stimuli render the organism more susceptible 
to stimuli subsequently applied?O In these two laws there 
was clearly the idea that the vital economy, like purely 
mechanical systems, required the restoration of its 
susceptibility to action, what we would call its energy, 
before it could resume its activity; and although Bateman 
did not inquire into the source of that restoration in 
Darwin's and Brown's theories, he did seem to think it not 
sui generis. If he had believed that vital power could be 
created de noVo whenever it was needed, there surely vlould 
have been no sense in his quoting Darwin on the principle 
that the torpor produced in an organism,as a result of its 
activity,was more intense or of longer duration, in 
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71 proportion to its expenditure of sensorial power. A wholly 
random generation of power would also have been incompatible 
vli th the tenor of Darwin's third la'Vl of physiology, which 
Bateman described approvingly: 
"That the functions of different parts of 
the system are so far catenated, or 
associated with each other, as it were in 
circles, either from direct connection in 
structure, or from the habit of acting 
together, or more frequently from causes 
at present inscrutable (see 'Catenation'), 
that an increase or decrease of the action 
of one organ is followed or accompanied by 
an increase or decrease of the action of 
h ,,72 anot er .•.• 
The treatments that Bateman advocated, on the basis of 
the dynamic theories of fever, were themselvs entirely 
dynamic; only scant attention was paid to chemistry. He 
proposed that, whatever theory of disease is adopted, the 
two principal aims should be to diminish those activities 
and powers which are in excess, and to increase those which 
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are defective? 3 In the language of Culle.'1, the first a.ir:t v,as "to I!'Oderate 
the violence of reaction", and the second ,\'as "to rerrove L"1e causes or 
obviate tile effeocs ()f debility". Clearly,Bate.1'Ja1\'S and :rrany other physio-
logists' fever therapies rested w'On the physics and dyna.'1lics, the balancing 
of forces, of the animal economy, a balancing act which 
presupposed a fundamental, and hopefully one day quantifiable, 
connexion between organic and inorganic powers. 
Bateman's theory of life, and thus his theory of fever, 
employed the paradigm of poweJ: or force, for only such an 
. 
agent could be versatile enough to account for the ever 
changing and intricate conditions of health and disease. 
Chemistry was simply too crude and limited to construct a 
fever theory, as we see in a passage where he discussed the 
use of emetics and purgatives .in removing putrescent matter 
from the intestines: 
Summary 
"With a view to correct the putrescency of 
these contents of the alimentary canal, 
various antiseptics have been recommended, 
especially the mineral acids. That these 
acids, especially the vitriolic .•. are 
sometimes useful, cannot perhaps be questioned; 
but it is probable that their administration 
was suggested upon the principle of being 
chemically antiseptic to dead animal matter. 
A chemical explanation of the operation of a 
medicine on the living body is somewhat 
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suspicious; and Dr. Fordyce has remarked that 
no antiseptic can be applied in that proportion 
to the living solid, as would be requisite to 
prevent putrefaction in dead animal matter"?5 
In this chapter, the physiological theories of six 
practising and well-known physicians of the first half of 
the 19th century in Britain have been discussed. They 
all believed power to playa central rOle, both within the 
vital economy itself and in its reactions to Nature at 
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large. With one exception, Sir Charles Bell, they believed 
that the science of physiology would be established upon 
the quantitative analysis of organic and inorganic powers, 
and they suspected that correlations, or at least intimate 
connexions, existed among those powers. Sometimes they 
revealed that the non-creatibility of power had become a 
general principle in inorganic physics and chemistry. 
Occasionally, that principle also gained admittance, through 
a back-door as it were, to their discussions on the vital 
economy, but their constant reluctance to theorize too 
freely stopped it from being admitted explicitly. Power 
or force was their principal, and usually exclusive, 
physiological paradigm, for they believed that the essential 
difference between life and non-life lay somewhere in their 
dynamical differences. By and large, the humours, 
chemistry and even the vital force as a distinct agent in 
its own right were disregarded by them. 
This interpretation of their theories, and their 
similarity to the earlier dynamical theories of Cullen, 
Brown and Darwin, are supported, I believe by Bateman's 
article on fever in Rees's cycZopaedia. My interpretation 
also agrees with other historians' studies760f 18th and 
th 
early 19 century concepts of fever. 
180. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 5. 
1. J. Bostock, Essay on respiration, Liverpool, 
J.HcCreery for Longman & Rees, 1804. 
2. J. Bostock, Elementary system of physiology, 
London, Baldwin, vol.l, 1824. vol.2, 1826, vol.3, 1827. 
3. Ibid., preface, p.iii. 
4. N.G. Coley, From animal chemistry to biochemistry, 
Amersham, Hulton Educational, 1973, pp.86-87. 
5. Op.cit., Note 2 above, pp.160-161. 
6. Ibid., p.214. 
7. Ibid., p.2l8. 
8. Ibid., p.324. 
9. Ibid., pp.195-196. 
10. My knowledge of Bell's life work is very limited, and 
I have relied greatly on secondary sources, the two 
most useful having been: i) Sir G. Gordon-Taylor & 
E.W. Walls, Sir Charles Bell: his life and times, 
Edinburgh, E. & S. Livingstone, 1958. And ii) P.P. 
Cranefield, The way in and the way out .•• with a 
facsimile of Charles Bell's annotated copy of his Idea 
of a new anatomy of the brain, New York, Futura, 1974. 
11. C. Bell, An essay on the forces wh1:ch ci1>cu late the 
blood, London, Longman, 1819. 
181. 
12. Sir Charles Bell, Animal ÜŤȘUŠŪÙȘVŸĚ or proofs of design 
in the anima 1 frame, Library of useful knm-rledge, iv, 
London, Baldwin & Cradock, 1838. 
13. Op.cit., Note 11 above, p.12. 
14. Ibid. , p.23. 
15. Ibid., p.B3. 
16. Ope e1:t. ,. Note 12 above, pp.33ff. 
17. I have been unable to find any exact technical meaning 
of jackstone that Bell might have had in mind. The 
dictionaries and cyclopaedias of his time define 
jackstone as modern dictionaries do, namely, as a 
small, smooth pebble or a small, specially-shaped bit 
of metal which is used in the game of jacks or dibs. 
Bell might nave been thinking of the momentum or force 
that a jackstone possesses as it falls. 
18. Ibid., p.47. 
19. Ibid., p.SO. 
20. Ibid., p.49. 
21. Ibid., p.48. 
22. T.S. Hall, Ideas of life and matter, Chicago, Chicago 
Univ. Press, 1969, vol.2, p.231. 
182. 
23. Sir Charles Bell, 'l'he hand, its mechanism and vitaL 
endowments, as evhwing design, Bridgewater Treatise iv, 
London, w. Pickering, 1832. 
24. Sir Charles Bell, PracticaL essays, Edinburgh, Maclachlan 
Stewart, 1841 and 1842. 
25. M. Hall, A critieaZ and experimental essay on the 
Cil'CU lation of the b L.ood, London, Sherwood, Gilbert 
& Piper, 1844. 
26. Ibid., p.lS8. 
27. M. Hall, Theory of the inverse ratio which subsists 
between the respiration and irritability in the 
183. 
animal kingdom, read to the Royal Society, February 1832, 
published London, R. Taylor, 1832. 
28. W.F. Edwards, De l'influence des agents physiques 
sur la vie, Paris, Crochard, 1824. This remarkable 
book went through several editions, was translated into 
English in 1832, and was cited extensively during the 
1830s and l840s. Regretably, since my space has been 
limited, I have had to omit any discussion of it, although 
it does bear upon my thesis. 
29. Op.cit., Note 27 above, p.ll. 
30. Ib id., p. 1. 
31. Ibid., p.14. 
32. J.D. Comrie, History of Scottish medicine, London, 
Bailliere, 1932, vol.2, p.611. 
33. W.P. Alison, Outlines of physiology and pathology, 
Edinburgh, Blackwood, 1833, p.viii. 
34. T.S. Hall, op.cit., Note 22 above, pp.22l and elsewhere. 
The phrase 'vital materialism' was actually coined by 
O'l;lsei Temkin. 
3S. W.P. Alison, Outlines of physiology, Edinburgh, Blackwood, 
1831, p.2. 
36. Ibid., p.4. 
37. Ibid., his discussion on respiration, esp. p.201. 
38. op.cit., Note 33 above, p.S8. 
39. Ibid., p.viii. 
40. Thomas Brown, the metaphysician, was cited occasionally 
by British physiologists between c1820 and 1850, but 
184. 
not often enough to merit inclusion in Chapter 1 of this 
thesis. 
Brown studied at Edinburgh continuously from 1792 
to 1803. At first, he read philosophy, logic and allied 
subjects and came under the influence of Dugald Stewart. 
In about 1796 he began to be interested in Erasmus 
Darwin's Zoonomia, on which he published some critical 
comments in 1798. From that year until 1803 he studied 
medicine, concluding with a dissertation 'De somno'. 
In 1804 he participated in a famous academic 
controversy at Edinburgh. The claim of John Leslie (1766-
1832) to the mathematics chair was being opposed because 
he had supported Hurne's theory of causality. Brown argued 
that Hurne's theory did not lead necessarily to the 
sceptical conclusions usually drawn from it, and he 
published his argument Observations on the nature and 
tendency of the doctrine of Mr. Hume concerning the 
relation of cause and effect in 1804. A second edition 
appeared in 1806 and a third, enlarged one in 1818. 
In 1808-1809 he began to assist Dugald Stewart in 
lecturing on moral philosophy, and in 1810 he was elected 
by the town council as Stewart's official colleague, a 
post that he held for the rest of his life. 
Among his many published works, his lectures were 
probably the most popular and highly regarded, a nineteenth 
edition appearing as late as 1851. There, his inquiry 
into causality was one of the most vigorous statements 
of Hume's doctrine; like Hume, he reduced causality 
to mere invariable sequence and emphasized that 'power' 
expressed nothing but such sequence. He differed from 
185. 
Hume in asserting that man has an intuitive idea, sub-
suming all experience, that the same antecedents always 
produce the same consequents; this replaced Hurne's 'custom' 
as the foundation of man's idea of causality and enabled 
him to avoid Hurne's theological scepticism; Brown could 
happily admit God as the First Cause of an orderly universe. 
Brown's philosophy was attacked sharply after his 
death, especially by Sir William Hamilton, the editor of 
the collected works of Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart. 
(See Chapter 1). Brown was accused, with some justification, 
of merely taking the ideas of Reid and Stewart and adding 
some ideas of the French 'sensationalists' such as Condillac. 
Whatever Brown's originality, it must be admitted that he 
was the last, vigorous member of the Scottish philosophical 
school which had elaborated its own philosophy largely 
unaffected by the rising school in Germany. From then on, 
it would no longer be possible to ignore German metaphysics, 
particularly that of Kant and the NaturphiZosophen. 
I am aware of my own inadequate understanding of 
Brown's ideas and possible influence, and this is but one 
area of this thesis which requires further study. 
41. Op.cit., Note 33 above, p.218. 
42. Ibid., the whole of chapter 13, esp. p.216. 
43. T. Southwood Smith, The philosophy of health; or an 
exposition of the physical and mental constitution of 
man, with a view to the promotion of human longevity 
186. 
and happiness, London, G. Knight, vol.l, 1836, vol.2, 1837. 
44. T. Southwood Smith, Animal ŮUXVÙŬŨŬŔÚQŸĚ The library of 
useful knowledge, iv, London, Baldwin & Cradock, 1838. 
45. Ibid., pp.21-22. 
46. This is my interpretation, after having read the whole 
of his Animal physiology, even though I am well aware of 
how frequently he used expressions like vitality and vital 
force. Among those sections in Animal physiology which I 
think support my interpretation are the first two pages and 
the section on 'Course of the blood in the foetus', esp. p.78. 
On this irreconcilability between a truly vital force 
and an omnipotent and ever-acting God, see my section on 
Paley in Chapter 9. 
47. T.S. Hall, op.cit., Note 22 above, pp.231-239. 
48. J.C. Prichard, A review of the doctrine of a vital 
principle, London, Sherwood, Gilbert & Piper, 1829. 
49. Op.cit., Note 44 above, p.6. 
50. Op.cit., Note 43 above, vol.l, p.vi. 
51. B. Spector, 'Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832): his influence 
upon medical thought', Bull.llist.Med., 1963, 37:25-42. 
See also F.N.L. Poynter, 'Thomas Southwood Smith - the man', 
Proc.Roy.Soc.Med., 1962, 55:381-391. 
52. Op.cit., NOte 43 above, vol.l, pp.21-22. 
53. Ibid., p.23. 
54. Ibid., pp.390-391. 
55. Ibid., vol.2, pp.113-ll4. 
56. Ibid., p.114. 
187. 
57. Indeed, they have been a continuous strand, in more or 
less vague form, in the preceding chapters. They are 
discussed most usefully in: E. Mendelsohn, Heat and Zife: 
the development of the theory of animal heat, Cambridge, 
Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1964. Also G.J. Goodfield, 
The growth of scientific physiology, London, Hutchinson, 1960. 
58. Smith, op.cit., Note 43 above, vol.2, p.115. 
59. Ibid.,p.116. 
60. Ibid., preface to vol.2, p.xii. 
61. T. Southwood Smith, The phiZosophy of health; ŬŲŸĚ an 
exposition of the physiological and sanitary conditions 
conducive to human longeVity and happiness, 11th edition, 
revised and enlarged, London, Longman, Green, 1865, p.2. 
62. A. Rees, The cyclopaedia; ŬŲŸĚ universal dictionary of arts, 
sciences and l1>terature '. in 39 volumes, London, Longman, 
Hurst, Rees, Orme & Brown, 1802-1820. 
63. T. Bateman, Practical synopsis of cutaneous TÙVŤŠVŤVŸĚ
according to the arrangement of Dr. WiZZan, London, 
Longman, 1813. 
64. Op.cit., Note 62 above, vol.xiv, unpaginated. 
65. Ibid., pp.l & 2 of the fever article. 
66. Amongst the many studies that have been done on fever, I 
have found the following useful for discussions of its 
symptoms. i) H.M. Winans, 'Evolution of the concept of 
th fever in the 19 century', Ann.Hed.Rist., 1935, N.S.l:27-35. 
ii) S.A. Gallacher, 'Stuff a cold and starve a fever', 
BuZl.Hist.f.ted., 1942, 11:576-581. iii) P.H. Niebyl, 'Old 
187a. 
age, fever and the lamp metaphor', J.Hist.Ued., 1971, 
26:351-368. iv) J.M. Eyler, 'William Farr on the cholera: 
the sanitarian's disease theory and the statistician's 
method', J.I!ist.Med., 1973, ŸJİĲĤÍÌÌĦĚ
67. Bateman, op.cit., Note 64 above, pp.lO-12 of his fever 
article. 
68. 
69. 
70. 
71. 
72. 
73. 
74. 
Ibid. , p.lO, column 1. 
Ibid., p.22, column 1. 
Ibid. , p.24, colwnn 1. 
Ibid. , p.26, column 1. 
Ibid. , p.24, column 2. 
Ibid. , p.27. 
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Chapter 6 Power in the natural philosophy of 
Peter Mark Roget (1779-1869) 
The man is not wholly evil -
he has a Thesaurus in his cabin. 
- Sir James Barrie describing 
Captain Hook. 
The one and only fact known widely today about Roget is 
that he compiled his Thesaurus. History, even history of 
science, has neglected all other aspects of his long and 
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busy life, and with the exception of D.L. Emblen's biographyl 
there has not been any attempt at a rounded appreciation of 
his work. 
The Dictionary of scientific biography (1970) makes 
no mention of him. However, the WorZd who's who in science 
from antiquity to the present gives him a fair mention2and 
the Dictionary of national 'biography gives him almost three 
pages: He also has half a page in Men of the ŮŤÙŦŪĜÍĮĮĪĞŸĚ
Here I shall outline only the main features of his career, 
with the sole intention of showing that he was a well 
respected figure in London's scientific community from c1810 
to 1850 and that his work in physiology and physics was 
widely read and well regarded even by his peers. What he 
wrote, therefore, - and I have his ideas on force or power 
particularly in mind - must have been at least an expression 
of up-to-date professional opinions; indeed, it will be 
argued that, though not an experimental genius of the order 
of Davy or Faraday, Roget was a man ahead of his times in 
some features of his physiology and physics and contributed 
original, sound, though not epoch-breaking, ideas of his own. 
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Roget began his medical studies in 1793 at Edinburgh. 
There, he was befriended by the professor of moral philosophy, 
Dugald Stewart, who was acquainted with Roget's uncle, 
Samua1 Romi11y (1757-1818). Romi!ly had acquired a 
reputation for his critical writings on English political, 
legal and social institutions; he was soon to become a close 
collaborator of Jeremy Bentham and James Mill in the Law 
Reform Movement in England and he became the solicitor-
general in the administration of 'All the Talents' of 1806-
1807. Romilly helped Roget settle into the social and 
scientific circles when he moved to London in 1808. 
Roget graduated in 1798 with a thesis on the laws of 
chemical ŠȚȚÙŪÙWXŸĚ He spent the next year visiting several 
physicians and natural philosophers, calling on Erasmus 
Darwin at Derby and stopping a while with Thomas Beddoes 
and Humphrey Davy at Bristol. During this year he made 
contacts which were to be useful for his London career: 
Davy was one, and through Davy he met Davies Gilbert; 
Gilbert became president of the Royal Society in 1827 on 
Davy's retirement, and under him Roget became the society's 
senior secretary and editor of the Philosophical Transactions, 
posts he held for the next twenty-one years! 
In 1800 Roget went to London and studied at Robert 
Willan's (1757-J.8l2) dispensary and at St. George's Hospital 
under Matthew Baillie (1761-1823). Baillie had inherited 
the Great \"1indmill Street School of Anatomy from his uncle, 
William Hunter and was then one of the most eminent physicians 
in the country. After further peregrinations, Roget obtained 
his first professional appointment as physician to the 
Manchester Public Infirmary, where his interests in public 
health and fever epidemics were first acquired. In 
Manchester he ran a course on physiology in the rooms of 
the Manchester Literary and Philosophical ŐŬȘÙŤWXŸĚ in the 
preface to his course booklet6he declared his chief aim 
was to give 'organization' to that new science and to 
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illustrate its 'relationship' with the other medical sciences. 
As Emblen mentions in his biography, organization and 
relationship were to be persistent aims in his life's work 
and, of course, became especially explicit in the Thesaurus. 
He became a fellow of the Manchester Lit. and Phil. in 
1805 and its vice-president for 1807-1808 when Thomas 
Henry (1734-1816) was president and John Dalton (1766-1844) 
secretary. But despite this auspicious start, Roget 
realized that the only place for an ambitious young physician 
and natural philosopher was London; accordingly, in 1808 
he moved into a house in Bloomsbury, bought for him by Sir 
Samuel Romilly. He quickly established a prosperous 
practice, but he was not merely a respectable physician; he 
was soon writing medical and scientific articles for 
encyclopaedias, began lecturing at the Russell Institution 
in 1809, the Great Windmill Street School in 1810 and the 
Royal Institution in 1812; in short, he acquired a reputation 
as a fine lecturer and versatile natural philosopher; he 
also became known for fair judgement, as in his writings on 
7 phrenology. 
Among his activities soon after arriving in London 
was his work for the Medical and Chirurgical Society, which 
had been established recently to bridge the gap between 
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physicians and surgeons. Roget collaborated especially 
with John Bostock (see chap.5), John Yelloly (1774-1842) 
and Alexander Marcet (1770-1822) in promoting the society. 
He collaborated too with Harcet's wife, Jane, working as 
her editorial assistant on her immensely popular book 
Conversations on chemistry. 
In 1812 he began lecturing on physiology and comparative 
anatomy at the Royal Institution, with obvious success for 
he was asked to repeat his course in the two years following. 
In 1815 he began to contribute articles to the famous 
th th th . SuppZement to the 4 ,5 and 6 edit10ns of the 
EncycZopaedia Britannica, eventually writing over 300,000 
words for it. Ernblen discusses Roget's work for the E.B. 
in considerable TŤWŠÙŨŸĚ Some of his articles were excellent; 
. for instance, that on 'Bichat' in the 1967 edition was 
clearly a condensed version of Roget's original 1824 article. 
Glowing praise was given by the SuppZement's editor for his 
long article on physiology (1824): 
"Physiology is fully treated in the 
Encyclopaedia, in so far as concerns 
the principal facts relative to the 
functions of animal life; but there 
seemed to be wanting a comprehensive 
view of the general laws to which they 
are reducible; a defect which has been 
ably supplied by Dr. Roget": 
Roget considered his achievement in physiology had been 
to discover order and inter-relations among the vital 
functions, rather than the execution of new experiments. 
This accords with the interest he showed in Xavier Bichat 
(1771-1802), for Bichat's most important works, Anatomie 
ŦĦŪŸŲŠRŤĚ (1801) and Anatomie descriptive (1802) had 
emphasized the usefulness of classification in the study 
of life. Emblen writes that one has only to recall 
Roget's own breakdown of the body's functions into neat 
classifications in his physiology course in Manchester, 
to realize that, like Bichat, he was persistently interested 
10 in applying categorical analysis to the animal economy. 
However, Roget was no mere compiler of other men's 
data. A certain degree of interpretative insight and 
creative thought is needed to review thoroughly, organize, 
and extract the general principles from any large collection 
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of data. This was Roget's aim and none of his contemporaries, 
(except the phrenologists a propos his critique of phrenology), 
doubted how well he achieved it, not only in his physiology 
but also in his treatises on EZectricity (1827), GaZvanism 
(1829) and NRŤȘWŲŬÜŠŦŪŤWÙVŸĚ (1831) ŸUÙȘUĚhe wrote for the 
Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. In 1862, 
the publisher of the Society's magazine wrote that 
"Amongst the founders of the Society, 
Dr. Roget was, from his accepted high 
reputation, the most eminent of its men 
of science. He wrote its treatises on 
Electricity and Magnetism Upon all 
questions of physiology, Peter Mark Roget 
and Charles Bell are the great authorities 
in the Useful Knowledge Society,,!l 
Roget also did his own experimental work: in 1818 he 
published an account of his investigation into the Kaleidoscope, 
an optical device that David Brewster (1781-1868), the 
Scottish physicist and biographer of Newton, had invented 
recently and patented. Roget read Brewster's account of it, 
conducted his own investigation, analysed the phenomenon 
12 
mathematically and in his own paper developed the 
kaleidoscope principle beyond what Brewster had written. 
In 1820, he published a paper 'On the voluntary action of 
,13d 'b' h h the iris, ŤVȘŲŸĚŸŪŦĚ ow e was able to dilate and contract 
the iris at will, a surprising technique since these were 
processes IIwhich are usually considered as no more under 
the dominion of the will, than the heart or blood-vessels". 
He concluded that the aperture of the iris is not wholly 
dependent on the influence of light. Nowadays this might 
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seem a simple topic for investigation, scarcely meritring 
the name 'experimentation', but we must recognize that until 
physiologists had discovered which bodily responses were 
voluntary and which involuntary, the fields of sense-perception 
and neuro-muscular functions could not be studied ŮŲŬŮŤŲŨXŸÏĚ
several aspects of these fields could be investigated only 
by self-experimentation. Roget was not alone in dOing such 
auto-experimentation; two others were Johannes Muller, who 
published his results, Ueber die phantastischen Gesichts-
erscheinungen, in 1826 (see chap. 13), and Jan Evangelista 
purkyXe (1787-1869), the Czech physiologist. 
One notable quality of Roget's kaleidoscope paper was 
its mathematical content. Roget was a highly capable 
mathematician, and it was on the strength of an elegant 
15 
mathematical paper that he was elected to the Royal Society 
in 1815. He realized, and emphasized repeatedly in his 
writings, the r61c of mathematics in any rigorous science, 
be it physiOlogy or physics. Rigour was consequently 
stamped on all his work, and his ideas, on power for instance, 
were therefore more than mere speculation. In this, he 
.,' , 
, i 
. I! 
differed greatly from a man like Hans Christian Oersted 
(1777-1851), whose seminal contribution to the study of 
power was informed greatly by his metaphysical position; 
Roget knew and reviewed Oersted1s work and regretted 
deeply its metaphysical ȚŬẀŪTŠWÙŬŪŸĬĚ
In 1822, he began another series of lectures on 
physiology and comparative anatomy at the Royal Institution; 
again, he was a great success and it was no surprise that 
when the Fullerian chair in physiology was created in 1834, 
Roget became its first occupant, retaining it for three 
years. In the l820s he was also engaged in two public 
health investigations, one on a fever epidemic which had 
erupted at the new Bentham-designed Millbank penitentiary;7 
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and the other on London's water supply. Like most reports 
submitted to a government dedicated to laissez-faire 
philosophy, they were largely unfruitful, but one result 
of the second report was that sand-filtration systems were 
built and became the standard method of water purification 
in England. 
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In December 1824 Roget read a paper to the Royal Society 
on the strange phenomenon he had noticed when looking at a 
moving carriage-wheel through venetian blinds in a window 
of his UŬÜŤŸĲĚ The slats of the blind broke the movement of 
the wheel into a succession of still pictures. Moreover, 
the spokes of the wheel then appeared curved, and Roget 
found that such curvature depended on the velocity of the 
carriage and the observer's position relative to the blind; 
he proposed that the phenomenon depended on the persistence 
of each still picture on the retina for a small but 
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significant period after the light rays have ceased 
arriving. This paper was one of the foundation stones 
of the motion-picture film, and a century later there 
were articles in The Photographic Journal, The Illustrated 
I 
London News, The Times and other journals commemorating 
t ' work 2. ° Roge s 
In the 1820s Roget was busy promoting the Useful 
Knowledge Society, of which he was a founder member. His 
essays on electricity and magnetism, mentioned above, were 
thorough and learned discussions on power or force. In 
his Bridgewater treatise on physiology (1834) he was also 
interested in the question of power. Indeed, Roget is 
an excellent example of a physiologist whose dynamical 
approach to physiology was thoroughly informed by his 
knowledge in the physical sciences, and whose physiology 
was read by, and presumably influenced, many of his 
contemporaries. The Bridgewater treatise, as the Dictionary 
of National Biography emphasizes, went through four editions 
during his lifetime. 
To conclude this account of his career: after years of 
wrangling with several members of the Royal Society, especially 
Charles Babbage (1792-1871), Sir Charles Lyell (1797-1875), 
Leonard Horner (1785-1864) and Sir John Herschel (1792-1871), 
he resigned his secretaryship in 1848 and devoted his time 
to preparing his ThesQurus for publication. The first 
edition appeared in ÍĮĪÎŸŨŠŪTĚby his death in 1869 he had 
seen it through 25 editions! 
The Thesaurus gives us a few clues to the character of 
Roget's thought in general and his scientific work in 
particular. The first point to realize is that, although 
it is considered today to be a book of synonym1s, Roget 
never envisaged it as such; he denied that two words could 
ever have the same meaning and he preferred to use the 
expressions 'analogous' or 'correlative' for similar words. 
The Thesaurus was nothing so prosaic as a mere list of 
words; rather, it was a list of ideas, and Roget considered 
it to be his philosophic magnum opus as well as his 
philanthropic contribution to mankind. This was explained 
in his preface. 
"The use of language is not confined to 
its being the medium through which we 
communicate our ideas to one another; it 
fulfills a no less important function as 
an instrument of thought; not being merely 
its vehicle, but giving it wings for flight. 
Metaphysicians are agreed that scarcely any 
of our intellectual operations could be carried 
on to any considerable extent without the 
agency of words •••• Into every process of 
reasoning, language enters as an essential 
element. Words are the instruments by which 
we form our ŠŞVWŲŠȘWÙŬŪVŸĚby which we fashion 
and embody our ideas .••• It is on this ground, 
also, that the present work founds a claim to 
utility. The review of a catalogue of words 
of analogous signification will often suggest 
by association other trains of thought which, 
presenting the subject under new and varied 
aspects, will vastly expand the view of our 
mental ẂÙVÙŬŪHHŸÎĚ
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Perhaps it is mere coincidence that this passage sounds 
remarkably similar to Coleridge's poetry criticism. 
(Coleridge, let us remember, had been a regular visitor to 
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Beddoes' Pneumatic Institute and he, Humphrey Davy and 
Roget were there contemporaneously. In later years, all 
three were in London together, and though Roget never 
mentioned Coleridge or other Romantics in his scientific 
writings or his Thesaurus, it might well be fruitful to 
enquire into his contacts with, and impressions of, Coleridge 
and others. To my knowledge, this has never been done; 
even Ernblen makes only passing references to Coleridge). 
Clearly, like Coleridge, Roget believed that the correct 
usage of words could be invaluable to "expand the sphere 
of our mental vision" and obtain an overall view of things. 
Such was the aim of his private notebook of ideas and their 
words which he began to compile in 1805 and which he 
expounded continuously until 1852 when it saw the light of 
day as the Thesaurus. Such, too, was the aim of his 
scientific work, for by classifying and relating raw 
observations one to another he hoped to give a connected, 
comprehensive view of his subject. As for the philanthropic 
aim of the Thesaurus Roget hoped that his system would 
be used for other languages and that a universal philosophical 
language would emerge. He followed the traditional belief 
that one of the greatest barriers to the interchange of 
thought and mutual understanding amongst men was the 
23 diversity of human language. In this, he realized well 
the power of words and warned against their careless usage. 
When, therefore, we read his scientific writings we may 
be confident that he meant what he wrote and was not prone 
to take refuge behind ambiguous analogies and magnificient 
metaphors. He himself warned against this all-too-prevalent 
tendency of his day in his critique of phrenology, entitled 
'cranioscopy,;4written for the E.B. Supplement. There, 
he argued that the only basis for phrenology was a series 
of analogical reasonings; but since analogies could only 
serve to direct and stimulate further inquiries, and could 
never prove identities, it was simply Ita gross violation 
of logic" to construct a whole new science thereon. In 
his considered opinion, whaterever the practical efficacy 
of phrenology might be, its theoretical infrastructure 
"would have been so capable of affording Swift a new 
incident for the history of the philosophers of Laputa". 
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Bearing in mind Roget's belief in accurate and judicious 
use of words and logical argwnent, let us examine his ideas 
on power. Power loomed large in the following works: from 
his physiology, his Introductory lecture on human and 
comparative phusiology (1826), his ŁŲÙTŦŤŸŠWŤŲĚ treatise (1834) 
and his two essays on physiology and phrenology for the 7th 
edition of the E.B., which were published together as a book 
in 1838; from his physical science, there were his essays 
for the Useful Knowledge Society, where he reviewed brilliantly 
and gave hiS own opinions on Electricity, Galvanism, 
Magnetism and Electro-magnetism. These essays were so 
meticulous and incisive that one cannot help thinking they 
must have ap,ealled more to professional natural philosophers 
and mathematicians than to ordinary readers, although the 
lucidity of his style often made an intricate issue easily 
comprehensible. I shall also discuss a philosophical jeu 
d'esprit he wrote in 1828, 'On an apparent violation of the 
law of continuity'. 
Roget's dynamical approach to physiology can be seen 
in two early encyclopaedia articles. 25 In 'Tetanus', 
which he wrote for Rees's Cyclopaedia, he described the 
last stage of the disease as the decline of the powers of 
life, due to the vast expenditure of energy by the violent 
muscular actions; death was due to exhaustion alone. His 
cure for tetanus depended on a theory, quite popular at that 
time, called GȘŬẀŪWŤŲĤÙŲŲÙWŠWÙŬŪHŸĬŴUŤŲŤŞXĚthe living body 
was supposed to possess a certain stock of power, especially 
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nervous power, which was partially consumed with every action 
of the organism and could not be replenished until sufficient 
food and rest had been supplied; disease, being a dynamical 
process, consumed a portion of the vital power; but if the 
physician could so employ the body's powers that none were 
left for the disease agent to "feed upon", the agent's activity 
would be suspended and the disease would die away. Behind 
this theory was the tacit assumption that vital power was not 
sui generis but was correlated somehow with other forms of 
power, chemical powers for instance, from which it could be 
made. In Roget's cure Cullen's ideas on the primacy of 
nervous energy were evident. 
"The plan from which theory would lead us to 
expect most success is that of exciting some 
new action in these organs /brain and nervous 
VXVWŤŸİHĚ by which their energies would be 
directed into some different channel, and the 
exciting, morbid action would be suspended and 
superceded. The remedies which exert the most 
powerful immediate effects in the nervous 
system are accordingly found to be the most 
efficacious in the cure of tetanus: Opium, 
wine and other highly diffusible stimuli, 
digitalis and other narcotics, the 
sudden affusion of cold water •••• "27 
28 In his article on 'Age' for the Cyclopaedia of 
practicaZ medicine (1833), Roget was concerned with the 
interdependence of the vital powers, (the old idea of 
sympathies), and the preservation of the balance and total 
quantity of those powers; he used an analogy between a watch 
whose mainspring is running down, (a mechanism in which 
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power was admitted to be neither created nor destroyed), and 
the ageing vital system. Death was due to exhaustion of 
energy, the result of the consumption of power exceeding its 
supply. He supported the hypothesis that a certain stock 
of vital power is given to the embryo at its formation, as a 
provision for life;"that in every action, a portion of this 
power is expended, 'till at length the whole is consumed lt • 
This was a mechanical notion; yet he recognized a distinction 
between organic and inorganic systems - the latter owed their 
destruction to external causes, whereas living systems were 
consumed from within, "being consumed by the very fire which 
is itself the source of their animation". This distinction 
did not imply that organisms could generate their own power, 
for bodies that are "consumed by the very fire which is 
itself the source of their animation lt is also a description 
of a flame - to wit, Mr. Christie's explanation of the 
Brunonian system. And no-one considered a flame to generate 
its own power. 
In his Introductory Zecture on human and comparative 
physioZogy Roget explained both his dynamical approach and 
his position on vitalism quite unequivocally: 
"The phenomena of life result from the 
conjoined and harmonized operation of 
those several powers /rnatnifest in life 
itsel!7; and it is one of the great 
objects of the science of physiology to 
ascertain the laws of those physical 
powers •.•• This has hitherto received 
less attention than its importance demands: 
and physiologists have in all ages shown 
too great an eagerness to attempt a 
reduction of all the phenomena to a single 
" "I I f I" f ,,29 pr1nc1p e, or aw 0 1 e •••• 
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Physical powers were thus admitted as connected closely with 
life itself. This did not prevent him from using the 
terminology of a distinctive vital force, for he believed 
vital force to be a final, not an efficient, cause. Like 
many others, he was wonderfully impressed with Paley's 
Natural theology where the teleology of the world, and 
especially of life, was spelt out. Although acknowledging 
the reality of final causes, however, Roget emphasized that 
they belonged to metaphysics and not to physiology, at 
least, not to his new science of physiology:O Vital force, 
though real, belonged not to the province of the physiologist; 
only physical forces belonged there. For that reason, he 
differed from his eminent colleague, Sir Charles Bell, in 
his evaluation of recent physiological developments. Take 
John Hunter's work for instance. Bell had praised it, 
especially for Hunter's theory of the blood. 
said that blood 
Hunter had 
"coagulates from an impression: that is, 
its fluidity under such circumstances being 
improper or no longer necessary, it coagulates 
now to answer the necessary purpose of solidity. 
for I have reason to believe that blood 
has power of action within itself, 
according to the stimulus of necessity; 
h · h . t . t f' . . ,,31 w 1C neceSS1 y ar1ses ou 0 ŸWVĚ VŸWẀŠWŸŬŪĚ • 
Roget rejected such usurpation of physically efficient 
powers by a final cause, even though he acknowledged John 
Hunter to be "the greatest physiologist since the days of 
Haller" • In his opinion, a similar usurpation had led to 
the doctrines of the areheus and anima of Van Helmont and 
Stahl; and the vis medieatrix naturae, which Hoffmann and 
Cullen considered so important, had the same ŬŲÙŦÙŪŸÎĚ
The temptation to find a primary source of power with 
which all other types could be correlated, and which would 
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set agoing and maintain a system, be it inorganic or organic, 
revealed itself in Roget's discussion of light. It reminds 
one of the almost magical importance of light in the growth 
of European science since the time of Robert Grosseteste 
(c.1175-1253) and Roger Bacon (12l4-1292);3an importance 
that it had still for James Hutton and was yet to have for 
John Draper's world view. Indeed, light has been one of 
the most alluring, divine and poetic issues that European 
natural philosophers have ever studied, and it is not 
surprising that Roget was in rare metaphysical mood when 
he discussed it: 
"We first avail ourselves of the power 
of light; that divine and almost spiritual 
essence, which seems especially formed for 
the use and enjoyment of intelligent and 
sentient ŞŤÙŪŦVHHŸÏĚ
This primacy of light led him to ask after the primary 
power within life; human machinery would employ stearn, he 
wrote, but none of the inorganic forces could be admitted 
conveniently as the primary power within life. So the 
35 
organic analogue to stearn-power was muscular-power. 
The quest for primary powers was reopened in his 
. . 36 ŁŲŸTŦŤŴŠWŤŲĚWŲŤŠWŸVŤĦĚ There, he sought as mechanistic an 
account of life as was compatible with the overall reign of 
vital force as a final cause. He sought, above all, that 
transcendent power by which mere matter became animated by 
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the breath of life and became capable of activity, sensation, 
perception and intelligence. That exalted first power was, 
of course, God, and from physiology Roget was sanguine 
enough to expect a clue. Indeed, he believed uhat sufficient 
clues had been found to indicate that the fundamental 
manifestation of God's creative power in life was muscular 
contractility, and in discussing it he analysed the similarity 
and distinction between organic and inorganic systems; 
clearly, the latter could never create power. 
"It is an established principle in physics 
that mere machinery is incapable of 
generating mechanical force; and that such 
force must always originally be derived 
from some extraneous source. Some impulse 
from without, whether it be the pressure 
of the wind, the fall of a stream of water, 
or the action of men or horses, or any 
other kind of foreign agency, must be resorted 
to, both to set the engine in motion and to 
continue its movements when they are once 
begun. Nor is the case essentially different 
when the source of motion apparently resides 
in some internal part of the machine itself r 
in a watch, for instance, which is actuated by 
h . . ,,37 t e maln sprlng .••• 
But the living body was different, for its internal 
principle of motion, lias far as we can perceive", could 
not be referred to any of the primary inorganic forces. 
Hence, muscular contractility seemed to be the primum 
movens of life. Elsewhere, however, he entertained 
respiration as a source of power for living systems even 
more fundamental than contractility, thus suggesting a close 
connexion between inorganic, chemical power and organic 
power. He seems to have been onto the same idea as 
Marshall Hall;8though Hall was not cited. 
"Combined with the particular mode of 
circulation Lof the blood/, it /respiration/ 
affords a tolerably accurate criterion of 
the energy of the vital powers. In birds, 
the muscular activity is raised to the 
highest degree, in consequence of the double 
effect of the air upon the whole circulating 
blood in the respiratory organs. The mammalia 
rank next below birds in the scale of vital 
energy; but they still possess a double 
circulation and breathe atmospheric air. The 
torpid and cold-blooded reptiles are separated 
from mammalia by a very wide interval, because 
although they respire air, that air only 
39 influences a part of the blood •••• " 
In the case of animal heat, Roget admitted that the 
connexion with respiration, and hence with chemical energy, 
40 
was a causal one. In the case of other vital activities 
and powers he was more cautious, but the possibility was 
left open: for instance, the perfection of plant sap could 
not occur unless exposed to the chemical agency of air in 
the leaves, and blood seemed to require the perpetual 
renovation of its vitality by the influence of respiration. 
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In direct disagreement with Charles Bell and John Hunter, 
he asserted that "even the circulation of these juices is 
an object of inferior importance compared with their 
. ,,41 ŠŤŲŠWŸŬŪĚ . Though he did not admit it explicitly, Roget 
seemed sometimes to believe in respiration as the power by 
which the spring of the living clock is kept wound up. 
This very metaphor was to be championed by Justus Liebig 
a few years later. 
The paramounce of power was evident especially in the 
closing paragraphs of the Bridgewater treatise; Roget 
reviewed the great enigmas in the world yet to be resolved, 
among which was the nature of dynamic agents: 
" ••• how narrow is the field of our 
perceptions, and how far distant from 
any approximation to a knowledge of the 
essence of matter, of the source of its 
powers, or even of the ultimate configuration 
of its parts! How remote from all human 
cognizance are the intimate properties of 
these imponderable agents, light, heat and 
electricity, which pervade space and exercise 
so potent a control over all the bodies in 
42 
nature II • 
In his Treatise Oil physiology ĜÍĮĨĮĞŸĨŴUÙȘUĚappeared 
first as an essay in the 7th edition of the E.B., Roget 
developed some of his earlier ideas, in particular the 
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nature of vitality and the interrelations of powers. Still 
emphasizing the uniqueness of living systems in their 
obedience to final causes, he went far in suggesting that 
they shared a cornman set of efficient causes. Vital 
affinities, he suggested, might be none other than ordinary 
chemical affinities operating under peculiar conditions, and 
every fresh discovery in animal and vegetable chemistry 
would help to remove the apparent differences. His was 
a remarkably clear account of what T.S. Hal1 44and Owsei 
Temkin45call 'vital materialism'. All this was part of 
his belief in the ultimate simplicity of Nature, but Roget 
was too cautious not to recognize that such a belief was 
a metaphysical point of view and not a proven principle of 
Nature. Therefore, 
"It is possible, or even probable, that 
future researches may be successful in 
establishing the identity of some of the 
powers we now conceive to be distinct, 
with other powers already known. Thus 
in the physical sciences the recent 
discoveries which have taken place in 
electro-magnetism have satisfactorily 
established the identity of the magnetic 
and electric agencies. The same may 
possibly be accomplished in future times with 
respect to heat and light •••• But no such 
approximation can yet be attempted with any 
prospect of success between the muscular, 
the sensorial, the nervous and the organic 
powers. No speculative ingenuity can reduce 
them to a single physical power •••• ,,46 
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Despite his avoidance of 'speculative ingenuity', Roget's 
belief in Nature's simplicity led him to discuss other 
reductionist hypotheses in physiology. For instance, there 
had been attempts to find the fundamental building block of 
living systems, of which the most plausible seemed to be the 
recent granular or globular one which, as Roget asserted, 
was most evident in the composition of chyle, blood and the 
secretions. Although he was not aware that such globules 
were usually artefacts of microscopic WŤȘUŪÙŰẀŤVŸİUŤĚdid 
, . 
admit that though such studies had great prospect of 
success, they still suffered from inadequate experimental 
tools in the medical sciences. 
Experimental techniques in the physical sciences, 
however, had become so rigorous that he believed new 
dynamical principles had been established recently. These 
principles unfolded themselves in his four articles for 
the Useful Knowledge Society between 1827 and 1831, in the 
last of which he discussed them most explicitly. In the 
first article, 'Electricity', he recorded the immense debt 
of natural philosophy to Humphrey Davy: 
II it was not until the present century 
that the extensive relations which connect 
electricity with so many other branches of 
physical science were discovered, and their 
importance appreciated ••• hence have we been 
able to trace alliances between several of 
the great agents concerned in the phenomena of 
the material universe. Electrochemistry has 
thus arisen as one of the connecting branches 
between the Philosophy of Nature. Still more 
recently there has been opened to us, in the 
subject of Electro-Magnetism, another new 
province of science, which establishes a 
natural connexion between WŸĦĦHŬĚ powers hitherto 
regarded as TÙVWÙŪȘWĒŸĮĚ
He discussed expermental evidence for the evolution of 
heat from electricity, of chemical forces from electricity, 
and of mechanical power from electricity, but he nowhere 
philosophized upon any fundamental connexions among such 
powers. 
More definite ideas on power connexions carne in the 
article 'Galvanism' ,(1829). In Davy's chemical theory of 
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galvanism he saw a rigorous causal connexion between 
chemical and electrical forces: "the energy of the 
galvanic power will depend altogether upon that of the 
chemical action, and can never be excited when the latter 
condition is ŴŠŪWÙŪŦĒŸĲĚ The concluding paragraphs of the 
article TÙVȘŸVVŤTĚVolta's contact hypothesis for galvanism, 
Roget's rejection of which was based upon his belief in 
l} A correlation or inter-convertibility of the inorganic 
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powers; and 2) A conservation of power in all such conversions. 
On the correlation issue, the association between chemical 
action and electrical effects occurred so invariably that 
all just rules of philosophy would admit a causal relation; 
indeed, the quantity of galvanic effect seemed always to 
be proportional to the energy of the chemical action. In 
addition, he had a more general argument: 
"If there could exist a power having the 
property ascribed to it by the /Voltaic 
ȘŬŪWŠȘŸİĚhypothesis, namely, that of giving 
continued impulse to a fluid in one constant 
direction, without being exhausted by its 
own action, it would differ essentially from 
all the other powers in Nature. All the 
powers and sources of motion, with the 
operation of which we are acquainted, when 
producing their peculiar effects, are expended 
in the same proportion as those effects are 
produced; and hence arises the impossibility 
of obtaining by their agency a perpetual 
effect; or in other words a perpetual ÜŬWÙŬŪĒŸÕĚ
Such, he said, were the consequences of Volta's hypothesis, 
and against the validity of such consequences the probability 
was all but infinite. 
The article on 'Magnetism' (1831) did not say anything 
new about forces, though it was concerned largely with 
their connexions. Perhaps the only suggestion of the 
direction of his thoughts was the declaration that no 
great or comprehensive fact in science was ever established 
without being preceded by a bold conjecture, and that 
hypothesis is invariably the precursor of WŲẀWUŸŨĚ
Coming now to the most important article in the series, 
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'Electro-Magnetism' (1831), Roget first outlined the history 
of the subject. There had been much speculation about a 
correlation between electricity and magnetism in the 18th 
century, and he cited a prize essay question that the 
Electoral Academy of Bavaria had set in 1774: 
"Is there a real and physical analogy 
between electric and magnetic forces; 
and if such analogy exist, in what manner 
do these forces act upon the animal body?"S2 
Some of the essays had supported the analogy, and 
Roget maintained that recent discoveries had gone further 
by showing that they emanate from a common source. Moreover, 
bearing in mind the ideas mooted in his essay on 'Galvanism', 
he probably envisaged a correlation among all inorganic 
powers. 
The essay question of the Bavarian Academy is also 
interesting as it exemplifies the use that medical theory 
tries to make of discoveries in physical science. There 
is a dearth of secondary literature on the use of electricity 
in therapeutics from the Hippocratic Corpus ŬŪŴŠŲTVŸĨĚ Its 
great popularity in European medicine began with the 
discovery of the Leyden Jar in 1745, for that permitted 
the delivery of far greater shocks than the older static 
machines. Between 1750 and 1780, according to one 
medical UÙVWŬŲÙŠŪŸÏŪŬĚ less than twenty-six papers on 
medical uses of electricity appeared in the Journal de 
medeaine alone. An electric shock machine was installed 
in the Middlesex Hospital in London in 1767, and within the 
next decade many other English hospitals followed suit. 
In turn, the similarity between the shock of a Leyden Jar 
and that obtained from electric fishes led physicians 
back to using such fish as Malopterurus eleatriaus and 
Gymnol;uB e leatriaus for therapy. 
Returning to Roget's paper, after the historical 
introduction he discussed the work of Hans Christian 
oested, and, though praising him for his incontrovertible 
experimental evidence on the correlation of electrical 
and magnetic powers, he regretted that his theoretic 
analysis was too speculative to be ÙŪWŤŨŨÙŦÙŞŨŤŸĪĚ Whereas 
Oested was a NaturphiZosophe, Roget saw himself as a 
cautious reviewer and experimentalist; his article was 
therefore a highly technical one, with much experimental 
detail and mathematical analysis, especially of Andre 
Marie Ampere's (1775-1836) electro-dynamic theory, whose 
rigour and elegance much attracted him. '1'0 test Ampere's 
theory, Roget did an experiment with Michael Faraday in 
the Royal Institution. Soon after hearing of Ampere's 
discovery that two parallel wires carrying currents of 
opposite directions attracted each other, Roget wondered 
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whether such an attraction could be observed between 
successive turns of a heliacal wire coil if the wire 
was sufficiently fine. He and Faraday wound a fine 
harpsichord wire into a helix; on passing a voltaic 
current through it, it immediately contracted, recovering 
its original dimensions as soon as the current was stopped. 
Roget's conclusion is interesting: 
"It was supposed that possibly some analogy 
might hereafter be found to exist between 
the phenomenon and the contraction of 
1 f 'b ,,56 muscu ar 1 res .••• 
Jean Louis Prevost (1790-1850) and Jean Baptiste Dumas 
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(1800-1884) had advanced a similar theory of muscle contraction, 
but in Roget's cautious opinion it was still too hypothetical 
an explanation to merit serious consideration. Such 
admirable and scientific caution, as Emblen suggests, is 
probably why Roget never hit the headlines so far as 
historians of science are concerned. Despite his caution, 
however, Roget hinted repeatedly at fundamental connexions 
among electricity, magnetism, electromagnetism and neuro-
muscular activity. These hints were supported by Ampere's 
theory, whose mathematical construction Roget understood 
fully; indeed, his understanding and admiration of the 
theoretical, mathematical labours of the French philosophers 
made him an unusual figure in British science, and in this 
respect he had a decided advantage over many of his colleagues; 
even physical scientists like Faraday rarely possessed the 
mathematical skill of Roget. Roget's support of Ampere 
57 
was also due to the simplicity and beauty of his theory; 
the lack of such simple elegance was the main reason for his 
rejecting a rival hypothesis of Wollaston and Oested, 
for Newton's dictum Natura simplex est was as powerful 
an arbiter as it had ever been. 
Roget's essay next discussed experiments and hypothesis 
on thermo-electricity (the Seebeck effect), the influence 
of light on magnetism, terrestrial magnetism and Ampere's 
field. Finally, be announced a grand idea which seems to 
have been intended as the climax of all four essays; in it, 
we cannot but recognize the influence of Davy: 
"On the whole, then, it must be allowed 
that there are strong grounds for the 
belief that there subsists some mutual 
connexion, or rather an intimate relation 
and affinity, between the several imponderable 
agents, namely Heat, Light, Electricity and 
MagnetiSM, which pervade in so mysterious a 
manner all the realms of space, and which 
exert so powerful an influence over all the 
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phenomena of the universe". 
Roget clearly believed this principle to lie at the 
very root of natural philosophy; indeed, as we have seen, 
he was to conclude his Bridgewater treatise three years 
later on exactly the same theme. Admittedly, that theme 
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was not original with him, as his own historical introduction 
showed. Where he did make his own contribution was in 
trying to gather adequate experimental and mathematical 
evidence so that the correlation of Nature's powers would 
no longer be only a speculation. His was a most thorough 
discussion of the subject, as we can appreciate by comparing 
it with Mary Somerville's (1780-1872) book On the connexion 
of the physical sciences ĜŨĮĨÏĞŸĲĚ Mrs. Somerville was a 
fine mathematician and physicist, and although her book 
was intended to be a popular presentation of physical 
science, it was thoroughly up-to-date and was very highly 
regarded by everyone, laymen and scholars alike. 
(Perhaps the only significant critic was Miss Marian 
Evans, alias George Eliot, though her criticism was not 
based on any scientific evidence). Roget's four essays, 
especially the last, were easily as critical, well-informed 
and discursive as Mrs. Somerville's book, and it is strange 
that although they were praised unreservedly by his 
contemporaries, historians of the physical sciences have 
rarely even mentioned them. 
Finally, let us examine Roget's philosophical article, 
'On an apparent violation of the Law of ĿŬŪWÙŪẀÙWXGŸÕĚfirst 
published in 1825. It was essentially a philosophical 
teazer, written more for light intellectual exercise than 
as a solemn problem. It concerns us for two reasons -
it displays his interest in mathematics, and it was a rare 
occasion when he discussed explicitly features of the 
philosophical background of his, and his contemporaries' 
science. The two philosophers he discussed most were 
Leibniz and (who else but?) Boscovich. In Roget's 
estimation, Leibniz's greatest legacy was his law of 
continuity; natUl'a non operatur per saZtum was his law of 
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the universe. Boscovich assumed this law as the foundation 
of his "ingenious and profound theory of natural philosophy, 
and deduced from it a variety of important corollaries and 
. ,,61 ȘŬŪȘŨẀVŸŬŪVĚ • One of those conclusions that Roget discussed 
was that the continuity law appeared to apply to all physical 
changes of situation, quality or anything else which are 
connected in mathematically expressible relations, and 
that even the forces and powers of Nature vary by 
continuous gradations from one period to another, 
, h ff' b t t 't' 62 h' , Wlt out su erlng any a rup ranSl lon. T lS ralses 
the question, for us, of how such changes could be 
continuous if force or power could ever be created or 
destroyed. Roget did not ask this question explicitly 
and did not suggest that Boscovich had; but he did write 
that 
" all the changes of magnitude in those 
quantities of which the value is dependent 
on that of certain other quantities, 
accompany corresponding changes in these 
latter quantities, in a manner strictly 
conformable with the law of ȘŬŪWÙŪẀÙWXHHŸĨĚ
Among these quantities he had the powers of Nature 
in mind, for two pages earlier he had discussed such 
powers vis-a-vis the continuity principle. One import 
of the above last passage was, therefore, that in the 
connexions among Nature's powers, no change in intensity 
could occur in anyone power without a corresponding change 
in another, since Roget was coming to believe, as his 
four essays on electricity and magnetism were to show, 
that power or force is interdependent in all its forms. 
Thus, in general terms, nihil ex nihilo. Furthermore, 
although he did not specify it, it would have been a 
breach of continuity if any power were to be destructible, 
and we may surmise that Roget would have admitted this 
even for vital economies. How else should an historian 
interpret Roget's whole-hearted approval of Boscovich's 
conclusion " ••. that the law of continuity is essentially 
universal, and that a breach of it is metaphysically /my 
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italics/, as well as physically, impossible?,,64 
The continuity law denied the possibility of creation 
or destruction of any thing or agent in Nature. In the 
case of one agent producing another, as in voltaic 
electricity, it indicated to writers like Roget that a 
true correlation existed between them. Roget was not 
alone in accepting the continuity law; most of his 
contemporaries did too, although few wrote papers on it 
unless they were pure philosophers. Roget's paper, 
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presented a purely mathematical challenge, which he fervently 
hoped the continuity law would solve with the utmost rigour 
since he had already decided that it had "a necessary 
existence in the nature of WUÙŪŦVHHŸĪĚ Inevitably, he found 
the solution and continuity remained secure. 
Summary 
Power or force, which Roget used synonymously, played 
a central role in his natural philosophy and physiology. 
One cannot but be impressed by how scrupulously he tried 
to give evidential and mathematical rigour to that and 
other general ideas, and one has to admit the depth of his 
understanding and praiseworthiness of his caution. A 
reading of all his major works and many of his minor ones 
has convinced me that, amongst the ideas that he grappled 
with and eventually espoused, were the correlation, and 
almost by implication, the conservation of powers. In 
the former he had a clear belief by 1831 at the latest 
when he wrote the essay on electromagnetism; and although 
he did no quantitatively conclusive experiments on it, it 
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was an utterly sober belief and it permeated all his 
work. As for his failure to enunciate explicitly the 
principle of power conservation, that is scarcely surprising; 
the conceptual world within which he had been reared was 
th that of the late 18 century and he consequently had many 
debates and conceptual difficulties to plough through 
before he could express himself clearly and confidently on 
the power question. Just one example of such difficulties 
was his need to decide on the relative merits and proper 
provinces of efficient and final causes; as a physiologist, 
the validity of final causes was obvious (as it is even 
in the 20th century, to wit H. MŲÙŤVȘUŸĬĚL. Richmond Wheeler67 
68 
and J.S. Haldane ); yet as a physical philosopher final 
causes were taboo. We must remember that his formative 
years were closer to the spirit of Boscovich, Hutton and 
John Brown than to that of the experimental and totally 
mechanistic 'scientist'. By the l840s, when other men 
were beginning to enunciate boldly the ideas of the 
correlation of forces and the conservation of power, Roget 
was already an old man; by then his driving interest was 
69 becoming his Thesaurus and besides, as Ernblen points out, 
he was becoming embittered by the squabbling within the 
Royal Society, and we may be sure that the life of a busy 
London natural philosopher no longer enchanted him. From 
the early l840s he contributed less and less to physiology 
and physical science and in 1848 he retired, a bitter man, 
from the senior secretaryship of the Society. It is 
therefore not surprising that, to my knowledge, he never 
commented publicly on the energy studies that were done in 
the l840s and l850s. Perhaps a search through his unpublished 
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manuscript material would reveal any private comments. 
Finally, I do not claim a primary place for Roget in 
the emergence of the correlation and conservation principles, 
certainly not on the same level as James Prescott Joule 
(1818-1889) or Helmholtz for instance. But he did 
contribute to the new, sober study of force or power, and 
this study was important for him. Roget was much more than 
the author of a word-classification, and although not a 
first-rank investigative scientist, he was a central, 
highly regarded figure in British science for several 
decades and his writings were read by a large proportion 
of the scientific community. If his ideas in physiology 
and on electricity, magnetism and allied topics were not 
startingly original, neither were they banal and, at 
least in physiology, he was cited often throughout the 
1830s, 1840s and 1850s. 
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Chapter 7. William Benjamin Carpenter (1813 -1885) 
William Carpenter received his early medical training 
as a physician's apprentice in Bristol. During that period 
he attended lectures and used the library at the Bristol 
Mechanics Institute and also attended the Bristol Medical 
School. In 1834 he went to London to study medicine for 
a year, became a member of the Royal College of Surgeons 
and the Apothecaries Company, and went on to Edinburgh where 
he took his M.D. in ÍĮĨĲŸĚ In Edinburgh, whilst still a 
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student, he made a name for himself as a talented contributor 
to several medical societies, becoming president of the 
(students') medical society; at that time he began a special 
interest in physiology. According to his ŞÙŬŦŲŠŮUŤŲŸĚat 
the age of 21 he began to plan a philosophical treatise on 
natural history, for all the treatises of the day seemed to 
him deficient in the underlying principles of physiology. 
He believed passionately that physiology ought to be based 
on a comparative study of animal and vegetable functions, 
and his first academic paper was on this theme: 'The 
structure and functions of the organs of respiration in the 
animal and vegetable kingdoms' (1835): The comparative 
approach was again evident in two papers of 1837: 'The 
voluntary and instinctive actions of living ŞŤÙŪŦVGŸĚ in 
which he sought a corrunon explanation of the irritabilities 
of vegetables and animals; and 'The unity of function in 
organized ŞŤÙŪŦVGŸĚ in which he attempted to apply to functions 
a law that the Russian naturalist, Karl Ernst von Baer 
(1792-1876), had enunciated for structures. 
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In 1837 he was appointed lecturer on medical juris-
prudence at the Bristol Medical College. There he won 
a prize for an essay 'On the differences of the laws 
regulating vital and physical phenomena', in which he asserted 
that vital laws are merely emergent characteristics of matter 
in particular arrangements. Like Roget, he was a vital 
materialist. 
By now, Carpenter had determined not to practise as a 
physician but to devote his life to write and teach physiology 
and conduct his own research. In 1839 he published a 
General and comparative physiology and in 1842 his Principles 
of human physiology; during the next 30 years, these books 
became standard texts in medical education in England and 
went through several editions. Indeed, despite the scant 
attention they receive from medical historians today, they 
seemed to have been well regarded and widely read, even 
outside Britain: for instance, J. W. Draper cited them in his 
Human physiology, sta-tical and dynamical, and von Baer wrote 
to him to say how much pleasure he had got from reading one 
of them whilst on holiday by the Caspian Sea? Sir James 
Paget's evaluation of his Physiologies was as follows: 
"I believe that among all the events that 
have had great influence on the teaching 
of physiology in our medical schools, none 
has been more important than the institution 
of separate courses of physiological lectures • 
••• among many things proving its necessity, 
none I think had more influence than the 
publication of Dr. Carpenter's two principal 
works in 1839 and 1842. Th6ir influence co-
incided with those exercised by Dr. Sharpey's 
teaching and the translation of MUller's 
Physiologie des Menschen, and with the 
constantly increasing interest in 
physiology which ",as stirred by the 
teachings of Owen, Liebig and Goodsir, 
by Dr. Marshall Hall's works on the reflex 
functions of the spinal cord, by Kiernan's 
essay on the minute structure of the liver, 
and Bowman's on that of the kidney .••• 
I think that no change more important than 
this has been made in our medical schools 
during the last half century; and that no-one 
contributed to it more than Dr. Carpenter. 
For many years, his books were almost without 
rival in the London schools; Mayo's Physiology 
soon ceased to be read; the translations of 
Tiedemann and Blumenbach were disused; the 
translation of Muller's Physiology was too 
large, and in some parts too difficult for any 
but the best students"? 
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A slightly less glowing estimation, but still a creditable 
was given by Thomas Henry Huxley ĜŨĮÎĪĤÍĮĲĪĞŸĚ Carpenter, 
he said, undertook the important role of intermediary between 
the rapidly accumulating mass of knowledge and the student in 
physiology; sifting and methodically arranging the data, and 
presenting them in lucid style, he produced a valuable 
compendium of physiology which, although containing but few 
original data of his own, ",as highly original in the way it 
treated various topics. 
It will be the principal argument of this chapter that 
one of Carpenter's most original contributions to general 
physiology was his use of power, that the ideas of the 
correlation and conservation of powers, especially the former, 
emerged even in the earliest editions of his Physiologies, 
and that after the formal, full enunciation of the 
conservation of energy in the late 1840s, he was one of 
the first physiologists to discuss in detail its applic-
ability to the vital system. 
Before discussing his dynamical physiology, mention 
should be made of his other works. Throughout his career 
he wrote fine, thoughtful papers on physiology and in 1856 
brought out a manual on The Miarosaope 9which became a 
scientific best seller in Britain and America. Meanwhile 
he was elected Fullerian Professor of Physiology at the 
Royal Institution, was made an F.R.S., began to teach 
physiology full time at University College and also began 
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his own research on fossil invertebrates. In 1856 he became 
registrar of the University of London, a post he held for 
the next 23 years. His fossil researches were not brilliant 
but they were very ȘŬÜŮŤWŤŸWĚand show that he was not only a 
compiler of other men's studies. Hence, Sir James Paget 
admired his study and extension of Marshall Hall's recent 
theory of reflex action in the spinal cord, which he did at 
Edinburgh; and his researches on foraminifera led him 
towards the evolution theory, on which he gave Charles 
Darwin (1809-1882) his support; Darwin appreciated such 
support, especially since he held Carpenter in high regard 
. 1 . t lO as a phYS10 0915 • 
Turning now to Carpenter's physiology and his ideas on 
power, there is a preliminary point to make which provides 
a key to his entire natural philosophy. In 1828 he attended 
a lecture at the Bristol Mechanics' Institute by a Nr. Thomas 
Exley (1775-1855) on his new theory of ÜŠWWŤŲŸĚ greatly 
excited by it, he read Exley's book, ppincipZes of natural 
ŮUÙRŬVŬŮUXŸĚ or a new theory of physics (1829);1 from which 
he probably got his introduction to Boscovich and to the 
notion of matter being explicable wholly in terms of force. 
As D.M. Knight points ŬẀWŸÎNẄŨŤXĚwas not an original or 
particularly influential figure in 19 th century science; 
but he did reflect the considerable interest in dynamical 
hypotheses of matter which constituted a powerful under-
current amongst some of the foremost intellects of his day. 
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He took his cue from Newton and Boscovich, aiming to construct 
a simpler dynamic theory of matter than either of them; his 
theory was that of Boscovich, but pruned by Newton's 
regulae ŮUÙŨŬŠŬŮUŠŪTÙŸĚ the first sphere of repulsion and 
the last sphere of attraction of Boscovich were retained, 
but the intermediate, alternating spheres were discarded, 
since the Newtonian rules did not allow a multiplicity of 
causes when few would suffice. He voiced the deepest 
beliefs of a number of his contemporaries, to wit Humphrey 
Davy and Michael Faraday, in saying that 
". •. it: is nothing but mere hypothesis, 
the effect of imagination and a vulgar 
notion, to judge that there is a minute, 
solid, impenetrable mass necessary to 
constitute an atom of matter on which forces 
act. I am aware that this notion has been 
admitted by philosophers of the first rank, 
but we know nothing of such little solids, 
we have never seen them, nor felt them, nor 
perceived them by any of the VŤŪVŤVĒŸĨĚ
Definition 24 constituted the core of his theory: 
"Absolute force of an atom is its force 
at a given distance from the centre, 
and this is called its mass or quantity 
14 
of matter". 
Nonetheless, he often used expressions like 'material 
atom' and 'etherial particle' for they were useful labels, 
even if not real entities. Of course, this gave his theory 
and others of the same ilk such an unfair advantage over 
strictly corpuscular matter-theories, for he could still 
use what appeared to be an atomic model which in many 
respects did not differ from, and had the usefulness of, 
true atomic theories; and when criticized for departing 
from the paradigm of pure force, he could defend himself 
by asserting that atoms might be entertained heuristically, 
even though they were essentially only aggregations of 
force. This might explain why, despite the blatantly 
deductive and speculative character of Exley's theory, 
it did appeal to a fair number of intelligent people; it 
must have had a consistent appeal throughout the next 
twenty years for he again lectured on it at a meeting of 
the British Association for the Advancement of Science in 
ŨĮÏĮŸĪĚ It is not surprising, therefore, that young William 
Carpenter was excited by it. Nor is it surprising that 
Carpenter never referred to it in his scientific writings, 
for he seems to have realized quickly how a-prioristic and 
speculative it was. Nonetheless, the primacy of power 
permanently informed his science. We shall now examine 
this. 
230. 
Throughout his career in physiology Carpenter sought 
functional and dynamical relations within the vital economy; 
unlike his lSth century precursors, he did not use the 
largely metaphysical vital powers such as vis nervosa, 
vis insita and vis meciicatrix, but relied mostly on recent 
empirical studies by British and Continental researchers. 
One instance of this was his idea of the essential unity, 
or correlation, of vital functions, as discussed in his 
paper 'On the unity of function in organized beings' (lS37). 
His aim was 
" to apply to function one of the laws 
propounded by Von Baer with regard to 
structure, namely that 1) A special function 
arises only out of one more general, and 
this by a gradual change. To this law I 
shall add a second. 2) In all cases where 
the different functions are highly specialized, 
the general structure retains, more or less, 
the primitive community of function ŸŅĦHUÙȘUĚ
originally characterized ÙWĒŸĬĚ
An obvious field in which these laws could be tested 
was the sense-perceptions, for several physiologists had 
been investigating them experimentally with promising 
results. Carpenter speculated that the special functions 
of sight, hearing, smell and taste might be merely elabor-
ations out of the general sense of touch. Such unity of 
functions he hoped also to find in the broader field of 
comparattve plan"t and animal physiology. It agreed too 
with his belief in the ultimate unity or correlation of 
the powers behind WUŸĚ inorganic phenomena of Nature; such 
was evident in his paper 'Physiology, an inductive science' 
(1838), where he put a Newtonian-like query: 
231. 
"Is it possible that these physical and 
vital properties of matter, which are at 
present our ultimate facts and axioms, may 
be hereafter included in a more general 
expression common to both? On this subject 
we can only speculate; but the probability 
appears decidedly in the affirmative. We 
have already remarked upon the rapid progress 
of generalization in the physical sciences, 
rendering it probable that before long one 
simple formula shall comprehend all the 
phenomena of the inorganic world; and it is 
not perhaps too much to hope for a corresponding 
simplification in the laws of the organized 
creation •••• In the proportion to our attain-
ment of such generalizations, we rise from the 
domain of our ignorance to that of our know-
d ,,17 Ie ge •••. 
This vision of two all-embracing laws (ultimately, 
perhaps, just one law) for Nature was clearly well in line 
with the Newton-Boscovich-Exley tradition. It also had 
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theological value for Carpenter, (as it had, too, for Newton 
and Boscovich), in that every step towards a comprehensive 
theory of Nature was further evidence of the beauty and 
harmony of the \'1orld and of the mind of its ȘŲŤŠWŬŲŸĮĚ
The quest for a general, unifying theory for both vital 
and inorganic powers can be seen in his GeneraZ and 
comparative physioZogy ĜÍĮĨĲĞŸĲĚ In its concluding 
paragraphs much of the argument of his 1838 paper was 
reproduced, but it went into the question of unity much more 
intensively. Carpenter's main aim seems to have been a 
true mean between extreme vitalism and extreme mechanicism, 
an aim which was facilitated by his thorough knowledge of 
the latest physico-chemical researches in physiology. An 
especially interesting approach was his discussion of 
William Paley's 'Principle of compensation', according to 
which all living organisms were supposed to be constructed 
on only a few basic patterns, each pattern being character-
ized by a certain quantity of material. In Paley's own 
words, 
"Compensation is a species of relation. 
It is relation when the defects of one 
part, or of one organ, are supplied by 
the structure of another part or of 
another organ. Thus, 1. The short, un-
bending neck of the elephant is compensated 
by the length and flexibility of his proboscis. 
He could not have reached the ground without 
it ••.• To a form, therefore, in some respects 
necessary, but in some respects also inadequate 
to the occasion of the animal, a supplement is 
added, which exactly makes up the deficiency 
under which he ŨŠŞŬẀŲŤTĒŸÕĚ
It was as if the living economy had only a certain 
quantity of material available for its construction, and 
like all limited economies, if one section was unusually 
well supplied, some other section had to suffer a deficit. 
With Paley, this principle of compensation had been wholly 
anatomical, concerning bodily structures rather than 
functions. Even when used physiologically, the functions 
were explicated in material terms, such as foodstuffs and 
secretions, rather than as powers. Carpenter shared this 
materialist approach, but he also applied the principle to 
the body's powers, whereby the power supplied by food and 
air was envisaged as the sole source of vital power, and 
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its excessive employment in one physiological function 
would be compensated by a corresponding reduced employment 
in another function. Thus, in plants there was an antagon-
ism between the nutritive and reproductive functions, the 
one being executed at the expense of the other. A similar 
antagonism existed in the animal kingdom, with the added 
complication of a third set of functions, namely the 
sensory and locomotive. The highest form of such competition 
for the power that an animal imbibed was the relation between 
the blood and air, namely the function of respiration. 
"The dependance of the organism on the 
constant stimulus of the circulating fluid 
is more evident in proportion as, in ascending 
the scale, we meet with greater variety and 
activity in the vital operations. The main-
tainance of the vivifying powers of this fluid 
by its exposure to the atmosphere is therefore 
demanded more urgently than the mere supply of 
its deficiency by the ingestion of fresh 
aliment; and it is accordingly found that many 
animals are capable of subsisting a considerable 
time without nourishment, whilst there are few 
which ,do not speedily perish, or whose vital 
actions at least are not checked, when deprived 
of air. The correspondence between the 
activity of this function in any individual 
system, and its general vital energy, must be 
evident to the discriminating observer; the 
comparative energy of the respiration in the 
active and rapacious eagle, and in the timid 
and indolent tortoise, afford a ready illustration 
of the connection. The development of the 
locomotive powers, and the degree of heat main-
tained in the system, which may be regarded as 
pretty constant indications of the general 
activity of its organic functions, will 
be found peculiarly connected with that 
f 't' ,,21 o ŲŤVŮŸŲŠĚŸŬŪĚ • 
Since he viewed respiration as a source of chemical 
power, the intimate connexion between it and organic 
activity was tantamount to a connexion between inorganic 
and organic force or power. Another such connexion 
concerned animal electricity. Like so many of his 
contemporaries and late 18th early 19th century pre-
decessors, Carpenter placed great hope in electricity; 
because of its ubiquity throughout organic and inorganic 
Nature, (on which Davy had expatiated so eloquently), and 
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because of its sheer power, (Davy had constructed a gigantic 
pile of 2000 plates by means of public subscripion), he and 
his colleagues saw it as the most promising bond between 
the realms of life and non-life. Historians have discussed 
in detail this pivotal position of electricity in 18th and 
19th century physiology and natural philosophy, and as 
T.S. Hall, for instance, shows, there were able physiologists 
who were eager to make electricity the very essence of life 
22 
- to wit John Abernethy (1764-1831). Carpenter's 
interest was more restrained than Abernethy's and others', 
for he was always reluctant to speculate beyond the bounds 
of empirical evidence; yet there was much evidence for the 
deep involvement of ordinary, i.e. voltaic, electricity in 
life. If a prune were sliced in two and the juice squeezed 
from its halves into separate containers, those containers 
would acquire opposite electrical states, even though the 
juice was of uniform chemical composition: 3 Such observ-
ations had set physiologists speculating. William Wollaston 
constructed an elegant electrical theory of VŤȘŲŤWÙŬŪŸÏĚ
and William Prout (1785-1850) suggested that the small 
quantities of minerals in vegetable tissues, usually 
regarded as accidental, might play an essential rale in 
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a plant's electrical composition: 5 As for 'the sheer power 
of electricity, Sir John Herschel (1792-1871) had shown that 
a fotce 50,000 times that of gravity might be generated 
instantaneously by the galvanic action of mercury amalgam 
on a millionth part of its own weight of sodium. Electricity 
was even implicated in human behaviour; in men, it was 
mostly positive, and irritable men of sanguine temperament 
had more free electricity than those of phlegmatic temperament. 
Careful studies had shown that the circumstances most 
e 
conducive to the generation of elctricity by the human 
" organism were a temperature of c. 80oP., tranquility of mind 
and social enjoyment, whilst a low temperature and depressed 
emotions diminished it ȘŬŲŸŤVŮÕŪTÙŪŦŨXŸĬĚ
Although Carpenter's discussion of functions and 
energies in this first edition of his treatise did not 
culminate in an assertion of some grand principle of power, 
it is reasonable to suggest that he had one in mind for he 
admitted as much in the treatise's penultimate paragraph: 
"It has been one object of the foregoing 
pages to show that vital properties are 
as essentially connected with certain forms 
of matter, as are those usually denominated 
physical with matter under its more common 
aspects. One more question yet remains. 
Is it possible that the physical and vital 
properties of matter, which are at present 
our ultimate facts and axioms, may be 
included within a more general expression, 
27 
common to both?" 
This general expression, as later editions of his 
Physiologies revealed, was none other than the correlation 
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of all forms of power and the increatibility and indestruct-
ibility of power itself. Taking his Physiologies in 
chronological order, we find nothing new in the second 
edition of General and comparative physiology ĜŨĮÏÍŶŸĮĚ In 
1842 appeared the first edition of his Principles of human 
ŮUXVÙŬŨŬŦXŸĲŴUŤŲŤĚhe aimed to collate the valuable results 
scattered throughout numerous specialized monographs that 
had been published recently in physiology and medicine. 
clearly, he had read many up-to-date papers, including 
some fine continental ones. Power was again a central 
concept, even more obvious than in the 1839 treatise. This 
was especially evident in the sections on respiration and 
sexual activity. On respiration, he discussed the rigorous 
experiments on bees by a Mr. George Newport (1803-1854) who 
had shown that the quantity of oxygen they consumed was 
exactly proportional to the heat they ŤẂŬŨẂŤTŸÕĚ Carpenter 
was aware of a similar conclusion that had been drawn from 
experiments on higher animals: needles had been inserted 
into active ÜẀVȘŨŤŸĚ and connected to a thermo-multiplier. 
Hence he proposed that throughout the animal economy, the 
development of heat is strictly proportional to the 
activities of the muscular processes which constitute the 
nutritive, secretive and other functions. It was then easy 
to explain the influence of the nervous system on animal 
heat production: l Carpenter believed that animal heat was 
totally due to the chemical power extracted from respiration 
and tissue activity, and that muscle activity was intimately 
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connected with respiration since the latter was a tissue-
based process and was not, as Lavoisier hud said, localized 
in the lungs. The idea of respiration as a tissue-based 
process was gaining ground already but, as Everett 
32 . 33 Mendelsohn, June Goodfleld and others have shown, it was 
still a debatable issue. Carpenter was well up on that 
debate. Once again, therefore, Carpenter asserted that 
a power that had been attributed to vitality, namely animal 
heat, was actually derived from an inorganic power, namely 
the chemical forces entailed in respiration. This theme 
was developed greatly in the third edition of his Human 
physiology. 
Turning to his discussion of the sexual functions, to 
discuss them in wholly dynamical terms as he did was quite 
unusual. There is a sizeable quantity of secondary 
literature on the history of ideas on sexuality, and although 
much of it has been researched meticulously, only a small 
proportion discusses the 19 th century dynamical approach. 
Two studies which do this most usefully are Haller and 
h h .. d '1 • t . V' t' . 34 Haller, T e p XVWȘŸŠŪĚan VŤẄẀŠŸŸĚ y Ln ŸȘĚ ŬŲŸŠŪĚĻÜŤŲŸȘŠHĚ
and H.T. Engelhardt, 'The disease of masturbution: values 
and the concept of TÙVŤŠVŤHŸĪĚ
Carpenter's account of sexual activity was that the 
manufacture of seminal fluid required a large quantity of 
the body's energy, (un idea which goes back to Hippocrates 
at least) ŸĬWUŠWĚ therefore each venereal act entailed a large 
expenditure of energy, and excessive indulgence would 
produce bodily exhaustion since the vi.tal economy had only 
a finite stock of power which could be replenished only from 
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its food. His, and his contemporaries', moral censure 
of promiscuity was thus given a valuable scientific boost 
which he and many others did not fail to exploit in their 
physiologies. Sometimes traditional ideas on sexuality 
were championed enthusiastically and uncritically; for 
instance, that seminal fluid was a discharge of the brain 
and spinal ÜŠŲŲŬŴŸİĚ Whatever the origins of 19th century 
discussions of sexual physiology, they almost all agreed 
that abnormal and excessive indulgence had one principal 
effect - debility, or over-consumption of the body's power. 
So said Carpenter: 
"The high degree of nervous excitement which 
the act of coition involves produces a sub-
sequent depression of corresponding amount; 
and the too-frequent repetition of it is 
productive of consequences very injurious 
to the general health. This is still more 
the case with the solitary indulgence 
for this, substituting an unnatural degree 
of one kind of excitement for that which is 
wanting in another, cannot but be still more 
trying to the bodily powers. The formation of 
the seminal secretion itself seems to be a 
much ŦŲŸŠWŤŲĚtax on -the corporeal powers, than 
might have been supposed d priori, and it is 
a well known fact that the highest degree of 
bodily vigour is inconsistent with a frequent 
indulgence in sexual intercourse; whilst nothing 
is more certain to reduce the powers, both of 
body and mind, than excess in this respect. 
These principles, which are of great importance 
in the regulation of the health, are but results 
of the general law, which prevails equally in 
the Vegetable and Animal Kingdoms, that the 
development of the individual and the repro-
duction of the species stand in an inverse 
ratio to each ŬWUŤŲHHŸĮĚ
This general law was clearly a type of compensation 
principle. It was reiterated verbatim in the third 
edition of Human physiology ĜÍĮÏĬĞŸĲĚ This was a revised 
edition and contained new discussions on the body's 
dynamics; for instance, sexual energy was correlated not 
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only with other physiological forms of power but also with 
mental power10the human animal was thus a versatile 
dynamical economy, in which the energy expended in any 
physical or mental activity would be a drain on the whole 
system. For instance, the sexual secretions, being 
strongly influenced by the mind, would be produced in 
greater or lesser quantity according to whether the mind 
contemplated lascivious or noble objects. Inevitably, 
however, sexual activity within marriage was considered 
salutary, so long as it was not excessive. On this point, 
all those who wrote about the physiological ill effects 
of sexual activity failed to deal satisfactorily; they 
failed to explain why a healthy adult could indulge 
vigorously during married life without debility, brain 
damage, neurasthenia etc., whilst even occasional extra-
marital indulgence would be infallibly harmful. Carpenter 
tried to give a dynamical explanation why this should be so: 
n\vhcn the appetite is naturally indulged, 
that is, in marriage, the necessary energy 
is supplied by the nervous stimulus of its 
natural accompaniment of love, ••• which 
prevents the injury that would otherwise 
arise from the increased expenditure of 
animal power: and in like manner, also, the 
function being in itself grateful, this 
personal attachment performs the further 
office of preventing immoderate indulgence ••• 
But, when the appetite is irregularly 
indulged, that is, in fornication, 
its energies become ŤẄUŠẀVWŤTHHŸŨĚ
A fine instance of how Carpenter used power in his 
physiology, and of how up-to-date the third edition of 
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Human physiology was, occurred in his discussion of muscle 
contractioni 2there, he discussed Helmholtz's research on 
the chemical changes vlhich accompany muscle acti vi ty which 
Helmholtz did in 1845, and he was fully acquainted with 
Liebig's chemical hypothesis of animal heat. Informing 
his whole discussion was his evident balief in a correlation 
between organic and inorganic powers, for his conclusion 
from Helmholtz's work was that: 
"It cannot but be regarded as a probable 
inference from these facts, that the 
development of the Contractile Force is 
in some way dependant on the Chemical 
Change, which seems to be so essential a 
condition of it; just as the development 
of the Electric Force of the Galvanic 
battery' is dependant on the new chemical 
arrangements, which take place between 
the bodies brought to act upon one another ...... 43 
Another instance of a vital function depending upon 
an inorganic force was his view of the blood's purification; 
he used a curious argument - that since physical powers 
and laws are \vholly mechanistic and determinate, whereas 
truly vital ones, if they exist at all, are indeterminate 
and fickle, it ŸGŊÕẀŨTĚ have been grossly improvident for the 
removal of carbonic acid from the blood to be a vital 
process. Thus, the critical, purifying function of 
respiration was entrusted to simple physical ŨŠŴVŸÏĚ
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carpenter's belief in the correlation of all powers 
seemed to free him from the necessity of vital forces 
to explain those functions that seemed to be confined 
to living organisms. Perhaps the best-substantiated case 
for him was animal heat, on which, having discussed the 
experiments of Lavoisier and Seguin, Liebig, Dulong and 
Despretz, he asserted confidently that: 
"Although the chemical doctrine of 
calorification cannot be regarded as 
yet perfected as to its details, there 
can be no reasonable doubt that it is 
altogether sufficient to account for 
the phenomena in question. And it may 
be stated as a general fact, that the 
production of Animal Heat is due to the 
various changes in chemical composition 
that are continually taking place within 
45 
our system". 
Indeed, in these sections of his physiological text-
book we see one of the earliest whole-hearted advocacies 
in Britain of Lavoisier's and Seguin's theory of respiration, 
in particular the dynamical implications that they themselves 
made in their first memoir on respiration in 1789. Let us 
recall that, having measured the differences in oxygen 
absorbed when a person eats, fasts, rests or vlOrks,they had 
concluded that oxygen usage was a measure of the equivalence 
of all forms of work: 
"Tnis sort. of observation k>ermits us to 
compare the use of forces between wnich 
there might appear to be no relation. 
One could learn, for example, what weight 
in pounds corresponds to the efforts of 
a man reciting a discourse, or a musician 
playing an instrument. One could even 
evaluate how much there is of a mechanical 
nature in the work of a philosopher while 
reflecting, a man of letters while writing, 
a musician while composing. These efforts, 
ordinarily considered as purely moral have 
something physical and material about them 
which permits them to be compared, in this 
respect, with the efforts of a labouring 
man. It is then not without a certain 
rightness that the French language has 
confounded under the single designation work 
Ltravai!7 the efforts of the spirit with 
those of the body, and work done in a study 
with that done in a ŐUŬŮĒŸĬĚ
T.S. Hall has said of this passage that Lavoisier 
obviously possessed a prophetic intuition of what would be 
expressed half a century later as the conservation of 
47 energy. With this interpretation I would hesitate, for 
the essential idea that Lavoisier and S€guin seem to have 
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been expounding was an equivalence or correlation, a generic 
likeness, among different forms of power which would thence-
forth permit a meaningful comparison between one power and 
another, no mat·ter how different in form. Nonetheless, 
such an idea as theirs was, I suggest, an important stage 
in the development of ideas on power, for it is difficult 
to imagine the emergence of a conservation theory without 
the concomitant, or preferably prior, emergence of a 
correlation principle. 
To return to Carpenter's discussion of respiration 
and allied topics, we find that the next two editions of 
his Human physioZogy contained little that was new, but the 
sixth edition (1864) offered important new ideas on power, 
and several ideas that had been expressed only vaguely 
in earlier editions yTere now boldly mentioned. Before 
discussing it, we must examine a paper he read before 
the Royal Society in 1850 'On the mutual relations of the 
vital and physical forces,48 and the third edition of his 
GeneraZ and comparative physioZogy (1851). 
Historians might well consider the Royal Society 
paper as the high-water mark of Carpenter's physiological 
career. He himself thought it so, and one can see how 
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his earlier, sometimes tentative, ideas on power now became 
explicit. Moreover, all editions of his PhysioLogies 
after 1850 differed notably from previous ones, for they 
incorporated the bold ideas of the paper. In the paper he 
acknowledged his debt to William Grove; Grove had expressed 
with unprecedented clarity since the early l840s the ideas 
on power that Carpenter and others had been formulating 
for several years, and Carpenter felt the time was ripe 
to declare himself explicitly. In this respect, he 
considered Grove's theory of the correlation of physical 
forces not an innovation but rather a crystallization of 
ideas, and his task was to bring to fruition the physiological 
49 implications of that theory. Actually, Grove himself had 
suggested the physiological import of his work, but 
Carpenter doubted that he had had in mind a correlation 
between the truly living functions (of growth, development 
and reproduction, for instance) and physical powers. To 
plumb these living functions was the task of a physiologist. 
Grove was not a physiologist; Carpenter was. 
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Carpenter saw his task much as Roget had, namely, 
not "to increase the knowledge of existing facts, so much 
50 
as to develope new relations between those already known". 
Just as Roget had hoped that some felicitous expression 
provided by the Thesaurus would open to his reader's mind 
a whole 'vista of collateral ideas I , so did Carpenter hope 
that his method in physiology would n ••• open out a vast 
number of new lines of inquiry, which promise an ample 
harvest of results •••. " 
The greatest result that he envisaged from the paper 
was simply" ... that Physiological science should be considered 
under "the same dynamic aspect, as that under which the 
Physical sciences are now viewed by the most enlightened 
h ,,51 philosop ers ••••• 
This aim had for him the sanction of Lockean philosophy. 
Early in the paper, having outlined Grovels theory, he 
aligned himself with Locke's idea that all force, which does 
not emanate from the wills of God's creatures, proceeds 
directly and inunediately from the \i1i11 of God himself; and 
therefore, regarding the so-called physical forces as so 
many modi operand,,: of one and the same agency, namely, the 
creative and sustaining Will of God, he could not see any 
validity in the objections that had been raised by several 
profound thinkers against the idea of the 'metamorphosis or 
f ,52 conversion of orces . He referred especially to Chapter 
21, 'On power', in Locke's Human understanding. 
Locke was again enlisted towards the close of the paper. 
starting with Locke's own notion of force, as emanating 
directly from the Divine Will, he proposed that such force, 
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operating through inorganic matter, manifests itself in 
electricity, magnetism, heat, light, chemical affinity 
and mechanical motion; and that when directed through 
organized beings, it effects the processes of grovlth, 
development, chemico-vital transformations and the like, 
and is further metamorphosed, through the instrumentality 
of the structures thus generated, into nervous and muscular 
53 powers. 
Carpenter began his lecture with a historical review 
of physiology; there we see how he believed his view of the 
relation between vital functions and physical forces 
differed from the general view of recent physiologists; 
whereas they had envisaged those forces acting only as 
stimuli on the vital system and rarely participating in its 
living, internal dynamics, he was seeking a more intimate 
relation between them. He thought himself alone in his 
approach, for he had never found 
II in physiological writings any indication 
of a more intimate relationship between the 
physical forces and vital phenomena, than 
that just stated - save on the part of those 
who have vaguely identified Heat or Electricity 
with the 'vital principle', with about the 
same amount of philosophical discrimination as 
that which was exercised by the iatro-chemists 
and iatro-mathematicians of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth ȘŤŪWẀŲÙŤVŨŨŸÏĚ
The next section of the paper sought mutual relations 
among the vital functions. He discussed evidence for the 
truly vital nature of certain plant and animal functions, 
vital functions being those which seemed to occur only 
in living systems and whose complexities put them beyond 
the reach of simple physico-chemical explanation. This 
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distinction seemed valid, although he would not accept any 
peculiarly vital force as its basis: it was the functions, 
or the behaviour of organisms, which were vital, but not 
the powers which effected those functions?5 One of the 
clearest instances of such vitality seemed to him the move-
ment of fluids - a field that men like John Hunter, ŸÙÙŨŨÙŠÜĚ
Alison, Charles Bell and John Draper, among others had also 
considered central to the study of life. He discussed 
Alison's study of the blood, agreeing with him on its 
essentially vital behaviour but disagreeing with his 
hypothesis of vital ȚŬŲȘŤVŸĬĚ
The next task was to show that the different causes 
or forces effecting such functions were correlated with 
one another. One line of evidence arose from Schwann's 
cell theory, for all forms of vital force were exerted 
through a common instrumentality, the cell; and all the 
cells, no matter how differentiated, in any organism were 
descended from a con@on ancestral cell; moreover, in 
single-celled organisms all forces and functions were 
known to occur without any apparent specialization. All 
living ȚŬŲȘŸVĚ could therefore be expressed collectively 
as 'cell force', each different function being the effect 
of a modified form of that force. Carpenter was quick 
to point out that by cell-force he was not raising the 
spectre of yet another definitive but incomprehensible 
vital power; the use of that expression 
" is just that which is commonly made 
of the term 'Engine-power'; everyone 
knowing that the stearn-engine possesses 
no power itself, but that it is simply 
the instrument most commonly exployed, 
because the most convenient and advantageous 
yet devised, for the application of the 
expansive force of steam, generated by the 
application of heat, to the production of 
mechanical motion":? 
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This cell-theory discussion led into a dynamical version 
of the principle of compensation although he did not mention 
Paley or the principle explictly. There was abundant 
evidence that when specialization of function occurred in 
the formation of higher organisms, the cells which effected 
one particular function lost their capacities for other 
functions. Thus the assimilating cells, which converted 
raw foodstuffs into 'organizable plasma', were observed to 
do scarcely any purely chemical transformation; they could 
not exert mechanical or nervous power or reproduce themselves. 
Carpenter concluded that the expenditure of the vital force 
of any cell upon a specific function seemed to unfit it for 
any other function: 8 This theme in his Human physioZogy 
entailed also a discussion of the debilitating effect of 
sexual indulgence; so too in his paper, though with a more 
confident assertion of the reciprocity or correlation of 
vital powers: 
"That a relation of reciprocity exists 
between the forces concerned in the growth, 
development and maintenance of the individual 
organism, and those which are employed in the 
generative act - so that an excessive expenditure 
of either diminishes the amount of vital force 
which is applicable to the other - is 
an idea so familiar to physiologists 
that the author need not here dvlell upon 
it, further than to point out how 
completely it coincides with, and illustrates, 
the view for which he is ȘŬŪWŤŪTÙŪŦHHŸĲĚ
The correlation theory accounted neatly for other 
phenomena he had discussed in his Physiologies, to wit 
the relation of nerve power to muscle contractility; on 
this he cited especially the Italian physiologist, Carlo 
Matteucci ĜÍŸÍÍĤÍĮĬĮĞHĚwho had also enquired into the 
relation between physical and vital forces; he praised 
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Matteucci's widely-read Lectures on the physicaZ phenomena 
of Ziving beings ĜÍĮÏİĞŸÕĚwhich tended to support his own 
ideas in dynamical physiology. 
Carpenter concluded this section by stating clearly 
what the correlation theory meant for the purely vital 
functions: that so close a mutual relation existed between 
all vital forces that they should be regarded as modes of 
a common cell force. Moreover, although this was not 
explicit, his argument implied a conservation, or at least 
a non-creation, of vi tal pOvler; for only by so envisaging 
the organism could his assertion of its exhaustion 
following overactivity (of the sexual functions for instance) 
have any useful meaning. Indeed, there vlOuld have been 
no point in constructing a correlation theory for vital 
forces as rigolrously as he tried to do, (remember that 
his was no idle speculation, but was based on the physical 
researches of Grove), and there could not have been any hope 
of testing that theory, if he had not envisaged the organism 
as a non-creator of power, just as most natural philosophers 
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already envisaged physical machines. Although there 
was no explicit assertion of a conservation of power 
or force anywhere in the paper, Section 3 developed along 
that line. 
Section 3 was entitled 'Relations of the vital and 
physical forces'. The most obvious field to seek 
correlations was nerve activity, for physiologists had been 
toying with the idea of an essential identity between 
that and electricity for at least a century, ever since 
the discovery of the Leyden Jar; the work of Galvani, Volta, 
Davy and others had provided support for the idea and some 
fine experimental studies had been done on it throughout 
Europe. Carpenter cited Matteucci's research which had 
apparently disproved an identity, yet he believed that 
there was abundant evidence for a correlation or mutual 
convertibility: electricity, when acting through nerve-
fibres, developing nerve force; and nerve force, when 
. ltd I' 1 t . . t 61 acting upon VŮŤȘŸŠĚ appara us, eve ŬŮŸŪŦĚe ec ŲŸȘŸĚy. 
He cited Johannes Muller's principle of specific nerve 
sensations, (to be discussed in Chapter 13), which agreed 
well with the correlation theory and which suggested to 
him that the relation between electricity and nerve-force 
was analogous to the relation between electricity and 
magnetism; nerve force was the effect of electricity in a 
nerve, magnetism being the effect of electricity in a piece 
of iron?2 The experiments of Davy, Faraday and Hatteucci 
on electric fishes were cited, which had shown that the 
electric power generated was "in precise accordance with 
f f h · , . . ,,63 the amount 0 nervous orce w ŸȘŪĚ ŸVĚ WŲŠŪVÜŸWWŤTĦĚ In 
Carpenter's opinion, therefore, there was not only a 
qualitative connexion but also a rigorous quantitative 
one, namely, a conservation of the net nervous and 
electric power during their interconversions. 
He was pleased to add that since he had written his 
paper he had found Matteucci adopting the doctrine of 
correlation between nervous and electric forces in his 
eigth series of ElectrophysiologicaZ researches ĜÍĮĪÌĞŸÏĚ
He added that in a review650f Matteucci's Lectures (1848), 
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which he had written in 1848, he had asserted the correlation 
principle himself. In a long footnote on the first page 
of the Royal Society paper he quoted from that review: 
"There can be no doubt that the present 
tendency of scientific investigation is 
to show a much more intimate relation than 
has been commonly supposed to exist between 
vital and physical agencies; and to prove 
that, whilst the former are of a nature 
altogether peculiar, they are yet dependent 
upon conditions supplied by the latter. 
And the more closely these phenomena are 
investigated, the more intimate and uniform 
does that dependence appear; so that we seem 
to have the general conclusion almost forced 
upon us, that the vitaZ forces of various 
kinds bear the same relation to the several 
physiual forces of the inorganic world, 
that they bear to each other; the great and 
essential modification or transformation being 
effected by their passage, so to speak, through 
the germ of the organic structure, somewhat 
after the same fashion that heat becomes 
electricity when passed through certain 
mixtures of ÜŤWŠŨVHHŸĬĚ
ĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĦĤĤĤŸĤĤ ĤĤŸĤĤĤĤĤĤ ------
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In the same footnote he cited a paper written by 
Dr. Richard Fowler in 1849, entitled 'If vitality be a 
force having correlations with the forces, chemical 
affinities, motion, heat, light, electricity, magnetism, 
gravity, so ably shown by Professor Grove to be modifications 
of one and the same force?,67 Clearly, Matteucci and Fowler 
were working along the same line as Carpenter, though he 
was apparently unaware of their correlation ideas until 1850. 
Returning to Section 3, Carpenter discussed how 
physical forces other than electricity were correlated 
with nerve force,namely heat, chemical affinity, light and 
motion. On motion he cited MUller's PhysioLogy and again 
made a conservation of power assertion: that the proportion-
ality between motor force and the nervous power exerted would 
be admitted by all physiologists, the most suasive illustration 
being the extraordinary force which is often developed by 
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persons under emotional stress. The least substantiated 
correlation was between nerve force and magnetism, on which 
he would not commit himself except to cite the researches 
of Baron von Feichenbach and Faraday which indicated a 
likely connexion. Priority was accorded to von Reichenbach, 
(who had devoted much time and money to an extensive and 
careful investigation. He is discussed in a later chapter) • 
The next theme was the possibility of correlations 
between vital forces other than nerve agency, and the 
physical ones. Muscle force was an obvious choice since 
it was well known that it was associated with the flow of 
electricity to or from muscles. On this issue, a/let 
of literature had appeared already and much has been 
253. 
written by medical historians. To cite only one historian, 
Dorothy Needham, 
"Many observations were recorded from 
the 17th century onwards; indeed, Volta 
in 1800 defined his Pile as an artificial 
electric organ. We may also recall the 
triumphant letter of Walsh to Benjamin 
Franklin in 1773: 'It is with particular 
satisfaction that I make my first communica-
tion, that the effect of TO"J:'pedo appears to 
be absolutely ŤŨŤȘWŲÙȘŠWĒŸĲĚ
Carpenter adopted Liebig's recent explanation of muscle force; 
it summarized the whole endeavour of these two vital 
materialists so well, that Carpenter's words merit 
extensive quotation: 
"These agencies Lelectricity, heat ŤWȘŸIHĚ
however, do not appear so directly 
concerned in the production of the motor 
power, as in occasioning that metamorphosis 
of living, organized tissue into chemical 
compounds, whereon the development of the 
muscular force seems to be immediately 
dependent. It is now universally admitted 
that the disintegration of a certain amount 
of muscular tissue, and the new arrangement 
of its components in combination with oxygen 
supplied by the blood, is necessary for the 
development of its contractile force; and the 
considerations adduced by PROFESSOR LIEBIG 
render it highly probable, that the muscular 
contraction may be regarded as proceeding 
from the expenditure or metamorphosis of the 
cell-force, which ceases to exist as a vital 
power, in giving rise to mechanical agency. 
The amount of muscular force developed appears 
to bear an exact correspondence with the amount 
of urea formed by the metamorphosis of the 
muscular tissue; and this metamorphosis 
involves the cessation of its existence 
as a living structure, and consequently 
the annihilation of the vital forces 
which that structure possessed. We are, 
then, to regard the nervous, electrical 
and other stimuli, under whose influence 
the muscular force is called forth, less 
as the immediate sources of that force, 
than as furnishing the conditions under 
which the vital force, acting through the 
muscle is converted into the mechanical 
force developed in its contraction"?O 
Carpenter considered it easy to correlate the forms 
of vital force mentioned so far with physical forces, a 
greater challenge was to show how physical forces were 
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implicated in the growth and development of living beings. 
Most historians of late 18th - early 19th century biology 
71 
would agree with Driesch and Wheeler that the study of 
development tended to develop vitalistic beliefs, whether 
one was an epigeneticist or a preformationist, (although 
epigenesis was perhaps the more likely road to vitalism). 
Against the vitalistic theories of embryological evolution 
and growth that had been enunciated in the past 80 years 
or so;2 particularly on the Continent, Carpenter had to 
contend. One of the primary pieces of evidence for his 
correlation view was the obvious fact that all life seemed 
to depend on heat and/or light. The question was wheother 
that dependence was total or only partial. The boldest 
hypothesis for a total dependence had been advanced by 
Jean Baptiste Boussingault (1802-1887), the French chemist 
and physiologist, and Carpenter cited him eagerly. According 
to Boussingault, the same species of plant in passing 
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through its several phases of life from germination to 
death, receives the same quantity of sunlight and heat, 
whether it be grown at the equator or the temperate zone 
or anywhere else; its rate of growth is in a precise 
inverse ratio to the quantity of light and heat it receives, 
and its organizing force is equivalent at all times to its 
73 imbibed solar power. Carpenter, though not in total 
agreement with Boussingault, believed that his and other 
men's studies had shown that heat was more than a mere 
stimulus upon an organism, and that it manifested itself 
as vital force whenever it operated within an organized 
structure. This idea, he added, "accords with the fact 
of the restoration to the inorganic world - under some form 
or other - of all the f01'ae thus withdrawn from it,,?4 
Clearly, the inorganic and organic realms together 
constituted a conservatory of power or force. 
Carpenter believed this view differed significantly 
from those of almost all other physiologists, a difference 
especially evident in their accounts of embryological 
evolution. This difference had at its root Grove's 
correlation theory as applied to physiology: 
"According to the doctrine current among 
some physiologists, the whole 'organizing 
force', 'nisus f01'mativus', or 'bildungs-
t1'ieb', which is to be exerted in the 
development of the complete structure, 
Ziea d01'mant in this single aell, the 
germ (it has been affirmed) being 
'potentially' the entire organism. 
And thus all the organizing force required 
to build up an oak or a palm, an elephant 
or a whale, is concentrated in a minute 
particle, only discernible by microscopic 
aid. 
As a refuge from this doctrine, ••• 
other physiologists, (among \'lhom the author 
formerly ranked himself), have affirmed that 
vital force must exist in a dormant condition 
in all matter capable of becoming organized; 
that the germ cell, in drawing to itself 
organizable materials, and in incorporating 
these into the living structure, does nothing 
else than evoke into activity their latent 
powers; and thus that, with every act of 
growth and cell-multiplication, new vital 
force is called into operation, whereby the 
process is continually maintained. This 
proposition does not involve any manifest 
absurdity. It attributes to oxygen, hydrogen, 
carbon and nitrogen properties which they were 
not previously supposed to possess; but no-one 
else could logically deny to these elements 
the possession of dormant vital powers, whilst 
they held that a dormant magnetic power might 
be attributed to iron •••• 
The views of PROF. GROVE, however, strike 
at the root of the notion of latent force of 
any description whatever; all force once 
generated being, in his estimation, perpetually 
active in one form or another; and its supposed 
"latency" being a hypothetical condition, the 
idea of which is quite unnecessary when the 
force which has ceased to manifest itself is 
recognized under some other form. Thus, in 
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his view, when iron is rendered magnetic by an 
electric current, the development of the magnetic 
force is rather to be looked on as the result of 
the conversion of the electric, by the instrument-
ality of the iron, than as a case of the excitation 
of one force previously dormant,by another which 
is expended in thus evoking it. Such an analogy 
should rather lead the physiologist to look for 
some extraneous source of the organizing 
force; and to suspect that when organizable 
materials are applied to the extension of a 
living structure, and are caused to manifest 
vital forces, some agency external to the 
organism is the moving spring of the whole 
series of operations. And thus, according 
to the view here advocated, the vital force 
which causes the primordial cell of the germ 
first to multiply itself, and then to develop 
itself into a complex and extensive organism, 
was not either locked up in that single cell, 
nor was it latent in the materials which are 
progressively assimilated by itself and its 
descendants; but is directly and immediately 
supplied by the Heat which is constantly 
operating upon it, and which is transformed 
into vital force by its passage through the 
organized fabric that manifests it"?5 
Heat was not the only physical agent known to be 
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essential for organic development. He cited W.F. Edwards' 
experimental study of the influence of light upon the 
metamorphosis of batrachia;6and a recent study by Jorgen 
Christian Schiodte, the Scandinavian naturalist,of the non-
development of eyes in subterraneous creatures like the 
Proteus anguineus and the AmbZyopsis spelaeus?7 On the 
influence of electricity he again cited Matteucci. 
In the paper's concluding paragraphs Carpenter gave a 
fine account of his vision of the world: there was a 
continuous interchange and metamorphosis of both matter 
and force between the inorganic and organic realms; the 
world was treated as a closed system within which the 
conservations of matter and force were the guiding principles 
which enabled the natural philosopher to have a clear view 
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of the unity of Nature. It is easy to see the philosophical 
kinship between Carpenter and men like Hutton, Davy and 
Roget; through their own specialized and painstaking 
studies, they believed they could construct comprehensive 
and rigorous views of Nature's unity. Carpenter's view 
was as follows: Not only is there a continuous material 
cycle between the inorganic and organic realms, but all 
the forces , which are operative in producing the phenomena 
of life, are in the first place derived from the inorganic 
universe, and are finally restored to it?8 In plants, 
light becomes metamorphosed into chemico-vital affinity, 
and heat manifests itself as vital force. The organic 
products of the working of light and heat within the plant 
become the food of animals and thus produce nervous and 
muscular forces. Taking his cue explictly from Liebig, 
the vi tal force, which effects primarily growth in plants, 
effects primarily the nervous and muscular forces in animals, 
whilst the organizing force requisite for these animal 
processes is heat. During animal life, therefore, there 
is a continuous restoration to the inorganic world of 
carbonic acid, water and ammonia, the quantities being 
exactly proportional to the heat and motion generated by 
the animal and the material it consumes as food. For 
Carpenter, this cycle was primarily dynamic: 
"50 that, on the whole there is strong 
reason to believe that the entire amount 
of force of all kinds (as of materials) 
received by an animal during a given period, 
is given back by it during that period, his 
condition at the end of the term being the 
same as at the beginning. And all that has 
been expended in the building up of 
the organism, is giVen back by its 
79 decay after death". 
In his paper we can see how several ideas which had 
appeared in his earlier works now became explicit; he 
drew attention to this in a footnote at the beginning where, 
having cited Fowler's correlation paper, he claimed priority 
for himself since the subject had been occupying his 
attention for some years; his paper was the first systematic 
treatment of it and was essentially a re-presentation of his 
own ideas in the light of new evidence and within the 
context of a newly stated physical principle. His mentors 
were mainly Grove and Liebig. Interestingly, not once 
in the paper did he mention Helmholtz, even though he 
discussed that aspect of muscle contraction to which Helmholz's 
studies in the mid 1840s contributed so much. Apparently, 
he was unaware of Helmholtz's 'Uber die Erhaltung der 
Kraft ' paper, which was likely enough since that paper was 
relatively little known even in Germany and had not been 
translated into English. The man who most influenced him 
on the conservation of power was therefore Liebig, for his 
name and work had acquired fame already in England. 
One more comment on Carpenter's paper: he was in no 
doubt about the difficulty of proving an hypothesis in 
physiology, that the life-sciences are not as amenable to 
rigorous investigation as the physical sciences, and that 
all broad physiological arguments are necessarily cumulative. 
He emphasized that the cunulative argument of his paper was 
what counted, and not the validity of each ŮÕÙŪWŸÕĚ Indeed, 
such has been the argumentative method in the life-sciences 
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from Aristotle to Darwin, perhaps even from the origin 
of human thought to the present day. 
The cumulative argument was developed next in the 
third edition of his General and comparative physiology 
ĜÍĮĪÍĞŸÍĚ In the preface he specified his own contributions 
thitherto to physiology; pride of place went to his work 
on 'the mutual connection of the vital forces, and their 
relation to the physical', and fourth in the list was his 
application of Von Baer's law of development from the 
1 h . 1 82 genera to t e specla • 
On the use of power in this edition, four points are 
notable. 
1) He was much more explicit than in earlier editions. 
2) He discussed more eagerly the theological implication 
of the correlation and conservation theories, and was much 
concerned with the philosophical validity of 'force' and 
'laws of Nature'; in this, he followed and quoted Locke. 
By force he meant only 'affections of matter' or the direct 
operation of the primal, all-sustaining First Cause. Vital 
forces were affections of matter in particular states of 
organization. So far as human understanding could reach, 
they were ultimate facts in physiology, just as attractions 
ŠŪŸĚrepulsions were ultimate facts in physics, and affinities 
in chemistry. The constancy of their actions indicated the 
constancy of God's PÙŨŨŸĨĚ
3) He discussed more eagerly than thitherto the primary 
role of the Sun and its light in the dynamical system of 
the world. One likely reason for this is that he had read 
and was quoting John Draper's recent treatise on Forces 
which produce the organization of ŮRŠŪWVŸÏĚ It is 
doubtful that he had read it before writing the second 
edition of his Physiology. Now, like Draper, he wrote 
lyrically on SUnlight85and quoted Lavoisier's powerful 
passage on it. In view of his geological interest, he 
might have read one or more of Hutton's treatises on 
natural philosophy, from which he would have obtained 
further ideas on the paramounce of light; but for this I 
have no evidence. 
4) He explicated respiration in bold dynamical terms 
and proposed more confidently that the bodily tissues 
are the loci of respiration. Respiration was necessary 
because of the energetic exertion of an animal's powers 
and its requirement for a high temperature. Apparently, 
this view had been championed in a paper he wrote as long 
ago as 1835 for the West of England Journal, and he was 
pleased to note that it had been confirmed by subsequent 
researchers, particularly Gustav Magnus (1802-1870) and 
86 
was now generally accepted. 
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The next step in his discussion of power was an essay 
on 'The phasis of force' ĜÍĮĪİĞŸİŠĚmetaphysical as well as 
scientific work, in which he developed slightly 
differently than before the physiological ŠŮŸŨÙȘŠWÙŬŪĚof 
the correlation theory ; again, there \vas no explicit, 
separate mention of conservation, but it was strongly 
implied. A large proportion of the essay was given to 
Liebig's chemico-physiological ideas on power, and the 
following synopsis of the essay might well be a synopsis 
of whole chapter of Liebig's Animal Chemistry: Carpenter 
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suggested that, apart from animal heat, the most 
characteristic method whereby animals restore force 
to the universe is by their motion. Hotion being an 
expression of force, he asked after the source of that 
force, answering that most physiologists now agreed in 
the principle first formally stated by Liebig, that every 
muscle contraction involves the death and oxidation of a 
quantity of muscle tissue proportional to the force 
exerted. The motion produced by each contraction could 
be regarded as an expression of the vital force which is 
superceded by chemical action, and as having the same 
relation to that chemical action which a voltaic current 
has to the oxidation of zinc in a ŞŠWWŤŲXŸĮĚ As 
Liebig first proposed, the nitrogenous constituents of 
plants and animals possess large concentrations of chemical 
force which, on being released, manifest themselves as 
ferments, motion, heat and other physiological phenomena. 
Just as the idea that death and oxidation of living tissues, 
provided the organism with its power for heat and motion 
had been a cornerstone of Liebig's physiology, so too was 
it for Carpenter. Thus, for nervous power: 
" ••. its source lies, like that of 
muscular power, in the chemical changes 
involved in the death and decomposition 
of the ŮŤȘẀŨÙŸŲĚ tissue which manifests 
,t" 89 ]. . 
In this essay and previous t.oJritings, Carpenter admitted 
the reality of matter as well as of force. In this, he 
departed from Boscovich and Exley and was part of the mid-
century movement in European physiology which might be 
described as the 'materialistic metaphysic' in which force 
and matter were the ultimate realities in physiology as 
in natural philosophy. However, he attributed more 
certainty to force than to matter, and (it seems to me) 
the main purpose of his 'Phasis of force' was to argue 
this point. Why else would he write as follows? 
"We shall have greatly failed in our 
purpose, however, if we have not by 
this time led our readers to perceive 
how complete is the distinction between 
matter and foroe, and how close is the 
relation between foroe and mind. Matter 
is in no case more than the embodiment or 
instrument of force; all its so-called 
active states being merely the manifestations 
of an energy which, under differet forms, is 
unceasingly operative. Nor can it be fairly 
said, that in substituting the doctrine of 
force for that of the 'imponderables', we are 
only setting up one hypothetical entity in 
place of another. Force is truly more of a 
reality to us than matter itself; for we 
cannot become cognizant of even the most 
fundamental property of matter - its occupation 
of space - without the consciousness of 
resistance.. . . And as we are thus led by the 
'correlation' doctrine to consider the various 
agencies of nature as the expression of a 
conscious will, we find the highest science 
completely according with the highest religion, 
in directing us to recognize the omnipresent 
and constantly sustaining energy of a personal 
Diety in every phenomenon of the universe 
d ,,90 aroun us .... 
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Once again, his general argument implied a conservation 
of power, such conservation being guaranteed by God's 
sustaining energy. 
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In the sixth and much revised edition of his 
Human physiology (1864)9l the conservation of energy was 
at last discussed explicitly. This edition had been 
edited by his physiologist friend, Henry Power (1829-1911), 
who had rewritten almost the entire book in order to keep 
down its length. But the first two chapters were 
Carpenter's original composition; and Chapter 1, 'Of life 
and its conditions,;2 was nothing but the physiological 
application of the correlation and conservation theories, 
in which his earlier ideas were now explicit. He referred 
to those philosophers, besides himself, whom he considered 
to have made original and seminal contributions, namely 
Liebig, Mayer, Grove and Joule. Again, Helmholtz was not 
cited as an original contributor, though he was mentioned 
as a subsequent participant in the TŤŞŠWŤŸĨĚ
Carpenter arranged the current views of life into 
three types: 
1) Life as an aggregate of living phenomena as they 
appear to us, without any ideas about its mechanism. 
2) Life as a mode of activity unique to living beings. 
3) Life as a special vital agency or power inherent in 
each organism. 
The first type, held by the 'positive' school, (of whom 
Draper was one), he rejected since it ignored the forces 
which operate the organism; it was as ridiculous as if, 
in studying the operations of a cotton factory, one 
restricted one's interest to the mechanism of carding, 
weaving and spinning whilst ignoring the motive power 
without which all the machines would be inert?4 
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The third type was rejected since it was incapable 
of being tested experimentally and was therefore useless; 
it was as speculative as explaining the transformation of 
raw cotton into woven calico by the agency of a 'calico-
k ' " 1 ,95 rna lng prlnclp e . 
The second tYl?H \vas most useful since it accorded with 
recent physical researches, and the physiologist could 
discern thereby the perpetual dynamic cycle and unity of 
Nature. 
In discussing the source of nervous and muscular forces 
he appended two footnotes. One enumerated the contributors 
to correlation and conservation, explicitly mentioning 
conservation as a distinct principle; the other mentioned 
later, less original contributions by Helrnholtzand William 
Thomson (1824-1907). The text of the essay proper argued 
that animal existence involves a constant expenditure of 
motor force, heat and, in the case of man, psychic powers, 
and that these derive from the chemical force stored up in 
the body's tissues and ȚÕÕTŸĬĚ Again, Liebig was acknowledged 
as the originator of this theory, although Carpenter thought 
that his ideas were being superseded: 
" he seems to have regarded the motor 
force produced as the expression of the 
vital force by which the tissue was 
previously animated; and to have looked 
upon its disintegration by oxygenation 
as simply a consequence of its death. 
The doctrine of the 'correlation of forces' 
being at that time undeveloped, he was 
not prepared to recognize a source of motor 
power in the ulterior chemical changes which 
the substance of the muscle undergoes; but 
seems to have regarded them as only 
concerned in the production of heat. 
The earliest distinct expression of 
the currer.t doctrine is to be found 
in the very remarkable treatise of 
Dr. Mayer, in which he worked out 
from the two fundamental axioms, 
"Ex nihilo nil fit" and "Nil fit ad 
nihilum", the whole system of doctrine 
which has since come to be known as 
that of the 'correlation of forces' and 
the 'conservation of force', in its 
application alike to physics and chemistry 
and physiology. Prof. Grove was simultaneously 
engaged in the development of the doctrine of 
the 'correlation of the physical forces'; and 
without any knowledge of Dr. Mayer's previous 
labours, the author of this treatise developed 
the doctrine in the form stated in the text, 
in his memoir 'On the mutual relations of the 
vital and physical forces', published in the 
PhiZooophicaZ ØŲŸŪVŠȘWÙŬŪVĚ for ŨĮĪÌĒŸİĚ
This passage is important for the historian since it 
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reveals the extent, as well as the limitations, of Liebig's 
contribution in Carpenter's opinion. It also shows that 
Carpenter considered the primary principle to be correlation, 
with conservation only a particular aspect of it, whose 
development from mainly metaphysical premises was due to 
the thitherto unknown genius of Hayer. This supports my 
earlier contention that Carpenter's concept of the correla-
tion of forces entailed a rough awareness of the conservation 
principle, and that a rigorous correlation theory only makes 
real sense if there is an implicit acceptance too of a 
conservation, or at least a non-creatibility, of force. 
Carpenter seems to have thought that the two principles of 
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correlation and conservation of force are mutually 
inclusive and that, when considered carefully, they are 
two sides of the same coin. Only thus can we explain 
his general lack of enthusiasm for conservation as a 
separate principle, for he thought it only a slight 
modification of the more substantial principle of correlation; 
in his opinion, correlation had been the subject of careful, 
extensive experimentation and reflection by eminent men 
like Liebig, Grove and Joule, not to mention himself; 
whereas conservation was only the brainchild of an ingenious 
metaphysician - albeit a remarkable brainchild. 
That both correlation and conservation of force were 
central features in his physiology, with correlation the 
more useful, can be seen from his summary of Chapter 1, 
where he described human life as essentially the manifest-
ation of different forces which are developed by the 
"retrograde metamorphosis of the organic compounds generated 
by the instrumentality of the plant,,?8 Even the reproductive 
force was of the same origin, albeit in an especially 
concentrated form. 
The last of carpenter's published writings that shall 
be discussed in this thesis is his Presidential Address 
to the British Association for the Advancement of Science 
in 1872, entitled 'Man the interpreter of ÔŠWẀŲŤHŸĲĚ
Departing from the custom for the president to review 
recent progress in a particular scientific field, he chose 
instead to deliver a general philosophic lecture whose 
main concern was to oppose the growing belief that, through 
science, man could understand Nature entirely and could 
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construct prescriptive laws for her. Such a reaction 
against the ever-growing arrogance of science was not new 
to the 19 th t B '1 W'll 100 d th cen ury; as ŠVŸĚ ŸĚ ey an 0 er 
historians have shown, it had been going on since the 
beginning of the century, to wit Coleridge and Newman 
among others. What is interesting about Carpenter's 
reaction was that it arose from his own scientific background 
and was based on his own first-hand acquaintance with 
methodological and philosophical difficulties, particularly 
within his own science of physiology. Total confidence 
in science, ne said, is naive since it ignores the difficulties 
inherent in sense-perceptions, intuition, logic and human 
judgement. He distinguished two types of scientific law; 
one was only a generalization of phenomena and was therefore 
not a proper law - such were the so-called laws of chemical 
combination; the other \vas a true law because it described 
the effects of a force, and force was an ultimate fact, 
even more certain than matter - the laws of gravitation and 
energy conservation (which he attributed solely to Mayer) 
were therefore real ŨŠŴVŸÕŨĚ
Since the only certainties in natural laws were the 
powers behind them, man's greatest task was to contemplate 
those powers; Carpenter's own contemplation led nim to 
appreciate the unity of Nature and God's ever active power. 
consequently, in the following extract we see the natural 
philosophy of a well-informed ŸUXVÙŬŨŬŦÙVWHĚ a man of science, 
whose guiding light had always been the dynamics of Nature; 
no better words than his own can convey the import of power 
for his world view: 
"To speak of any law as regulating or 
governing phenomena is only permissible 
on the assumption that the law is the 
expression of the modus operandi of a 
governing power •••• 
And thus we are led to the culminating 
point in man's intellectual interpretation 
of Nature - his recognition of the unity of 
the power, of which her phenomena are the 
diversified manifestations. Towards this 
point, all scientific inquiry now tends. 
The convertibility of the physical forces, 
the correlation of these with the vital, 
and the intimacy of that nexus between mental 
and bodily activity .•• all lead up to one 
and the same ȘŬŪȘŨẀVÙŬŪŨŨŸÌÎĚ
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That conclusion was the unity of Nature, on which the 
brilliant lines of Pope were quoted: 
"All are but parts of one stupendous whole, 
Whose body Nature is, and God the Soul." 
As the closing words of his lecture show, Carpenter shared 
pope's vision in all its glory: 
"Por whilst the deep-seated instincts of 
humanity and the profoundest researches of 
philosophy alike point to mind as the one 
and only source of power, it is the high 
prerogative of science to demonstrate the 
unity of the power which is operating through 
the limitless extent and variety of the 
univ8rse, and to trace its continuity through 
the vast series of ages that have been 
. d' . tIt' ,,103 occuple ln 1 s evo u 10n • 
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Summary 
It is difficult for an historian to evaluate the 
work of a man like Carpenter, for most historians of 
physiology and most historians of the correlation and 
conservation of energy have neglected him; only occasionally 
is he acknowledged as an original contributor to the energy 
debate, as in J.E. Carpenter's selective edition of his work, 
Nature and ÓŠŪŸÌÏĚYehuda Elkana does not mention him in his 
recent book, The discovery of the conservation of ŤŪŤŲŦXŸÌĪĚ
but that is scarcely surprising since he does not seem to 
have intended to do any research on the possibility of a 
physiological contribution. 
This chapter on Carpenter has therefore been a much-
needed, detailed rehabilitation of him as an original and 
thorough contributor to the development of the correlation 
and conservation principles. I have discussed his work 
into the 1870s, for only thus could it be sho\'m that his 
early ideas in dynamics - as they appeared in his physiological 
writings in the 1830s and early 1840s - were more than vague 
speculation and did constitute a roughly-hewn but definite 
conception of the correlation of Nature's powers. t-loreover, 
as his physiological textbooks were revised and as new 
evidence carne in from the Continent, \'le see that his 
correlation theory became more rigorous and also resulted 
in the explicit statement of conservation of energy, which 
had been only implicit in his earlier \'1ork. 
If we try to evaluate his standing among his contempor-
aries - which is an essential task for an historian - we 
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must admit that he was a well regarded physiologist, whose 
work impressed a fair number of his equals and peers. A 
persuasive instance of this is a letter written to him 
by the elderly Mary Somerville, congratulating him on a 
lecture-series he had given at the Royal Institution in 
1859-60 on 'The relation of the vital to the physical 
forces' : 
"Florence, June 12,1860. 
Dear Dr. Carpenter, 
The proof of the sequence of forces by which 
you have connected mind with mind, and transmitted 
your ideas to the minds of your audience, has 
required a higher power of intellect than that of 
making electricity the bearer of thought from 
continent to continent, sublime as it is, inasmuch 
as many intellects were combined to effect the 
latter, while the general tendency of science seems 
to have been your sole guide in demonstrating that 
matter is merely the medium through which rnind-
force, like all other force, acts, and that thus 
mind may, and does in fact, exist independently of 
matter. The series which you have completed is 
very beautiful. First, Mr. Grove's masterly 
demonstration of the correlation of the physical 
forces, then your proof of their correlation with 
the vital force so happily illustrated by the 
zoospores, and lastly the remarkable correlation 
between the vital and mental forces. No doubt, 
this series will mark the middle of the 19th 
century as a great scientific epoch ,,106 
If Somerville, Paget, Huxley and others thought so well 
of carpenter's work, why have historians of 19th century 
science largely ignored him? The reasons seem to me to be 
similar to those for Roget's neglect. Carpenter's was not 
a powerfully original or imaginative mind; it preferred 
sobriety and evidence to flashes of intuition. Like 
Roget, he preferred writing to research, the dispersal 
of scientific knowledge to the many to the intensification 
of knowledge among the few. Like Roget, he was both 
enquiring and didactic, with the didactic taking up much 
272. 
of his energy and time. Had they written less and 
concentrated more on their enquiries they might well have 
carved themselves more noticeable niches in history. 
However, history should not be concerned merely with 
notabilities, and when fine minds like Roget's and 
Carpenter's contributed to the emergence of an important 
new aspect of man's world view they ought not to be ignored. 
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CHAPTER 8. John William Draper (1811-1882). 
Draper studied chemistry at University College, London, 
and on emigrating to the United States took ẀŸĚ the study of 
medicine at the University of Pennsylvania, graduating in 
1836. He had already contributed papers on physiology to 
the Amepican Joupnal of Medical Sciences, and in 1836 was 
appointed professor of chemistry and physiology at Hampden 
Sidney College, Virginia; in 1839 he accepted the chair of 
chemistry and physiology at New QŬŸÛĦĚ
Draper became one of the most distinguished scientists 
in America, contributing original work and many papers on 
molecular physics, physiology and chemistry; his principal 
papers were on light and heat; indeed he seems to have been 
the first to produce daguerreotype portraits (1839), to take 
photographs of the moon (1840) and to combine the camera 
with a microscope, using his micro-photographs to illustrate 
his physiology lectures. In 1875 the American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences awarded him the Rumford Medal for his 
researches on radiant energy. Perhaps the greatest of his 
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physiological achievements, in his own opinion, was to apply 
to nations the same laws of growth and development as he 
found in his physiological research; presenting his conclusions 
in his History of the intellectual development of Eupope ĜÍĮĬÎĞŸĚ
which has been translated widely. To historians of science 
he is probably best known for his Elistcn·y of the conflict 
betpeen sC'ience and roeLigion (1874):: Out of his many 
writings, (for instance, he communicated 54 :t>ai:,>ers to the 
Royal society of London), only his two p.11ysiological treatises 
will be discussed below. 
These ŸUXVÙŬŨŬŦÙȘŠŨĚworks reveal the primary position 
of power in his science. In one especially obvious way, 
his physiology and dynamics differed from those of the 
physiologists discussed already - namely, in his knowledge 
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and faith in chemistry. He therefore tackled his physiology 
very much as Liebig was doing at approximately the same time, 
but it is interesting to note that although he must have 
read Liebig's Animal Chemistry, he did not cite him even 
once in the two treatises about to be discussed. 
These treatises had several features that are worth 
preliminary mention: we find that Draper had read widely on 
the question of power and was eager to discuss the experimental 
studies of many eminent European philosophers; the chemist 
Antoine Cesar Becquerel (1788-1878), Charles Daubeny (1795-
18G7), Michael Faraday, William and John Herschel, Karl 
Jacobi (1804-1851), Macedonio Melloni (1798-1854) and 
Alessandro Volta were often ȘÙWŤTŸĚ Among the several 
British physiologists he cited were Peter Roget and William 
ȘŠŲŮŤŪWŤŲŸĚ He hardly ever cited pre-19 th century natural 
philosophers or the British metaphysicians, for he seemed 
to be more concerned with ideas based on solid experimentation. 
However, despite his obvious skill as an experimental 
scientist and his open allegiance to ÖÕŐÙWÙẂÙVÜŸĚ there were 
strains of quite lyrical natural philosophy and natural 
theology in his writings, especially when he extolled the 
Sun as the great provider of power for the living world; 
such passages remind one of the complex natural philosophies 
of men like James Hutton and Humphrey Davy. 
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Draper protrayed power on a much more expansive 
canvas than had any of the physiologists so far discussed. 
In this respect, he was in the same class as Davy and Liebig; 
all three of them discussed the broad, social context of 
power, in addition to its purely scientific content; they 
seemed to be endorsing Bacon's vision that knowledge would 
be power, and some of Draper's writings seem to have had 
Bacon clearly in mind. 
Draper was a fully committed mechanicist. It was 
therefore inevitable, given the extent to which the physical 
sciences had progressed and his own skill in chemical 
experimentation, that he would investigate somewhat quanti-
tatively the connexions between inorganic and organic powers. 
In such manner he investigated topics that were at the very 
core of animal and plant physiology, for instance, the 
circulation of the blood in animals and of the sap in plants. 
His explanation of the powers that maintain these circulations 
bore some resemblance to the ideas of the physiologist 
William Alison? 
Two of Draper's publications will be discussed; they 
were both major treatises and together discuss all his 
important scientific work; they were read by leading 
contemporary scientists both in America and Britain, for 
instance, by William Carpenter, who frequently cited them. 
In 1844 Draper published A treatise on the forces which 
. t· f? ŸĚ 8 produce the ŬŲŦŠŪŸYŠĚ ton a ŮŸŠŪŸVĦĚ In the preface he 
mentioned that he had been applying detailed chemical 
analysis to vegetable physiology since 1833 and that his two 
main physiological pursuits were chemistry and the study of 
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the powers of Nature. In the preface to the second edition 
(1845) he declared that the popularity of the first edition 
had shm'ln the validity of his approach and that 
lithe agency of the imponderables in 
determining the production of chemical 
results, and more especially those 
connected with the growth of plants, is 
beginning to obtain the attention of 
philosophers, and doubtless before long 
will constitute a separate sCience"? 
Both as a chemist and as an investigator of physiological 
dynamics Draper was fascinated by the continuous process of 
death and rebirth in the living system; as a chemist, he 
discussed the carbon cycle (as we would call it nowadays); 
from the point of view of power, be analogi sed the living 
system with inorganic ones, the main points of these analogies 
being that power could never be created ex nihilo and that 
all its manifestations are correlatable with one another. 
"If an electric current is to be passed along 
the wire of a voltaic battery, and is required 
to evolve a certain amount of light or heat, 
or to produce a certain amount of electro-
magnetic motion, a fixed amount of zinc must 
be consumed. If a steam engine has a given 
quantity of work to perform, a given quantity 
of coal must be burned. So also in animal 
systems, the production of motion can only 
be effee"ted by the consumption of the parts 
of the animal ÜŠȘUÙŪŤĒŸÕĚ
The great originator of all power on the earth is the 
Sun: on this theme he became quite lyrical, the Sun being 
praised as the giver of Life and Civilization by virtue of 
the power of his light: 
"How is it also that wild birds and beasts 
conform in their habits to the progress of 
the seasons? ... Those migrations of fishes 
that take place at given seasons, and which 
are even connected with the wealth and well-
being of nations, are determined by the 
occurrence of certain epochs •..• If in any of 
these cases we pass from fact to fact, we 
uniformly come at last to the same conclusion, 
that all these incidents are directed by 
astronomical events; that THE SUN not only 
determines periods of awakening and sleep, of 
growth and decay, but there is also committed 
to him a control and regulation over all the 
movements of animated beings on the face of the 
globe .••• This physical agent /the light and 
heat of the VẀŸIHĚ thus eternally but invisibly 
continuing its operation, produces a thousand 
events in which its agency is only remotely 
traced; nor are those influences limited to 
merely physical results; they stand in connexion 
with the progress of society and the evolution 
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of mind. A full development of the reasoning 
faculty can only take place where physical 
circumstances conspire. It is to the climate of 
England and France that the human race is indebted 
for the intellect of Newton and ÒŠŮŨŠȘŤHHŸŨĚ
Thus, the power of the sun eventually becomes manifest 
in the power of the mind; that in turn produces the power 
of civilization, for advances in knowledge are advances in 
power. Draper believed that the civilized man of the mid-
19th century was an utterly different being from the man who 
had lived a thousand years ago, and that the conditions 
determining man's position had changed totally: for modern 
man, the position both of empires and individuals is fixed by 
the possession of knowledge - knowledge which is incessantly 
advancing. Wherever intelligence has been given, there is 
a requirement to join in the advancing march. The Indian 
stands still, and the penalty is TŤŠWUŸÎĚ At the very end 
of the first chapter Draper described the general purport 
of his 'treatise; it was designed to be a treatise on the 
paramountcy of power, and vegetable physiology was merely a 
suitable illustration of it: 
" ••. that whatever motion is accomplished, 
or whatever change is brought about, there 
is a consumption of material or an expenditure 
of force; that as the surface of the earth is 
continually remodelled by physical agents, so 
are the vicissitudes through which organized 
forms pass determined by physical powers, and 
bring about physical ends •••• If, moreover, 
our thoughts are directed to the relations 
which exist between climates and the character 
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of races, the distribution of vegetables and 
animals; if we observe the antagonization of 
these great classes in the result of their vital 
processes, their position as respects the 
a-tmosphere I the control which astronomical events 
possess over everything, ••• we surely shall have 
but little difficulty in understanding that, as 
in the inorganic world, so also in the world of 
organization, those all-pervading forces which 
natural philosophers and chemists recognize are 
13 
constantly employed". 
In chapter two he discussed his cause ceLebre - the 
circulation of fluids in animals and plants; he asserted 
that the basic force maintaining all such circulations was 
chemical affinity, though this actually manifested itself 
as capillary attraction within the circulatory vessels. 
Thus, if two liquids communicated with one another in a 
capillary tube, or in a porous or parenchymatous structure, 
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and had for that tube or structure different chemical 
affinities, movement would ensue; the liquid with the 
most energetic affinity would move with the greatest velocity 
and might even drive the other fluid entirely before it; all 
this was due to 'common capillary attraction', which in its 
turn was due to electric ŤẄȘÙWŤÜŤŪWŸÏĚ He believed this was 
both new and important in its wide applicability; for instance, 
. . . even in MAN, the circulation of the blood is caused " 
by the oxydating action of that liquid on the solid 
structures with which it is brought in ȘŬŪWŠȘWĒŸĪĚ Ultimately, 
however, the primary power of all was still the light of the 
sun. 
In chapter three Draper argued that, since the primary 
cause of the blood's circulation was chemical affinity -
the affinities between the oxygen of the arterial blood and 
the carbon and hydrogen of the body's tissues - the heart 
was only a regulator of the circulation; and as in a steam 
engine, where a change in its motion is eventually impressed 
upon the governor which adjusts itself accordingly, so would 
the heart act as a governor and accomodate itself to the 
changes in the blood VXVWŤÜŸĬĚ Essentially then, the prime 
mover of the circulation was supposed to be respiration -
not the traditional notion of respiration as occurring 
primarily in the lungs, but the new notion of tissue-located 
respiration, ŸŨÜŤŨXHĚ the interaction between oxygen and 
other elements within the extra-cardia I parts of the body. 
For this scheme Draper had a certain amount of empirical 
evidence. That his scheme turned out to be correct does not 
concern us here; what does concern us is that he reached 
that idea by considering the body's functions not only as 
a mechanicist but also as a chemist: 
"To the mind of a chemist, the relation which 
exists between arterial and venous blood and 
the soft tissues of the animal body may be 
very forcibly impressed by these ȘŬŪVÙTŤŲŠWÙŬŪVHHŸİĚ
Having discussed the dependence of the body's powers on 
the powers of inorganic Nature in the first three chapters, 
the remaining chapters reviewed experiments and hypotheses 
on the question of whether such powers might be reducible to 
one fundamental type. Could all forces be correlated? 
2H8. 
Draper reviewed studies done by the two Herschels, Joseph 
Fraunhofer (1787-1826) and Macedonio Melloni on the questions 
whether the light and heat from the sun are essentially 
identical, or at least derived from a common agent, and 
whether they are similarly correlated with the chemical powers 
that seem to result from them. Some ten years earlier, Melloni 
had concluded that light and heat were two physically 
independent principles, but recently he had changed his mind, 
opining that "light is only a series of calorific indications 
sensible to the organ of sight, or vice versa, that radiations 
of dark heat are true, invisible radiations of light n : 8 
Draper admired Melloni's experimentation but disagreed with 
his conclusion, for he did not think the experimental evidence 
yet adequate. Just as in chemical analysis, where chemists 
considered it absurd that Nature should possess 40-50 differenf 
metallic elements when their differences were often slight, 
but that until more evidence became available they could not 
"go back to the alchemical doctrine"190f only a few 
fundamental elements, so too with the enumeration of the 
imponderables; Draper believed that eventually the essential 
identity or correlation of these agents would be proven: 
"That some splendid generalization will 
hereafter unite all these imponderable 
principles, we have repeatedly said; but 
there are very many facts now known which 
none of the views hitherto brought forward 
can embrace. Under these circumstances, 
it would seem that the proper course to 
pursue is to regard each one of these 
agents as physically TÙVWÙŪȘWĒŸÕĚ
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As we shall see, such a belief in the eventual discovery 
of a generalizing principle for force, moderated by an 
awareness of the insufficiency of experimental evidence 
thitherto available, was shared by contemporaneous natural 
philosophers and physiologists in Germany; we have already 
seen the similar current in Britain. Of course, this was 
no coincidence for, as Rothschuh ŠVVŤŲWVŸŨĚ the development 
of physiology in the United States during the entire 18th and 
th first half of the 19 century followed the European ante-
cedents. Indeed, Rothschuh suggests that American physiology 
remained in its first, pre-experimental phase, as a field for 
study outside the laboratory, until c1860. of course, there 
were exceptions, for instance William Beaumont (1785-l853) 
and Robley Dunglinson (1798-1869) who did pioneer research 
on digestion; and he gives a paragraph to MŲŠŮŤŲŸÎĚ It is 
well to bear RothschuWspoint about the derivativeness of 
American work in mind \'lhen reading Draper for, although he 
cited physicists and chemists readily, he does not seem to 
me to have cited as many physiologists - particularly 
Germans - as he might have. Perhaps he regarded their 
work as too tainted with the spirit of Naturphilosophie 
to deserve citation. 
An interesting point in his discussion on power was 
an argument for correlation of forces that had been used 
by the chemist, Antoine Becquerel, and which reminds us of 
the basic idea behind Johannes Muller's specific sensations 
23 theory: 
"This brings me to offer some remarks on the 
opinion expressed by M. Becquerel, that the 
phenomena now under discussion are due to the 
qualities of the receiving surfaces, and not 
to agents intrinsically different, coexisting 
in the solar beam. That the same beam of light, 
falling on sulphuret of lime, causes it to 
phosphoresce; on chloride of silver, blackens 
it; on the retina, gives rise to the phenomena 
of vision and colour; on a piece of black cloth, 
causes it to become warm. This opinion seems 
to be surrounded with insurmountable difficulties 
and, if admitted, would disturb some of the best 
established truths of VȘÙŤŪȘŤĒŸÏĚ
Muller's theory was not actually mentioned, and since 
it was not available in English until Baly's translation of 
the Handbuch der Physioloaie in 1838 and 1840, it is not 
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improbable that Draper did not know of his ideas. However, 
it is worth noting how the consideration of sense-perceptions 
could lead onto the question of the correlation of powers; 
this is precisely what happened with Muller himself and with 
his pupil, Hermann Helmholtz. (See chapters 13 and 16 of 
this thesis). 
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Draper thought that, in the absence of contrary evidence, 
he might propose at least four different powers in sunlight:-
1) Visible light; 2) The principle of radiant heat; 3) A 
principle of chemical force, which seemed to be intimately 
associated with light, yet differed from it in wanting the 
power of affecting the human eye. From its intimate 
association with light, Draper suggested for this principle 
the name of TITHONIC RAYS, in allusion to the fable of 
25 Tithonus and Aurora; and 4} A principle of phosphorescence. 
In his experimental study of photosynthesis, Draper believed 
26 that he had managed to separate these four powers; for 
instance, he had shown that the decomposition of carbonic 
acid in leaves was due to that part of the sun's spectrum 
where there was maximum visible illumination in the yellow 
region, and that therefore this was not due to the yellow 
calorific or the yellow tithonic power, but only to the 
27 yellow light power. 
One overall impression one gets from Draper's treatise 
is that his investigation of photosynthesis since the 1830s 
had led him into the general topic of power, which had since 
become his principal interest. Consequently, the problem 
of unravelling plant metabolism was a problem of dynamics as 
well as of detailed chemistry; and although he nowhere 
quoted Liebig, this was precisely the same approach as 
Liebig's. What most impressed Draper was the immensity of 
the power in the sun's rays; the question of what happens 
to all that power inevitably forced itself upon him (as it 
had upon Hutton and Davy and was to upon von Reichenbach, 
28 Liebig and Helmholtz). His solution was that it is 
metamorphosed into the various terrestrial types of power 
and that power is therefore neither destroyed nor created. 
Plant metabolism had therefore led him onto a question of 
cosmic significance: 
"In what manner, then, does this light act? 
... What are the corresponding and contempor-
aneous changes which happen to the light? 
Action and reaction are always equal, and if a 
given beam can produce a result which demands 
the most energetic chemical force, it is 
reasonable to suppose that in doing so, it 
undergoes itself a change. 
These considerations show us that the 
question in what manner yellow light acts in 
controlling the function of digestion in plants, 
is not only exceedingly interesting in a 
physiological point of view, but also that it 
involves the whole theory of radiant matter, 
whether it be of light, heat or tithonicity,in 
producing chemical change. 
From the combustion of small quantities of 
carbon, we see, in improved stearn engines how 
great an amount of force can be originated, and by 
the oxydation of a few grains of zinc in voltaic 
batteries, what surprising chemical results arise. 
From those more ordinary cases of changes 
accomplished by the action of light, which appear 
to be feeble and slowly produced, we should form 
the most erroneous opinions of the force of the 
sun rays. General considerations might lead us to 
know that the principle which has in charge the 
keeping up of the constitution of the atmosphere, 
and regulating the vital functions of plants, is 
of great intensity. Thus, I have found that the 
rays which are emitted from a common wax candle 
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are superior in chemical force to the current which 
is evolved by a cell of Grove's battery, the most 
powerful of voltaic combinations known, for they 
could effect the recomposition of muriatic acid 
much faster than the battery could decompose it, 
and yet that battery was found competent to 
maintain a platina wire white hot, and if 
the views of Dr. Faraday are correct, was 
evolving more electricity than is developed 
by any thunderstorm. If this .is the case with 
a candle, what, then, shall we say of the 
brilliant rays of the sun, which impinge on 
the earth on all sides?"29 
Coming now to his Human ŮUXVÙŬŨŬŦXŸĚ statical and 
dynamical (1856), we find reiterated therein all the salient 
ideas of the earlier treatise, some developed in the light 
of more recent scientific studies. Once again, the 
correlation and conservation of powers were championed and 
occupied an important place in his physiology. By now, of 
course, these principles had become fairly accepted in 
western science, for it was nine years since Helmholtz had 
read his classic paper. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to 
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discuss what these principles meant to Draper as a physiologist, 
and we may still regard his use of them as largely original, 
for he had been developing his own line of thought since the 
l830s. 
His preface to Human physiology ŴŠVŤVŮŤȘÍŸÍŨXĚnoteworthy, 
for its allegiance to Auguste Comte (1798-1857) and his 
philosophy of 'positive sCience'rOno longer were the old 
metaphysical philosophies of the "English, Scotch, French 
31 
and German schools" relevant; Locke, Hurne, Reid, Stewart 
and others were of no use to Draper's science. Physiology 
was that branch of positive science which Draper most 
wanted to propagate: 
"How many advantages would arise if the 
elements of this science were made a part 
of general education in America!" 
And "That a great revolution is impending in 
the practice of medicine, no one who is 
at all observant of the progress of science 
can doubt. The great physicians of the 
future will be the great ŮUQŐÙÕŨŬŦÙVWVŨŨŸÎĚ
The first part of the treatise - 'statical physiology' 
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- was less explicit on the relations of power than the 
second part, but it did contain some germane discussions.; 
for instance, Draper had become more assured that the primary 
causes of the blood's circulation were the chemical affinities 
entailed in respiration; respiration was now located un-
hesitatingly in the body's tissues;3and there was therefore 
a grand correlation between I} the chemical powers of oxygen 
and the components of the body, 2} the movement of the blood, 
3) animal heat and 4) animal ÜŤWŠŞŬŨÙVÜŸÏĚ Vital functions 
were easily accounted for by employing these powers; for 
instance, the five senses could be explained by the 
metamorphoses of external forces into their physiological 
equivalents. Thus, in the mechanism of the eye, the first 
impression on the retina might be heat, 
" .•• and though in this manner, the origin 
of the action which has been set up is calorific 
and therefore physical, it immediately becomes 
converted into a physiological equivalent in the 
metamorphosis and destruction of a nervous 
WÙVVẀŤŨŨŸĪĚ
lilt now remains to add that this is only one 
manner of looking at the thing. According as 
our hypothesis of the nature of Light, of its 
relations to heat, and of its mdnner of 
establishing chemical changes may be, the special 
explanations we give of the functions of the eye 
will differ; yet there is such a relationship 
among these hypotheses that we can, without any 
difficulty, convert an explanation derived 
from one into an explanation derived from 
another. It really comes to little more 
than a translation of ŮUŲŠVŤŬŨŬŦXĒŸĬĚ
This explanation was fully reconcilable with Muller's 
theory of sense-perceptions, though again that was not cited. 
However, he did cite Muller's study of the vocal organs;7 
and we may believe that by that time (1856), he had become 
acquainted with most, even all, of Muller's principal 
physiological researches. 
The second part of Draper's Human physioZogy, on 
'dynamical physiology', was bolder in its use of power. 
This twofold division, into statical and dynamical, was not 
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arbitrary but was, he claimed, modelled on Galileo's division 
. . t th t· 38 of ÜŤȘUŠŪŸȘVĚ ln 0 e same ca egorles. (vve saw in Chapter 1 
of this thesis that Hume had divided his analysis of mind 
into statics and dynamics, apparently modelling himself on 
Newton. Draper might well have known of this, but he did 
not admit it.) This twofold division was extremely useful 
to Draper, for his physical science, his physiological science, 
his anthropology and his theology could all be served by a 
single paradigm - power. Even chemistry could be explained 
by dynamical laws, one of which was the conservation of 
power: 
"If, then, our earth does not possess within 
herself the power of sustaining the varied 
forms of vegetable life, but borrows it from 
an extraneous VŬẀŲȘŤŸĚ if light, in producing 
these effects, never undergoes destruction, 
but only modifies its state - for neither 
force nor matter can be annihilated, though 
they can be changed - what shall we say of 
the plastic power which we have thus assumed 
to reside in the germ?,,39 
Ultimately, the powers in the germ, as in all organisms, 
were seen to be derived from the sun. Draper claimed that 
to the physiologist the sun was no less sublime and powerful 
than it had traditionally been to the astronomer. All heat 
and light came from the sun; and Draper meant much more than 
a metaphor in saying that: "The sunbeam is the finger of ŇŬTŨÍŸÕĚ
Often, Draper sounds quite lyrical, even religious, in his 
scientific writing, and nowhere more so than in his 
contemplation of the powers of the world. In this blending 
of 'positive science' with religious feeling he was, of course, 
simply following the example of Comte. Like his master, 
Draper considered nothing to be outside the aegis of his 
positivism. In particular, he considered nothing to be 
outside the aegis of his philosophy of power. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, he used that philosophy even to defend 
the inunortality of man's soul against the atheists: 
"If there is a point in natural philosophy 
which may be regarded as finally settled, 
it is the imperishability of the chemical 
elements and the everlasting duration of force. 
With the system of Nature existing as it is, 
we can not admit that an atom of any kind can 
ever be destroyed; and a like assertion may be 
made of force. Heat may give rise to motion, 
motion to electricity, electricity to heat: one 
kind of force may be converted into another, 
there being a perfect correlation or quality of 
of substitution among them. The quantity of 
power is now the same as it ever was. Its 
variations are analogous to the apparent 
transmutations of ponderable material. They 
are mere metamorphoses. 
Summary 
•.• and if thus neither matter nor force can 
die, it would be a great anomaly if the 
principle of conscious identity were capable 
of annihilation. Like them, it may be 
capable of modification or change, and like 
them it is not capable of loss of existence •••• 
Perhaps,in some age hereafter physiology 
will find herself sufficiently advanced to 
offer her opinion on this profound topic, for 
I cannot think that GOD has left us without a 
witness in this matter, even in the structure 
and development of the body ÙWVŤŨȚHHŸŨĚ
The topic of power, especially the correlation of its 
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various forms and its net conservation in the world, occupied 
pride of place in Draper's natural philosophy and physiology. 
It determined the pattern of his thoughts and of his 
experiments, so that he became totally absorbed by it. He 
was, however, no mere metaphysical enthusiast for power; he 
was a Skil;:fUl experimentalist, and many portions of his 
treatises were given to detailed discussion of his own and 
others' experimental researches. He undoubtedly tried to 
test hypotheses by experiments, which was probably why he could 
not admit to the correlation of powers in his first treatise, 
but did expound it in his Human physiology, for by then 
sufficient evidence had accumulated to overcome his wariness. 
In his approach to this problem he reminds one of von 
Reichenbach in Austria, who was investigating the relations 
of forces and had coined a new force, the 'Od', at about the 
same time as Draper was working. (Von Reichenbach is 
discussed in Chapter 15 of this thesis). Neither cited 
each other, yet both were working in the same direction 
and were to have their discoveries - of tithonic rays and 
the Od - ignored. 
I have not been able to assess the influence that 
Draper exerted on the study of dynamics. He was cited not 
infrequently in Britain - for instance, by Carpenter - and 
was probably cited quite often in America; into that I have 
not researched. However, what does emerge from this brief 
study is that the question of force occupied at least one 
eminent American in the mid-19 th century and was investigated 
thoroughly by him before he would commit himself to any all-
encompassing hypothesis. Of Draper's competence in 
experimentation there can be no doubt, for he was a widely 
acknowledged pioneer in photography and microphotography, 
and his studies on tithonicity must have commanded attention, 
if not assent. 
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Chapter 9. On power or force in the physiologies of 
Richard Fowler (1765-1863), George Holland 
(1801-1865) and Orson Squire Fowler (1809-
1887), and in William Paley's natural theology. 
Conclusion to the preceding chapters. 
This final chapter on British dynamical physiology is a 
mixed bag. It discusses three physiologists who contributed 
to the physiological application of the correlation of forces. 
They are discussed because, although not great physiologists, 
they held ideas which were fairly original and struck their 
contemporaries as ingenious. Moreover, men like Roget and 
Carpenter cited them not infrequently. They differed from 
each other in the character and significance of their work: 
Dr. Richard Fowler conducted an admirable, experimental 
investigation into galvanism, with the intention of testing 
the various hypotheses which were in the air concerning the 
relation of galvanic to other forces; that was published in 
1793, and he was still beavering away in the 1840s and l850s, 
as we shall see from papers he read to the British Association 
for the Advancement of Science. He was obviously an early 
and widely respected researcher in physiological dynamicsi 
Johannes Mliller cited him and Carpenter acknowledged the 
value of his work in his 1850 Royal Society paper. But, 
despite his promising start and doggedness, he was never 
especially influential. 
Dr. George Calvert Holland (1801-1865) has been chosen 
as an example of a now-forgotten physiologist who used the 
concept of power to its utmost and was especially intent on 
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using it in his choice of materia medica. He was in the 
John Hunter - William Alison tradition of focussing especially 
on the circulation of the blood and its powers; like 
Carpenter, he was interested in using dynamical physiology to 
prove the folly of sexual overindulgence, thus giving 
scientific support to society's traditional moral attitude. 
Despite the idiosyncratic nature of his ideas, William Carpenter 
referred approvingly to his work. 
The third physiologist was Orson Squire Fowler (1809-1887), 
a well known American phrenologist. He also gave much 
attention to proving scientifically the folly of sexual excesses; 
moreover, no physiological or pathological phenomenon was 
beyond explanation by his dynamical principles. 
The ultimate section will discuss the place of power in 
William Paley's immensely popular NaturaZ theology, a treatise 
that no historian of 19 th century ideas in Britain can afford 
to ignore. Paley runs in the Locke - Reid - Stewart tradition 
of philosophy of power, and it is scarcely an exaggeration 
to say that every natural philosopher reared in Britain during 
the first half of the century read him. 
Richard Fowler 
In 1793, R-iohapd F01JZer, a young Edinburgh physician, 
published a slim treatise called Expepiments and observations 
reZative to the infZuence lateZy disoovered by M. ŇŠŨẂŠŪÙŸĚ
lZ l . l 1 •• 1 and commonly ca .cr ŠŪŸÜŠĤ ŤŸŤȘWŲŸȘŸWXĦĚ His aim was to 
investigate whether Galvani's principle or force had any 
intimate relation with other principles, such as ordinary 
electricity; Eusebio Valli (1755-1816), Galvani's nephew, had 
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contended that there was a relation. Fowler's book 
described many experiments, some simple, others intricate, 
that he and other researchers had done, and even today one 
must be impressed by its thoroughness and total reliance on 
experimental data; it greatly impressed his contemporaries 
in Britain and replaced Valli's work as the most authoritative 
analysis of galvanism. 
Having concluded in sections I and 2 of his book that 
galvanism had no relation to electricity or magnetism, he 
asked "What are the relations between the influence discovered 
by Galvani, and the muscles, the nervous and the vascular 
systems, of animals?,,2 After reviewing all available evidence 
he concluded regretfully that no essential relations had yet 
been discovered, although it seemed as if the blood-system 
might be involved in the source of galvanic power. One of 
his finest series of experiments was on sight; it is note-
worthy for its thoroughness, for the questions it raised on 
the relations between inorganic and organic powers, and 
because this field was to become so important in the next 
few decades, especially in the hands of Johannes Muller. 
Fowler began his experimental investigation of sight because the 
eyes are affected easily by metallic combinations. Laying 
a piece of tin-foil on the tip of his tongue, and the end of 
a piece of silver in the inner canthus of his eyeball, and 
bringing the metals into contact, a pale flash of light spread 
over his eye. On darkening the room, the flash was more vivid; 
if zinc and gold were used the flash was yet brighter. Re-
collecting that nerve filaments pass from the ophthalmic 
ganglion, through the eye's sclerotic coat, to the choroid 
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coat and uvea, and that the ganglion is formed partly from 
the nasal branch of the fifth pair of nerves, he passed a 
piece of silver up into his nasal passage as far as possible 
and brought it into contact with a piece of zinc placed on 
his tongue; as expected, he experienced a flash of ŨÙŦUWŸĚ
Although Fowler did not offer any theory about a 
connexion between galvanism, light, taste and chemical affinity, 
such as could account for the above experiments, he probably 
thought deeply along that line in the next few decades, for 
in 1849 he delivered his British Association paper: 'If 
vitality be a force having correlations with the forces, 
chemical affinities, motion, heat, light, electricity, 
magnetism, gravity, so ably shown by Professor Grove to be 
modifications of one and the same ȚŬŲȘŤGŸĚ From the abstract 
of it in the official Report of the meeting we learn that, 
having argued for the interconvertibility of the physical 
forces, he asserted that vitality was equally freely inter-
convertible with them. One of the main differences between 
physical and organic forces, he said, lay in the mechanisms of 
their interconversions, particularly the coils that experimenters 
like Faraday had been using with such success. (Faraday had 
constructed coils of wire around magnets and pieces of iron 
and with such apparatus had discovered electromagnetic induction 
in 1831). Fowler employed such coils as analogues to imagine 
how forces,previously latent, might be made apparent to human 
senses: for instance, the temperature change to which a newly 
born infant is subjected excites the motion needed for 
inspiration of air; this gives rise to chemical reaction 
between oxygen and carbon, this again to animal heat, from 
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which animal electricity might be obtained; from such 
electricity, "by an appropriate coil", magnetism is 
obtainable. Unlike mere physical apparatus, however, 
vitality is "the artist of its own coils"; no other force 
is known which could produce a piece of mechanism to re-
produce itself. Finally, mind and vitality are correlated 
with each other and with the physical ȚŬŲȘŤVŸĚ
Clearly, Fowler was thinking along the same physiological 
lines as Carpenter, and the full enunciation of the correlation 
of forces by Grove gave him the opportunity and incentive to 
present his own ideas more boldly, with the assurance that he 
would be heard with some respect by his scientific colleagues. 
Fowler does not seem to have influenced any of the other 
contributors to the correlation and conservation principles, 
and apart from his early treatise on galvanism, he was not 
widely quoted. However, WUŸĚpersistence of his interest 
in the relations of forces throughout his life, and that this 
theme was central to his own view of Nature, can be seen from 
the fact that he was still discussing its physiological 
implications in a paper he read to the British Association in 
1859, at the age of 94. There, he explored the question that 
Carpenter was to raise in his Royal Institution lectures later 
that year, namely, the dynamical relations between mind and 
matter. The main purport of this paper, entitled 'A second 
physiological attempt to unravel some of the perplexities of 
the Berkleyan ÑXŮŬWUŤVÙVGŸĚwas to disprove Berkeley's assertion 
that a conception or image has no existence except while it is 
being perceived. Locke had dealt with this theme of image 
formation earlier. Fowler agreed with him but wanted to give 
a thoroughly dynamical explication of the persistence of 
images in the human mind: 
"Now the bridge to connect mind with what 
is external to mind will be found, I think, 
in the pre-established affinities of the 
forces with which phenomena are composed, 
and the mind which conceives them. Such 
affinities consitute the pre-established 
harmony suggested by Leibniz. 
All chemical affinities are of this 
kind; all sensational, all intellectual, 
all associations of ideas, the affinities 
of force for each other, as magnetism for 
iron (see Ampere)"? 
"The vitality of sap in trees is so modified 
by the graft coil through which it passes, as 
to result in varieties of fruit corresponding 
with the graft. The motion by which a ship 
moves is modified by the adjustment of the sails, 
the rudder, paddles and screw. NOW, the law 
of these forces requires investigation, and is 
clearly (as Turgot and Dugald Stewart asserted) 
independent of the mind, and external to it. 
May it, then, not be asserted, as affirmed, that 
the forces are the bridges by which the mind 
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passes to and from the phenomena which it perceives?" 
"I am afraid I may not have been sufficiently 
explicit as to the means by which the severance 
between matter and mind may be bridged over 
by an affinity, or a force; but I consider that, 
in addition to the 7 physical forces, of which 
Mr. Grove has so ingeniously proved the correlations, 
mind and vitality are equally forces, as I have 
attempted to prove in former papers, and that these 
- mind dnd vitality - have such correlations with 
the physical forces as to form the communication 
which bridges over the apparent severance between 
8 
mind and matter". 
Richard Fowler must have been the grand old man of 
British scientific society in the late 1850s and early 
1860s, renowned not for any seminal scientific discovery 
but rather for his magnificent staying-power and loyally 
supporting the annual meetings of the British Association. 
His scientific acquaintances must also have been impressed 
by his persistence in exploring the relations among the 
powers of Nature, and it is just possible that there was a 
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closer connexion between his work and Carpentp.r's and Roget's, 
than I have yet discovered. Certainly, he had much in 
common with both Carpenter and Roget, for they were all 
fellows of the Royal Society, members of the British 
Association and physiologists with more than passing 
interests in the latest researches on forces. All three 
were graduates of NTÙŪŞẀŲŦUŸĚ Perhaps the most significant 
difference between Fowler and the other two was that he 
never lived in and rarely visited London, whereas they spent 
most of their careers there; that would account for 
carpenter's apparent unawareness of his work until 1850. 
George Calvert Holland was known to British physiologists for 
two quite impressive treatises - his ExperimentaZ inquiry 
into the Zaws of organic and animaL Zife (l829);oand his 
Inquiry into the principles and practice of medicine, 
founded on originaZ physioZogical investigations, Vol.l, 
11 (1834) ,Vol.2, (1838). Since the latter treatise contained 
all that was important in the former, and much more, it alone 
will be discussed in detail here. The aim of both works was 
to discover some of the general laws which regulate the 
well-being of the vital powers. In the earlier work, he had 
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concluded that the two essential centres of power in the 
animal organism are the circulation of the blood and the 
respiration;2 that the energies of all other vital functions 
depend upon the power supplied to them by these two, and 
that ailments are mostly due to essentially dynamical 
derangements in the blood's circulation. 
These conclusions were developed in the later treatise. 
There, for instance, he criticized Cullen's doctrine of 
spasms, his vis medicatrix naturae and his notions on the 
nervous system, because Cullen's powers were not fundamental 
enough; if only he had studied the powers connected with the 
blood, he would have been able to explain spasm etc., more 
VÙÜŮŨXŸĨĚ Holland's main criticism of other physiological 
systems was that they had failed to explain how the properties 
and circulation of the blood were modified by external and 
internal forces, how the blood system was the main co-
ordinating mechanism in the animal, and the laws regulating 
the generation of animal UŤŠWŸÏĚ He envisaged the animal 
system as a store of power, the principal source of which 
was the chemical energy of food and oxygen. Although he 
never explicitly discussed the possibility of a real correlation 
between vitality and inorganic forces, and cannot be said to 
have contributed directly to the principles of correlation 
and conservation, he clearly believed that the living 
organism could not create its own power and that exhaustion 
of its power was the key idea in accounting for, and treating, 
15 ' 1 t' 't f h '.ilments; exceSSlve sexua ac lVl y was one 0 t e most 
dangerous ways to exhaust the animal frame, his views on which 
were very similar to Carpenter's. Thus, 
"Among other important and frequent causes 
of constitutional exhaustion, associated with 
nervous irritability, may be enumerated the 
unrestricted indulgence of the animal desire, 
or even the ordinary gratification of it in 
feeble habits of ŞÕTXĒŸĬĚ
"The gratification of the sensual passion is 
more frequently a cause of disease than is 
generally imagined. My own observation, which 
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has been particularly directed to the investigation 
of this subject, has furnished me with many 
instances strongly illustrative of the injurious 
effects of such indulgence on the constitution. 
Consumption is often produced by it •••• "17 
"The undue indulgence of the amative propensity 
produces, of course, different effects in 
different constitutions: in some consumption, in 
others various diseases of the nervous system, 
and not unfrequently scrofulous affections, 
attacking the spine, mesenteric and other ŦŨŠŪTVĒŸĮĚ
As with John Brown and Benjamin Rush, Holland's dynamical 
physiology did have the beneficial effect of proclaiming that 
the whole patient - his surroundings, state of mind and body -
must be cared for whenever he suffers any ailment, be it 
psychological or physical. This can be seen especially in 
volume 2 of his Inquiry, 'On cholera', where he offered a 
new view of the disease, namely that it was caused by an 
agent or external power which, acting upon an already weakened 
body, caused a "depression of the circulatory powers, and a 
consequent internal determination of the blood". The initial 
weakness could be caused by climate, or even a state of 
mental depression; since mental power seemed to be only one 
form of vital power, he believed too that the mental state 
was often the occasion of cholera, dysentery and ȚŤẂŤŲVŸĲĚ
Most of the remedies he proposed for cholera were 
dynamical, aimed at inducing the whole animal economy to 
20 
recover 'its natural energies'. The most important 
remedies were: First, a calm and cheerful state of mind. 
311. 
Second, nourishing and stimulating diet. Third, warm 
21 
clothing and habits of temperance. Others were galvanism, 
especially in states of collapse; and muriate of soda, for 
this would aid the oxygenation of the blood, whereby the 
blood could impart more power to the body's tissues and more 
readily maintain the animal UŤŠWŸÎĚ
As with other physiologists discussed in this 
dissertation, Holland's ideas on the physiological r5le of 
power were often vague, and are difficult for an historian 
to evaluate. Certainly, he was far below Peter Roget and 
William Carpenter, with regard to both the thoroughness and 
experimental reliance of his physiology, and his contributions 
to the energy question. Yet Holland's two treatises were 
regarded well by British physiologists in the second quarter 
of the century, and it is probable that the doctrine of 
correlation, especially as enunciated by Carpenter and 
Richard Fowler, would not have surprised him for it accorded 
well with his own ideas. 
Orson Squire Fowler 
In 1850 a collection230f papers on phrenology and 
physiology by Fowler was published in New York. Fowler 
had already written several works on diverse topics, and 
during the next 30 years he was to widen the scope and 
discursiveness of his physiological writings. According 
312. 
to two historians of American physiology, his books on love, 
marriage and physiology touched on everything from animal 
magnetism to phrenology, from birthmarks to the dynamical 
principles of health foods, from the evils of wearing corsets 
to composing a prayer for those addicted to GVŤŨȚĤŠŞẀVŤHŸÏĚ
Fowler's principal physiological interest was in the body's 
forces; health was the maintenance of a due balance and an 
adequate level of these forces, whilst ailments were 
primarily caused by exhaustion. Occasionally he seemed to 
write as a vitalist, though more often he used a sort of 
correlation theory to account for vitality in terms of 
physico-chemical forces, especially magnetism. Indeed, it 
is difficult to extract a totally consistent theoretical 
basis from his writings, but it is certain that he regarded 
the organism essentially as a storehouse of power in various 
forms, that every action of the body entailed an expenditure 
of that power, and that the forms of living power were 
correlated one with another and with the powers obtainable 
from food, air, sunlight etc. 
His theory is well seen in one of the pamphlets, 
'Amativeness; or evils and remedies of excessive and perverted 
sexuality,;5 in his 1850 book. There it appeared that he 
was not alone in his belief that sexual excesses could lead 
directly to grave maladies such as fevers, insanity and acute 
gastro-intestinal disorders. Of the letters that fellow 
American physicians had written to him, the following is 
typical: 
"Brooklyn, MŤȘĦÍĲŸUĚ 1840. 
In my own practice, I think I have seen 
the following results of masturbation -
involuntary emissions, prostration of 
strength, paralysis of the limbs, hysteria, 
epilepsy, strange nervous affections, 
dyspepsia, hypochondria, spinal disease, 
pain and weakness in the back and limbs, 
costiveness and in fine the long and dismal 
array of gastric, enteric, nervous and 
spinal affections, that are so complicated 
and difficult to ÜŠŪŠŦŤĒŸĬĚ
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To this Fowler added that the loss of seminal secretion 
is the loss of vitality itself, and that since it is a well 
known physiological principle that the over-taxing of one 
organ robs the other organs of the vital power, excessive 
sexual indulgence cannot fail to weaken the whole system. 
Well had the Book of Wisdom said "Give not thy strength to 
women", and he who did had to expect to be weak everywhere 
27 
else. 
Fowler' s remedies for sexually induced debility \'1ere 
solely dynamical ones. The first was to abstain immediately. 
Then, 
"galvanism and magnetism, and Sherwood's 
magnetic pills, have effected some surprising 
cures of this disease, and especially of 
female complaints; yet the former, being a 
powerful tonic, must not be used too freely • 
••• physiological prescriptions and preventives 
\-1ill generally be found to work a more effectual 
cure than those medicines (of which I un-
equivocally disapprove) used by the faculty. 
Avoid all stimulants and irritants. 
Inflammation being the chief cause of your 
difficulty, everything calculated to increase 
it is unequivocally bad. Hence abandon wholly 
and at once tea 3 coffee 3 tobacco 3 and all 
stimulating meats and TŮÙŪÛVHHŸĮĚ
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These remedies were what one would have expected from 
the old anti-phlogiston theory; that theory was now obsolete, 
but so long as health and disease were considered to be 
vaguely dynamical phenomena it was still possible to believe 
in the anti-phlogiston remedies. 
In a paper on 'Love and parentage' Fowler tackled the 
question of the source of an organism's powers. Animal 
magnetism was the basic form of that power, although electricity 
and galvanism were synonyms for it. Magnetism could be 
called the master workman or grand executive of every animal 
and mental function, and even "when applied to grain, roots, 
herbs, etc., it accelerates their growth a thousand per ȘŤŪWĒŸĲĚ
Consequently, he envisaged the organism as a type of galvanic 
battery generating positive and negative forces, the alternation 
and expenditure of which produced every motion and function in 
living nature. The vital system was essentially a machine 
in which every action entailed an appropriate expenditure of 
30 power. Thus one could explain why great men often have 
weakly children - because they expend so much of their energy 
on their labours that little vitality is left over to produce 
an energetic seminal secretion and hence vigorous offspring. 
A child's innate stock of vitality depended on the power 
transmitted by his parents during the act of conception; and 
the principal aim of a child's education was simply to build 
c 
up this ÒŠÜŠŸÛÙŠŪĤWXŮŤĚ inherited power. 
liThe great fault of modern education is robbing 
the body to develop the mind Let your 
first labour be to give your children strong 
constitutions, and to lay in for them as large 
a supply of physical energy as possible. You 
may cultivate their intellects, but not so much 
31 
as to withdraw their energies from growth". 
Medical practice was to aim at building up the body's 
reservoir of power. Food and sleep were, in Fowler's 
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opinion, the main inlets of this power, whilst every physical 
and mental effort expended it. Whenever the expenditure 
exceeded the supply, a draft occurred on the original stock 
of vitality, namely, on the constitution itself, and the 
ultimate effect of that was death. Consequently, "To take 
alcoholic stimulants is to commit suicide in proportion to 
32 
the amount taken". 
In like vein, when considering food, his main interest 
was what kinds of food develop specifically the physical and 
mental powers of the body. In his opinion this was one of 
the most momentous questions facing physiology. Fowler was 
a vegetarian and argued that such a diet could easily supply 
the body's energy requirements, as well as foster a greater 
moral energy than a meat diet (an argument still used by some 
vegetarians, to wit Mr. Smith in Graham Green's novel, The 
comedians). On the nutritional adequacy of a farinaceous 
diet, he quoted Liebig with great admiration: 
"His Aninla Z ahemis try, one of the most profoundly 
philosophical works on this subject ever written, 
thus answers this question ,,33 
It is at first sight surprising that Fowler, firmly 
committed to dynamical physiology and with no training in 
chemistry, should have admired and extensively quoted Liebig, 
the high priest of organic chemistry. To a great extent 
dynamical physiology and the new chemical approach were 
mutually antagonistic, since the adherents of the former could 
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easily explain vital functions solely in terms of force or 
power and rarely was the need for, or even validity of, a 
full-scale chemical approachr conversly, chemists considered 
force to be philosophically dubious, and they were obtaining 
promising results with their purely chemical researches. 
This antipathy was especially exemplified by one of Fowler's 
fellow phrenologists in America, Charles Caldwell (1772-1853), 
a former army surgeon and holder of several chairs of medicine 
during his long and not undistinguished career, who had written 
a scathing attack340n Liebig's Animal chemistry in 1843. How 
then, could Fowler adhere to dynamical physiology in much the 
same way as Caldwell did, yet admit the greatness of Liebig's 
physiological chemistry? It seems to me that Fowler under-
stood the character of Liebig's Animal chemistry, whilst 
Caldwell had not; for, although Liebig was primarily a chemist, 
he was also greatly interested in force, and his treatises on 
organic chemistry in its application to agriculture and 
physiology, in 1840 and 1842, were written from that viewpoint. 
Fowler most likely realized that, since he called Liebig's 
work "one of the most profoundly philosophical works on this 
subject ever written". (My Chapter 14 refers back to this 
point) • 
Fowler's ideas on bodily powers were connected with his 
belief in magnetism and phrenology. However, there were many 
physicians who held similar ideas on the debility caused by 
sexual overindulgence and on the essentially dynamical nature 
of the body, who were not phrenologists and roundly ȘŬŪTŤŸŨŤTĚ
animal magnetism. Perhaps the model treatise for these 
physicians was the Macrobiotik; or the art of prolonging 
Zife (first published 1797, latest edition 1975), which had 
been written by the Prussian physician Christoph Wilhelm 
H\ifeland (1762-1844). This and other works by Hufeland 
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had been translated widely; many of the British physiologists 
discussed in this thesis had read him and Carpenter quoted 
him approvingly; Fowler must have read the Macrobiotik, but 
since it totally rejected animal magnetism he did not acknowledge 
it as a useful source. Hufeland was so widely read, however, 
both in German and English, and was so committed to the 
doctrine of dynamical physiology, that he will have a chapter 
of his own later. 
A comment on phrenology 
So far in this thesis, several passing comments have been 
made to phrenology, but I have not attempted to evaluate any 
possible relevance that topic might have. to my thesis. I am 
fairly sure that such a study would yield considerable relevant 
material and that several chapters might be written on, for 
instance, the connexion between the growth of dynamical 
physiology and phrenology. However, that task would have 
taken up more time than I could afford and will have to wait 
awhile. From my thesis, several points already suggest 
themselves for a start into phrenology. For instance, almost 
all my British figures studied in Edinburgh. What, then, did 
they know of George Combe (l788-l858)? Combe was not a 
medical man but he was a moral philosopher as well as a 
practitioner at la\'1. Did Dugald Stewart, another moral 
philosopher, or any of the medical students who attended 
Stewart's lectures, have contact with Combe either before or 
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after he began developing his own system of phrenology? As 
we have seen, Roget carried on a literary debate with him, 
earning himself the wrath of all phrenologists. Carpenter 
also had things to say about phrenology. Both men were 
well acquainted with its theory. 
I cannot refrain here from mentioning a delightful little 
book entitled A New Year's gift for the medicaL ŮŲŬȚŤVVÙŬŪŸĪĚ
published in December, 1846. It contained two essays. The 
first, witty and skillful, was on 'Dr. Carpenter and the 
antiphrenological physiologists', by T.S. Prideaux. Right 
in the middle of that essay is a paragraph on force which 
seems to have owed a great deal to some of the figures in my 
thesiS, including Carpenter himself. Part of the paragraph 
goes thus: 
"The step from the inorganic to the organic 
world is marked by the simple elements of 
matter passing unde'r the dominion of a new 
force more powerful than chemical affinity, 
by virtue of which they enter into ternary 
and quaternary combinations. There can be no 
doubt, however, but that this new force 
exhausts itself in its struggle against chemical 
affinity, so as to require to be constantly 
renewed by nutritive matter. The vital principle 
or force is therefore elaborated by a certain 
combination of the simple elements of matter. 
The essence of vitality is, then, the power 
inherent in a certain form and arrangement of 
matter, when placed under the requisite conditions 
regarding caloric, light and electricity, of 
elaborating out of the simple elements of matter 
the vital principle, that is, a force similar to 
itself. Of all the agents which influence the 
affinities of the elements of matter and produce 
changes in their combinations, none is so 
powerful as caloric, and its power affects 
the organic equally with the inorganic world". 
It was tempting to follow up the author's career and 
enquire whether he and Carpenter might have influenced one 
another. However, that would have taken me into the realm 
of phrenology itself and a stop had to be called somewhere. 
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I have made this comment merely to mention that I am aware of 
the necessity of investigating the possible relationship between 
phrenology and the growth of dynamical physiology. 
William Paley 
Having examined the place of power in 17th and 18th 
century British philosophy in Chapter 1, it would not be 
inappropriate to discuss, albeit briefly, one particular and 
most influential theological and philosophical treatise of 
the early 19th century in which power loomed large. Thus 
we might see how much of the earlier philosophy of power was 
still in use, and see the dynamical ideas of the 19th century 
physiologists in broader context. 
The most suitable single work of the early 19th century 
to examine for the broad philosophical basis of its natural 
philosophy must surely be William Paley's Natural Theology; 
or evidences of the existence and attributes of the Deity. 
36 Collected ȚŸŬÜĚ the appearances of Nature (1802). The 
readership of this book was immense; at least an entire 
generation of the educated members of British society read 
and was deeply impressed by it; for instance, until his voyage 
on the Beagle, Charles Darwin considered Paley's book to have 
been the most influential single work in his education, and 
ĨŸÕĦĚ
within the first twenty years of its appearance it went 
through as many editions in English. 
As we might expect, Paley was much concerned with power 
since it was one of the traditional attributes of God and 
was the means whereby God's providence could manifest itself 
on earth. He declared, against Hume, that power really exists 
and that it is the sole reality behind the so-called 'laws 
37 
of Nature'. Such laws, he said, are only man-made; it is 
a perversion of language to declare any law the efficient, 
operative cause of anything, for a law presupposes an agent 
or power, which power alone is the efficient cause. 
strictures applied to the word 'mechanism': 
"Mechanism is not itself power. Mechanism 
without power can do nothing. Let a watch 
Similar 
be contrived and constructed ever so 
ingeniously; be its parts ever so many, ever 
so complicated, ever so finely wrought or 
artificially put together, it cannot go with-
out a weight or spring, i.e. without a force 
independent of, and ulterior to, its 
mechanism ..•• when we see the watch going, 
we see proof of another point, viz., that 
there is a power somewhere, and somehow or 
other applied to it; a power in action; -
that there is more in the subject than the 
mere wheels of the machine; that there is a 
secret spring, or a gravitating plummet; in 
a word, that there is force and energy, as 
well as ÜŤȘUŠŪÙVÜHHŸĮĚ
Such confidence in the reality of power was, of course, 
essential for any prolonged investigation of dynamics in physics 
and physiology. Men do not seek and study things in which 
they do not believe; and for the British natural philosophers 
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of at least the first half of the 19th century, Paley 
was a most eloquent champion of the reality of power and 
of man's duty to investigate it. As Leslie Stephen wrote 
in his monumental History of English thought in the eighteenth 
century (first published 1876), Paley's book was 
"a marvel of SkiVful exposition. It 
states with admirable clearness and in 
a most attractive form, the argument 
which has the greatest popular force 
and which, duly etherialised,. still 
passes muster with metaphysicians. 
Considered as the work of a man \'/ho had 
to cram himself for the purpose, land 
cram himself with remarkable thoroughness 
he did7, it would be difficult to praise 
his literary merits too highly. The 
only fault in the book, considered as an 
instrumentof persuasion, is that it is 
too ȘŬŪȘŨẀVÙẂŤHHŸĲĚ
Stephen and other commentators on Paley, however, have 
tended to emphasize the structural features in Paley's 
arguments, rather neglecting its functional features. 
Thus, they have discussed Paley's idea that since from the 
intricacy of a watch we infer the existence of a watchmaker,' 
so from the intricacy of the eye we must infer the existence 
of an eyemaker, the God of Nature. Thus, the cornman inter-
pretation of Paley's argument is that from the intricacies 
of the structures, of the mere mechanisms, in Nature, man 
can infer the existence of God. But it seems to me that 
Paley's thoughts went further than this, for as we haveust 
seen in Paley's extract above, ,rrere mechanisms, how intricate VŬŸẂŤŲĚ
it might be, was useless and relatively rneaningless to him. 
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Only by doing something, by becoming the tool of some power, 
did it become useful and acquire its true meaning in his 
natural theology. Power and meohanism together oonstituted 
the basis of Paley's natural theology, and not meohanism alone. 
Hence: 
"The Divine 'omnipresence' stands, in natural 
theology, upon this foundation. In every part 
and place of the universe with which we are 
acquainted, we perceive the exertion of a 
power which we believe, mediately or immediately, 
to proceed from the Deity. For instance, in 
what part or point of space that has ever been 
explored, do we not discover attraction? In 
what regions do we not find light? In what 
accessible portion of the globe do we not meet 
with gravity, magnetism, electricity; together 
with the properties also and powers of organized 
substances, of vegetable and animal nature? Nay, 
further, we may ask what kingdom is there of 
Nature, what corner of space, where do we not 
fall upon contrivance and design? ••. NOw, an 
agency so general that we cannot discover its 
absence, or assign a place in which some effect 
of its continued energy is not found may, in 
popular language at least, be called universal; 
and ..• the person or being in whom that power 
resides, or from whom it is derived, may be taken 
to be omnipresent. He who upholds all things by 
his power may be said to be everywhere ŮŲŤVŤŪWĒŸÕĚ
The world's powers were thus envisaged as manifestations 
of God's Will and Power, and in him they were correlated -
just as Locke, Reid and Stewart had argued. For Paley, as 
for Locke, this was the best argument for the existence of 
physical and organic powers: 
"It may likewise be acknowledged that no 
arguments we are in possession of exclude 
the ministry of subordinate agents. If 
such there be, they act under a presiding 
and controlling will, because they act 
according to certain general restrictions, 
by certain common rules and, as it should 
41 
seem, upon a general plan •••• " 
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However, exclusive interest in these subordinate agents, 
the physico-chemical powers, without acknowledging their 
divine origin was to be condemned. Such materialstic 
philosophers, Paley said, in resolving all things into 
unconscious energies have not really advanced upon the 
ancient forms of atheism. It \V'as the duty of a Christian 
philosopher to keep the presiding power of God constantly 
in view when investigating the powers of Nature. Men like 
Davy, Faraday, Roget, Carpenter and even Draper must have 
agreed whole-heartedly with him on this point. 
Another point on which they surely agreed with him and 
which also concerned power was that of 'relations'. 
Chapter XV was called simply 'Relations', discussing the 
fitness or relations among natural phenomena; and although 
Paley did not emphasize the relations among Nature's powers 
he did have this dynamical feature somewhere in his mind. 
This is most evident in Chapter XVII, on 'The relation of 
animated bodies to inanimate nature'. 
"Take the earth as it is", he writes, 
"and consider the correspondency of the 
powers of its inhabitants wlsh the properties 
and condition of the soil which they tread. 
Take the inhabitants as they are; and consider 
the substances which the earth yields for 
their use. They can scratch its surface; 
and its surface supplies all which they 
want. This is the length of their faculties: 
and such is the constitution of the globe, 
and their own, that this is sufficient for 
11 h . . ,,42 a t e1r occaS1ons . 
The very study of relations, let alone their actual 
existence in Nature, depended on Nature being mechanical. 
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Such mechanism was especially important for those physiologists 
who were most interested in relations between the animate 
and inanimate and who sought dynamical connexions between 
them. Indeed, only within a truly mechanical world could 
the idea of a correlation of forces have a truly useful role, 
for if one were to deny the mechanical nature of living 
things (at least as a working hypothesis), the investigation 
of their functional relations with the rest of creation would 
be severely limited. What was even more important in Paley's 
opinion, (and Carpenter ŲŤÙWŸŲŠWŤTĚWUÙVĞŸĨŴŠVĚ that if a 
uniquely vital force, independent of all other forces, were 
supposed to be the prime mover in living organisms, they 
would no longer depend on God's own power, and the great 
chain of power would be broken. Vitalism was the high road 
h . 44 to at e1sm. 
I shall make one more comment on Paley's Natural theology 
with regard to its likely impact on the physiologists we have 
examined. Paley emphasized that his argument of design in 
the living organism was essentially different from arguments 
in physical science. The latter rely upon each step in the 
argument being valid, one step being false and the entire 
edifice collapses. But Paley saw his argument as cumulative, 
so that the overall conclusion did not depend critically 
on the soundness of each part: 
"Of this point /of desigg/, each machine is 
a proof independently of all the rest. So 
it is with the evidences of a Divine agency • 
••• it is an argument separately supplied by 
every separate example. An error in stating 
an example affects only that example. The 
argument is cumulative, in the fullest sense 
45 
of that term"., 
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Let us recall that Carpenter concluded his Royal Society 
paper in 1850 on exactly this theme - that his argument 
should be treated cumulatively. Charles Darwin was also 
to emphasize the cumulative nature of his argument in the 
origin of Species. Indeed, physiologists not infrequently 
admitted that their hypotheses could not but have that 
character, for the life-sciences· were (and perhaps still are) 
not amenable to rigorous, linear arguments, but must needs 
employ cumulative ones. 
It seems to me that this difference between the biological 
and the physical sciences is part of the reason why historians 
of science, as well as most mid-late 19 th century commentators 
on dynamics, have focussed on the contributions of physical 
scientists to the energy question, to the general exclusion 
of physiologists. The latters' arguments could never hope to 
be conclusive, in the sense that an argument by a physical 
scientist could be, simply because of the complexity of the 
living organism. Yet to other physiologists, the ideas on 
force that Carpenter, say, or Draper, advanced, might well 
have seemed conclusive. This point is also relevant with 
respect to men like Helmholtz, Mayer and Liebig who all 
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worked, at least initially, within a physiological milieu, 
for they must have been impressed by ideas on force that 
their German predecessors in physiology had advanced. 
The apparent rigour of physico-chemical argument might 
also explain why the metaphysical and theological contribu-
tions to the energy doctrine have been largely ignored, at 
least so far as the energy doctrine in Britain was concerned. 
One of my modest aims has been to draw attention to that 
philosophical content. I have not attempted to evaluate 
its importance compared with the purely physico-chemical 
research that was done on power. All that I have done has 
been to give a glimpse of the philosophical background behind 
the work of the natural philosophers and physiologists in 
the English-speaking world. 
If one extract is to be chosen from the works of the 
British contributors to the energy doctrine in the 1840s, in 
order to illustrate the philosophical fascination of the 
subject, no better choice could be made than Hilliam Robert 
Grove (1811-1896), the cautious physicist and barrister. 
To Grove is usually accredited the full and experimentally-
based enunciation of the correlation of forces. His work' 
was unquestionably scientific. Yet the metaphysics of 
power was part of his scheme, as we see at the very end of a 
46 paper 'On the gas-voltaic battery', read to the Royal Society 
in 1843. There he suggested that powers might be mere 
constructs of the h\.lll1an mind, since all natural phenomena 
could be reduced to 
"effects of motion and rrIatter>. These two 
seem the most distinct.,., it not tile only 
conceptions of the mind, with regard to 
natural phenomena, and when we try to 
comprehend or explain affections of matter, 
which are not obviously modes of motion, we 
hypothetically or theoretically reduce them 
to it: The senses perceive the different 
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effects of sound, light, heat, electricity etc., 
but the mind appears capable of distinctly 
conceiving them only as modes of motion. Does 
not this supply an argument that all physical 
agencies are reducible to these elements of 
mental conception? Or are we to look for new 
powers of mind, in other words, will greater 
familiarity with phenomena, at present recondite, 
enable the mind more clearly to comprehend them, 
and avoid the necessity of referring them 
theoretically to more familiar and apparently 
more similar phenomena? To pursue this curious 
inquiry would involve me in a discussion foreign 
to the object of this paper, and to the general 
character of contributions to the Royal Society, 
but the question arises so immediately out of 
the subject, and is so necessary to explain my 
own view, that I trust this brief statement of 
it will be considered sufficiently pertinent. 
It touches upon that interesting, scarce 
definable boundary, where physical merges into 
metaphysical VȘÙŤŪȘŤHHŸİĚ
Such was the nature of power - a problem for two sciences, 
namely physics and metaphysics. As we have seen in these 
past nine chapters, various, sometimes quite 'scientific', 
natural philosophers and physiologists sensed the import of 
the power question and tackled it in different ways. From 
the speculative generalities of John Brown through to the 
learned sobriety of ŸŒGÙŨŨÙŠÜĚCarpenter, from Locke to Paley, 
there ran a common thread which ended in the mid-century 
doctrines on force and energy. Another thread, that which 
belonged to chemists and physicists of the period, crossed 
the first on many occasions, and we can best see their 
crossing (and their staying together) in Carpenter's 
marathon paper to the Royal Society in 1850. So far as 
Carpenter was concerned and, in my opinion, so far as 
dynamical physiology in Britain was concerned, that paper 
marked the end of an era. 
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CHAPTER 10. On Power, Causality and Relation in the 
principal Continental philosophies from 
Des Cartes to Schelling. 
So far as German natural philosophers in the first 
th half of the 19 century were concerned, the philosophical 
analysis of force and power, (which were usually treated 
synonymously, but were differentiated occasionally), began 
with Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716). However, he 
cannot be understood without a brief look at the philosophy 
of Rene Des Cartes (1596-1650), which he took as his basis 
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and subsequently modified - sometimes beyond all recognition. 
Des Cartes is therefore my starting-point. 
I should interject a humble warning: what follows is 
not an attempt to describe exhaustively the places of power, 
causation and relation in these philosophical systems. I 
would not have written anything on such themes, had I not 
come across frequent, and often lengthy, discussions of 
them in the writings of the German physiologists who will 
be enumerated in subsequent chapters. In order to help 
myself to understand the philosophic framework within which 
those physiologists operated, some study of secondary 
philosophical literature at least seemed essential; it 
then seemed that the presentation of those physiologists' 
ideas on power would be best achieved by writing a preliminary 
synopsis of what the philosophers had taught them on 
'causation' and 'relation' as well as on 'power'. Such is 
this chapter. 
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This chapter has relied greatly on secondary material, 
especially the following: Bertrand Russell's History of 
western ŮUÙËŬVŬŮUQŸĚwhich contains fine philosophical 
discussion despite occasional historical inaccuracies and 
its rather subjective, sometimes flippant, interpretations; 
Robert Adamson's dated but still respected Development of 
modern phiZosophy1 Pierre Costabel's Leibniz 
John Kemp's The philosophy of OŠŪWŸĚwhich is 
d d . 3 an XŪŠÜŸȘVĴĚ
both lucid and 
detailed; H.J. de Vleeschauwer's The development of Kantian 
WUŬẀŦUWŸĚwhich is especially useful in detailing the differences 
between Kant's first and second editions of Kritik der reinen 
vernunft; C.A. von Peursen's ŁŬTXŸĚ VŬẀRŸĚ spirit: a survey of 
6 
the body-mind problem; and Gottfried Martin's Kant's meta-
physics and theory of science? I also learned much from 
the lengthy philosophical discussions that Johannes Muller 
and Hermann Helmholtz included in their scientific treatises, 
and although well aware of the likely inaccuracies and 
prejudices in their discussions, they seemed to be fair and 
accurate on the whole. 
My primary source reading has been in Des Cartes (almost all 
his published material), Leibniz and Kant (only the Kritik 
der reinen ŒŤŲŪẀŪȚWŸĞĦĚ
Des Cartes had scarcely any use for the concept of 
force in his natural philosophy, for the essential and primary 
attribute of matter was extension; the other properties of 
matter, including its dynamical ones, were derivative. 
However, power was important for things simply to exist at 
all, for existence depended directly on the will and power 
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of God, since God was the First ȘŠẀVŤŸĚ
Much of Des Cartes' philosophy and method was taken 
up by Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677), and synthesized into a 
novel, and at times startling, system. The question of 
causation was a central problem in Spinoza's system; he 
rejected it, rejected the traditional idea of God as the 
First Cause, and in place of causation substituted the type 
of relation which is found in geometry, namely, that of 
ground to consequent. What he sought was therefore the 
supreme ground of all things, namely that assumption which 
had to be made, in order to render intelligible the assertion 
10 
of anything else. 
Within the process of acquiring knowledge, Spinoza made 
a fundamental distinction between the understanding and the 
imagination. To imagination he referred all familiar and 
easy conceptions of things, which prevent us from contemplating 
the complete symmetry of logical arrangement that pure reason 
demands; simply because we consider things with our imagin-
ations, we conceive of them as contingent and variable, and 
not determined by a merely logical sequence. hence, all those 
familiar ideas of connexion, such as locality in space and 
causation, were, for Spinoza, misinterpretations of the 
real, logical sequences in Nature. God could not be a 
cause of the universe, but he was the supreme ground or 
raison d'etre upon which all else was consequent. These 
consequents were not to be supposed ÙŪTŸŮŤŪTŤŪWĚof the 
ground, but formed part of the full conception of the ground 
11 itself. Then:lfore, the whole of existence constituted 
a unity, and the study of anyone part of Nature would be 
336. 
relevant to all other parts and would be a set of common 
principles. 
None of the physiologists whom we shall discuss 
adhered to Spinoza's denial of causation; but at least one 
of them, Johannes Muller, applauded his doctrine of the 
divine unity of Nature, or Pantheism; and his pupil, Hermann 
Helmholtz saw fit to include a long analysis of Spinoza in 
his Treatise of physiologiaaZ optiast2indeed, of the two 
philosophers who seem most to have informed Helmholtz's 
metaphysics, as evidenced in his scientific as well as his 
philosophical writings, Spinoza was one; Kant was the other. 
Spinoza's influence was exerted in great measure through 
his impact on Leibniz. 13 As Bertrand Russell has shown, there 
were two philosophical systems that Leibniz constructed -
the one which he published and which students of his thought 
read until the early 1900s, and the one which he dared not 
publiSh; both were influenced by Spinozism, even though 
Leibniz denied such influence; here, we shall be looking 
largely at his published system. 
On arriving in Paris in 1672, Leibniz fell under the 
influence of Cartesianism, though he soon acquired serious 
misgivings about it; one cause of his dissatisfaction was 
that Des Cartes had apparently excluded the possibility of 
final causes, or teleology, from Nature. Spinoza also had 
grave misgivings on that score, and in 1676 Leibniz visited 
Spinoza to discuss their difficulties and exchange ideas:4 
In 1677, Spinoza's Ethias was published posthumously; Leibniz 
acquired a copy immediately but found no solutions therein 
to his dissatisfaction with Des Cartes; in fact, Spinoza 
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seemed to deny final Cd:ses more strenuously than Des Cartes, 
and as l\damson has pointed out, Liebniz had to turn to Plato 
15 for a reaffirmation of teleology. 
His dissatisfaction with Cartesian physics came to a 
head with Des Cartes' principle of the conservation of 
motion in the universe. Leibniz, among others, wanted a 
clearer definition of 'quantity of motion', and since he 
was a fine mathematician and protege of Christiaan Huyghens 
(1629-1695), Leibniz was able to supply one himself, in the 
form of vis v -iva. In so doing, he included one parameter 
that Des Cartes had proscribed, namely inertia or mass, 
his main argument for its inclusion being that the logical 
consequence of Des Cartes' view would be the admission of 
perpetual motion. Perpetual motion was no less desirable 
to the Cartesians than to Leibniz himself, and French, 
th German and Swiss mathematicians throughout the 18 century 
argued powerfully against perpetual motion in the inorganic 
16 
world. Let us note, however, that those arguments did not 
consider the possibility of such motion in organic beings; 
that task was apparently left exclusively to physiologists, 
for there was no a priori reason to suppose that organic 
systems should follow the same principles of motion as 
inorganic ones. Among the physiologists who tackled that 
task, we shall discuss in the'following chapters Christoph 
Wilhelm Hufe1and (1762-1836), Johann Friedrich Blumenbach 
(1752-1840), Friedrich Tiedemann (1781-1861), Johannes Muller 
(1801-1858), Justus Liebig (1803-1873) and Hermann Helmholtz 
(1821-1894); one physiologist who will scarcely be mentioned, 
although he tackled the same task, is Julius Robert Mayer 
(1814-1878): there simply will not be room to discuss his 
ĨĨŸĦĚ
ideas adequately. Some of these physiologists actually 
saw their task as bringing the study of physiological 
motion up to the level of sophistication and certainty 
that had been attained for inorganic motion: for instance, 
at the beginning of his 1845 paper on 'The motions of 
organisms and their relation to metabolism', Mayer lamented 
how the discoveries of Galileo, Newton and Mariotte had 
borne no fruit in physiology, and that despite the work of 
men like Theodore Schwann (1810-1882) and Gabriel Gustav 
Valentin (1810-1883) on muscle action, there was still a 
huge gap between physics and physiology in the study of 
, 17 
mot1on. 
With Leibniz's concept of vis viva, or active force, 
we corne to a definite distinction between what we nowadays 
call "force" and "energy". V , h' t' f' 18 ar10US 1S orlans 0 SC1ence 
have discussed this distinction, the essence of which was 
that Des Cartes was concerned solely with a body's momentum 
(mv) , whilst Leibniz was concerned with the effects or 
workings of a force-in-action. As Leibniz explained in a 
paper in 1695, he considered the cartesian force to be dead 
force, or vis mortua, because motion did not yet exist in it, 
but only the instigation towards motion p by contrast, his own 
vis viva was intimately associated with motion; vis viva, 
indeed, was produced by an infinite number of applications 
of dead force. 
It is well known that Christiaan Huyghens had used the 
product of mass times the square of velocity <mv2 ) in his 
analysis of the compound pendulum in 1673, but he did not 
envisage it as a fundamental expression that might have more 
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general application. Leibniz, however, singled it out 
as a new and important expression and gave it a name -
vis viva - which stuck with it until well into the 19th 
century when it was renamed kinetic energy ĜŸĚ mv2 ). Once 
Leibniz had proposed that Des Cartes' principle of the 
conservation of the quantity of motion (mv) in the universe 
might be replaced by a law of the conservation of vis viva, 
it was not long before Huyghens saw that vis viva was related 
to the concept of work itself. From Huyghens' law 
v 2= 2as, and Newton's law f = rna, it was easy to see that 
fs = ŸĚ mv2 • In Leibniz's terminology, vis viva was the 
continuous sum {i.e. the integral! of infinitely many vires 
19 
mor-cuae. 
Leibniz's concept and precise formulation of vis viva 
suffered various fortunes at the hands of 18th century 
mathematicians, like Johann Bernoulli (1667-1748), Jean 
Le Rand d'Alembert (1717-1783), Leonhard Euler (1707-1783), 
Daniel Bernoulli (1700-1782) and others; but whatever they 
though-t about vis viva as a real existent - d' Alernbert, for 
instance, denied that it really existed as a force - they 
all agreed that the mathematical principle of its conservation 
seemed to hold. 
So far as Huyghens and Leibniz had been able to 
demonstrate, the conservation of vis viva applied only to 
elastic impact; but Leibniz, being as eager as Des Cartes 
had been to construct a metaphysical as well as a physical 
system, suggested that the conservation of vis viva might 
be a universal principle applying to both inelastic and 
elastic impacts; in the former, vis viva which apparently 
vanished merely assumed a different form - it became 
latent. A C 1 B h . t d t 20 h' t s ar oyer as pOln e ou, t 1S was no 
unlike Joseph Black's later concept of latent heat, but 
unfortunately Leibniz could not supply quantitative 
verification. 
Leibniz's doctrine of vis viva may surely be called a 
th forerunner of the 19 century Conservation of Energy, 
despite its largely metaphysical character, its lack of 
empirical evidence, and its primary concern with motion 
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only. It is important, for instance, to realize that Leibniz 
and some of his adherents envisaged vis viva to be more 
. general than the dynamics of mere motion; for them, it was 
a truly universal principle; we see this in an extract 
quoted by Thomas Kuhn from Daniel Bernoulli's Hydrodynamica 
of 1738: 
"I am persuaded that if all the vis viva 
hidden in a cubic foot of coal were called 
forth and usefully applied to the motion of 
a machine, more could be achieved than by 
the daily labour of eight or ten ÜŤŪŨŨŸŨĚ
One aspect of Leibniz's philosophy which ought to be 
mentioned, since it dealt with a problem which 19th century 
writers on force felt acutely, was his view of definitions. 
A definition was said to be real in two cases: i) When its 
content can be shown to be logically possible; or ii) ŘŸUŤŪĚ
experience corresponds with its content. A definition was 
merely nominal when it only assigned a meaning to a word, 
without deciding whether its contents were possible or ŠȘWẀŠŨŸÎĚ
As is well known, a large part of Newton's controversy with 
ÒŤÙŞŪÙYŸĨŤVŮŤȘÙŠŨŨQĚas conducted in the Clarke-Leibniz 
correspondence, concerned the definition of Newton's force 
of gravitation; and this concern over the status or 
definition of force was shared by 19th century natural 
philosophers. It seems to me that there might well be a 
connection between the attitude of those contributors to 
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the conservation of energy mentioned by Kuhn, whose "notion 
of an underlying, imperishable, metaphysical force seems 
prior to research and almost unrelated to itll, and Leibniz's 
view that a definition could be real simply if it was 
logically possible. 
Another theme that Leibniz discussed, and which was 
important in the 19 th century debates on force, was relations. 
Obviously taking his cue from Spinoza, he asserted that 
relations between things are not external to those things, 
but that the relations must be contained within the natures 
of the things themselves. On the cosmic scale, since all 
things are related to one another, for instance by possessing 
spatial relations or simultaneity, and since the formation 
of the idea of any individual being is dependent on the 
formation of the ideas of the rest of the universe, the idea 
of each individual implies, or more exactly contains, the 
ideas of all the rest. The implication of this objective 
connexion of all things was that each unit of the whole, 
each monad, is in itself a complete ŴŬŲŨTŸÏĚ
One property that Leibniz would not attribute to these 
uni ts was that R irw qua non of Des Cartes, namely extension, 
since 
"Every extended mass may be considered as 
composed of two, or a thousand, others; 
••• so that one can never find a body which 
can be truly called a substance. It 
will always be an aggregate of several 
substances .... Extension is an 
attribute which cannot constitute a 
complete being; no action or change can 
be derived from it; it expresses a 
present state only - not the future and 
the past, as the notion of a substance 
25 
should do". 
Consequently, for Leibniz the one admissible property 
of things was force or power - that by which activity or 
change could occur. However, realizing that the purely 
abstract conception of power was of little avail to his 
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scheme of things, Leibniz took up and developed a proposition 
of early Greek metaphysic - that unity and reality are one 
26 
and the same. Furthermore, since the essential property 
of reality was active force, or vis viva, to be a "one" 
was synonymous with activity. Thus, the type of physical 
unit or atom that Des Cartes, Gassendi and others had in 
mind, was not a true unit for Leibiz; in this he was followed 
by Roger Boscovich and various natural philosophers of the 
th 
early 19 century. The core of Leibniz's view of 
reality was therefore as follows: The characteristic of 
reality is definable by two marks - unity and activity. 
To exist and to act amount to the same thing; and each 
individual existent can be represented solely through 
activity or active force. Of the Continental philosophers, 
therefore, it was Leibniz who first wrote the full 
credentials of force and power for the use of natural 
philosophers; and to him, men like Johannes Muller (see 
Chapter 13), Hermann Helmholtz (see Chapter 16) and Julius 
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Robert Mayer27 referred in their physiological writings. 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) 
Of the three principal errors into which Kant believed 
metaphysics had fallen;8we shall here discuss only one, 
namely rational cosmology. In this branch of metaphysics, 
it seemed to him that conflicting arguments had often been 
proposed, and yet on the commonly accepted metaphysical 
assumptions, they had been incapable of resolution. These 
conflicts, or 'antimonies' as Kant called them, seemed to 
be inherent in reason itself; Kant believed that they could 
be resolved, but only by a long and penetrating re-appraisal 
of philOSOPhyt 9 that was the purpose of his Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft. Of the four antinomies that Kant diagnosed in 
cosmologies, two were concerned with causation. Briefly, 
they were: 
1. Thesis: Causality according to laws of Nature is not 
the only type of causality from which the phenomena of the 
world can be derived. These phenomena also necessitate a 
'causality of freedom'. 
Antithesis: There is no freedom; everything in the world 
occurs according to the laws of Nature. 
2. Thesis: There belongs to the world, either as a part 
of it or as its cause, a being who is absolutely necessary. 
. h b . . t 30 Antithesls: No suc elng eX1S s. 
In order to resolve these antimonies, Kant undertook 
a full inquiry into the nature of man's reasoning powers 
and their suitablity for their task. Of course, Des Cartes 
had claimed to do much the same thing, but his had not been 
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the systematic attempt that Kant believed necessary. Locke 
had come rather nearer the mark, for in his Essay aonaerning 
human understanding he had attempted to distinguish between 
those issues on which the human mind could attain certainty, 
and those on which it could acquire only opinions. Power 
was one of the concepts of whose general existence men 
o 31 
could be certaln. Kant appreciated the sincerity of 
Locke's effort to unravel "the physiology of the human 
understanding", as he put it;2but believed that it had not 
probed deeply enough and had been limited by Locke's 
empiricism. 
The only one of his precursors whom he ŠŸȘŲŤTÙWŤTĚwith 
making a substantial contribution to the task was David Hume; 
indeed, he asserted that Hume had first awakened him from 
his dogmatic VŨẀÜŞŤŲVŸĨĚ Kant considered Hume's principal 
achievement to have been UÙŸĚ analysis of causality, in which 
he had shown that reason alone, working from a priori 
concepts, could not prove that a particular effect results 
necessarily from a specific cause; such a cause-effect relation 
could be discovered only by experience, in Hune's vie\oi, and therefore 
reason was not entitled to lay down a priori laws of connexion. As Kant 
put it: "The imagination, having by experience 
brought certain representations under the 
law of association, passes off a subjective 
necessity arising out of this, namely custom, 
for an objective necessity from ÙŪVÙŦUWHHŸÏĚ
Kant thought that in arriving at this sceptical 
conclusion Hurne had been consistent, unlike Locke who, though 
admitting that our ideas are derived from experience, still 
tried to use them ot transcend experience. Nonetheless, 
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h 'f" t" f' 35 Kant had tree specl lC crl lClsms 0 Hume s system: 
firstly, it dealt only with the concept of causality 
and not with other concepts of the understanding too; 
it was insufficiently general. Secondly, having 
ascertained what human reason could not do, it had not 
discovered what reason might do. And thirdly, it had not 
distinguished between the validity of the belief that A 
caused B, and the belief that B must have had some cause, 
whatever that cause may be; Kant asserted that the first 
proposition can be known only from experience, whilst the 
latter is an a priori one. 
If true metaphysical knowledge were to exist, Kant 
believed that it would have to be constructed upon a priori 
general concepts to be truly scientific. He envisaged 
three sciences which could yield a priori knowledge - logic, 
, d I . 36 d " h' h mathematlcs an P1YS1CS - an enqulrlng w at lt was t at 
allowed them to be called sciences, he concluded that they 
alone used a priopi judgements in a way that was philosophically 
rigorous. The use of such judgments in pure logic was easy 
to defend since its method of reasoning was purely analytic 
and could be tested merely by the law of contradiction. 
Mathematics and physics were more difficult to defend since 
they provided synthetic a priori knowledge; since this was 
what metaphysics would also have to do, it seemed to him 
that to become a science, metaphysics, and any other field 
for that matter, would need to acquire synthetic a priori 
knowledge as a prerequisite. These issues were handled in 
the principal part of his Kritik: in the sections on 
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"Transcendental Aesthetic" and "Transcendental Analytic" 
he explained how synthetic a priori judgements were possible 
and how the sciences of mathematics and physics were based 
thereon. 
In Kant's view, Inan's empirical knowledge has two 
sources - sensibility and understanding. One of his most 
ÙÜŸŬŲWŠŪWĚ ideas was that the sense-impressions, which convey 
information from the outside world into man's sensorium, 
are not already organised into intelligible categories, such 
as spatial relations, but that the human mind organizes 
them thus. For instance, we receive the light-rays from 
a book, but it is not given to us that this object is a 
book; we must first form for ourselves the concept of book. 
Kant's task was therefore to explain the intellectual, 
formalizing aspect of sense-perceptions, rather than the 
other aspect, namely physic.al sensation, which was no less 
important but was easier to grasp. (This latter ŠVŸŤȘWĚ
was to be tackled by a series of physiologists and natural 
philosophers in the next century, to wit Johannes Muller who, 
however, followed Kant's assertion of the importance of 
both the physiological and the psychological aspects of sense 
perception, and expressed a belief in the necessity of a 
physiological psychology in his pioneer treatise on dreamst 7 
Hermann Helmholtz; the Czech pnysiologist, Jan Evangelista 
v Purkyne (1787-1869); and, at the end of the century, Ernst 
Macn (1838-1916) I the physicist-philosopher.) 
Kant set out to show that, just as the nature of our 
sensibility ensures that all it receives is spatially and 
tem20rally arranged by it, so the nature of our understanding 
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ensures that all knowledge, empirical as well as a priori, 
is arranged according to certain rules or categories; that 
the spatio-temporal character of the world is derived from 
the formal character of our faculties of sensation; and that 
our conviction, for instance,that every change has a cause, 
is derived from the formalizing character of our ÜÙŪTVŸĮĚ
There is a lot more that could be said on Kant's view of 
apprehension, but the features that were to be important for 
investigators like Muller can be suwmarized as follows: Nature 
is subject to the categories of the intellect, not because 
things in themselves are so arranged (things in themselves, 
noumena, have their own arrangements, which we can never know), 
but because Nature is nothing for us except as it appears to us. 
Nature as it appears to us is, therefore, the only level on 
which we may usefully talk about and investigate reality. And 
the way in which it appears is determined by the fact that our 
intellects have to categorize our perceptions, if we are to 
make any sense out of them. This does not mean that we can 
discover the operations and details of Nature by intellectual 
acti vi"ty alone; we cannot deduce scientific knowledge merely 
from the categories. It does mean that, although empirical 
investigation is necessary before scientific knowledge can be 
acquired, the general structure of that knowledge is determined 
by the human mind. 
Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling (1775-1854) and some NaturphiZosophen 
It is part of my argument in the following chapters that 
the notion of the conservation and correlation of forces, 
as it was held by men like Muller, Helmholtz, Liebig and 
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even von Reichenbach, was considered by them as one of the 
a priori, synthetic ÚẀŸÜŤŪWVĚof the human mind, and that, 
as Kant had argued, it could be a thoroughly respectable 
scientific concept even before it had been verified 
ŤÜŮÙŲŸŠŨŨXHĚ (which, need it be said? it never can be). 
1\ 
Similarly, they believed that forces are real entities, even 
though they could not be demonstrated in any tangible way; 
the reality of a force was sufficiently assured by a certain 
set of phenomena which seemed to bespeak a common ground or 
cause, and since the human mind could perceive only 
phenomena, that was all that was required. (See the chapter 
on Liebig especially for an illustration of this argument). 
This argument is one aspect that I have chosen to investigate, 
of Kuhn's suggestion that NaturphiZosophie provided a power-
fully fertile basis for the emergence of conservation of 
energy. As he has mentioned, the NaturphiZosophen took the 
concept of organism as the fundamental metaphor for their 
universal science, and consequently sought unifying principles 
39 for all natural phenomena. The high-priest of Natur-
phiZosophie, Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling, constructed his 
philosophy largely upon Kant's system and the extensive 
modifications of that system by Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-
ÍĮÍÏĞŸÕĚ In his philosophy of Nature, Schelling, like 
Fichte, was essentially concerned with processes of develop-
ment; and in both Nature and Spirit (which were his twin 
aspects of reality), the principle of development was essentially! 
Thought. Nature, for example, was supposed to exhibit the 
gradual development of what may be called slumbering thought, 
natural force, in three ways, each of which contained the 
antithesis required for any activity: the first way was 
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mechanism, where the antithesis was between attractive 
and repulsive forces of inorganic matter; the second way 
was light, itself containing the activities of magnetism, 
electricity and chemical force, in which the general 
phenomenon of polarity constituted the antithesis; and the 
third way was organic life, where the antithesis was manifested 
by the fundamental processes of reproduction, irritability 
and sensibility. Thus, he maintained that magnetic, 
electrical, chemical, and finally even organic phenomena 
would be woven into one great association extending over the 
whole of Nature; consequently he was forever on the look-out 
for processes of conversion and WŲŠŪVȚŬŲŲŪŠWÙŬŪŸŨĚ Schelling's 
natural philosophy appeared first in print in 1797 with his 
Ideen zu einer PhiZo8ophie der Natur; in 1799 appeared his 
Erster Entwurf eines Systems der NaturphiZosophie, and the 
last major writing on that theme appeared in 1809. Thus this 
stage of his ·intellectual development occupied only about 
12 years in the first half of his life. Schelling's 
teaching came to dominate most German-speaking universities 
th during the first third of the 19 century. Indeed, his 
philosophy of Nature was well received not only by poets 
and Ziterati of the Romantic School, but also by eminent 
natural philosophers like Lorenz Oken (1779-1851), Karl 
Ernst von Baer, ŸŪTĚKarl Friedrich Burdach (l776-l847). 
The physicians of the Brownian School, who viewed man as a 
unity of body and soul which should always be treated to-
gether, welcomed his ideas. In 1802, the medical faculty 
of Landshut University awarded him an honorary doctorate in 
medicine. (One of the figures in this thesis, Friedrich 
Tiedemann, had worked with Schelling in Wurzburg in the early 
l800s and in 1807 was called to Landshut as professor of 
anatomy and zoology). 
Schelling's philosophy was therefore disseminated 
widely and was available to at least a whole generation 
of scholars. Amongst the natural philosophers who fell 
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under his sway, Kuhn mentions Hans Christian Oersted (1777-
18S1), professor of natural philosophy at Copenhagen, who 
persisted for many years in his search for a fundamental 
relation between electricity and magnetism, largely because 
of his prior philosophical commitment to such a relation. 
However, Oersted recognized the danger of unbridled speculation, 
such as he had found in Schelling, and he emphasized the 
necessity of experimentation as a check. 
Yet another NaturphiZosophe, or at least another natural 
philosopher who was influenced by Kant, Ampere, argued that 
it was justifiable to speculate freely so long as one did 
so within a very limited, carefully defined area, and that 
one may speculate on the nature of things in themselves, on 
the noumena, and from such speculations reconstructing the 
phenomenal world. Thus he constructed a theory of 
electrodynamic molecules and believed them to be valid, 
because he could deduce therefrom the magnetic phenomena 
descernible in the phenomenal world of experimental physics. 
His model gave unity and precision to the study of electricity 
and magnetism, and that was its ÚẀVWÙȚÙȘŠWÙŬŪŸÎĚ
Not all Natul'phiZ08ophen were content to leave the 
question of speculative hypotheses on this level. Natural 
philosophers like Oersted, Johann Ritter (1776-1810) and 
Christian Samuel Weiss (1774-1853) could not be satisfied 
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with models which were initially arbitrary, like Ampere's. 
They sought the absolute truths of Nature's noumena. Yet 
how was that possible, granted Kant's rigorous distinction 
between phenomena and noumena? Inevitably, since they were 
devout Kantians and Kant (like all seminal thinkers) could 
mean all things to all men, they found their solution in the 
master himself. In his second antimomy of pure reason Kant 
had argued that it is impossible to decide bet\veen an atomic 
and a plenist view of the world. Yet there was a way out 
which was only hinted at in the Kritik but was developed 
especially in the later Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der 
Naturwissenschaft. In the Kritik Kant asserted that 
"We are acquainted with substance in space 
only through forces which are active 
in it LLeibniz's ŮŬÙŪŸİHĚ such iorces 
either bringing other objects to it 
(attraction) or preventing them penetrating 
into it (repulsion and impenetrability) • 
We are not acquainted with any other properties 
constituting the concept of substance which 
appears in space, and which we call ÜŠWWŤŲĒŸĨĚ
The Metaphysische Anfangsgrande developed this 
epistemological point and, in one historian's opinion, thus 
laid the basis for the 19 th century study of dynamics and 
thus pulled the disparate strands of Naturphilosophie 
together into a fairly unified system, enabling such diverse 
minds as Schelling, Ampere, Oersted, Davy and Coleridge to 
cohabit under the one roof. This unifying dynamical world-
view was responsible for NaturphiZvsophie's bewitching and 
i.s 
often irrestible influence upon even the most experimental 
A th 
of scientists in the 19 century. 
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That same historian asserted that it was also from 
this unifying dynamical world-view that lithe most important 
methodological innovation of NatupphiZosophie was TŲŠŴŪŨŨŸÏĚ
Kant's attractive and repulsive forces, as we have VŸŤŪHĚwere 
adopted by Schelling, but whereas Kant had envisaged an 
equilibrium resulting from the conflict of forces of equal 
magnitude, Schelling envisaged a development into a higher 
level of conflict entailing new forms of force. For 
Schelling, therefore, evertiUng was ever active, such activity 
being sustained by God. God literally manifested himself 
in force which acted through spirit and matter. From the 
conflict of forces came beauty. Such beauty rested, of 
course, on God. God alone was the guarantor of the scheme's 
truth. Truth and beauty, therefore, derived from God's 
ceaseless activity manifested by conflicting forces. On 
such a basis could the sciences ever rest, as we can see 
from the only treatise that Oersted ever wrote; it was 
published in French with the give-away title of Recherches 
sur RGÙTŤŪWÙWŸĚ des forces chimiques et ŤRŤȘWŲÙŰẀŤVŸĪĚ
There, as is well known, Oersted predicted the discovery 
which was to make his reputation - the transformation of 
electrical into magnetic force. His prediction was merely 
a corollary to Schelling's doctrine that conflicting forces, 
when sufficiently constrained, undergo transformations into 
other forces. After years of experimenting, Oersted managed 
to constrain a force sufficiently by passing an electric 
current through a thin wire of high resistance; a magnetic 
force appeared. This set off a search by himself and others 
(for instance, Davy and Faraday) for further transformations 
of forces. This search, which lasted from c.l820-1860, was 
.} 
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largely unfruitful, but a few investigators such as Grove, 
Joule and Hayer did obtain confirmatory results. Its 
frequent unfruitfulness did not persuade its adherents that 
their belief in the unity and transformations/correlations 
of forces was misplaced. Take Faraday for instance. Try 
as he might, he never demonstrated the magnetization of 
light, yet he never doubted its ÖÕŐŐÙŞÙŨÙWXŸĬĚ What failure 
meant was merely that the correct conditions for constraining 
light had not yet been found. 
Against this complex background, in which the belief in 
the unity or correlation of forces was pre-eminent, the 
researches of the 19th century German contributors to the 
energy conservation doctrine must be seen, as Kuhn and other 
scholars have declared. Only then shall we appreciate why 
the young Helmholtz expected many of the older German 
natural philosophers to react to his thesis 'Ueber die 
ErhaZtung der Kraft' in 1847 with a sigh of "What does this 
fellow think he is doing? We know all that ŠŨŲŤŠTXĒŸİĚ
Only then shall we also appreciate why many of them actually 
rejected his thesis, for, having been brought up on the diet 
of Naturphilosophie and then made to see how unproductive it 
was compared with experimental science, they were reacting 
against it lock, stock, and barrel. Horeover, only then 
shall we appreciate one of the aims of Liebig's AnimaL 
chemistry for, despite his denial of owing anything to 
NaturphiZoBophie, those passages wherein he discussed force 
are so eloquent, enthusiastic, even emotional, that I cannot 
believe that he was investigating force in the utterly 
empirical, sober way he wanted us to believe. 
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To mention one more legacy that Kant left to the 19 th 
century, he and more especially the NaturphiZosophen 
embraced the metaphor of the organism for their world-view. 
By and large the 18th century had been impressed by the 
mechanical appearance of the world, and the machine was the 
only metaphor that the PhiZosophen would ŠŨŨŬŴŸĮĚ But for 
Kant and his followers, since the concepts of final cause and 
development were important, and since Nature was envisaged 
as an harmonic whole, whose wholeness was more meaningful 
than the mere sum of its parts, the world had the character 
of an organic being. Plato's query, quoted earlier in this 
thesis, was again admissible: "In the likeness of what 
animal is the world made?" This organismic world-view 
would appeal inevitably to biological natural philosophers, 
but it also took hold of physicists. Oersted was one such, 
as Kill1n has shown. I would cite Alexander von Humboldt 
(1769-1859)49 too, as a prime example; he wrote that a truly 
philosophic view of the physical world 
" ••• would seem to lack its attractive features, 
did it not at the same time present the sphere 
of ORGANIC LIFE in the numerous grades of its 
typical developments. The idea of animation 
is so closely connected with the idea of the 
existence of the impelling, ceaselessly active, 
decompounding, compounding and fashioning 
natural forces, which inhere in the terrestrial 
globe, that in the popular myths of the nations 
of antiquity, the production of plants and 
animals was always ascribed to these ȚŬŲȘŤVĒŸÕĚ
As a young r,lan Humboldt had moved in Goethe's and 
Schiller's circles in Weimar and Jena and he continued to 
proclaim their philosophy throughout his long life. We 
;j 
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shall meet him again, en passant only, on two occasions in 
the following chapters - firstly as a student of the physiologist 
Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, and then as the invaluable patron 
of a very young and brilliant chemist, Justus Liebig. 
To summarize this organismic world-view: the laws of 
Nature were seen as laws of development. Just as organisms 
live because they are informed by Spirit, so is the WeZtseeZe 
the ultimate substratum of physical reality; and the ultimate 
substratum of physical activity occurs within the fields of 
force. Hence only spirit can understand the world at its 
most fundamental, for only spirit can commune with spirit. 
As Schiller said, "Was der Geist ẂŤŲVŮŲŤȘUWŸĚ Zeistet die 
Natur". (What the Spirit proposes, Nature disposes). This 
world-view was held not only by German Romantics but also 
by cautious natural philosophers in the rest of NẀŲŬŮŤŸĚ
and since the first nine chapters of this thesis have been 
about British figures, let us take an English scientist to 
illustrate its spread:- On November 4th, 1869, the first 
issue of the journal Nature appeared. Its editor had asked 
Thomas Henry Huxley to write its opening paper. That paper 
was crammed with aphorisms by Goethe on Nature; it represented 
the world-view of one of England's most respected scientists, 
and it was pure poetry. To chose only t\-lO of those 
aphorisms: 
"Her life is in her children; but where is 
the mother? She is the only artist; working 
. 
up the most uniform material into utter 
opposites; arriving, without a trace of effort, 
at perfection, at the most exact precison, 
though always veiled under a certain softness". 
"She has always thought and always thinks; 
thonah not ŸVĚ a man, but as Nature. She 
broods over an all-comprehending idea, which 
no searching can find ŬẀWĒŸŨĚ
If there was an 'all-comprehending idea' over which 
men 'brooded' during the first few decades of the century, 
it was the nature of force. In the following chapters we 
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shall examine a handful of such men, all physiologists, all 
influenced by the charm of ÔŠWẀŸŮUÙŨŬVŬŮUÙŤĦĚ Occasionally, 
they seemed not to be affected by it but, as one scholar has 
52 
asserted in a remarkable paper, even aggresive denunciations 
of it suggest that it had tainted their early years; and 
Johannes Muller and Justus Liebig will be particular instances 
of that. 
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CHAPTER 11. On power in the physiologies of Johann 
Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840), 
especially as presented by his English 
editors, and of Friedrich Tiedemann 
(1781-1861). 
One of those "tough minded and productive scientists" 
JbJ. 
who strongly invoked "vital properties, principles or powers" 
during the 19th century (to use the words of T.S. Hall in his 
discussion on vitalism in Ideas of Life and ÜŠWWŤŲŸĞĚ was 
Johann Friedrich Blumenbach. Blumenbach studied medicine at 
Jena and Gottingen and soon acquired a reputation as a fairly 
original champion of vitalism and epigenesis. He also 
acquired a reputation as a teacher for he taught almost two 
generations of medical students; perhaps his best known student 
was Alexander von Humboldt. Among his seminal and experiment-
ally-based treatises was his Institutiones physioLogiaae ĜÍİĮĬĞŸĚ
which was one of the earliest attempts to account for the 
functions of the body independent of minute anatomical 
descriptions. It soon became a standard text wherever 
physiology was taught in Europe, and all four of his Latin 
editions (Blurnenbach preferred writing in Latin) were translated 
into European languages. 
Most historians who have commented on his physiology have 
not distinguished between successive editions of the 
Institutiones, or discussed the differences in his presentation 
and interpretation by his different editors. For instance, 
T.S. Hall has confined himself to the English translation of 
the third edition by John Elliotson ĜŨĮŨİĞŸĚ This does not 
necessarily give one a false impression of his physiology, but 
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since this thesis has concerned itself so much with British 
physiology, and since Blumenbach was influential on British 
(and American) physiology, I shall examine his ideas not only 
in themselves, but particularly as presented and commented 
upon by his English editors. I shall examine the 1795 English 
4 translation of the first Latin edition by Charles Caldwell, 
the American physiologist mentioned in Chapter 9, and the 1828 
translation of the fourth and last Latin edition by John 
NŨŨÙŬWVŬŪŸĚ I shall also examine a lengthy 'Report on animal 
physiology' read to the British Association for the Advancement 
of Science in 1834 by William Clark, in order to corroborate 
my own evaluation of Blumenbach's place in the emergence of 
dynamical physiology. 
The most striking difference between Caldwell's edition 
and Elliotson's is that Caldwell saw himself merely as a 
translator of the master's own treatise, whereas Elliotson 
felt compelled to comment on everything; indeed, Elliotson's 
own footnotes, appendices ŸWȘĦHĚwere often much longer than 
Blumenbach's own text and anyone who read that translation must 
have been liable to lose track of Blumenbach's own ideas. 
This danger also confronts the historian who relies solely on 
Elliotson's translation. 
Caldwell asserted that, at least in America, there was a 
widely felt need for a new system of physiology, especially 
since the condensed English version of Haller's Institutiones 
was so pitiful. For Caldwell, Blumenbach's physiology fulfilled 
that need. Although Blumenbach was much concerned with the 
material organization of the body, his physiology was essentially 
dynamical and focussed on the nature and relations of the vital 
GĦŸĚ '. 
forces. He enumerated five types of vital pm'ler or force6 
(still synonymrs generally): simple contractility which, 
since it seemed to reside in every part of the cellular 
membranes, he called vis ceZZuZosa; the irritability of 
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Haller, which he called vis muscularis; sensibility, or vis 
nerveai the specific energies, or vitae propriae, which were 
peculiar to different parts of the body: in this respect he 
was reminiscent of Bordeu, who gave each organ a life of its 
own, and anticipated Bichat, who was to regard the tissues, 
rather than the organs, as the body's functional units; and 
fifthly, there was the most important of these powers - the 
nisus formativus, or formative tendency, which was responsible 
for generation. Moreover, since by generation (generatio), 
Blumenbach had the Aristotelian concept in mind, namely that 
the processes of nutrition and repair throughout the life of 
an adult organism are species of generation, this nisus was 
also the efficient cause of nutrition, growth and maintenance; 
and since his physiology was essentially dynamical, the nisus 
was also the cause or source of the other four types of vital 
power. Thus, despi'te his assertion of several vi tal powers, 
the urge to reduce Nature to utmost simplicity and to discover 
a single main-spring in the living mechanism was too tantalizing 
to avoid. In addition to the nisus j'01."mativus, this quest for 
a main-spring can be seen in his ideas on the heart: 
"The heart is, as it were, the first active 
organ and moving spring of the whole human 
machine, as it is by the perpetual and truly 
astonishing energy of this body, that the most 
important'vital function, namely the circulation 
of the blood, is performed •..• ,,7 
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Like a clock, the living organism consumed its own powers 
by its own exertions, and in order to be rewound it needed 
sleep and food; sleep restored the animal powers (vires 
animales) , though exactly how, he did not say; food restored 
the natural powers (vires ŪŠWẀŲŠŨŤVĞŸĚ The organism was 
therefore not to be considered a perpetuum mobile. 
Blumenbach was well aware of the complexity and indefinability 
of the nisus formativus, but he believed that its philosophical 
difficulties were no greater than those entailed in inorganic 
powers, and that its ontological status was identical to theirs. 
Therefore, although not saying so explictly, he believed that 
the discovery of the nature and basic laws of power would 
benefit equally the physical and the life sciences. 
vein, he wrote 
" That this energy may not be confounded 
with the other kinds of vital energy, let it 
In this 
be TÙVWÙŪŦŸÙVUŤTĚby the name of nisus formativus. 
By this name, however, we mean to designate not 
so much a cause as a perpetual and uniform effect, 
the existence and reality of which are deduced 
from actual observations •••• It is thus, with 
views and on principles entirely similar, that 
we make use of the terms attraction and gravitation, 
to denote certain energies or sources of action, 
the causes of which are, notwithstanding, still 
involved in more than cimmerian TŠŲÛŪŤVVŨŨŸĚ
Indeed, as T.S. Hall has pointed ŬẀWŸÕUŤĚconsidered his nisus 
formativus doctrine as effecting a bridge between the exclusive 
study of inorganic powers, (i.e. the iatro-mechanical school), 
and the exclusively vitalistic approach, (i.e. those who 
explained development purely teleologically); in this respect, 
he considered his nisus to differ from the V7:S p las tiea of the 
ancients and the vis essentialis of Wolff, for it posited 
" ••• the union and intimate co-exeption of 
two distinct principles in the evolution of 
the natupe of organized bodies - of the 
PHYSICOMECHANICAL with the purely TELEOLOGICAL 
- principles which have hitherto been adopted 
but separately by physiologists in framing 
theories of ŦŤŪŤŲŠWÙŬŪŨŨŸŨĚ
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Caldwell did not comment much on Blumenbach's text; his 
overall reaction came in 'An appendix on animal electrity' 
which he had written and bound with the main treatise. There 
he eulogized Blumenbach as the philosopher who had brought 
Haller's physiology most up to date; Caldwell also believed 
that the greatest development in recent physiology had been 
the discovery of animal electricity, and he gave highest praise 
to "the youthful Mr. /Richard7 Fowler" for his ŲŤVŤŠŲȘUŤVŸÎĚ
In his own career, Caldwell does not seem to have 
championed the nisus formativus doctrine, but he did maintain 
a belief in the utmost importance of the early formative 
processes in human beings; this resulted in his being deeply 
interested in education, which he explicated according to his 
own theory of vital force. Caldwell seems to have abandoned 
Blumenbach's belief in several vital forces, and in so doing 
he might have been influenced by another of Blumenbach's 
English translators, namely, Alexander Crichton (l763-1856), 
who in his 1792 t:ranslation of Blumenbach' s TJbep den Bi 7,dungs-
trieb (first published 178l)l3hinted that the nisus formativus 
was only a manifestation of an all-encompasing vital principle. 
Caldwell's belief in a single vital principle and the importance 
4' 
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of the early formative stage in an organism's development can 
be seen from the following extract, taken from his Thoughts 
on physical education and the true mode of improving the 
condition of Man (1844):-
"In fact, physical education, hitherto so 
much neglected, and still so imperfectly 
understood and practised, may be pronounced 
the ARBITER of the human mind, no less than 
of the human body. Its influence in strengthening 
and weakening, improving or deteriorating, all 
kinds of mental faculties and operations, is far 
greater than is commonly supposed. Through its 
instrumentality alone can man attain, in mind as 
well as body, the highest perfection of which he 
is susceptible. It is destined, therefore, ••• 
to be the chief agent in the production of the 
millenium, at whatever period that improved 
condition of our race may ŬȘȘẀŲĒŸÏĚ
When he wrote this, Caldwell was a well-established 
academic figure in America, and his physiological - and 
phrenological - writings were being read widely. 
The third and fourth editions of Blumenbach's treatise 
were translated by John Elliotson, a prominent teacher of 
medicine in London, a founder of University College HospitallS 
and founder and first President of the Phrenological Society. 
The fourth edition had been retitled Primae Lineae physioLogicae; 
Elliotson's translation was especially useful to his contemp:>raries 
(and is equally useful to historians), for Blumenbach made many 
more references to his colleagues' works than he had in the 
first edition, and his editor added a wealth of his own 
references; for instance, Elliotson was widely read on the 
German contribution to vital force and gave his readers a very 
solid reading ŨÙVWŸĬĚ Blumenbach himself referred to several 
ĤĤĤĤŸĤĤŸŸŸŸĦĤĤĤŸĤĤĦĤĤ
ĨŞŸĦĚ
English physiological studies which have been mentioned 
earlier in this thesis; for instance, on "what the English 
have lately termed specific irritability", that is, the 
different reactions of different parts of the body to the 
same stimulus, he cited Samuel Farr's On animal motion (1771) 
and Gilbert Blane's On muscular motion (1788)t 7on the 
dependence of health upon the number, as well as upon the 
energies, of the bodily functions, he praised Sir Gilbert 
Blane's Elements of medical logic: "The very acute Gilbert 
Blane's classification of the functions of the animal economy 
according to the powers which direct them, surpasses all 
other modern attempt.s of the ÛÙŪTHHŸĮĚ
Perhaps Blumenbach's most obvious mentor in the fourth 
edition was ŇŠŨŤŪŸĲĚ For instance, he adhered by and large 
with the division of living functions into four faculties -
the vital, animal, natural and genital - abiding by this 
division when discussing which components of the animal body 
were truly alive. Thus, he denied that the blood was alive, 
although he attributed life to the genital ȚŨẀÙTVŸÕĚfor they 
evidently possessed a faculty unique to themselves and 
essential to life; Elliotson disagreed with him on this point, 
quoting a venerable list of authorities for the life of the 
blood - Aristotle, Harvey (who had attributed the idea to 
Moses), Francis Glisson (1597-l677), Bernard Albinus (1697-1770), 
and John Hunter (1728-1793); however, Elliotson also realized 
hoW intricate the issue was and called Dugald Stewart to his 
aid:-
"The essential nature of life is an impenetrable 
mystery and no more a subject for philosophical 
inquiry than the essential nature of attraction 
or of heat. To attempt explaining the phenomena 
of life by a vital fluid is only increasing the 
intricacy of the subject by an unfounded hypo-
thesis, and always reminds me of Mr. Dugald 
Stewart's remark - 'That there is even some 
reason for doubting, from the crude speculations 
on medical and chemical subjects which are daily 
offered to the public, whether it (the proper 
mode of studying nature) be yet understood so 
completely as is commonly imagined, and whether 
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a fuller illustration of the rules of philosoph-
izing, than Bacon or his followers have given, 
might not be useful even to physical ÙŪŰẀÙŲŤŲVHĒŸŨĚ
Elliotson seems to have been well aware of the recent, 
and often sophisticated, theories on forces that had been 
developed in natural philosophy and physiology, and he 
considered it his duty to bring Blurnenbach's otherwise sound 
text up-to-date on those issues; for instance, Blurnenbach's 
, . t' d . .. 1 ,22 . own text on Resplra 10n an lts prlnclpa use occupled only 
seven pages (including footnotes) in Elliotson's edition, and 
he offered a material, non-dynamical, view of it, taking 
his cue solely from Harvey who had suggested that "the use 
of expiration is to purify and ventilate the blood, by 
23 
separating from it these noxious fuliginous vapours". By 
contrast, Elliotson discussed William Prout's galvanic theory 
of respiration, whereby more than mere chemical changes were 
supposed to be effected, namely the production of galvanic 
ȚŬŲȘŤŸÏĚ He made a dynamical addition to Blumenbach's 
discussion of animal heat, concluding on the cautionary note 
that animal heat, though usually discussed as if it was 
" ¥ 
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corpuscular, was probably only a state in which matter exists, 
as were ordinary heat, light and electricity; indeed, he 
suggested that they were all modifications of the same VWŠWŤŸĪĚ
Elliotson believed that the elucidation of the natures 
and essential unity of all dynamical agents in natural 
philosophy would benefit physiology too, for it faced similar 
'd' , t l'k 26 h problems 1n 1scuss1ng agen s 1 e nervous power; suc 
physiological agents had, like the physical ones, been 
explained by an oscillation hypothesis, and although that was 
ingenious, El1iotson did not think highly of it as a 
representation of the reality of life: 
"We might as well attempt to explain the 
phenomena of motion or of chemical affinity 
and galvanism by vatality and mind, as the 
phenomena of vitality and mind by mechanics 
or chemical affinity or galvanism. They are 
altogether distinct principles, although there 
can be no question that the laws of mechanics 
and chemical affinity and galvanism are important 
and indispensable in every living system, in 
subservience to life and mind. The mind, for 
aught we know, may stimulate the voluntary 
muscles by means of galvanism communicated along 
the nervp.s, but then the galvanism is not mind, 
it is merely an instrument employed by the ÜÙŪTHHŸİĚ
The relations between inorganic and organic powers were 
developed further in his additions to Blumenbach's text on 
secretion: the vital powers could be said to bring into 
play the purely chemical relations bet\veen the particles 
which constitute the living organism; exactly how this happens 
was enigmatic, but of one fact he was sure - that life cannot 
create or annul the physical and chemical qualities of matter, 
, 1 t t ' , 28 that 1t may on Y coun erac one 1nan1mate force by another. 
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Clearly, Elliotson envisaged a rigorously law-abiding scheme 
for organic and inorganic powers alike, though the precise 
mechanism was yet inscrutable. 
In discussing sexual indulgence, Blurnenbach adhered to 
the idea that it deprived the animal economy of much of its 
power; thus, ejaculation of semen was described as " ••• a 
succussion of the whole system, short and less violent 
though of an epileptic nature, and followed by a depression 
29 
of strength". Elliotson added a lengthy historical comment 
to this passage, mentioning that, for this reason, Zeno the 
stoic, had called the loss of semen the loss of animating 
principle and that he had therefore "embraced his wife but 
once in his life, and then out of mere ŮŬŨÙWŤŪŤVVŨŨŸÕĚ The 
atomists, Epicurus and Democritus, were of the same opinion, 
and the athZetae never married, lest their strength be 
impaired. Moreover, the Jewish rabbies, in their anxiety to 
preserve their nation, were said to have ordered, with a view 
of preventing loss of vigour, that a peasant should indulge 
but once a week, a merchant but once a month, a sailor but 
twice a year, and a studious man but once in two years. Moses 
forbade indulgence before a battle. Evidence from plant 
physiology was adduced - for instance, that many plants die 
soon after they have flowered, and the removal of the sexual 
apparatus from plants often renders annual ones biennial, 
. t" 1 31 and bienn1al ones r1enn1a. 
Elliotson did not support the theory, which was still 
popular, that the ardour with which a procreating couple 
embraced affected the energy of the offspring12yet he admitted 
there was some evidence for that idea, since it had been 
remarked that bastards were frequently endowed with great 
genius and valour, for which history gave many examples; 
the phenomenon was generally ascribed to the impetuousity 
of the parents during their embraces, for which one could 
cite no less a student of human nature than Shakespeare 
himself: in King Lear, Edmund bursts into indignant 
soliloquy: 
ĒŸẂUXĚbastard? Wherefore base? 
When my dimensions are as well compact, 
My mind as generous, and my shape as true, 
As honest madam's issue? Why brand they us 
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v-lith base? with baseness? bastardy? base? base? 
Who in lusty stealth of nature 
Take more composition and fierce quality 
Than doth, within a dull, stale, tired bed 
Go to creating a whole tribe of fops 
Got between sleep and wake?" (Act 1, ŐȘĦÎĞŸĨĚ
Edmund was in good company, for other bastards of great 
attainments were Hercules, Romulus, Alexander the Great, King 
Arthur, William the Conqueror, Horner, 'Pope Adrian the fourth 
and Peter Lombard. Such historical and literary allusions 
were not at all out of place in early - mid 19 th century 
scientific treatises, for scholars in all fields were often 
widely read in t he classics and other literature (and were 
occasionally still writing their treatises in Latin in the 
34 18305 and 18405) . It was therefore useful for Blurnenbach, 
Elliotson and others to be able to cite historical examples 
in support of their ideas on longevity, sexual indulgence and 
vi tal pm-ler. If we try to extract the basic 'scientific' 
ideas that such citations were intended to illustrate, there 
are at least three worth mentioning: 1) That the power of 
the vital economy was never sui genepis, but depended 
ŸŸĤĶĶŸĶĶĶĶĶŸĤĤĤĤĤ -----
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ultimately upon a supply from without; the exact source of 
this supply was not always discussed, although we shall see 
that Tiedemann discussed it explictly; 2) That, as with 
irrorganic mechanisms, a primary concern in the vital economy 
was the economy of power; and 3) that in the process of 
procreation, vital power played the principal rale of being 
the vehicle for the transmission of parental characteristics 
and of life itself. 
Another view of what Blumenbach's ideas on vital forces, 
particularly the nisus formativus, meant to British 
physiologists can be got from A review of the doctrine of a 
vital prinoiple ĜÍĮÎĲĞŸĪŞQĚJames Prichard, a physician and 
rellow of the Royal Society. Prichard refuted the doctrine 
of a vital force as a real entity in the vital economy, 
although he did not doubt the unique phenomenal character of 
life itself; his own view was that the vital functions, 
including the circulation of the blood, respiration and its 
consequent production of animal heat, were evidently 
contrived and arranged with wonderful art, but were essentially 
mechanical; and that there was a variety of chemical relations 
between living and inorganic matter, whereby actions and 
reactions occurred continually and thus supported the vital 
activities of the animal economy. To mechanism and chemical 
affinity he believed all the phenomena of animal life would 
36 be attributed eventually. Clearly, the vital system was 
not to be envisaged as a perpetuum mobile; on this pOint he 
critized the physiologists who had come before John Hunter's 
new mode of theorizing, for instance, "the celebrated Dr. Head", 
who had compared the living body to a machine endowed with 
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the property of perpetual motion. Mead had said that God 
alone could complete such a machine, and God was pleased 
that the body should be a fabric of that sort, by disposing 
all its parts in such a manner, that they should form a 
kind of circle in which, at the same time that they performed 
their respective functions, they should constantly and 
mutually repair each other!7 Since Mead's time, Prichard 
believed that physiology had come a long way and that there 
had lately been two major views of life that had deservedly 
been attracting much attention; one was the doctrine of the 
Bildungstricb or nisus fopmativus, 
" ••• which originated with the venerable 
Blurnenbach, and which has been adopted 
recently, together with the terms connected 
with it, by some of the most distinguished 
naturalists in ŃŲŠŪȘŤĒŸĮĚ
According to Prichard, it was commonly felt that Blumenbach's 
theory was rather obscure and difficult to unravel; he had 
therefore decided to present a translated abstract of Blumenbach's 
original essay, '(Joe r d,)r) B 7: ldungs tY'ieb (Ni sus FOY'ma tivus), und 
seinem E7:n!Zus8 all! ŸŨÙĦJĚ Generoation und Rcppoduction' from the 
G5ttingen Magazine of ÍİĮÍŸĲĚ Among the extracts that he 
quoted from the paper was one which suggested a single, basic, 
vital force: 
"'1\ truth', says the author, 'which must never 
be lost sight of in these inquiries, and the 
neglect of which may often have impeded their 
VẀȘȘŤĪŸŔẀŨĚ prosecution, is this, that generation, 
nutrition and reproduction, are fundamentally 
mere modifications of the same energy, which in 
the first instance constructs, in another main-
tains, and in a third repairs; in other words, 
nutrition is an universal but imperceptibly 
continued reproduction, and the latter a 
repeated but only partial ŦŤŪŤŲŠWÙŬŪGĒŸÕĚ
Yet in his paper, Blumenbach had emphasized that the 
376. 
ŁÙŨTẀŪŦĨWŸÙŤŞĚwas not to be confounded with the vis plastica 
(as defined by Francis Bonamico, the Aristotelean, in his 
De Formatione Foetua) or the vis essentialis (of Caspar GŸŨȚȚĞHĚ
both of which had been propounded as a fundamental vital force 
with which all other vital forces could be ȘŬŲŲŤŨŠWŤTŸŨĚ The 
difficulty of interpreting what Blumenbach meant might be 
alleviated if we suppose that he was adhering, by and large, 
to Aristotle's idea that all processes of nutrition, growth 
and repair in organisms are essentially analogous to generation, 
for they could all be envisaged as processes of 'coming-to-be'. 
As such, they had a common character and could be considered 
particular modes of a single process, energy or nisus. 
Like ĻŲÙVWŬWŨŤŸÎÙŨŨẀÜŤŪŞŠȘUĚconsidered generation to be the key 
to physiology, for that is the point at which the materials, 
powers and form of the creature come into beingp all subsequent 
pTocesses, in the creature's life are essentially means of 
maintaining what had already come to be. 
Blumenbach IS [)'i 7.durzg:., trieb made a strong impression on 
his contemporaries for it offered a ne\'I1 argument for 
epigenesiS against preformationism. Moreover, his entire 
physiology seemed to promise a new viewpoint, as we see in 
the British Association Report on physiology, mentioned 
earlier. 'l'he author of that Report, Hilliam Clark, was a 
physician, F.R.S., and professor of anatomy at Cambridge. 
He traced the d8V8lopment of physiology pretty accurately, 
and cven when discussing the work done in the past fifty 
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years he maintained a remarkable level of objectivity even 
though it became clear what his own theoretical position 
was. (In fact, his Report is most valuable for an 
historian requiring an overall view of physiology throughout 
th th the 18 and early 19 century and is far more useful than 
most modern histories of the subject). In the Report, 
Blurnenbach figured as one of the earliest dynamical physio-
logists in his insistence on every part of an organism having 
its own characteristic degrees of excitability and nervous 
power, and hence its own mode of life. Clark put him 
alongside the French vitalists, ØUŸŬŮUÙŨŤĚde Bordeu (1722-
1776) and his pupil Paul Barthez (1734-1806), for developing 
this opinion roughly simultaneously and for also admitting -
ten tati vely on Bl umenbacil' s part - a fundamental power, 
called vis vitrle, of which the different degrees of excitability 
and sensibility could be considered mere modes. So far so 
good, but for Clark and for some of Blumenbach's German 
contemporaries there was a serious flaw since the means 
whereby the basic 1) i[: lJ;: {;ae becomes modified had not been 
explained: 
"It miyllt have been foreseen that this 
analytical mode of treating the living 
orgdnism - this isolation of powers -.'Ihich 
had been intended by their concurrent acts 
to produce the phenomena of life - could 
scarcely lead to the detection of that 
controlling cause which forced the whole 
to conspire to a common ŮẀŲŮŬVŤHHŸĨĚ
In other words, for Clark and others, a dynamical 
physiology was admirable but it had to have a teleological 
focus; with this we COI"!1e to a new group of physiologists of 
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whom the most eminent, in Clark's opinion, was Friedrich 
Tiedemann. 
On Power in the physiology of Friedrich Tiedemann (1781-1861) 
Friedrich Tiedemann graduated M.D. at Marburg University 
in 1804, and in the next half dozen years came under the 
influence of three men who were to shape his career as a 
thorough experimentalist. Firstly, he stayed on at Marburg 
to attend courses in physiology, osteology and cranioscopy by 
Franz Joseph Gall (1758-1828), whose skill in anatomical 
preparations set hin a standard for his own later work. He 
then went to Wlirzburg to study with Schelling; he managed 
largely to resist the temptations of Naturphil.osophie, and 
according to his own admission, Schelling was responsible 
44 for his decision to pursue empirical researCfi. The third 
influence was that of Georges Cuvier (1769-1832), under whom 
he studied in Paris ŸŪTĚ from whom he acquired his ŠŮŸŲŤȘÙŠWÙŬŪĚ
of comparative studies. 
Tiedemann was a teacher of anatomy and physiology for 
over forty years, during which his literary output included 
some remarkable and seminal works. Perhaps the most 
remarkable was t.he study of digestion that he did \'lith the 
chemist, Leopold Gmelin (1788-1853), which was published in 
1826,5its innovating character can be seen from the praise 
given to it by the great Jons Jacob Berzelius (1779-1848) I as 
"uncontestably the most complete pnysiological examination, 
which has enriched the chemical study of the processes that 
occur in living animals". 
ĨİŸĦĚ
Most of Tiedemann's major works were translated ŴÙTŤŨXŸĚ
, 
his most oft-cited work in Britain was the Physiologie des 
Menschen (first ŸẀŞŨÙVUŤTĚ in 1830) which, as can be seen 
from Clark's British Association Report' exerted some 
influence on British physiologists even before its WŲŠŪVŨŠWÙŬŪŸĚ
after translation, it became one of the oracles in British 
physiology - a status it had acquired already in Germany. 
In this treatise we find his fullest discussion of power in 
physiology. 
Tiedemann was a fully committed vitalist and Sa\o1 himself 
in the school of thought of Reil and Hufeland. Many of his 
central ideas on vital force have therefore been mentioned 
in the preceding chapters, and here only his own contributions 
to the physiological use of power will be discussed. He 
developed the dynamical explanation of generation that had 
been espoused by hufeland, calling the agent responsible for 
it the power of formation (Bildungskraft). This was the 
most fundamental power i.n all living systems for, as 
Blumenbach had Cll"gued, it was the agent that synthesized 
the organism and its powers from the moment of conception. 
The formative ŮŬŴŸŲĚwas responsible not only for the generation 
of new individu<.tls, but also contributed to the maintenance 
of their vital ŸŬŴŤŲVĚ throughout ŨÙȚŤŸĚ on this point he 
17th t h" GEt (1604 168 ) quoted the cen_ury P YS1c1an, eorge n - 9, 
who had reasserted the Aristotelian idea that nutrition 
resembles a. cont.inlled act of generation in each living 
organism, and that the organism is a continuous balance of 
d ' 47 T' d coming-to-be an puss1.ng-away. le emann realized that 
only a dynamic theory of generation could resolve the 
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challenge to the generative theories of Harvey and Linnaeus 
that had been posed by the more recent researches of John 
Turberville Needham (1713-1781), Joseph ÖŲÙŤVWŸXĚ(1733-1804), 
Heinrich August \'lrisberg (1739-1808), Ottc ŃŲŸTŤŲÙÛĚHuller 
(1730-1784), Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus (1776-1837) and 
others, who had shown that certain simple animals and 
vegetables could be formed without the concurrence of living 
. 48 
organlsrns. The explanation was wholly dynamical and 
elegant: 
"The power of formation which calls organic 
bodies into existence in generation, which 
produces all their tissues and parts, together 
with their vital properties, in the germinative 
fluid, which develops, completes and maintains 
them during their life, should be considered 
as the primitive and fundamental power of 
these bodies, as the creator and preserver 
of all the powers that belong to living bodies, 
either in their ensemble or in their different 
parts. Hence, physiologists and physicians 
who seek the principle of life in any other 
power than it, in excitability, irritability, 
or sensibility, commit a great error •••• 11 49 
Actually, there was a more fundamental power than that 
of formation, namely, the plastic power (vis pl.astica). 
As its name implies, it was responsible for the initial 
plasticity or formation of organic beings and their powers. 
Tiedemann grappled with the question of the source of the 
plastic power itself, for he seems to have been reluctant 
to allm·/ thdt allY power could be VU1: gen:;l'i8; however, he 
was forced to admit that, so far as science was concerned, 
this question was and always would be insoluble, and that 
physiologists would have to treat it as a primary irreducible 
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agent. Not that he was content with this admission, for 
it \-/as an admission that the living organism might be a 
perpetuum mobile and therefore forever inscrutable. The 
only respectable way out of tne dilemma was to derive the 
plastic power from God, which, like Hufeland, Tiedemann did. 
However, whereas Hufeland's God as the source of all power 
was an intrinsic and frequently invoked component of his 
physiology, Tiedemann's God seemed to be only a desperate 
solution to an intractable physiological problem. This 
is not to say that Tiedemann was insincere in his employment 
of the Deity; it simply means that he was reluctant to resort 
hastily to God to solve scientific problems. Here we see 
how well he had escaped the enchantment of NaturphiloBophie, 
and how Hufeland had not. Hufeland could never admit, as 
Tiedemann did, that the questions of primary and final 
causes were utterly beyond human understanding: 
"It if be asked, whence organic matters 
proceed, how they are produced, together 
with the power of formation innerent in 
them, we are necessitated candidly to 
confess our ignorance on the subject, 
inasmuch as the first origin of organic 
matters ŸŪTĚ living bodies is altogether 
beyond the range of experiment, as is also 
that of inorganic bodies and matter in 
general. The final cause of the existence 
of the plastic power is, like that of all 
the otlier pm'lers, of attraction, of repulsion 
and their modifications, mechanical attraction, 
9raviL1tion, conesion, and adhesion, as also 
that of chemical affinity, a secret whose 
profundity, as Buffon said, we shall never 
be able, from .1.11 appearances, to reach •.•. ,,50 
Yet the nagging question of the origin or source of 
vital power, of whether it could be created ab nihilo, 
was again appdrent in Ilis discussion of muscular contractility 
and nervous power. The debate bebleen those who maintained 
that muscle possesses its own inherent power for contraction, 
(the school of HZlller), and those who derived muscle power 
51 from nerve power (Robert Hhytt, Alexander Monro secundus 
(1733-1817) and their followers), was therefore partially 
envisaged as a question of whether vital forces could be 
sui ŦŮŸȘŲÙŠŸĚ of course, it was a question of other things too, 
for instance, whether any single vital force could operate 
in total isolation from all other vital forces. Tiedemann 
felt obliged to emphasize that the very concept of organism 
entailed a mutual connection among all its powers and ȚẀŪȘWÙŬŪVŸÎĚ
His view of muscle ŮŬŴŨŸŲĚ \.;as a compromise between the two main 
VȘUŬŬŨVŸĚ he agreed with lIaller that there is a special force 
inherent in muscular fibres, but Haller had erred in not 
asking what maintained that ȚŬŲȘŤŸĨĚ In similar vein, he 
praised the doctrine of John Brown but criticized its neglect 
of the origin of organic powers and the principles concerning 
their exhaustion ŸŪTĚrenovation: 
UBrown laft altogether untouched the question, 
what passes in the organs during the action of 
external stimuli, and wherefore excitation 
diminishes, and finally even annihilates, 
excitability. The reaction of living parts, 
and tiller excitability, are diminished by the 
operation of excitants, but rest re-establishes 
them. JIow thir:; happens, he did not attempt to 
inljuire, or explain. In short, ne paid no 
attention to the internal condition necessary 
for the lTI\1intcnance and preservation of 
, b'!'t ,,54 exclta 1. .l Y . 
Tiedemann's answer to the question that he thought 
Haller and Brown had neglected was to envisage nutrition 
primarily as a dynamical process, rather than as a material 
phenomenon which was the commoner point of view, and to 
attribute to nutrition the renovation of the organism's 
power. Indeed, he offered perhaps the boldest dynamical 
theory of nutrition before those of Huller and Liebig. He 
asserted that: 
"During sleep the necessary conditions of this 
ÜŠWŤŲÙŸŨĚconstitution are renewed by the 
operation of nutrition, as also the external 
and internal excitants that maintain them. 
Hence, the forces of these parts have their 
energy renovated, and recover the power of 
acting under the influence of excitants that 
urge them to activity. It is the force of 
nutritjon, therefore, which not only originates 
excitability and activity of the nerves, 
sensitive organs and muscles, but also renovates 
them ŴUŸŪĚ they are exhausted by exertion. 
3ti3. 
Similar phenomena of a varied state of excitability 
and mobility, according to tne diurnal periods 
and the kinds of excitants, are observed in the 
leaves, flowers and genitals of plants, in which 
they arc also only an index of the changes they 
underyo in the state of their nutrition according 
to the periods of the day and the excitants they 
11 ,,55 meet overa • 
In his section on nut.ri tion and its relation to muscle 
power he asserted his kinship with Reil and Hufeland on what 
they meant by excitability. However, he stressed that 
excitability was not an isolated force, wholly independent 
of the organic ŅŸŘĴŨWWȘŲĚ to \'lhich it vias attached, but that it 
was associated inextricably with that matter. He seems to 
.. 
- - --r-=:- ĤĤĤĤĤĤŸĦĚ
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have misunderstood Reil, for if one realizes the purely 
heuristic status of Reil's vital force, his ideas on the 
relation between living forces and organic matter were 
almost identical to Tiedemann's. 
Vital forces were not the only forces in the organism 
that Tiedemann discussed; the evolution of the imponderables 
- heat, light and electricity - took up about 60 of the 430 
pages of the book. Although well aware of the debates on 
the natures of these imponderable agents, he refrained from 
discussing whether they were true powers or imponderable 
substances. Hhat was important about them, for physiology, 
was solely that they seemed to result from the material 
changes connected with the nutritive functions: 6and their 
phenomena were therefore central to the animal economy. 
(Interestingly, in discussing animal electricity, the only 
British researcher he mentioned was Richard Fowler; indeed, 
Fowler's book on animal electricity (1793) was cited several 
times in the WŲŤŠWÙVŤŸİĞĚ In this and other sections, he 
suggested that the elucidation of the primary sources of the 
commonly mentioned forces of Nature would be a great step 
forward in both physiology and physics, and that this 
investigation into the nature of force might be mounted on 
two fronts - the physiological and the physico-chemical. 
The same philosophical and technical problems confronted 
the question of force in physiology, physics and chemistry, 
and like Blumenbach he looked forward to the day when power 
or force would b8 explicated in a grand, overall theory 
d b · d 1 . rob' . 58 and woul be urIC no onger 1n a 19U1ty. 
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Tiedemann's general physiology is rarely discussed 
by historians, for his work with Grnelin on digestion has 
stolen the limelight. Nevertheless, on his contemporaries 
his dynamical physiology exerted considerable influence; 
and that it influenced British physiologists can be seen 
from the frequency with which they cited him during the 
1830s and 1840s and from William Clark's Report. In 
Clark's summary of his own theory of embryological develop-
rnent we can see the influence of Tiedemann, for instance, 
the idea that the nutritive substance, the yolk, which 
occurs in the proximity of the germ at the beginning of the 
germ's evolution, is destined primarily to enable the ŦŤŸĚ
to ŴŬŲÛŸĲŪẀWŲÙWÙŬŪĚ is the provider of energy. Also in 
his ideas on the different forms of energy in the 
organism being manifestations of a single fundamental force, 
Clark was in line with him. 
Indeed, Clark called the Physiologie an "excellent 
work, worthy of the great name of its author,,60and implied 
that its influence on British physiology was profound. 
Finally, a comment on Tiedemann's metaphsics. There 
is very little explicit indication in any of his physiological 
writings of any important interaction between his metaphysics 
(whatever they were) and his physiology. He wrote of 
'conflict' between the forces of the organism and external 
forces, and used other phrases reminiscent of Naturphilosophie, 
but nowhere was there any explicit acknowlegement of a 
philosophical background. Perhaps further study of his non-
physiological works will reveal something. but in the mean-
while one has to concur with his biographer, Theodor ŁÙVȘUŬȚȚŸŨĚ
ŸŸĶĶŸŸŸŸŸŸĤĶĤŸŸĤŸĦŸŸŸĚ... ŸĶĶĶĶĶĶĶĶĶĶĶĶĶĶĶĶŸĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤ
that having resisted the lure of Naturphilosophie at 
Wurzburg as a young man, he remained true to empiricism. 
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CHAPTER 12. On power in the physiology of Christoph 
Wilhelm Hufeland (1762-1836) 
Hufeland was cited often by German physiologists during 
the first half of the 19th century and not infrequently by 
British authors. It is therefore curious that very scanty 
attention has been paid him by historians of medicine in the 
ĨŸÎĦĚ
English speaking world. The Dictionary of VȘÙŸŪWÙȚÙȘĚbiography 
does not mention him and, to my knowledge, there is not a 
single rounded appreciation of his life and work in English 
not even a paper in a history of medicine journal; By 
contrast, he has been studied in depth by German, Czech,Polish 
and Russian scholars who have clearly appreciated his stature. 
On the German secondary ŨÙWŤŲŠWẀŲŤŸĚ as well as on his own 
writings, this chapter relies. 
At the age of eighteen Hufeland began his medical studies 
at the University of Jena. However, finding that the 
atmosphere there was uncongenial to serious study he moved to 
Gottingen where he carne under such eminent teachers as August 
Gottlob Richter (1742-1812), Ernst Gottfried Baldinger (1738-
l804), Blumenbach and Grnelin. In 1783 he graduated with a 
thesis 'De usu vis eZectricae in Asphyxia I (The use of 
electrici ty in -the treatment of asphyxia) • He inunediately 
returned to his home town of lveirnar and took over his father IS 
medical practice. To begin practice so young, without 
having spent a few years travelling and gaining different 
experiences in medical theory and practice, was fairly 
unusual, particularly if one had any ambition. However, 
Hufeland's career did not suffer from his ten years' confine-
.. -
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ment to Weimar, for that city was then a hubbub of 
intellectual activity. A group of scholars had assembled 
there around the magnetic personality of Goethe. Hufeland 
became their personal physician, was a regular attender at 
Goethe's FreitagsgeseZlschaft and became well acquainted 
with men like Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) the 
philosopher and historian, Christoph Martin Wieland (1733-1813) 
the poet, and Friedrich Justus Bertuch (1747-1822) the jurist. 
At one of Goethe's friday-evening gatherings Hufeland was 
reading from his notes that he had been compiling during his 
medical practice, (these notes were published in 1796 as his 
Makrobiotik), and so impressed the Archduke and Goethe that 
it was felt he deserved a chair at Jena. The following 
spring (1793) he began his professorial duties. 
His spell at Jena brought him into contact with another 
galaxy of scholars - the ŮUÙŸŬVŬŮUŤŲĚ Johann Gottlieb Fichte, 
the poet and historian Friedrich von Schiller (1759-1805) and, 
most importantly for his medical work, the fine anatomist and 
physiologist Johann Christian Reil. Inevitably he carne into 
close contact with ÔŠWẀŲŮUÙŨŬVŬŮUÙŤŸĚyet, largely because he 
had spent the past ten years in medical practice, which had 
often been gruelling and had left him with little time to 
develop a too speculative turn of mind, he managed to avoid 
excessi ve importation of metaphysics into his medical \'Iri tings 
and teaching. 'rhroughout his Ii fe he genuinely considered 
his obligations to his patients to far outweigh obedience to 
any system, and although he was ready to theorize in 
physiology, his theorizing \>las alvlays close to the ground of 
empiricism. As one historian recently wrote: 
"rlann Systematiker wie BROWN, HAHNEMANN, 
MESMER oder die Natu2'phiLosophen versuchten, 
aZZe Lebensvorgange aus einem einheitZichen 
Prinzip zu erklaren und sich dabei weitgehend 
theoretischen SpekuZationen uberZiessen, so 
betonte HUFELAND demgegenuber den Wert der 
Vernunft und der Erfahrung in der Medizin. 
Ohne sorg!aZltige Beobachtung am Krankenbett, 
ohne Experimente und kritisches Nachdenken und 
ohne ein grundLiches Studium der Literatur kann 
der Arzt nicht ŠẀVÛŬÜÜŤŪĒŸĚ
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Indeed, Hufeland's loyalty to his patients and the many 
words he therefore wrote on the ethics of medical practice 
have resulted in his being remembered chiefly as "an ideal 
4 doctor, a moralist, a philosopher and a gentleman", rather 
th than as a physiologist of some originality. One 20 century 
medical historian has gone so far as to call him "one of the 
great philanthropic physicians"Sof all time, and with this 
it would be difficult to disagree. But we must not lose 
u.. 
sight of his ȘŬŪWŲÙŸWÙŬŪVĚ to academic medicine. He edited 
four journals during his life, the most impressive being 
Hu!eland's ŊŬẀŸŪŠŨHĚ alias JournaL der praktischen Arzneikunde, 
which ran to eighty-two volumes between 1795 and 1836. In 
1796 he published the Makrobiotik: Die Kunst, das menschLiche 
Leben zu ẂŤŲRŠŪŦŤŲŪŸĚ and between then and his death in 1836 
published a not inconsiderable number of papers and treatises, 
some of which were largely concerned with purely practical 
matters whilst others were largely concerned with theoretical 
issues. Of the latter kind we might mention his papers on 
animal magnetism7 and UŬÜŬŤŬŮŠWUXŸĚ for they were especially 
influential. 
- =;-
His last work to be published, the Enchiridion 
Medicum, oder Anleitung zur medizinischen Praxis (1836); 
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tells us by its very title that its aim was practical rather 
than theoretical. Nonetheless, it contained some highly 
revealing passages on his physiology, a physiology which 
seems to have been essentially dynamical throughout his life. 
To examine that physiology, we shall discuss two of his 
treatises, the Makrobiotik and the Enchiridion, keeping our 
eye on some of his other works too. 
Before doing that, however, a few more biographical 
details ought to be mentioned, both because they are rarely 
known among English-speaking medical historians and to 
emphasize that we are not dealing with an insignificant figure 
in medical history. In 1801 he was called to Berlin as 
director of the Collegium Medico-Chirurgicum and principal 
physician at the Charite Hospital. From 1806 to 1809 he 
served as personal physician to the Royal Family of Prussia 
during exile, and on its return played a leading rale in the 
reorganization of the country's medical VŤŲẂÙȘŤVŸÕĚ In 1810 
he was aPPointed to the chair of special pathology and therapy 
in the new University of Berlin and later he founded the 
medical-chirurgical society which became officially named 
the Hufelandsche Gesellschaft (1833). His last years were 
spent in ordinary medical practice. 
Hufeland's physiology had strong affinities to those of 
cullen, Brown, Blurnenbach and Tiedemann. It was based on 
the idea that the living organism possesses a determinate 
capacity for reacting to stimuli. In addition, he was a 
fully committed vitalist and was intent on exploring the 
39b. 
the nature and laws of Lebenskraft, which he did with 
considerable reliance on empirical and experimental 
evidence (although he himself could not be called an 
experimentalist), and in this respect he ranks beside 
Johann Christian Reil as a systematic exponent of vital 
force. Unfortunately, most historians of the German 
enunciation of vital force have largely, and often totally, 
ignored Hufeland and have focussed on Reil: for instance, 
Mikulas Teich in his paper 'On the historical foundations 
of modern biochemistry' (1970};ldiscussed only Reil's 
contribution to the vital force concept among the late 18th 
century Germans; Teich is too fine a scholar not to have 
realized that there were other important workers in the field, 
and in fairness to him, he seems to have singled Reil out 
simply as "a very fine example of how to blend experimental 
knowledge with theoretical thought,,12 in the working-out of a 
concept like vital force. Marcel Florkin in his A history 
of biochemistry (1973);3part 1, (1972), mentioned Reil as 
the principal critical student of vital force and also 
mentioned - but only mentioned - that Hufeland contributed 
too. Noel Coley in his From animal chemistry to biochemistry 
(l973}14ment1oned only Reil's work, saying that "The first 
systematic treatmen-t of the concept of vi tal force appeared 
in the opening paper of the first issue of Archiv far 
Phvsiologie, published by J.C. Reil in ŨİĲĪĒŸĪĚ Considering 
that Hufeland openly elaborated his ideas on vital force in 
the early l790s, those ideas being published in his Makrobiotik 
in 1794, it is historically inaccurate to give all or most 
of the credit to Reil, and it seems to me that much more 
research on primary sources needs to be done on this issue. 
Although I have not had sufficient time to undertake this 
task, one purpose of this chapter is to show briefly that 
Hufeland was an important contributor to the vital force 
doctrine during the late 18th and early 19 th . centuries. 
In the preface to the Makrobiotik he declared his 
397. 
wholly dynamical approach to physiology, one branch of which 
was the macrobiotic science of prolonging life. This 
differed from ordinary medicine in not attempting to maintain 
a person in maximum fitness and vitality, but seeking rather 
to make his vitality last as long as possible at a level 
I ' 'bl 't 't 16 somewhat be ow max1mum POSS1 e 1n enS1 y. Macrobiotic 
science dealt with man's moral and spiritual nature in 
addition to his bodily ȚẀŪȘWÙŬŪVŸĚ such spirituality provided 
man with a divine source of power in addition to vital and 
physico-chemical ones. 
The first point to make about Hufeland's vital power 
is that he believed in power as a real entity in Nature; 
forces were therefore no merely heuristic concepts in 
natural philosopjy;7 Indeed, in his analysis of what 
constitutes an individual organism, he had to deny the 
organism as a permanent, definable entity, for it seemed to 
him that the Leibnizean categories of change and power are 
the only truly ascertainable qualities in life; the organism 
continuously changes, just at Time does, and it is therefore 
forever elusive. In this argument, Hufeland's admission 
of the reality of power, arising from his denial of the 
existence of the individual as a permanent physical organism, 
seems to be analogous to Leibniz's admission of the reality 
of power, which was connected with his denial of the reality 
of Absolute Time. Leibniz had written: 
"I find nothing so capabte of being 
apprehended as force. I believe that 
we must even have recourse to it in order 
to uphold the true (eucharistic) presence, 
which I admit I am not able to reconcile 
sufficiently well with the view that puts 
the essence of bodies in a completely 
empty ŤẄWŤŪVÙŬŪĒŸĮĚ
In an essay on dynamics, Leibniz had written that 
lilt is yet appropriate to point out that 
force can be evaluated without taking 
time into consideration. For a given 
force can give a certain limited effect 
which it will never exceed, however much 
time be allowed. Whether a spring is let 
down suddenly or gradually, it will not 
raise a greater weight to the same height, 
th . ht t t h' ht ll19 nor e same ŴŤŸŦĚ 0 a grea er ŤŸŦĚ • 
In contrast with this reality and definability of force, 
II ••• motion is something successive, which 
consequently never exists, any more than 
time, because all its parts never exist 
20 
together" . 
In similar vein, Hufeland championed the reality of power 
in life: 
"The life of man, considered in a physical 
view, is nothing else than an incessant 
ceasing and being; a continual change of 
destruction and restoration; an everlasting 
contest of chemical, decomposing powers, 
wi"th all the combining and creative vital 
powers .... 
What,then, in a common sense we call 
the life of a creature, considered as a 
representation, is nothing else than a mere 
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phenomenon, which has nothing peculiar or 
self-subsistent, but the active spiritual 
power which forms the grounds of it, and 
which binds and regulates the whole. All 
the rest is only appearance; a grand spectacle 
continued, where the thing represented does 
not remain the same a moment, but is incessantly 
ȘUŠŪŦÙŪŦHHŸŨĚ
Life itself was therefore an incessant exertion of 
ĨĨŸĦĚ
powers, and each vital action entailed a consumption of power 
f I ·· tt 22 S h f . d . as well as 0 lVlng rna er. uc con 1 ence ln power 
contrasted with the reluctance of some of Hufeland's 
contemporaries to admit its reality; one such contemporary 
was Reil, who believed that, in the last analysis, all power 
could be reduced to chemical mixtures and particular forms 
of matter. Reil used the term Lebenskraft without assigning 
it any reality of its own. Thus: 
"Force is a subjec,tive concept, the form in 
which we think of the relations between cause 
and effect. If it were possible for us to 
think clearly of each body as it is, of the 
nature of all its constituents and their 
combination, and of their mixture and form, 
then we would not need the concept of force, 
which gives rise to quite a number of erroneous 
ȘŬŪȘŨẀVÙŬŪVHHŸĨĚ
Reil's use of the term Lebenskraft, despite his doubting 
its reality, is a fine testimony to the balanced, cautious 
approach he had to the problem, and it is therefore not 
surprising that historians have focussed on him. Hufelandrs 
analysis, though more metaphysical than Reil's, was nonetheless 
a thoroughly reasonable one and contained some penetrating 
ideas that indicated how the topic could be investigated 
---.,-.--
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further. One of these ideas was the close affinity between 
vital and inorganic powers; in fact, Hufeland asserted that 
vital power had to be nourished continually for the organism 
to survive, and that nourishment was effected solely by light, 
24 - -heat and oxygene Lsicl. Indeed, Hufeland was one of the 
first physiologists to consider nutrition more from a 
dynamical point of view than from the traditional material 
one:-
"I think I may with justice, therefore, assert 
that light, heat and oxygene are the real, 
proper nourishment and sustenance of the vital 
power. Grosser kinds of nourishment seem 
to serve rather for supporting the organs and 
repairing ȘŬŪVẀÜŮWÙŬŪĒŸĪĚ
Similarly, bodily activity entailed primarily a consumption 
of power, whilst the physical wearing away of the organs was 
d . t 26 M h . of only secon ary ŸÜŮŬŲĚance. oreover, e ŸŪWŤŲŮŲŤWŤTĚan 
organism's physical size in essentially dynamic terms, so 
that the size of an oak-tree or an animal indicated primarily 
the quantity of vital power it contained and thus its life-
span. This was expressed, for plants, by three pithy 
axioms: 
I. Bulk shows greater provision of the vital or 
plastic power. 
II. Bulk gives more vital capacity, more surface, more 
external acess. 
III. The greater mass a body has, the more time is 
required before it can be wasted by its external and 
internal consumptive and destructive ŮŬŴŤŲVŸİĚ
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The preservation of the bulk of a living organism 
necessitated a continuous replenishment of its power, for 
one idea which ran implicitly throughout his Makrobiotik 
was the inconceivability of creation of vital power ab 
nihiZo or of the living system being a perpetuum mobiZe. 
Although he did not liken the organism explicitly to an 
inorganic mechanism, he liked to use the flame analogy, where 
the primary point was that the dynamic input had to equal 
the dynamic output if the flame was to burn steadily; the 
flame would die when there was insufficient input or excessive 
output of power; the consumption of the carbon of the candle, 
or of the materials of the living organism, was of only 
. t 28 secondary lmpor ance. 
Another important feature of his physiology was that 
throughout life an organism had to compromise between the 
intensity of its actions, ĜWŸŠWĚ is, the rate at which it 
lived), and the duration of those actions (i.e. how long they 
could continue before the organism was totally ŤẄUŠẀVWŤTĞŸĲĚ
All organisms had to rest regularly, for only thus could the 
consumption of vital power be retarded. All vital exertions 
drew power from an organism's stock of vitality, which had 
been imparted to it by its parents at its moment of conception, 
and its life-span was predetermined largely by the size of that 
stock. This particular argument did not take due account of 
his earlier assertion that vital power is continually 
replenished by light, heat and oxygene; but its usefulness lay 
in the ease with which physiologists could explain the 
different, and apparently predetermined, life-spans of 
different types of creatures; elephants lived longer than mice, 
rats, dogs etc., simply because elephants contained much more 
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hereditary vital power than the smaller mammals, and could 
pass on more vital power to their offspring. 
The differences of life-span among individuals of the 
same species could be explained dynamically with equal ease. 
One of the most important factors in this - indeed, the most 
important single factor in the case of man - was sexual 
indulgence. Hufeland's assertion of the intensely debilitating 
effect of this function was most impressive, both with respect 
to the breadth of empirical data that he used and the remorse-
less logic of his argument. Although Hufeland's discussion 
could not be called modern, it obviously retained its 
th 
credibility for much of the 19 century because, by and large, 
it was the same argument as was used by the mid-19 th century 
British and American physiologists discussed in Chapters 8 
and 9. Even today, one can appreciate his logic: 
"What can communicate life, must also contain 
life. In the generative juices, the vital 
power is so concentrated that the smallest 
particle of them is able to call to life the 
future being. Can ''Ie imagine a greater balsamic 
for restoring and supporting our own vital power? 
We are sufficiently taught by experience 
that the body does not acquire its full solidity 
and consistence, until those organs lof 
generatiogl have attained to perfection, and are 
in a condition to create this new kind of jUices, 
and by this means to give expansion to new 
powers: the most evident proof that they are 
destined not merely for others but, in a 
particular manner, for ourselves and have so 
extraordinary an influence on our \'I7hole system, 
that they impress everything, as it were, with 
a new character never before felt .••• ,,30 
From such a passage we can see how useful the concept 
of power could be for physiology. There were certain 
vital processes which appeared so wonderfully inscrutable, 
so far beyond the reach of mere atoms, that the only agents 
likely to cause them were forces or powers. Only a 
dynamical agent could be sophisticated and potent enough 
to effect the well-nigh miraculous generation of an adult 
organism from a tiny spermatic animalcule and ovum. As 
various studies in the history of ideas on generation - by 
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31 32 33 Needham, Cole and Bodemer for instance - have shown, all 
attempts at accounting for generation by means of particles 
were running into serious difficulties in the 18th century, 
and those difficulties were not resolved even by the bio-
chemical discoveries of the 19th century. One of the best 
ways to avoid those difficulties was to construct a dynamical 
theory of generation, for the only admissible agents in natural 
philosophy which could produce grand effects from tiny 
beginnings were powers and forces. Of course, any dynamical 
theory of generation had problems of its own, not the least 
of which was the difficulty of defining what was meant by 
'force', (remember Reil's argument). But for men like 
Hufeland, who believed that forces were real and that recent 
researches in natural philosophy were holding out the promise 
of discovering their essential nature in the not-tao-distant 
future, a dynamical account of generation was most convincing. 
Indeed, the dynamical theory of generation was to be tested 
experimentally in the 19 th century by means of voltaic 
electricity; for instance, William Carpenter in his textbooks 
on physiology discussed the experiments of a Mr. Andrew 
Crosse (1784-1855) who in the 1830s had apparently generated 
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tiny insects (Acarus Crossii) by passing electricity through 
salt solutions; Crosse's experiments were impressive and 
f t . B' t' h . . f' . I 34 raised a storm 0 con roversy 1n r1 1S SC1ent1 1C C1rc es. 
In the Makrobiotik, Hufeland's view of the living 
organism seems to have been that it was an engine, in which 
the primary consideration was the economy of power; its only 
difference from an inorganic engine was its possession of an 
extra form of power - vital force - which, although a real, 
distinct form in its own right, nonetheless fitted into the 
universal laws of dynamics and did not usurp, but only 
modified, the physico-chemical powers. It was here that his 
metaphysics blended especially well with his science and 
made Makrobiotik so convincing; with great eloquence he 
asserted that vital power was of fundamental concern in physics 
and physiology, and that its origin was divine: 
"The vital power is, without dispute, one of 
the most general, the most incomprehensible, 
and the most powerful, of all the powers of 
Nature. It fills and gives motion to every-
thing; and in all probability is the grand 
source from which all the other powers of the 
physical, or at least the organized, world 
proceed. It is that which produces, supports 
and renews everything; by it, the creation, 
after so many thousands of years, revives every 
spring with the same frehsness and beauty as 
when it first came from the hand of its Maker. 
It is inexhaustible and infinite - a real, 
eternal emanation from the MŤÙWXHHŸĪĚ
Even though it was the most subtle, most pervading agent 
in Nature, Hufeland pointed out time and again that it seemed 
to have the closest affinity to light, electricity, rnagnetism36 
37 
and heat, and that the future of physiology and natural 
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philosophy lay in the investigation of that affinity. 
Hufeland's Enchiridion Medicum or Manual of the ppactice 
of medicine: The result of fifty years experience, was less 
concerned with physiological theory and more with the job of 
the physician. Hippocrates was his mentor; some passages 
were pure Hippocrates, both in ideas and in style, for 
instance: 
"Art is eternal, system transient. 
Art pertains to the internal sanctuary of 
man; system to time, whose product it ÙVHHŸĮĚ
Hippocrates was also his high-priest, for he had been the 
first to appreciate the vocationary nature and moral worth of 
medicine. Thus Hufeland advised: 
"Bear always in mind who you are, and what 
your office is. You are employed by God 
as a priest of the holy flame of life, and 
as administrator and distributor of the 
highest gifts, health and life, and of the 
secret powers which he has bestowed through-
out Nature for the benefit of ÜŠŪÛÙŪTHHŸĲĚ
Occasionally, one gets the impression that it was not 
only Hippocrates, but also a twinge of Naturphilosophie, 
which guided him; for instance, despite the practical aim of 
the Enchiridion there were lengthy theoretical sections which 
expounded a wholly dynamical physiology, sometimes with 
considerable eloquence. In one notable passage discussing 
various methods of diagnosis, having enumerated the methods 
of chemical examination (which was still confined largely 
to urine analysis), examination of the animal electricity of 
the patient, (having Mesmer in mind), and examination by the 
stethoscope, he dismissed these three as only second-rate 
methods, since they disclosed 
" more of a physical and material, 
than of a dynamic state, of the system, 
and are consequently of more value in 
regard to the natural history of the 
patient at the time, than of practical 
t 'l't ,,40 u 1 1 Y . 
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Consequently, in this later treatise he again envisaged 
the organism as a system for the economy of power; and 
although the Enchiridion did not discuss as explicitly as 
the Makrobiotik the dependence of vital power on light, heat 
and oxygene, the idea of the correlation between vital power 
and the inorganic powers, upon which it was nourished, still 
seemed to be implicit. 
One of the principal topics in the Enahiridion was 
fever; this was treated as a purely dynamical abnormality of 
the organism. Moreover, just as the various physiological 
manifestations of power were supposed to be forms of a 
fundamental power, so were different fevers only different 
forms of a basic fever. And just as power \vas one throughout 
Nature, so was fever one throughout all conditions of acute 
disease. 
41 fever" • 
Thus: "There is only one acute disease - it is 
And: 
"The practitioner has to look upon the 
original fever as a unity, as a phlogosis; 
and all the so-called species and sorts as 
mere deviations and modifications of this 
fundamental state, which they always retain 
as their base, and to which they may easily 
, ,,42 
return agaln • 
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Hufeland's solely dynamical view of health and disease 
turned his attention to the environmental and psychological 
needs of his patients in addition to their immediate medical 
conditions; we have seen how the sarne happened with John 
Brown and others in Britain, and Benjamin Rush in America. 
For Hufeland, this all-encompassing consideration of the 
patient had the valuable authority of Hippocrates, and it is 
hardly surprising that he advocated daily measurements of 
the barometer and thermometer, wind direction and intensity, 
atmospheric electricity and the likely effects of psychological 
factors such as anxiety and the threat of ŴŠŲŸĨĚ The 
physician also had to understand natural philosophy and 
chemistry, at least in so far as they concerned ŨÙȚŤŸÏĚ
Hufeland believed these subjects to be intimately concerned 
with life for, in keeping with his Naturphilosophische 
background, which he rarely championed explicitly but which 
feels as if it was just beneath the surface of his writing, 
the vital power was envisaged as feeding upon the powers of 
Nature at ŨŠŲŦŤŸĚ and in exerting itself against Nature's 
powers, life seemed to consume itself. As was discussed in 
Chapter 10 of this thesis, power or force was a central 
concern of Natur'pJd losophie, and there were several natural 
philosophers who managed to produce valuable work under its 
aegis by holding its speculativeness in check. Everett 
Mendelsohn has cited Lorenz Oken, Richard Owen and Johannes 
Muller to that ŤȚȚŤȘWŸĪŠŪTĚit seems to me that Hufeland might 
qualify too, since his reputation and influence perSisted 
long af'ter his death. In fact, the Makr'obiotik passed through 
an astonishing number of editions; it was last printed in ÍĲİĪŸĬĚ
not as a medical curiosity but as a thoroughly valid guide to 
living. To a most impressive degree, Hufeland managed to 
temper his metaphysics ltlith his experience as a working 
physician, and his dynamical ideas were therefore an 
integral - and are still a fairly unexceptionable - part 
of his careful, mainly empirically-based study of the 
prolongation of life. Hufeland's Enchiridion continued to 
be read and cited throughout Europe and North America 
throughout the 19 th century for, as one physician wrote 
in 1931, 
"the closing chapters on medical ethics 
and the relation of the physician to the 
sick, to the public, and to his colleagues 
are most striking and constitute a classic 
in medical literature. The principles of 
the conduct of physicians, as laid down by 
Hufeland, became the code for the guidance 
of the ŮŲŬȚŤVVÙŬŪHHŸİĚ
This being so, it was inevitable that Hufeland's 
dynamical ideas in physiology, even when outdated, had a 
wide audience; and it can be no coincidence that the 
writings on sexuality, for instance, by Orson Squire Fowler 
in America during the mid-late 19 th century bore such 
resemblance to Hufeland's ideas on the same topic. Fowler 
was exceptional in not citing Hufeland, for most of the 
physiologists writing in English after c.1830 and who have 
been examined in this thesis, cited him approvingly. 
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CHAPTER 13. On Power in the physiology of Johannes 
Peter Muller, (1801-1858) 
"When one comes into contact with a man of the first 
rank, one's spiritual scale is changed for life. Such 
a contact is the most interesting event that life can 
offer." LHermann von Helmholtz, probably thinking of 
Johannes MUller7 
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In 1819, Johannes Muller began his medical studies at the 
University of Bonn. The teachers there had been selected by 
the Prussian Ministry of Education largely for their adherence 
to Schelling. It was therefore inevitable that Muller would 
be moulded into a NaturphiZosoph. NaturphiZosophisahe Medizin, 
which had John Brown's excitation theory as one its main 
components, was well represented at Bonn; there were the 
physiologists Christian Friedrich Nasse (1778-1851) and 
Philipp von Walther (1782-1849), Karl Wilhelm Gottlob Kastner 
(1783-1857) a friend of Schelling, and the botanist Nees von 
Esenbeck (1787-1837) a friend of ŇŬŤWUŤŸĚ
A turning point came when, having graduated in 1822, 
MUller moved to Berlin to study under Karl Rudolphi (1771-1832), 
then Germany's most eminent anatomist, who had been trying 
to free natural philosophy from the "turbid mire of mysticism" 
2 
and to establish a rigorous methodology. By the late l820s 
Muller had learnt enough from Rudolphi to be acquiring a 
reputation in his own right in experimental physiology and 
anatomy, and in 1826 he was appointed to the chair of medicine 
in Bonn. However, his years under Rudolphi wnen he had been 
acquiring his teacher's methods, cannot have gone too smoothly; 
for instance, his first piece of important research was on 
psychology, and he recalled later that his teacher had 
frowned upon his preoccupation with that 
"more abstract subject of the physiology 
of the mind, rather than with the 
investigation of the anatomy of the 
organs of the senses, such as that of 
the eyes of insects and VŮÙTŤŲVĒŸĚ
Actually, Muller soon adopted a more orthodox approach 
to the study of how man acquires his knowledge about the 
external world, as evidenced by his first publication, Zur 
vergliechenden PhyaioZogie des Gesiahtssinnes des Mensahen 
und der Thiere ĜÍĮÎĬĞŸĚ (On the comparative physiology of 
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sight in man and in animals). It marked not only the start 
of his career but also the opening of an era in the physiology 
of sense-perceptions, for its thesis was; 
"We want to say, right at the beginning, the 
basic idea of all physiological investigation, 
not only of vision but of all the other senses, 
which \ve cannot repeat often enough ••• is that 
the energies of light, dark and colour are not 
immanent in external things 
visual substance ÙWVŤŨȚĒŸĚ
but in the 
Essentially, he argued on the basis of his own experiments 
that the qualities we attribute to the external world are 
largely, or even wholly, created by our own organs of sense; 
that, as Kant had proposed, there is a gulf between phenomena 
and noumena that in many, or even all, cases cannot be 
bridged by the human understanding. 
In the same year he published another work, seldom even 
mentioned by historians of physiology, entitled Ueber die 
phantastisahen ŇŤVÙŠUWVŤŲŁŠUŤÙŪẀŪŦŤŪŸĚ (On fantastical sight 
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perceptions) which had relied on a series of difficult self-
experimentation and was a much more subjective and metaphysical 
work than the other. In the foreword he explained the 
connection between the two, (and since this work has never 
been translated and is so seldom discussed, I might be excused 
a lengtny extract): 
"The present investigation is to be regarded 
as a continuation of the earlier physiological 
work of the author on the faculty of sight 
(On the comparative physioLogy of the sight-
facuLty of man and of animaLs, Leipzig, 1826). 
It deals with the sight-faculty with respect to 
its higher social bearing upon the organs, whose 
life-form we call psychic, spriritual. For the 
author, the soul is only one special form of 
life amongst many, which is amenable to physio-
logical research; he retains the conviction, 
therefore, that physiological research must 
itself, in the last analysis, be psychological. 
'rhe doctrine of the' life of the soul as a 
particular life-form of the organism is therefore 
only a part of physiology, in the widest meaning 
of the word .••• Should the author explain himself 
briefly on this issue, which seems to him a 
scientific (wissenschaftliche) physiological 
treatment of psychology, he would declare that, 
though guarding himself well against the suspicion 
of Spinozism, he has no doubts upon the last thl:'ee 
books of the Ethics of Spinoza, which dealt with 
the violent emotions and whose psychological 
content can be seen to be separate from his other 
teachings •••• {they/ provide at least an effective 
account of the method and purport of life, which 
one cannot say for most psychological treatises"? 
In other words, the young Muller considered Spinoza's 
psychology to be of heuristic value, even though he would not 
admit it as necessarily true, a typically Kantian position. 
In the next few sentences, he revealed how much he was also 
indebted to Naturphilosophie: 
"Here, the author has nothing to say about 
the ŨÙȚŤŸȚŬŲÜVĚ that we call spiritual lor 
immaterial/; but the life-form of sensitivity, 
which was his specific object of study, stands 
among all physiological functions in such a 
direct, transforming relation to spiritual life, 
that the physiological study, if it succeeds, 
cannot be without psychological implications. 
Already in earlier physiological work, the 
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author believes he has indicated many psychological 
implications. This relationship is developed even 
more significantly in the present paper, whose 
task is precisely to investigate the sight-
faculty in its transformations with spiritual 
life. May this work contribute a little to 
leading psychological research back from the 
sterile ground of so-called empirical psychology, 
and on the other hand from the all-tao-easy and 
peremptory speculations on life, towards fruitful 
8 
results" . 
As we have seen, the topic of transformation among Nature's 
dynamical agents was central to Naturphilosophie. Here was 
Muller championing that idea more forcefully than he would ever 
again and also revealing that it lay at the very root of his 
newly found principle of specific nerve energies. h " Ncr( T ŸVĚ ÙVŸĚto 
say that the only basis for that principle was metaphysical; 
his autoexperimentation had given him another baSis, even 
though such experiments were difficult to perform properly 
and even more difficult to interpret. (Remember that at 
about this time Roget was doing similar experiments on himself 
and had found them difficult to interpret conclusively. A 
v little earlier, the young Czech physiologist, Purkyne, had 
done similar autoexperiments and made himself violently ill 
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9 thereby. ) The question of the origin of Muller's specific-
energies principle has been asked by physiologists, philosophers 
and historians from that day to this. According to J.T. Merz 
in his A history of european thought in the nineteenth century, 
the answer given by Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) the ŮUXVÙÕŨŬŦÙVWŸÕĚ
1 t ' 0 t 1 11 0 and Helmho tz was Kan s ep1s emo ogYr they regarded 1t as an 
attempt to verify the a priori character of human understanding 
by a piece of carefully designed physiological research. 
Their interpretation seems to me to be correct, even though 
we must bear in mind that Wundt rejected Muller's principle, 
o 0 t d 1 f 1 f t' 1 0 dOff 12 propos1ng lns ea a aw 0 neura unc lona ln 1 erence, 
and their views were suspiciously typical of the 1870s and 
1880s, a period of enthusiastic neo-Kantianism13qUite different 
from Muller's time. 
Let us briefly examine the two components of Muller's 
principle, namely specificity and his word energie. It has 
been suggested that he obtained the actual word Energie from 
either ŮẀŲÛXŪŸHĚ (who admired and might have obtained the word 
from Goethe; Muller had read ŮẀŲÛXŪŸGVĚwritings on the 
h f 0 • 14) f M 0 subjective P enomena 0 V1Slon ,or rom agendle, who used 
the word in describing the sensibility of the nasal ȘŠẂÙWXŸĪĚ
Moreover, as we have seen, the concept of excitation and the 
word 'energy' were part of the Brunonian contribution to 
th German physiology in the early 19 century. Muller was 
thus using a current term when he spoke of Energie, a term 
that had not yet been given a precise meaning and could still 
be synonymous with more traditional terms such as Haller's 
'irritability' and 'sensitivity'. 
However, whereas irritability and sensitivity were 
general properties, Muller definitely meant his Energieen 
to be specific. One scholar has suggested that we must 
turn to Goethe's ŸUŤŬŲXĚof colour for the source of this 
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. f' . t 16 specl lCl y. Goethe had asserted that light is essentially 
white and that the so-called seven primary colours that 
Newton had obtained with his prisms were ŠŲWŤȚŠȘWVŸİĚ Goethe's 
method had been partly experimental, but largely psychological; 
like ŮẀŲÛXŪŸHĚMuller and Roget, he believed that certain 
aspects of sense-perception were not amenable to mere physical 
experimentation, such as Newton had used. Muller thought 
highly of Goethe's work on colour: 
"I have no second thoughts about admitting 
how very much lowe to the inducements of 
Goethe's colour theory, and can fairly say 
that without many years of studying it, 
together with personal observation of the 
phenomena, the present researches would not 
. ,,18 have arlsen . 
Goethe's influence is also discernible in Muller's 
inaugural lecture in 1824, when he declared that 
"plain observation in anatomical investigation 
is far more splendid and superior to the 
reckless and often deceitful physiological 
experiment"t 9 
he also declared that a certain type of investigation, namely 
the sectioning of nerves, could lead to 'urphaenomena,20in 
physiology. In 1824 Fran90is Magendie had published his 
t · . 21 experiments on nerve-sec lonlng. Muller read them but could 
not believe his claim that pricking nerves after they had been 
sectioned -in vivo did not elicit their customary responses. 
ÏŸǾĦĚ
The reason for his scepticism was his own, and Goethe's, 
belief based on their own autoexperiments that the sensation 
of light could be produced by both internal and external 
causes. By this belief, which he described as "the 
h . f th . 1 ub t ,,22... . f metamorp OSlS 0 e Vlsua s s ance, ln lmltatlon 0 
Goethe's Versuch die Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu ŤŲÛŨŠŲŤŪŸĨĚ
he meant that sensations are specific qualities of nerves 
themselves. 
I have discussed these two 1826 treatises in some detail, 
not only because they contained Muller's seminal discovery 
of specific sensitivities of nerves, which (as I shall argue 
later) led on to his developing a strongly dynamical general 
physiology and a special interest in the dynamical relation-
ship between the external world and the whole living organism, 
but also because they illustrate two key characteristics of 
his life's work: the use of carefully planned experimentation, 
as found especially in the Vergleichende Physiologie, and his 
deep philosophical roots, as evidenced by the Phantastischen 
Gesichtsersaheinungen. The roots never atrophied although 
they did change direction, for by 1827 he apparently abandoned 
NaturphiZoDophie though retaining his deep interest in 
philosophy itself. Evidence of the latter was his frequent 
citation of Spinoza and Kant in his Handbuch der Physiologie 
des Mensahen (Treatise on human physiology), (vol.l, 1835, 
vo 1. 2, 18 37) • Actually, his philosophical mentors went even 
earlier: most historians who bother to mention the 
Phantasiisahen GeBiehtse1"scheinungen cite it as I have. But 
there was a second part to its title: Eine physiologisahe 
untersuchung, mit einer physiologische Urkunde des Aristotles 
tiber den Traum. Muller considered Aristotle's treatise on 
dreams to be a truly physiological one and essentially 
24 
correct. We shall see Aristotle re-emerging in the 
Handbuch with amazing vitality. 
Ln.. 
In 1833 Muller succeeded Rudolphi :t:O the Berlin chair 
of anatomy. The post had been offered to Tiedemann, and 
when he declined Huller proposed himself; among the skills 
he declared to be necessary, and which he possessed, were a 
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comparative approach to anatomy, experience in physiological 
research, microscopical techniques and embryology, and the 
ability to teach. Indeed, his evaluation of himself was 
accurate, for during the 1840s and 1850s he was virtually 
the high priest of the biological sciences in Germany, not 
so much for his mvn discoveries, though they were impressive, 
as for the training he provided for a whole generation of 
men, who went on to do their own physiological research and 
to occupy the professorships in physiology at many of the 
, d S ' 't' 25 German, Austrlan an W1SS unlver les. In this respect, 
th Muller occupied a pivotal position in 19 century physiology, 
just as Liebig occupied a pivotal position in chemistry. 
Like Liebig and almost contemporaneously, Muller also developed 
an outlet for the publication of research results: he 
became the editor of the Apchiv fuY' Ana-tomie, PhysioZogie 
und w1:ssenschaf-tl<iche Medizin, which had been established 
in 1796 as the first journal devoted solely to physiology 
it was then called Apchiv fap die Physiologie and was ailing 
badly when MUller took it over and restyled it. That and 
his Handbuch der PhysioLogie were filled with contributions 
made by him, his colleagues and students. The late 19 th 
century physiologist, Max Verworn (1863-1923) looked back 
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on him as "one of those monumental figures that the history 
of every science brings forth but ŬŪȘŤĒŸĬĚ Indeed, 
historians of physiology have always acknowledged his 
stature, but sometimes for different reasons; for instance, 
Hans Driesch in his Der Vitalismus alB Geschichte und als 
Lehre (190S)27 and Science and philosophy of the organism (1929);8 
and L. Richmond Wheeler in his book Vitalism ĜÍĲĨĲĞŸĲŮŲŠÙVŤTĚ
him largely for his scientific contribution to the doctrine 
of vital force. Wheeler saw the principle of specific nerve 
energies as evidence for vitalism, for it implied that things 
in themselves, the noumena, could never be truly experienced 
and all knowledge therefore has a subjective and vitalistic 
basis. Most recent historians would disagree with Wheeler's 
use of MUller, and it seems to me that the principal import 
of Muller's work on sense-perception, as he saw it, was: 
1) That the nature of causality, particularly between 
phenomena outside of ourselves and our perceptions of them, 
was much more cOlnplex than had been commonly thought thitherto; 
that, as Kant had said, a specified cause need not have a 
specific effect, but that different effects could arise 
according to the conditions within which the cause acts. 
2) That the problem of human knowledge is immensely complex 
and perhaps inscrutable, and therefore that mere experimentation 
and data-collecting will never suffice in science; the 
scientist must employ the tools of philosophy, psychology, 
intuition and scientific disciplines other that his own. 
As we have seen, both these themes had been aspects of 
Kant's analysis of the acquisition of knowledge. 
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Parts of Driesch's and Wheeler's appreciations, however, 
did not depend on their own wish to vindicate vitalism and 
are in agreement with more recent historians; for instance, 
OWsei ØŤÜÛÙŪŸÕŇŬWWȚŲÙŤTĚOŬŨŨŤŲŸŨŴŠŨWUŤŲĚRiese 32and Everett 
33 Mendelsohn. Thus, Wheeler realized that Muller was not a 
traditional vitalist, for he rejected abiogenesis and the 
doctrine of a specific living matter and tried, as much as 
was reasonably possible, to explicate organic activities in 
physico-chemical terms. 
Because of his eagerness to use whatever techniques were 
at hand, and for other reasons mentioned above, it is easy 
to see why MUller's Handbuch became a best-seller, set the 
pattern for a new genre of physiological treatises, was 
translated extensively and was still hailed as a masterpiece 
by researchers into sense-perception in the 20th century, 
for instance by Ernst ÓŠȘUŸÏĚ However, the writing was 
already on the wall before volume two came out: as Mendelsohn 
mentions;5 during the early 1830s while he was writing volume 
one, Muller was still a staunch vitalist; by the time that 
volume two appeared, he was no longer so sure of his vitalism, 
but he could never shake it off. One example of the less 
physico-chemical approach in volume one was his discussion of 
specific nerve energies; the principle was now formulated in 
more neuro-anatornical terminology than it had been in the 
Phantastischen GOAichtaerscheinungen, but he was still 
thinking in terms of vague energies and excitabilities rather 
than of material changes in the body's tissues as he was to 
later. These Energieen were not defined rigorously, since 
he did not regard them as merely physical agents. Perhaps 
that was why his pupil, Helmholtz, rarely used the word 
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Energie when discussing qualities of visual sensation, but 
preferred to call them signs, (Zeichen). Eventually, 
Energie came to mean something purely physical for Helmholtz, 
as when he used it in his 1847 paper 'Ueber die ErhaZtung 
d er Kl'aft'. Yet, although departing from his teacher's 
broad and imprecise idea of the word, Muller's Energie was 
clearly his starting point and was important in the develop-
ment of his ideas which led ultimately to the conservation of 
force/energy. Moreover, it seems to me that in volume two 
of the Handbuah, Muller's use (even if not his actual concept) 
of Energie became more refined and therefore perhaps more 
acceptable to Helmholtz and his fellow students. 
One historian of physiology has written that, although 
Muller was clearly a vitalist, he led his students into fields 
where they developed a radically new idea of what constitutes 
a proper physiological ŤẄŮŨŠŸŠWÙŬŪŸĬĚ Students like Theodor 
Schwann, Emil du Bois-Reymond and Hermann Helmholtz emerged 
from their initial research studies believing that vital 
functions could be explained solely by physico-chemical 
forces and laws. In the next few pages we shall examine 
a few instances of this. 
In Volume 1, Book 3, of the Handbuah Muller discussed 
the physiology of the nerves. There he set a challenge for 
physiologists, a challenge so explicit that its impact on his 
students and readers can scarcely be doubted; indeed, we know 
how soon it was to be taken up by his pupils. The issue was 
animal excitability: 
"Physiologists have not, however, merely to 
ascertain the laws governing this general 
property, which unfortunately was the sale 
object whcih occupied the attention of 
ÒŊŬUŸIĚBrown and his followers; but to 
investigate the peculiar forces themselves 
which are susceptible of this excitation, 
and in this there is a great field opened 
for experimental science. In inquiring 
into the nature of the forces resident in 
the nerves, it is necessary to study the 
action of all kinds of stimuli upon them -
a method of enquiry which acquires for 
physiology an experimental certainty similar 
to that which the sciences of physics and 
chemistry in reference to inorganic bodies 
enjoy. In chemical processes, reagents 
give rise only to products, combinations and 
decompositions; applied to organic bodies and 
especially to the nerves, their effects, 
however various they may be, are never other 
than manifestations of the proper forces of 
the bodies acted on, or modifications of their 
forces. It will be seen that all influences 
acting on the nerves either excite them or 
produce an altered state of their excitability; 
•.• the most different causes produce the same 
effect, because that on which they act possess 
but one kind of excitable force, and because 
agents in themselves the most different act here 
by virtue of the same quality, that of VWÙÜẀŨÙHHŸİĚ
Already this issue had been studied with respect to the 
physiological effects of ŦŠŨẂŠŪỲŸÜHĚ and Muller praised 
especially the writings of Galvani, Alexander von Humboldt, 
Volta, Johann Ritter (1776-1810), Jan ÖẀŲÛXŪŸĚ the young 
Czech physiologist, and Richard Fowlerj8powler's researches 
would have been available' to him in German 39as well as English. 
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Muller's own explanation of these galvanic studies 
was wholly physical and his Enepgie seemed not to have 
any metaphysical implication worth mentioning; the central 
idea was that the activities of nerves always entail an 
expenditure of power which has to be replenished continually 
from external sources, especially by nutrition; nutrition 
was therefore a dynamical process as well as a material one: 
"All stimuli, which by producing changes in 
the matter of nerves excite reaction of them, 
are also capable of modifying their state of 
excitability. Reaction is always attended 
with an expenditure of power; it is the result 
of the material change; and the longer the 
excitement is continued,' the greater is the 
change produced ..•• The daily changes in the 
system, consequent on the action of stimuli, 
are counterbalanced by the processes of ŪẀWŲÙWÙŬŪĒŸÕĚ
In Volume 2, which appeared two years after Volume 1, 
he extended this dynamical explanation to all vital activities, 
again emphasizing that two types of change occur: i) a change 
in the chemical composition of the active tissue itself; and 
ii) A diminution in its power. As is well known, these 
became key ideas in Liebig's theory of vital activity, 
although Liebig did not acknowledge any debt to Muller; 
they also influenced his pupil, Helmholtz, for one of his 
earliest,important ŤẄŮŤŲÙÜŤŪWŸĚwas designed to test the 
hypothesis that vital activities always entail chemical 
changes in the tissues concerned; that was his 1845 study on 
the excitation of excised frog leg ÜẀVȘŨŤVŸŨĚ Muller's min 
succinct account of his hypothesis was that 
"This constant reanimation of the tissues 
by the general vital stimuli ordinarily 
renders them capable of a proportionate 
exercise of their ȚẀŪȘWÙŬŪVŸĚ but if their 
action is increased and accelerated, 
subsequent rest is necessary to restore as 
much power for new action as has been thus 
consumed. Generally, in the healthy state, 
just as much power is generated in a certain 
space of time as has been exhausted by the 
exercise of the ȚẀŪȘWÙŬŪVŸĚ but there are 
cases in which the nutrition of the organ 
becomes gradually increased, while the state 
of action is either equal or regular, or 
alternating with rest. This is the case in 
h .. 42 yout ..•• 
_- -::;:sZ 
For Muller, the only truly vital stimuli were external 
heat, air, water and food; these alone \'lere the causes of 
4'L.7. 
the manifestation of life and of the increase of vital ȚŬŲȘŤŸĨĚ
From such passages one gets the impression that one of 
Muller's intentions was to argue against the living organism 
as a peT'petuum mobile or as a creator of its own power; 
actually, this became explicit in his discussion of the nature 
of the organic force, where he also seemed sometimes to propose 
the existence of a fundamental type of vital force, a vis 
essentiaZis, to which all modes of vital activity might be 
44 
referred. Such a force vTaS only a probability for Muller, 
yet one aspect of vital forces of which he was sure was that 
they are never sui geneT'is but always require replenishment 
from external sources of power. Between inorganic and 
organic forces there was seen to be a fundamental inter-
changeability or correlation; to suppose the contrary to be 
true,namely that organic power could be created, struck him 
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as absurd. This idea is so important that it merits 
extensive quotation: 
" ..• the source of the increase of the 
organic or vital force seems, therefore, 
also to lie in the organization of new 
matter; and this being admitted, it must 
be allowed that plants, while they form 
new organic matter ••• are also endowed 
\vi th the power of increasing the organic 
force from unknown external sources, while 
animals also in their turn would generate 
the organic force from their nutriment under 
the influence of the vital stimuli, and 
distribute it to the germs during propagation. 
whether during life the organic force, as well 
as the organic matter, is constantly suffering 
destruction is quite unknown. This much, 
however, seems certain, that at the death of 
organic bodies, the vital force is resolved 
into its general natural causes, from which it 
appears to be generated anew in plants. If 
this increase of the vital principle in existing 
organized bodies from unknown sources in the 
external world be not admitted, it must be 
supposed that the apparently endless multiplication 
of the vital force in the process of growth and 
in propagation is merely an evolution of germs 
encased one within the other, or it must be 
admitted that the division of the organic force 
which takes place in propagation does not weaken 
its intensity - a supposition which appears 
absurd. But the fact would still remain, that 
by the death of organized bodies, organic force 
is constantly becoming inert, or resolved into 
its general physical ȘŠẀVŤVĒŸĪĚ
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As exemplified in this passage, the way whereby Muller 
formulated his particular version of the Conservation of 
Energy was by considering the ancient problem of generation; 
the essential problem, as he saw it, was that in propagating 
their own kind, living organisms must share out their power; 
yet the intensity of their power never seems to diminish 
from one generation to the next; how can something divide 
itself in such a way that each fraction is as large (or intense) 
as the original whole, without positing a perpetual creation? 
Clearly, the only acceptable alternative to perpetual creation 
was continuous nutrition. That seems to me to be the 
significance of nutrition in his physiology. 
Muller found this account satisfying not only from a 
purely physiological, 'scientific' point of view, but also 
philosophically. As we have seen, in 1826 one of his 
philosophical mentors was Benedict Spinoza, for so long as 
one distinguished Spinoza's philosophy from his theology, 
Muller believed him to be a most valuable mentor. Towards 
the end of Volume 2 of the Handbuch, Muller wrote a section 
on 'Cosmological systems', where he discussed the two 
principal hypotheses on the connection of life and mind with 
matter, at the point where that issue passed "beyond the 
domain of empirical ŮUQŐÙÕŨÌĲXHHŸĬĚ One hypothesis was 
Plato's theory of innate and transcendent ideas; this was 
the commonly accepted hypothesis on the relation of the mental 
and vital principles to the body, for upon this was based 
the Christian belief that the vital essence or spirit leaves 
the body at its death and returns to its divine source. 
For MUller, the main difficulty in this doctrine was that 
life and mind, not being latent properties of matter, could 
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not be replenished from any physical source during the 
propagation of organic creatures, 
" which, contrary to every attribute 
of matter, renders them capable of division, 
ad infinitum, without any diminution of their 
power or intensity. Such a property it is 
certainly difficult for the mind to ȘŬŪȘŤÙẂŤHHŸİĚ
The second hypothesis, the pantheistic view of a universal 
spirit, was easier to imagine and rendered the growth of 
organic force during the propagation of life perfectly 
intelligible. Although this was Spinoza's doctrine, Muller 
chose not to quote him but quoted Giordano Bruno as his sole 
authority, (presumably because Bruno was the earlier and 
because Spinoza was still theologically unacceptable and 
smacked of total atheism in certain circles). From Bruno's 
theory, Muller concluded that organisms, wherein vital and 
. spiritual phenomena manifest themselves through definite 
structures and chemical compositions, have emanated from the 
creative spirit of God. As soon as inanimate matter comes 
within the influence of this creative spirit acting in the 
guise of vitality, its capacity for life, hitherto latent, 
becomes manifest. Consequently, the assimilation of new 
matter by an organism gives rise to an increase of its 
organic force, and with this is combined its capability of 
multiplication by division of itself. To all this Muller 
added that 
"Phenomena analogous to such a conditional 
manifestation of a principle of vital content in 
all matter, are known in physical science. 
Forces or principles such as electricity 
and light, for example, which are present 
in a latent state in bodies, are manifested 
when these bodies are subjected to certain 
ȘŬŪTÙWÙŬŪVHHŸĮĚ
This view agreed neatly with a theory on vitality that 
the anatomist Reil had proposed, and that Muller discussed 
49 
elsewhere. Reil had suggested that the characteristics 
and powers of organic systems are the results of the mode 
of coriliination of the chemical elements, that form and 
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composition are the primary factors in differentiating life 
from non-life, but that until such factors have been truly 
elucidated, physiologists may use the term Lebenskraft as a 
provisional heuristic device. Some men, Rudolphi for 
instance, regarded Reil's idea as a masterpiece, but not 
Muller. As Mi.iller pointed out, the chemical composition of 
an organism must be the same immediately after death as 
immediately before; -therefore, the life-principle would have 
to be something over and above mere form and composition; 
Reil would want it to be something material, but Muller 
leaned towards something dynamical. With characteristic 
frankness Muller admitted that 
n\vhether this principle is to be regarded 
as imponderable matter, or as a force or 
energy is just as uncertain as the same 
question is in reference to several important 
phenomena in physics; physiology in this case 
is not behind the other natural sciences, for 
the properties of this principle in the 
functions of the nerves are nearly as well 
known as those of light, caloric and electricity 
in ŮUXVÙȘVĒŸÕĚ
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Clearly, he believed that much the same type of research 
was needed in physiology as in physics to elucidate the 
nature of the imponderable agents, and that these disciplines 
would be of mutual benefit to each other; perhaps, even, 
the enigma of the unknown principle that had had to be used 
to supplement Reilts view would be solved. As we know, 
this line of thought was soon developed by some of his pupils; 
by 1841, Du Bois .. Reymond was quoting \'lith approval the idea 
of the Marquis Dutrochet (1776-1847), that 
liThe more one advances in the knowledge of 
physiology, the more reasons one will have 
for stopping to believe that the phenomena 
of life are essentially different from the 
physical ŮUŤŪŬÜŤŪŠHHŸŨĚ
Inevitably in this thesis, Muller is being discussed 
partly because Helmholtz was his pupil, and we want to know 
what Helmholtz's intellectual debts to him might have been. 
It seems to me that Helmholtz took over not only his ideas 
in, and approach to, physiology, but also his more purely 
philosophical interests, and that their intellectual 
relationship therefore existed in several fields. This is 
not generally discussed by historians of 19 th century German 
physiology, although inevitably Leo Koenigsberger's standard 
biOgraphy52of Helmholtz did explore this theme. In what 
follows I shall be drawing on Koenigsberger, although some 
of my contentions shall be my own. 
We have already seen how well Muller thought of Bruno 
and Spinoza. In the section 'On the distinction between 
mind and life' in the Handbuah, Muller revealed the strongly 
favourable impression that Locke, Hume, Kant and Aristotle 
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made on him. It can scarcely be a coincidence that Helmholtz 
discussed Spinc'za in Volume 3 of his Handbuch der physiologischen. 
Optik, or that his philosophical inclinations were similar to 
Muller's, for instance, his general agreement with Locke. 
Both were greatly indebted to Kant for their Weltanschauung 
and believed his philosophy a valuable guide in scientific 
ŴŬŲÛŸĨĚ in a letter in 1857 Helmholtz wrote: 
"It seems to me a favourable moment for 
voices of the old school of Kant and the 
elder Fichte to obtain a hearing once more. 
The philosophical vaporing and consequent 
hysteria of the 'nature-systems' of Hegel 
and Schelling seem to have exploded, and 
people are beginning to interest themselves 
in philosophy again •••• Philosophy finds 
its great significance among the sciences as 
the theory of the source and functions of 
knowledge, in the sense in which Kant, and 
so far as I have understood hiM, the elder 
h t J 't,,54 Fic te, ŬŬŸĚ 1 • 
Such faith in the scientific import of pure philosophy 
Helmholtz reiterated in a letter approximately twenty years 
later: 
"I believe that any German University that 
had courage to appoint a scientific man with 
an inclination for philosophy to its Chair of 
Philosophy would confer a lasting benefit on 
, .. 55 German SClence . 
In my opinion, one of the most interesting and difficult 
to calculate examples of MUller's belief in the importance 
of studying the ideas of his predecessors was his use of 
Aristotle. We have seen that he appended his own translation 
of Aristotle's treatise on dreams to his work Ueber die 
phantaatiachen Gesichtserscheinungen in 1826; he called 
Aristotle's treatise Heine physioZogische Urkunde", and 
took it as his philosophical and physiological vade mecum. 
More than a decade later, in his Handbuch, he rea£firmed 
his immense ŠFŸÙŲŠWÙŬŪĚfor it: 
"Aristotle's treatise on dreams contains views 
in themselves more correct, and stated in a 
more scientific form /Ihan any more recent 
WŲŤŠWÙVŤŸİĦĚ His explanation of spectral 
appearances as a result of internal actions 
of the sense of vision, is quite on a level 
with the present state of science. He 
adduces, indeed, the observation made since 
by Spinoza, that images seen during sleep 
can still be perceived in the organs of vision 
after waking; and the varying colours of the 
ocular spectra produced by gazing at the sun 
were well known to UÙÜHHŸĬĚ
He went onto say that despite the recent tendency to 
fragment science into separate disciplines, there remained 
the important, general task 
" to ·test the theories of fundamental 
phenomena, more especially of those which 
interest different sciences, such as the 
actions of light,on organic beings. But 
this would be a task of extreme difficulty 
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It was no coincidence that his pupil, Helmholtz, would 
devote much of his physiological career to this very task, 
physiological optics. Muller warned that the study would 
be difficult and time-consuming, and it took Helmholtz more 
than a decade to write his three volume work on it. Neither 
was it a coincidence that in the preface to Volume 3, Helmholtz 
also discussed the fragmentation of science, to which he 
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attributed his predecessor's lack of success in studying 
visual perception; he asserted that only by studying the 
subject from all aspects had he achieved anything worthwhile. 
The only omission from his preface, compared with Muller's 
passage quoted above, was that he did not cite Aristotle. 
There is a most interesting affiliation (which, to my 
knowledge, no other historian has commented upon) between 
Muller's Handbuah and Aristotle. It occurs in the sections 
'Of the senses,58and 'Of the mind,59 in Volume 2 of the 
Handbuah. There, Aristotle's treatise on dreams De somniis 
and his De anima are cited glowingly. Moreover, not only 
are their ideas in general agreement, but the very lay-out 
of Muller's discussion parallels Aristotle's lay-out. 
Muller's 'Of the mind' begins with a survey of his predecessors 
in the field - Plato, Pythagoras, the new-platonists and the 
pantheists, Anaxagoras, Heraclitus and Bruno. Aristotle 
surveys his predecessors in greater detail?O Then they 
discuSS the hypothesis that IIlike attracts like", Aristotle 
I , f . t' T' 61 d M·oII .. mentioning P ato s use 0 1 ln ŸÜŠŤẀVĚ an u er c1t1ng 
62 Hegel. Already in the 'Prolegomena' to the Handbuah he 
had discussed this hypothesis, saying how handy it would be 
to make a single observation of an organic attraction between 
similar living germs?3 The next topic they both discuss is 
the homogeneity and distribution of the soul within the living 
body; their argwnents are again similar. In discussing the 
senses they follow the same order: Aristotle deals firstly 
with sense-perception generally, then sight, hearing, smell, 
taste and touch (all in Book 2 of De anima), and finally 
with mind and motion (Book 3). Muller parallels him, the 
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general discussion and the five sences occupying 'Book 5. 
Of the senses', and mind and motion occupying 'Book 6. 
Of the mind'. Both begin the discussion of touch by 
wondering whether it is confined to particular, very 
localized parts of the body or is distributed over its 
entire surface. Aristotle leaves this question unanswered, 
for 
" we are unable clearly to detect in 
the case of touch what the single subject 
is which underlies the contrasted qualities 
and corresponds to sound in the case of 
hearing. To the question \'lhether tJ.le organ 
of touch lies inward or not (that is, whether 
we need look any farther than the flesh), no 
indication in favour of the second answer can 
be dra\Yn from the fact that if the object 
comes into contact with the flesh, it is at 
once ŮŤŲȘŤÙẂŤTĒŸÏĚ
Mliller's discussion starts o£f by seemingly answering 
Aristotle's question; he says that the sense of touch is 
possessed by all parts of the body which can register the 
sensation of touch or of pain or pleasure, heat or cold. 
Indeed, to read the De anima and Muller's discussion side 
by side, one cannot avoid the impression that Muller 
deliberately modelled his discussion on Aristotle's and had 
set out principally to bring Aristotle's treatise up-to-date. 
In his dynamical view of the org-anism l·luller distinguished 
two type of stimulus, and in this he was partly original. 
The less important type consisted of agents that induced 
or prodded an organism into activity; by and large, tnese 
th th ., 
were what the 18 and early 19 century physlologlsts had 
in mind when using the terms "stimulus", "stimulant" or 
"excitant"; and although they were considered to be 
necessary for the manifestations of life, they were only 
supposed to keep the organism awake (so to speak) I and did 
not provide the organism with power to keep it going. 
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Muller's second type of stimulus was more important to him; 
these were the truly vital stimuli which provided an 
organism with power, as well as prodding it into action; 
they produced two types of effect - the purely chemical, 
material changes that are seen to occur throughout life, 
and the interchanges of force that occur between a living 
system and its environment. Such vital stimuli were 
therefore the pabulum vitae, in both a material and dynamical 
sense; by their means, Muller believed one might reasonably 
compare the organism with a piece of pure mechanism or a 
flame: 
"The external conditions which are necessary 
to life - caloriC, water, atmospheric air and 
nutriment - at the same time that they maintain 
life, induce constant changes in the composition 
of the organized body; themselves combining with 
the body, while certain old components are 
decomposed and cast off. These external agents 
have been called vital stimuli •••• These vital 
stimuli produce the phenomena of life by 
effecting material changes, by producing an 
interchange of ponderable and imponderable 
matters •.•. 
The stimuli are, as it were, the external 
force which sets in motion the wheels of the 
whole machine; and although the comb>arison of 
the animal body with a machine may not be very 
apt, yet the organic principle is incapable of 
activity without this external impulse and 
without the constant material changes 
effected by the aid of the external vital 
stimuli. Richerand has therefore, not 
unaptly, compared the manifestation of 
life with the phenomenon of combustion 
65 
and flame". 
This line of thought took him close to the idea that 
the vital powers and their manifestations are attributable 
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ultimately to the chemical changes, and the releases of 
chemical power, which occur continuously during ŨÙȚĦŤŸĚ he did 
not get quite so far as to propose this explicitly, as 
Liebig the chemist was to do a little later. The closest 
Muller got to the chemical source of vital powers was in his 
discussion of animal excretions: 
"As these excretions are constant, even when 
the supply of nutriment is stopped, it necessarily 
follows that a constant decomposition of the 
substance of the body is essentially connected 
with life. It cannot, indeed, be otherwise if 
it be true, as it has already been proved to be, 
that the vital force is manifested in an animal 
body only while certain vital stimuli produce 
in the living tissues constant material changes, 
of which the phenomena of life are merely the 
external signs, just as flame is the appearance 
resulting from the material changes, of which 
the phenomena of life are merely the external 
signs, just as flame is the appearance resulting 
from the material changes effected in cornbustion,,?6 
Further resemblence between such ideas and those that Liebig 
was to enunciate, was Muller's assertion of the importance 
of respiration in his scheme, namely that the impulse for these 
h .. b . t· 67 material c anges ŸVĚ ŦŸẂŤŪĚ y ŲŤVŮŸŲŠĚŸŬŪĦĚ Nine years later, 
in Animal chemistry, Liebig was to make his pivotal declaration 
ÏĨŸĦĚ
that "respiration is the bent spring which keeps the clock 
/I.e. the living anima.!.! in ÜŬWÙŬŪHHŸĮĚ Liebig was not to 
acknowledge any debt to Muller, and it has yet to be shown 
th by historians of 19 century physiological chemistry whether 
there was any such debt. However, we may assert that, as 
illustrated above, MUller and Liebig held remarkably similar 
views on the dynamics of the living organisM, declaring 
themselves explicitly against the possibility of its being 
a creator of its own power, and seeking its dynamical 
nutriment in the inorganic powers of the world around it. 
It is, moreover, inconceivable that Liebig did not read 
MUller'S Handbuch; no physiologist or organic chemist in 
Germany during that period could have ignored MUller's work. 
Two likely explanations for Liebig's silence are that he was 
genuinely developing his own theory of dynamical physiology 
largely independently of Muller, and did not see why he should 
run the risk of allowing someone else the limelight, (for 
Liebig loved the limelight dearly); secondly, Liebig claimed 
to eschew the metaphysics of his German predecessors and 
proclaimed himself to be nothing but an experimental chemist; 
MUller was probably too much of a philosopher for Liebig to 
feel comfortable in acknowledging any real kinship between 
them. On the other hand, Muller readily acknowledged that 
kinship; he held back the fourth edition of his Handbuch 
long enough to incorporate certain ideas from Animal chemistry 
which appeared in the spring of 1842, commenting that Liebig 
had provided profound insights into the relation between 
respiration and nutrition. In fact, r.1Uller' s discussion of 
this relation was rather longer than in his previous editions, 
for he emphasized Liebig's view of the proportionalities 
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between food, heat, motion and the carbon that is burnt 
in respiration, and Liebig's ideas on the roles of nitro-
genous and non-nitrogeniolls nutrients. Muller did not accept 
Liebig's work without reservations but, as Frederick Holmes 
has argued very ŮŨŠẀVÙŞŨXŸĲUŤĚdid realize that it would 
henceforth set the pattern for physiology and that it could 
not be simply incorporated into the more traditional pattern 
that he himself had fashioned; henceforth, physiology would 
have to be based upon skilZful research in chemistry and 
physics; and Muller, being neither a chemist nor a physicist, 
withdrew from physiological investigation, refused to publish 
further editions of his Handbuoh and spent the rest of his 
life working on anatomy. As Karl Rothschuh wrote in his 
Gesohiohte der PhysioZogie (1953);OMuller was more a 
morphologist than an experimentalist and viewed with distaste 
the direction in which physiological research was going -
especially the use of vivisection that French physiologists 
were championing. Indeed, it seems that the theme of his 
inaugural lecture at Bonn, 'Von den Bedurfnis der PhysioZogie 
naoh einer philo30phisohen Naturbetraohtung' (On the need 
for a philosophical coatemplation of Nature in PhysioI09y)?1 
given in 1824, remained the Zeitmotif throughout his career 
and explains why he was becoming more and more estranged from 
experimental physiology from the late 1830s onwards. None-
theless, his influence persisted into the 1840s, for the Handbuoh 
had deliberately raised many key questions and had left them 
unanswered. One of those questions concerned the source of 
organic forces, to which a handful of Muller's most brilliant 
pupils and the chemist, Liebig, addressed themselves. 
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CHAPTER 14. On power in the physiological chemistry 
of Justus Liebig (1803-73) 
Since there are several excellent accounts readily 
available in English and German of Liebig's life and work 
I shall give hardly any biographical details here, except 
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to mention a few essential features of his university 
education and career. He received his medical education 
first at Bonn, then at Erlangen. At Bonn, one of his fellow 
students was Johnanes Muller, a fact of some interest because 
of the similarity which was to arise in some of their key 
ideas. Exactly what their relationship was, if any, during 
their student or later years has not yet been elucidated; 
it is quite probable that they never met during their student 
period, although they would have been exposed to the same 
teachers, amongst whom were several ardent NaturphiZosophen. 
(See the introduction to the previous chapter.) Yet even if 
they did not become acquainted as students, it is inconceivable 
that Liebig was not to read Muller's Handbuch der PhysioZogie 
during the l830s, and it is most probable that he well 
appreciated the general direction and import of Muller's 
physiological dynamics by the time he wrote his own treatise 
on physiological chemistry. 
In 1822 Liebig went to Paris to study under the brilliant 
French chemists who were developing new techniques in 
quantitative analysis. There he caught the eye of Alexander 
von Humboldt who secured him a place in the laboratory of Louis 
Joseph Gay-Lussac (1778-1850) where he spent about a year. 
In 1824, again at von Humboldt's recommendation, he returned 
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to his home country, the grand-duchy of Hesse-Darmstadt, 
to take up an appointment as professor-extraordinary of 
chemistry in the small university of Giessen. Over the 
next fifteen years he built up a thriving research and 
teaching chemistry department, extended the analytical 
techniques he had learnt in Paris and achieved his ambition 
of putting Germany on the map as a leading country in the 
newly-rigorous science of chemistry. To Giessen, students 
flocked from allover Europe and North America, and by the 
time Liebig left to take up a chair in Munich in 1852, he had 
become the world's most renowned, or at least most vocal and 
controversial, organic chemist. 
Liebig's contribution to the emergence of the Conservation 
of Energy has been analysed by several scholars. In his 1957 
paper entitled 'Energy conservation as an example of 
simultaneous discovery'; ØUŬŸŠVĚKulm recognized Liebig as one 
of a dozen or so discoverers of the principle. Kuhn's paper 
was a superbly written and truly scholarly piece of historical 
research, and it may be justly regarded as a classic in this 
field. However, there is one important point in nis paper 
on which I take issue, namely the way whereby Liebig was 
supposed to have arrived at his own realization of energy 
conservation. According to Kuhn, he had been conside+ing 
the duty of electric motors, as a result of which he proposed 
that the chemical equivalents of the elements involved determine 
the \'lOrk that is retrievable from chemical processes by either 
electrical or thermal means. In Kuhn's \'1ords: 
"Joule and Liebig reached energy conservation 
by asking an old engineering question, 'What 
is the duty?' about the new conversion processes 
in the battery-driven electric ÜŬWŬŲĒŸĚ
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It seems to me that Kuhn, as later Liebig scholars have done, 
focussed largely on Liebig's Die Thierchemie ĜÍĮÏÎĞŸĚwhich 
did discuss the duty of the electric motor, and his Chemische 
Briefe 4 first published in 1844 and translated that year into 
English as Familiar letters on chemistry. \vhat Kuhn ap1Jarently 
did not do \'TaS examine Liebig's earlier treatise, Die Chemie 
in ihrer Anwendung aUf AgrikuZtur und Physiologie ĜÍĮÏÌĞŸĚ
(henceforth to be called AgricuZturaZ chemistry.) Other 
scholars have followed Kuhn's disregard of that work; for 
instance, Frederick Holmes in his fine introduction to the 1964 
reprint of the first English edition of Animal chemistry 
discussed how it gave Helmholtz his cue for investigating forces 
in a physiological ȘŬŪWŤẄWŸĚbut he did not mention that the 
AgricuZtural chemistry contained many of the ideas, including 
those on forces, which were to appear in the more famous 
Animal chemistry. 
To appreciate the connection between those two treatises, 
let us recall that in 1837 the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science asked Liebig, as one of the leading 
organic chemists in Europe, to compile a report on the state 
of organic chemistry. (It was a frequent practice of the 
British Association in its early years to commission comprehensive 
reports from ŤẄŸŤŲWVĚon their own sciences? to wit, William 
Clark's 'Report on animal physiology' mentioned earlier.) 
Animal chemis tJ.>y \v3S the second part of that report; the 
Agricultural chemistry was the first part, and it therefore 
set the tone, and contained many of the ideas, of the 
second. 
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It seems to me that these two parts of Liebig's report 
on organic chemistry together constituted, among other things, 
the detailed enunciation of a new principle, which Liebig 
himself believed to be important and of universal applicability: 
that principle was the conservation of energy or force, (Liebig 
did not always distinguish between these two concepts often 
used Kraft for both of them). Moreover, since Liebig was 
enunciating that principle within the context of organic 
chemistry and physiology, Kuhn's assertion of the electric-
motor origin of his principle must be queried. 
In the following pages, Liebig's interest in power or 
force will be traced in his 1840 and 1842 treatises and in 
his Familiar letters on chemistry. 
Throughout the first part of his Agricultural ahemistry 
he showed a concern for the transformations of inorganic into 
organic matter; these required forces, not only chemical 
affinities, but also heat, motion, light and electric force. 
Moreover, these forces could themselves undergo transformation, 
chemical forces producing electrical ones and heat, sunlight 
producing chemical forces in green parts of plants, etc. 
Liebig was a vitalist, but his faith in the applicability 
of chemistry to organic processes resulted in his vital force 
being a carefully defined and somewhat restricted one. 
Essentially, vital force was for him, as it was for Blumenbach, 
a device to explain the wonderful process of generation: 
"Vitality is the power which each organ 
possesses of constantly reproducing itself; 
for this, it requires a supply of substances 
which contain the constituent elements of 
its own substance, and are capable of under-
going WŲŠŪVȚŬŲÜŠWÙŬŪĒŸĚ
Such transformations were, in themselves, purely chemical 
451. 
processes. Between these two polarities of organic activities, 
that is, bet\V'een the power of vi tali ty and the powers of 
chemistry, Liebig envisaged a world where these powers mingled, 
cooperated, opposed each other and usually ended up in a sort 
of unstable equilibrium; power was his paradigm, and the two 
extreme types were the vital and the chemical, between which 
there was often an unholy alliance. Liebig's vital principle 
was a subtle agent which is difficult for the historian to 
define. Indeed some of his writings seem to deny a vital 
force, and even his contemporaries were not always sure of 
his opinion. Perhaps the most felicitous account that he 
himself gave is the following from AgriculturaZ chemistry, 
where he suggests that Lebenskraft, though real, is not a useful 
tool for research, and that the physiological chemist must work 
as if the organism obeys purely physico-chemical laws: 
ĒŸẂŤĚ should not permit ourselves to be 
withheld, by the idea of a vital principle, 
from considering in a chemical point of view 
the process of the transformation of the food, 
and its assimilation by the various organs. 
This is the more necessary, as the views 
hitherto held have produced no results, and 
are quite ÙŪȘŠŸŠŞŨŤĚof useful application"? 
A particularly topical issue at that time which involved 
the debate between vitalism and mechanicism was the question 
of digestion. Despite the study of it by Gmelin and 
Tiedemann, some physiologists still considered it to be 
an essentially vital process. Then in the 1830s Theodore 
Schwann and Johann Nepomuk Eberle (? - 1834) furnished 
further evidence for the purely chemical point of view, and 
with their results behind him Liebig denied, in the 
AgricuZturaZ chemistry, that the digestive powers were vital. 
However, realizing the complexity of the issue, he felt 
compelled to 'i.varn that the vital force had many points of 
contact with chemical forces, that the latter could even seem 
to replace it for certain functions, and that it was therefore 
incumbent on physiologists to investigate those points of 
contact and not to champion vitalism to tile total neglect of 
. 10 h . 
chemical forces, or ẂŸȘŤĚversa. T at 1nvestigation, in my 
opinion, is precisely what he attempted in Animal chemistry 
two years later. 
One of the most convincing arguments for the existence 
of vital force for Liebig seems to have been simply the 
apparent magnitude of its power, compared with the power of 
inorganic forces. One could see this in the amazing 
productivities of certain plants, 
II to which the most powerful chemical 
action cannot be compared. The best idea 
of it may be formed, by considering that 
it surpasses in power the strongest galvanic 
battery, with which we are not able to 
separate the oxygen from carbonic ŠȘÙTHHŸŨĚ
This interest in the immense power of vital force 
reappeared in Animal chemistry and the Familiar letters on 
chemistry, where it was sometimes linked with a discussion 
of the duties of various engines. Such passages are the ones 
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that Kuhn had in mind. 
Despite the sheer power and apparent versatility of vital 
force, Liebig attempted to explain a host of hitherto 
enigmatic and apparently wholly vital phenomena in terms of 
physico-chemical powers and the motions they could induce; 
fermentation, putrefaction and decay could be extracted from 
his physico-chemical crucible, wherein vital force as an 
efficient cause had barely any role. His key idea in these 
accounts was that an agent, such as a ferment, possessed 
internal movement or vibrations, and that when placed among 
molecules of a substrate, such as sugar, it could communicate 
its vibration to them, thus causing them to be shaken apart 
into simpler molecules, such as alcohol and carbonic acid. 
This hypothesis sounds crude to us today, and there were indeed 
many objections raised against it in Liebig's own time; yet he 
was able to call upon a fair amount of experimental evidence 
for support, particularly work done by French investigators. 
One of the most interesting passages where he explained the 
idea occurs in the section on poisons: one type of poison was 
supposed to exert a purely chemical effect on the body, by 
canbining with components of the body itself; there was another 
type, however, that acted 
. . . not on account of their entering into " 
combination with it, or by reason of their 
containing a poisonous material, but solely 
by virtue of their peculiar condition. 
In order to attain to a clear conception 
of the mode of action of these bodies, it is 
necessary to call to mind the cause on which 
we have shown the phenomena of fermentation, 
decay and putrefaction to depend. 
This cause may be expressed by the 
following law, long since proposed by 
Laplace and Berthollet, although its 
truth with regard to chemical phenomena 
has only lately been proved. 'A molecule 
set in motion by any power can impart its 
own motion to another molecule with which 
it may be in contact'. 
This is a law of dynamics, the operation 
of which is manifest in all cases, in which 
the resistance (force, affinity or cohesion) 
opposed to the motion is not sufficient to 
overcome it. 
We have seen that ferment or yeast is a 
body in the state of decomposition, the atoms 
of which consequently are in a state of motion 
or transposition. Yeast placed in contact with 
sugar communicates to the elements of that 
compound the same state, in consequence of which 
the constituents of the sugar arrange themselves 
into new and simpler forms, namely into alcohol 
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and carbonic acid. In these new compounds, the 
elements are united together by stronger affinities 
than they were in the sugar ...... 12 
To this he added that the idea of yeast reproducing 
itself as seeds reproduce seeds, that is in the manner of 
living organisms, was absurd. This hypothesis had been 
championed recently by three able investigators - Charles 
Cagniard-Latour (1777-1859), Theodore Schwann, and Friedrich 
Kutzing (1807-1893). In 1839, Berzelius, then the most 
influential chemist in Europe and still on friendly terms with 
Liebig, had reviewed Kutzing's work; he admitted that it might 
have some value as a microscopical study, but the idea that 
fermentation could be due to living organisms seemed to him to 
be much too metaphysical and inimical to the progress of 
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VȘŸŤŪȘŤĦĚ In Liebig's AnnaZen of that year, Liebig and 
Wohler followed Berzelius in rejecting this hypothesis; 
their article was in bad taste and vituperative, for Liebig 
regarded the hypothesis as naive and arrant vitalism. This 
was in keeping with his view, mentioned above, that the 
transformations that occur in organic systems are purely 
chemical, and that to invoke primarily a vital force, let 
alone a whole organism as Schwann, Cagniard-Latour and 
KUtzing had done, was wholly erroneous. Indeed, Liebig was 
able to explain simple processes of reproduction, of which 
the growth of a mass of yeast seemed to him to be one example, 
in purely chemical terms: 
If a body A,e.g., oxamide,be brought into 
contact vlith another compound B, which is 
to be reproduced; and if this second body 
be oxalic acid dissolved in water, then ••• 
the oxamide is dissolved by the oxalic acid, 
provided the conditions necessary for their 
exercising an action upon one another are 
present. The elements of water unite with 
the constituents of oxamide, and ammonia is 
one product formed, and oxalic acid the other 
If we now add to the same mixture a fresh 
portion of oxamide, the same decomposition is 
repeated; •.. in this manner, a very minute 
quantity of oxalic acid may be made to effect 
the decomposition of several hundred pounds of 
oxamide; and one grain of the acid to reproduce 
itself in unlimited ŰẀŠŪWÙWXĒŸÏĚ
We see here that Liebig had cracked one problem that had 
bedevilled the study of generation and which, as discussed in 
my earlier Chapter ,Blumenbach and others had resolved only 
by employing dynamical agents: namely, the problem of explaining 
how living organisms can share out, or pass on, their 
powers and other properties to their offspring, without 
those powers and properties undergoing any diminution in 
successive generations. Liebig's solution lay in chemical 
forces, for each new molecule of oxalic acid (or yeast) 
derived its powers and properties from a preceding molecule 
of oxamide (or sugar); the powers that appeared in each new 
molecule of oxalic acid (or yeast) were therefore purely 
chemical powers which had existed, albeit in different 
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conditions and therefore with different manifestations, in the 
nutritive molecules. 
Nonetheless, Liebig did not pretend to have solved the 
entire mystery of generation and he therefore still needed 
the vital force: 
"Our notion of life involves something more 
than mere reproduction, namely the idea of 
an active power exercised by virtue of a 
definite form, and production and generation 
in a definite form. By chemical agency we 
can produce the constituents of muscular 
fibre, skin and hair; but we can form by their 
means no organized tissue, no organic ȘŤŨŨĒŸĪĚ
The characteristic effect of vital force was therefore 
the forms that organic matter assumed; in Aristotelian terms, 
we might call Liebig's vital force a purely formal cause, 
and not an efficient cause, of life; in this vein, Liebig 
was able to envisage inorganic powers as the sale efficient 
agents in organic processes. Yet there was also a sense in 
which vital force was more than ÜŤŲŸĚ form, for its capacity 
to direct the chemical powers meant that it was similar to 
heat, electricity and other agents which could also regulate 
chemical powers. Thus: 
"The chemical forces are subordinate to this 
cause of life, just as they are to electricity, 
heat, mechanical motion, and friction. By the 
influence of the latter forces, they suffer 
changes in their direction, and increase or 
diminution of their intensity, or a complete 
cessation or reversal of their action. Such 
an influence, and no other, is exercised by 
the vital principle over the chemical forces,,:6 
At this stage \'le might ask whether he discussed the 
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origins of vital power, for only thus can we determine whether 
Liebig considered the living organism to be a peppetuum mobile. 
This issue was to be discussed at length in the Animal chemistpy, 
but in the 1840 treatise it received only brief discussion: 
his argument was reminiscent of Muller's distinction between 
stimuli that exhaust the organism and true vital stimuli, and 
like Muller he chose respiration as the main renewer of life: 
"The vital principle opposes to the continual 
action of the atmosphere, moisture and 
temperature upon the organism, a resistance 
which is, in a certain degree, invincible. 
It is by the constant neutralization and 
renewal of these external influences that 
life and motion are maintained. 
The greatest wonder in the living 
organism is the fact that an unfathomable 
wisdom has made the cause of a continual 
decomposition or destruction, namely the 
support of the process of respiration, to be 
the means of renewing the organism, and of 
resisting all the other atmospheric influences,,:7 
Thus, the living organism was treated as being dependent 
on external influences, namely the inorganic powers and 
respiratory supplies, for its activity; it was not a 
perpetuum mobile. As if to leave no doubt about this 
point, he devoted the penultimate paragraph of the treatise 
to it: 
"After the removal of the cause which 
forced their union - that is, after the 
extinction of life - most organic atoms 
retain their condition, form and nature, 
only by a vis inertiae; for a great law 
of nature proves that matter does not 
possess the power of spontaneous action. 
A body in motion loses its motion only 
when a resistance is opposed to it; and a 
body at rest cannot be put in motion or 
any action whatever, without the operation 
of some exterior ȘŠẀVŤĒŸĮĚ
458. 
We must be cautious in evaluating this paragraph. Liebig 
denied emphatically the possibility of a perpetuum mobile, 
either in living or inorganic systems; but that was not 
tantamount to an assertion of the Conservation of Energy; it was 
only an assertion of the non-creatibility of motion. However, 
he seemed to be reaching out for a more fundamental principle, 
in that he used the word 'activity' (Thatigkeit) in addition 
to 'motion' (Bewegung) , and chose to express the universal 
law in the most general terms, namely, that matter is 
incapable of spontaneous activity_ This more general and 
fundamental form of the denial of perpetual motion loomed 
large in Animal chemistry. 
Part III of Animal chemistry, the last and most important 
part for the discussion of power in the animal economy, 
propounds the conservation of motion often accompanied by 
expressions, some vague but others quite precise, of the 
conservation of forces within the organism. Actually, he 
usually expressed this latter idea as conservation of the 
momentum of force (Kraftmoment), meaning the work that a 
moving force could do. (This is one occasion when the 
original words of the author are so important and difficult 
to translate exactly that they must be quoted in German): 
"Die Wirkung ist foZgZieh nieht del' bewegenden 
Kraft ŠŨRŤÙŪŸĚ noch del' Zeit ŠŨŨŤÙŪŸĚ sondern 
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dem MŲẀȘÛŸĚ multipliciert mit del' Zeit = OŲŠȚWÜŬÜŤŪWŸĚ
• 741 19 prop or t-z.ona ŸĚ • 
This seems to have been one of Liebig's several attempts 
to differentiate between what we today call force on the one 
hand, and work or energy on the other. A more rigorous 
attempt at such differentiation occurred a fe\'1 pages later: 
"Wir wissen, dass dieses Bewegungsmoment del' 
Lehenskraft in einem belebten Korpertheil 
verwendbar ÙVWŸĚ um ruhenden Materien Bewegung 
zu ertheilen (Zersetzung zu ŞŤŴÙŲÛŤŪŸĚWiderstande 
aufzuheben), und wenn die Lebenskraft in ihren 
Aeuserungen sich ahnZich verhaZt wie andere OŲŠȚWŤŸĚ
so muss dieaes Bewegungsmoment mitgetheiZt odeI' 
fOl>tgepflanzt werden ÛÕŪÍŸŤŪĚ durch Materien, die in 
sich neZbst durch eine entgegenwirkende Thatigkeit 
seine freie Aeuserung niaht ŠẀȚUŤŞŤŪĒŸÕĚ
("We know that this momentum of motion in the 
vital force, residing in a living part, may be 
employed in giving motion to bodies at rest 
(that is, in causing decomposition, or overcoming 
resistance), and if the vital force resembles 
other forces in its manifestations, this momentum 
of force must be able to be conveyed or communicated 
by material bodies, which in themselves do not 
destroy its effect by an opposite manifestation of 
force". ) 
On motion itself, he asserted that by vlhatever cause 
produced, it cannot be annihilated; it might become 
inappreciable to human sense, but even when arrested by a 
resisting force, its effect is not ŠŪŪÙUÙŨŠWŤTŸŨĚ This 
was all totally in keeping with Des Cartes and Leibniz 
(although, as usual, Liebig did not cite anyone); where he 
was original was in applying the principle pre-eminently to 
physiology. 
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Liebig suggested that the usual conceptions of motion, 
equilibrium and resistance could be transferred to chemical 
forces and thence to vital force, for it was his belief that 
the modus operandi of vital force was infinitely closer to 
that of chemical forces, than to any other type of force. 
This suggestion was developed greatly in Part III. For 
instance, in explicating "the phenomena of motion in the 
animal organism", he began by considering the voltaic cell, 
in which the role of chemical force was obvious: chemical 
activity produced the manifestation of electrical force in 
a wire connecting a series of zinc and copper plates dipped 
in an acid, and it was to be noted particularly that the wire 
itself did not produce this force. Even more important 
from the point of view of this thesis is that Liebig did not 
indulge in any NaturphiZosophie-type speculation about the 
way whereby the original chemical force becomes transformed 
into other types of force (heat, electricity or magnetism) 
during its passage through the wire. In Chapter 10 we saw 
how Oersted had concerned himself vlith such a question. But 
not Liebig. In fact, he went so far as to say: 
"In the preceding paragraphs we have considered 
these remarkable phenomena in a form which is 
independent of the explanations of the schools • 
••• All the suppositions which may be employed 
as explanations of-the phenomena have not the 
slightest influence on the truth of these 
phenomena; for they refer merely to the form 
in which they are ÜŠŪÙȚŤVWŤTĒŸÎĚ
All he would say was that the chemical forces of the 
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voltaic cell had produced a momentum of motion which in turn 
produced mechanical effects. Similarly, momenta of motion 
were produced in the animal organism, the nerves being the 
conveyors of vital force to the muscles. In this way he 
could explain those vital phenomena that had been explicated 
by the old theory of sympathy (see my chapter on Cullen and 
Brown), although he typically did not refer to that theory 
or any of its exponents. 
The generator of force for motion in the animal was 
muscular tissue, according to ÒÙŤŞÙŦŸĚ the rOle of vital force 
was to transmit the moving forces from one limb to another 
and to induce a chemical change in the recipient tissue. 
This latter lost some of its vitality as a result of its 
chemical change, since as he had explained in the Agricultural 
ahemistry, vital force was a consequence or phenomenon of 
particular forms of matter which depended upon particular 
chemical compositions. (It was essentially Reil's theory). 
In hi s own words: 
"A living part acquires, on the above 
supposition, the capacity of offering and 
overcoming resistance, by the combination 
of its elementary particles in a certain 
f 
form; and as long as its form and 
composition are not destroyed by 
opposing forces, it must retain its 
force uninterrupted and unimpaired,,:3 
Since any change in muscular composition and form entailed 
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a concomitant diminution in its stock of vital force, there 
immediately arose an imbalance between the chemical forces 
inherent in the tissue's composition and its vital force. 
since chemical forces, especially those possessed by oxygen 
in the blood circulation, tended continuously to break down 
or oxidize the living tissues, that portion of muscle which 
had lost its vitality would be speedily oxidized. The net 
process was that the change of form of the muscle tissue 
generated mechanical force, just as the chemical changes in 
the voltaic cell generated mechanical force; moreover, since 
vital force initiated the process, vital force had generated 
an equivalent quantity of me,chanical ȚŬŲȘŤŸÏĚ
This synopsis of Liebig's theory of animal motion differs 
slightly, but not importantly, from what other historians 
\ 
would say; see, for instance, the fine paper on 'Vitalism 
and Reductionism in Liebig's physiological thought' by 
Timothy ÒÙŮÜŠŪŸĪĚ One aspect of Liebig's theory that Lipman 
does not discuss was his persistent effort to express it 
rigorously and quantitatively; this, as well as the considerable 
number of pages that Liebig gave to discussing the relations 
and interconversions among vital, chemical and mechanical 
forces, show us how crucial such dynamics were in his physiology. 
We can see this in the following: 
• 
"The change of matter, the manifestation of 
mechanical force, and the absorption of 
oxygen are, in the animal body, so closely 
connected with each other, that we may 
consider the amounts of motion, and the 
quantity of living tissue transformed, as 
proportional to the quantity of oxygen 
inspired and consumed in a given time by the 
animal. For a certain amount of motion, for 
a certain proportion of vital force consumed 
as mechanical force, an equivalent of chemical 
force is manifested; that is, an equivalent of 
oxygen enters into combination with the 
substance of the organ which has lost the vital 
force; and a corresponding proportion of the 
substance of the organ is separated from the 
living tissue in the shape of an oxidized 
26 
compound" . 
So we see that Liebig was greatly concerned with 
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proportionality between forces or causes, and their manifest-
ations, momenta of motion or effects. His most unequivocal 
expressions of this concern occurred in Part I of Animal 
ahemistry, particularly Sections IV and ẂŸİPUÙȘUĚ I consider 
to be one of the lynch-pins of the whole treatise. (No 
other commentators on Liebig, to my knowledge, have considered 
these sections to be so important; this is probably because 
they have not been as exclusively concerned with his dynamics 
as I am. Timothy Lipman, however, has made some perceptive 
comments on his physiological dynamics, which will be mentioned 
below. ) At the end of Section IV, in discussing respiration, 
Liebig developed several mechanistic analogies for the role 
of that function in the animal; one was the flame, which is 
extinguished when its oil is consumed by the atmospheric 
2 
oxygen; another was the pendulum-clock, where we see how 
crucial he considered respiration to be in the regulation of 
the dynamics of the animal economy; in reading this passage, 
we might recall what Muller had said about respiration, 
although Liebig did not acknowledge him or anyone else for 
his idea: 
"Respiration is the falling weight, the 
bent spring, which keeps the clock in 
motion; the inspirations and the expirations 
are the strokes of the pendulum which regulate 
"t,,28 ŸĚ . 
He asserted that just as the effects of the length of the 
pendulum and the temperature of the air on ordinary time-pieces 
were known already with mathematical accuracy, so would be 
the physiological effects of the air and temperature. 
these were envisaged mainly as dynamical effects, rather 
material ones, and that Liebig envisaged the organism as 
dynamical 
evident in 
economy, rather th;:m a material structure, are 
his next paragraph - the start of Section V: 
"The want of a just conception of force 
and effect and the connexion of natural 
phenomena has led chemists to attribute 
a part of the heat generated in the animal 
body to the action of the nervous system. 
If this view exclude chemical action, or 
changes in the arrangement of the elementary 
particles, as a condition of nervous agency, 
it means nothing else than to derive the 
presence of motion, the manifestation of a 
force, from nothing. But no force, no power, 
can come from ŪŬWUÙŪŦHHŸĲĚ
That 
than 
a 
Liebig was in no doubt that heat is a true dynamical 
agent 30and spent the rest of Section V discussing its 
production from, and correlations with, other forces: by 
the combustion of carbon, by solution of a metal in an 
acid, by the combination of the two electricities, by 
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absorption of light and by mere friction. Then, again not 
mentioning his predecessors, he discussed the duty of the 
steam-engine: 
"When we kindle a fire under a steam-engine, 
and employ the power obtained to produce heat 
by friction, it is impossible that the heat thus 
obtained can ever be greater than that which was 
required to heat the boiler; and if we use the 
galvanic current to produce heat, the amount of 
heat obtained is never, in any circumstances, 
greater than we might have by the combustion of 
the zinc which has been dissolved in the ŠȘÙTĒŸŨĚ
Perhaps he did not refer to other theorists on the steam-
engine because the principle was already quite well-knowni 
moreover, as Thomas Kuhn points out;2those theorists who had 
enunciated a rigorous relation between heat and work, namely 
Sadi Carnot before 1832 and Marc Seguin in 1839, had not been 
able to develop it into a general principle for all forces; 
and other workers in the energy conservation field usually 
did not realize the general import of those heat studies. 
Consequently, Liebig probably did not consider those studies 
on heat and work important or broad enough to merit acknowledge-
mente Nonetheless, heat and its dynamical correlations were 
t 
important for his physiology; they led to the important assertion, 
which occurred only once or twice in AnimaZ chemistry so 
explicitly, that the ultimate cause of muscular motion was 
chemical force - the implication of which was that even the 
vital force, which was transmitted to muscles to induce them 
to act, was ultimately one with chemical force. As he put it, 
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immediately after his discussion on the steam-engine and the 
galvanic current: 
"The contraction of muscles produces heat; 
but the force necessary for the contraction 
has manifested itself through the organs 01 
motion, in which it has been excited by 
chemical changes. The ultimate cause of the 
heat produced is, therefore, to be found in 
these chemical ȘUŠŪŦŤVHHŸĨĚ
As if to emphasize the right of admission of the vital 
force to the pantheon of powers in Nature, Liebig continually 
juxtaposed his discussions of vital force with discussions 
of inorganic forces. A L ' t' 34 s 1pman men 1ons, he was confident 
enough in the reality of vital force not to undertake a major 
defence of it in his physiology, but he did feel the need to 
draw attention to its profound similarities with the forces of 
natural philosophy. Thus, in the very first paragraph of 
Part III, he declared that if ever it should be proved that the 
vital force, in its manifestations, had nothing in common with 
those forces which were known to produce motion or change in 
inorganic nature, all his arguments on animal motion (which 
constituted a huge chunk of his physiology) would be ÙŪẂŠŨÙTŠWŤTŸĪĚ
Near the beginning of the book he had discussed briefly the 
ontology of forces and concluded that, since all other forces 
could be inferred solely from their effects, and since there 
seemed to be one range of effects or phenomena in Nature which 
diverged from all other phenomena, it was perfectly philo-
sophical to infer the existence of a different, a vital, force. 
It is tempting for historians of Liebig to sniff out metaphysical 
strands in these ideas; indeed, any German natural philosopher 
of that period who claimed as vehemently as Liebig did to 
be free from metaphysics automatically arouses suspicion. 
As Ernst von Meyer in his Gesahiahte der Chemie (1888)36and 
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J.T. Merz in his European thought in the nineteenth century 
(1923-1950) 37pointed out, Liebig's two years' study under 
Schelling provided him with a philosophy of vitalism that he 
never surrendered. Actually, Liebig himself admitted at 
least a temporary infatuation with NaturphiZo8ophie, in an 
essay entitled Ueber das Studium der Naturwissenschaften (On 
the study of the natural sciences) published in 1840: 
"I myself spent a portion of my student days 
at a university where the greatest philosopher 
and metaphysician of the century charmed the 
thoughtful youth around him into admiration and 
imitation; who could at that time resist the 
contagion? I too have lived through this 
period - a period so rich in words and ideas 
and so poor in true knowledge and genuine studies. 
it cost me two precious years of my life,,?8 
Liebig was remarkably unwilling throughout his life to 
disCUSS philosophical issues and it is, as yet, impossible to 
determine any lasting impact that Schelling and other 
philosophers might have made on him. Perhaps a close study 
of his friendship wIth Graf August von Platen-HallermUnde 
(1796-1835) the famous poet and essayist, who seems to have 
"fallen in love with him" at first sight when they met in 1822 
and with whom he remained friendly until von Platen's death, 
1-' 39 
might reveal VŬÜŤWŨÍŸŪŦĦĚ
For those of us who hope to discover metaphysical 
skeletons, particularly of a ŪŠWẀŲŮUÙŸŬVŬŮUÙVȘUŤĚframe, in 
Liebig's cerebral cupboard, even his discussions on the 
ontology of force are disappointing. Although there is 
obviouS similarity between them and Kant's philosophy of 
knowledge, to wit the distinction between noumena and 
phenomena, it was not only Kant who informed his discussion, 
but also that well-known and oft-regurgitated declaration 
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by Newton when he had had to defend his force of gravitation 
against Cartesians and other critics; as Liebig wrote: 
"Natural science has fixed limits which cannot 
be passed; and it must always be borne in mind 
that, with all our discoveries, we shall never 
know what light, electricity and magnetism are 
in their essence, because even of those things 
\'Ihich are material, the human intellect has 
only conceptions. We can ascertain, however, 
the laws which regulate their motion and rest, 
because these are manifested in phenomena. In 
like manner, the laws of vitality and of all 
that disturbs, promotes or alters it may be 
discovered, ŠŨWUŬẀŸUĚwe shall never know what 
life is. Thus, the discovery of the laws of 
gravitation and of the planetary motions led 
to an entirely new conception of the cause of 
these phenomena. This conception could not 
have been formed in all its clearness without 
a knowledge of the phenomena out of which it 
was evolved; for considered by itself, gravity, 
like light to one born blind, is a mere word, 
. . .. 40 TŤẂŬŸTĚof ÜŤŠŪŸŪŦĚ . 
The lawS of vitality, he believed, would be found in 
harmony with the universal laws of motion and force "which 
preserve in their courses the worlds of our own and other 
,,41 
systems . Perhaps the most important law of vitality that 
Liebig considered himself to have discovered, was that every 
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action of the living organism necessitates a transformation 
of some part of itself into unorganized matter; that therefore 
every motion, every manifestation of force, is the result of 
a chemical change; that even every conception, every mental 
affection, every sensation, is accompanied by a change of 
composition of the brain1 2and that at the root of all these 
processes lies the utilization of chemical force which alone 
is the fuel keeping the organism going. As he wrote early on 
in Animal chemistpy: 
And: 
IIIn order to keep up the phenomena of life 
in animals, certain matters are required, 
parts of organisms, which we call nourishment. 
In consequence of a series of alterations, they 
serve either for the increase of the mass 
(nutrition), or for the supply of the matter 
consumed (reproduction), or finally for the 
production of force." 
"If the first condition of animal life be the 
assimilation of what is commonly called 
nourishment, the second is a continual absorption 
of oxygen from the atmosphere •••. 
All vital activity arises from the mutual 
action of the oxygen of the atmosphere and the 
elements of the food. 
In the processes of nutrition and reproduction, 
we perceive the passage of matter from the state of 
f:lotion t.O that of rest (static equilibrium); under 
the influence of the nervous system, this matter 
enters again into a state of motion. The ultimate 
causes of these different conditions of the vital 
force are chemical ȚŬŲȘŤVĒŸĨĚ
As these passages show, and as Lipman has argued, Liebig 
considered his vital force to be a thoroughly respectable and 
scientific agent. Far from using it to set aside the living 
organism as a piece of mechanism distinct from all others in 
its capacity to generate force, he was at pains to correlate 
it with all the other dynamical agents in Nature. The 
organism thus became a powerhouse in which the momentum of 
force, or power output, could never be greater than the power 
input; if output and input were balanced perfectly, good 
health and physiological equilibrium resulted; if input 
exceeded output, growth resulted. In this, Liebig's theory 
was much akin to those of Hufeland, Blumenbach and various of 
the British physiologists already mentioned. 
Turning now to his more populist publication, Familiap 
letters on chemistry, which at least one late 19th century 
British encyclopaedia called his most memorable work, we 
find several letters devoted largely to force or power. 
Although the first edition of that work appeared in 1844, that 
is, a few years after Grove, Joule and Mayer had first 
announced their ideas on torce, Liebig almost certainly did 
not owe anything to them; almost certainly, he did not know of 
Grove's and Joule's studies, and although Mayer had published 
his theory in Liebig's own Annalen, it is unlikely, as Thomas 
Kuhn points ŬẀWŸÏWUŠWĚLiebig realized its import at that time. 
Therefore, what he wrote about the connections of forces in 
the first edition of FamiZar Zetters were probably his own 
ideas; they resembled closely what he had written in ĻŦŲÙȘẀRWẀŸŠŨĚ
and Animal chemiRtry. 
Letter VII, 'On mechanical forces', was at pains to 
arrange the vital force alongside the other forces of Nature; 
vital force was simply another force, about which there was 
no need to make any fuss. Liebig was simply continuing a 
theme which, as we have seen, he had discussed in 1842. 
"Light, Heat, the Vital Principle, and the 
Force of Gravity exercise a most decided 
influence upon the number of the simple atoms 
which unite to form a compound atom, and 
upon the manner of their arrangement. They 
determine the form, properties, the character-
istic qualities of the combinations, precisely 
because they are able to communicate motion to 
atoms at rest, and to annihilate motion by 
resistance. 
Light, heat, the vital principle, the 
electric and magnetic forces, the power of 
gravity, manifest themselves as forces of 
motion and of resistance, and as such change 
the direction and very the strength of the 
chemical ȚŬŲȘŤŨŨŸĪĚ
Thus: 
Indeed, if any force was special it seemed to be chemical 
force ŸĚ
Letter VIII, 'The vital principle', dealt explicitly with 
the connections among forces. It asserted the intimacy of 
the interactions of the vital force with all other forces, 
re-emphasized its similarity to those forces and merely 
repeated the arguments that had been used in the earlier 
treat.ises. 
Letter IX, ''l'ransformations of almond milk I, discussed 
the vitalism-mechanicism issue with particular regard to the 
various hypotheses on fermentation; no new arguments on vital 
force or other forces were advanced, but what was surprising 
was his declaration that " ••• the greatest and most enduring 
TE ------. ------ .. -....... 
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acquisition which chemical science has derived from the study 
of fermentation" was the principle of Laplace and Berthollet, 
that an atom or molecule put in motion by any power whatever 
would corrununicate its O'I.'ln motion to any atoms in contact with 
it. 
Throughout this edition, Liebig seemed to declare that his 
general purpose had been not only to discuss the main issues 
in chemistry but to develop a truly dynamical point of view, 
namely to know the causes, to understand the forces to which 
d th t d ·f ld f d t· 46 man owe e grea an man1 0 successes 0 mo ern 1mes. 
From his other letters, we know that by the "manifold successes 
of modern times" he meant not only the scientific investigations 
of forces but also the application of power to industry, war, 
agriculture and the general wealth of nations. 
As we have seen in AnimaL chemistry and AgricuLtural 
chemiDtry, Liebig followed Newton (probably with Kant in mind 
too) in denying man's ability to comprehend the essence of 
force. In the third edition of FamiLiar Letters , which was 
much longer than the earlier ones, he developed that theme, 
asserting that the only fruitful quest in dynamics was for the 
relations among forces. He was now prepared to posit, more 
explicitly than before, an actual interdependance or correlation 
among forces. Thus, in Letter XIX he suggested that just as 
naturalists could not define the boundary between plant and 
animal life, so natural philosophers could not distinguish the 
boundary between the vital and the physico-chemical forces 
d · d th· . 1· . 4 7 when they stu 1e e m1croscop1C 1vlng creatures. In 
Letter XX, on 'The connection of the sciences', he again argued 
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the inscrutability of the essence of force, but mentioned 
some indication of progress in the "wonderful connections" 
that had been detected between the electrical and chemical 
48 forces. In this direction lay the future of science. 
Letter XXI took up this point: 
"The history of science gives us the consoling 
assurance that we shall succeed, by pursuing 
the path of observation and experiment, in 
unveiling the mysteries of organic life, and 
that we shall be enabled to obtain decided, 
definite answers to the question - What are the 
causes which have a share in producing the vital 
phenomena? All the peculiarities of bodies, all 
their properties, are determined by the co-
operation of several causes r and it is a problem 
to be solved by scientific research, to ascertain 
the proportion in which each individual cause 
contributes to the effect. In order to attain 
a knowledge of the mutual relations of these 
properties, we must endeavour to become acquainted 
with them, and to discover the cases in which they 
vary. It is a natural law, which admits of no 
exception, that variations in one property are 
always and invariably accompanied by uniform and 
corresponding variations in another property, and 
it is perfectly obvious that if we know the laws 
of these variations, we are enabled to deduce one 
property from another without further observation. 
To ascertain a natural law is nothing more 
than to ascertain such a relation of dependance. 
Knowledge of the law includes explanations of the 
phenomenon, and an insight into the essence of 
the forces by which it is TŤWŤŲŲŪÙŪŤTHHŸĲĚ
All of which was clearly useful, not only to confirm 
the reality of force, which Liebig never doubted, but also 
to confirm the existence of vital force. 
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Liebig went on to enumerate the progress that had been 
made in discovering the inter-dependencies between forces -
between electricity and magnetism, radiant heat and magnetism, 
radiant heat and electricity. Who could doubt, he asked, 
that the vital force must also obey the law of dependence, 
and that the physico-chemical properties of an organism play 
a definite and ascertainable rOle in vital phenomena?50 
In this last letter, Liebig seems to have had the 
studies by Grove, Joule and others in mind forthis was precisely 
the patch they had been cultivating; but as usual he cited no 
one. Actually, he was well acquainted with their investigations, 
for we find lengthy discussions of them in some of the volumes 
of the Annual report of the progress of ȘUŤÜÙVWŲXŸĚ and the 
allied sciences, physics, mineralogy and geology. for the l840s, 
of which he had been a principal editor. In Volume I (1847)51 
there was a detailed account of experiments by Joule, Dulong 
and Seguin to determine the mechanical equivalent of heat. 
This was clearly considered by the editors of the Annual report 
to be an important topic, but it did not seem to them to 
presage any principle of more fundamental and general import; 
it was only concerned with two dynamical agents - mechanical 
work and heat. Seguin was the only one of the three, according 
to the report, vlhose thoughts had a wider horizon, for he 
"announces that he is engaged in an extensive 
series of investigations, in order to determine 
that the phenomena of heat are only phenomena 
of motion, and consequently subject to the law 
of general ŦŲŠẂÙWŠWÙŬŪĒŸÎĚ
That AnnuaZ l"epol"t carried another discussion of this 
f . 53 field at the start 0 its section on kinet1cs. It began 
with a review of Grove's pamphlet 'On the correlations of 
physical forces' (1846), and what is most interesting is 
that the editor(s) declared that Grove's 
" ... leading notion, that each of the 
following forces, motion, heat, electricity, 
light, magnetism and chemical attraction, 
can be connected into all the others is not 
altogether new, and perhaps the author has 
not supported his position with all the 
materials which were at his disposal •••• ,,54 
This assessment was grossly unfair: Grove himself did not 
ÏİŸĦĚ
pretend that his theory was original, but what he did claim, 
and justly so, was that he had investigated the topic with 
unprecedented experimental care and detail. yet the review did 
not bother to praise the thoroughness of his work. Perhaps 
the revie\'/er, whoever he was, had in mind the speculations on 
the interconversions of forces of the Naturphilosophen, when 
he mentioned that Grove's idea was not altogether new; or 
perhaps he had in mind certain assertions of the same idea 
which had already appeared in the writings of one of the 
Annual report's editors, namely Liebig's. (I have not yet 
discovered who wrote the review. Clearly, it could be most 
instructive to find that out. ) The review \-lent on to approve 
Grove's 
55 
remark that the next important task was to determine 
the mechanical ('quivalents of the various forces; it mentioned 
that steps had been taken already by Joule, Karl Friedrich Gauss 
(1777-1855) and Wilhelm Eduard Weber (1804-1891) on the 
relations of magnetic forces, and by Weber alone on the electro-
chemical equivalent of water. Moreover, the review went on 
to mention that 
IE 
"Matteucci has instituted a series of 
experiments, which seemed to entitle him 
to conclude that the imponderables -
heat, light and electricity - are developed 
in chemical processes in quantities independent 
of each other, so that the amount of the first 
contains no alteration by the simultaneous 
appearance of a second or third of WUŤÜŨŨŸĬĚ
The next contributor whom the article discussed was a 
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Mr. Robert Leslie Ellis (1817-59)57who had contributed a purely 
theoretical, wholly mathematical analysis of force to the 
Cambridge Philosophical Society; he had treated all forces in 
the form of a single algebraic series which was ingenious but 
too abstract to be useful or to merit discussion here. 
The significance of these Reports for our study of Liebig's 
dynamics is that he obviously knew about the studies on forces 
of other thoroughly reputable natural philosophers by 1847 at 
the latest, even though he did not cite them in his own 
discussions on force in the post 1847 editions of ŃŠÜÙŸÙŠŲĚ
Zetters. Not even Matteucci's discussions, which had a 
physiological background, did he cite. We cannot help asking 
why he refused, throughout his career, to acknowledge other 
men's work. As in his disputes with Dumas and Boussingault;8 
we know that this parsimony sometimes embroiled him in vicious 
squabbles. Perll3.ps he ,'las driven by his well-known ambition 
to vaunt German science, and especially German chemistry, over 
that of the French. It is also well-known that he was jealous 
of his own prestige and consequently became personally 
involved in his scientific debates; Liebig certainly saw 
himself as the saviour of physiology and the creator of the 
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rigorous science of organic chemistry. (Indeed, he reminds 
one of Galileo, whom he admired enormously, for Galileo had 
had no mean opinion of himself as a physicist and astronomer 
and did not brook rivals in his own field. ŸŘØŤĚ need only 
recall his treatment of Kepler, and his possessive declaration 
to Sarsi in IZ Saggiatore that "it was granted to me alone to 
discover all the new phenomena in the sky and nothing to 
anybody else"). 
Liebig's fierce pride presents us with a problem: If he 
considered his view on forces to be important and largely 
original, to the extent of rarely citing any other investig-
ators, why did he never corne out with a clear declaration of 
it? Was it because the two German natural philosophers to 
enunciate the principles of conservation and correlation in 
formal papers devoted exclusively to those principles were 
Mayer and Helmholtz? They were apparently reductionists 
who seemed to be giving powerful arguments against vitalism, 
whereas Liebig was still a vitalist. Perhaps he realized the 
danger to his vitalistic belief in siding with men like them. 
Liebig's last major defence of his vitalism was a general 
critique of contemporary materialism in a lecture given in 
ŨĮĪĬŸĲĚ His criticism of opponents of vitalism was even more 
bi ting tlnn UÙJJŸĚ usual polemics; he called them "total 
strangers to all investigations connected with chemical and 
physical forces ... ama.teurs ..• ignorant and presumptuous 
,,60 dreamers . Only insufficient knowledge of inorganic forces 
had led people to deny an active force in organized beings; 
a profound understanding of Nature's powers would convince them 
...... 
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that the agent responsible for the forms and complex 
compositions of organized systems had to be different from 
all other agents yet also strongly akin to them. 
The great irony of Liebig's vitalism is that his 19 th 
century biographers mentioned little, or even nothing, about 
it. Most of them took his own assessment of himself as a 
sober, thoroughly experimental chemist who had escaped the 
tentacles of Naturphilosophie and other metaphysics at face 
value. Only his pupil, Theodor Bischoff, gave a reliable 
f h ' 't l' 61 J b lh assessment 0 1S Vl a 1sm. aco Vo ard mentioned it 
scantily, as if it was ŤÜŞŠŲŲŠVVÙŪŦŸÎĚ In his otherwise 
valuable Faraday lecture of 1875, August von Hofmann, another 
pupil, declared that Liebig had not been a ẂÙWŠŨÙVWŸĨĚ The 
biographies by Kohut and Shenstone in 1895 mentioned his 
vitalism but ŞŲÙŤȚŨXŸÏĚ Clearly by the end of Liebig's life, 
vitalism was fast becoming a sign of primitiveness in a 
scientist's mental outlook. In my opinion, the main flaw in 
these biographies, even Bischoff's, was not that they 
ignored Liebig's vitalism, but that they missed his intense 
interest in force and energy and his contribution to the 
emergence of the correlation and conservation laws. In 
vain one searches them for an awareness of the dyanamical 
aspect of Liebig's physiology, and that is because they 
focussed on his techniques and discoveries in organic 
chemistry, in which his vital force had no apparent place. 
Some 20th century studies have been redressing the 
balance, however, and Stephen ØŬẀŨÜÙŪŸĪŊẀŪŤĚŇŬŬTȚÙŤŨTŸĬĚ
T.S. Kuhn, F.L. Holmes and Timothy Lipman67merit particular 
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mention. As Lipman asserted, Liebig was able to be a 
splendid chemist, as well as a full-committed vitalist, 
simply because he could do his chemistry without employing 
the vital force. Vital force was relevant solely to his 
profoundest theorizing in physiology; it was a shadowy 
figure in a cupboard that could be kept tightly locked when 
he wished to wear the hat of a thorough chemical experimentalist. 
Yet, as this chapter has argued, albeit all too briefly, the 
topic of force, energy and work was a cornerstone of his 
metaphysic of science, and energy conservation was a principle 
be believed to apply equally to the realms of life and of 
brute matter. 
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CHAPTER 15. Ideas on force of Karl Reichenbach (1788-1869) 
"Einer neuen rvahr>heit ist nicht.?> schadlicher> 
aZs ein alter> Irr>thum." Goethe. 
One of the most enigmatic investigators into force during 
the l840s and l850s was Karl von Reichenbach. Having studied 
at Tubingen, where he obtained the degree of doctor of 
philosophy, he set out to apply his scientific knowledge to 
industry and established several metallurgy factories in 
Moravia. His efforts were VẀȘȘŤVVȚŸŨHĚ for he acquired a 
large fortune as well as a baronetcy in 1830 from the King 
of wurtemberg. In purely scientific circles he was known as 
the author of the first geological monograph to be published 
in ĻẀVWŲÙŠŸĚhe discovered paraffin2and creosote3in 1830 and 
1833 respectively, and he was an authority on ÜŤWŤŬŲVŸĚ He 
attracted most attention, however, although his scientific 
reputation was proportionately lessened, by his supposed 
discovery of a new force in Nature, which he called the Ode 
The task for an historian of science of evaluating the 
rigour and worth of von Reichenbach's theory of the Od is 
daunting, for since his earliest announcement of it he has 
been the object of ridicule on the one hand (by Emil du Bois-
Reymond particularly), and considerable praise on the other 
(by Berzelius, William Gregory and William Carpenter, to name 
only three). Indeed, any man who would allow his researches 
into liqht, heat, electricity and magnetism to lead him into 
that no li me ta'nger'e of mid 19th century science - animal 
magnetism - was asking for trouble. Not that von Reichenbach 
5 
was a follower of Mesmer. Indeed, he declared often that 
Mesmer's "hotch-potch of the most absurd kind" was neither 
science nor anything like his own sober theories. His 
experimental researches - and they were truly experimental, 
not merely fortuitous fact finding - especially those on the 
human body, led him by quite straight-forward induction to 
postulate the Od, which William Gregory, his English editor 
and champion (who had also edited and championed Liebig's 
work) renamed the OdyZe or OdyZZia Forae. 
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Von Reichenbach published his first detailed account of 
his dynamical researches as a 270 page supplement6to Liebig's 
and wBhler's Annalen der Chemie und Pharmacie of 1845. In 
Germany it was received with scepticism and even ridicule. 
Emil du Bois-Reymond wrote a biting review of it for Karsten's 
FortschY'i-!;t deY' PhysioZogie of that year; calling it "an absurd 
romance, to enter into the details of which would be fruitless", 
and "one of the most deploraple aberrations that has for a 
long time affected a human ŞŲŠÙŪŨWŸĚ This criticism was obviously 
not based on a careful, objective reading of von Reichenbach's 
work; it was almost certainly based on his impression that this 
was yet another piece of hocus-pocus in support of the then 
thoroughly suspect field of Mesmerism or animal magnetism r and 
as Gregory suggested, he probably did not even bother to read 
the whole of it. 
Von Reichenbach, to his eternal credit, did not stoop 
anywhere as low as his critics. Whilst their criticisms were 
often venomous, his replies were calm and polite. There were 
several likely reasons for his equanimity. Firstly, he saw 
his work firmly within the recent, careful studies on dynamics 
iiT 487. 
that had been done by eminent figures like Faraday, Mrs. 
Somerville and Liebig, all of whom he cited, especially Liebig. 
Secondly, he appreciated the dangerous ground on which he trod 
and avoided speculating about the fundamental nature of force. 
Although he asked occasional questions about the possibility of 
all forces being correlations of a single one, etc., questions 
which anticipated the doctrines of the correlation and 
conservation of forces, they were always only tentative and 
he never gave definite answers to them himself. In short, 
he realized how difficult it was to treat Kraft theoretically. 
Thirdly, his work on force was highly regarded by several eminent 
scientists, whose statures were an easy match against du Bois-
Reymond. However bad-mannered his critics might be, he was 
not alone. 
of 
In 1846 William Gregory, then ŮŲŬȚŤVVŬŲŸȘUŤÜÙVWŲXĚat 
Edinburgh, disappointed at von Reichenbach's treatment in 
Germany, translated his Untersuchungen under the title of 
Abstract of 'Reseapches on magnetism and on certain allied 
VẀŞÚŤŪWVGŸĚ including a aupposed new ÙÜŮŬŪTŤŲŠŞŨŤGŸĚ Although 
only an abstract, it was 112 pages long and \-las crammed with 
account5" (If experiments, usually by V(tn Reichenbach himself. 
They described how lights or flames had been seen around 
powerful magnets, usually at their poles; how magnets and 
crystals had exerted forces on parts of the human body; how 
light had been emitted during crystallization of cornmon salts; 
and how the thitherto unnamed force resembled, yet also 
differed from, the other forces of the universe. The 
experiments had usually been on people who were highly 
sensitive, often nervous and sometimes suffering from or 
recuperating from serious nervous disorders. This was a 
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point on Hhich du Bois-Reymond picked, but von Reichenbach 
ĤĤŸĚ
himself had admitted this weakness: 
"From what has been said, it appears that 
the peculiar force thus detected opens up 
a new leaf in the book of the imponderables. 
The new force appears to be subject to the 
general laws of the imponderables, but has its 
specialities and peculiar laws, the study of 
which must henceforth be a problem of physics. 
It is exceedingly desirable to discover an 
inorganic test or reagent for it, a means of 
recognizing and measuring it, which shall relieve 
us from the dependence ••• on sick. persons, 
hospitals, 
The author 
good hopes 
and unscientific persons of all kinds. 
is engaged in this research and has 
of VẀȘȘŤVVŨŨŸÕĚ
The problem was that because this field had never been 
amenable to rigorous, quantitative experimentation with the 
\, 
tools of physics and chemistry, scientists were 
Physiologists like du Bois-Reymond (and Ludwig, 
neglecting it. 
h. Helmoltz and 
" Brucke) had chosen a priori to exclude from their science all 
phenomena that could not be manipulated by physics and chemistry. 
Their definition of valid science was different from, and at 
least as questionable as, von Reichenbach's. As he put it: 
" ••. scientific men neglected the subject, and 
did not admit it as a branch of physical 
enquiry. Individual physicians and lay amateurs 
partly kept alive the tradition they called 
it Animal Magnetism •••• Numerous works have 
since that time appeared on the subject, chiefly 
written in a medical point of view. A few are 
good; many partial and one-sided; many, again, 
such as cannot be read with patience. 
The author has avoided the study of 
this literature, in order to obtain an 
unfettered judgement, and to raise his 
work on the foundation of his own observations. 
He has studied the subject in a physical, not 
a medical point of view, being convinced that 
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thus the investigations will be more VẀȘȘŤVVȚẀŨŨŨŸŨĚ
Actually, since so many of his experiments were done on 
the human body, his ideas did have a physiological bearing. 
That he discussed in a later work. 
Numerous experiments done over several years had convinced 
him of the existence of a new force. The most exact and 
unequivocal experiments had suggested that it existed in magnets, 
crystals, the sun's rays (an area which Mrs. Somerville had 
been investigating);2 the human body, sources of heat and the 
earth's magnetic field. It was also produced along with, or 
by, chemical force; and thus, t,<lithout fanciful speculation, 
he could account for Mesmer's magnetic baquet - that it was 
merely a slow and long-lasting source of chemical activity, 
and that from such activity came the new force which resided 
too in the human beings connected up to the baquet. Since 
the motive force in the baquet might thus be shown to be due 
to ordinary chemical activity, its mystique and the ridicule 
13 
of animal magnetism would dissolve away. 
Hhat, then, was the origin of the living organism's magnet-
like force? None other than the chemical activities involved 
in digestion. And his great authority on the relations 
between organic and chemical forces was Liebig: 
E 
"By one of the most profound combinations 
of thought to which our age can point, 
Liebig has led us to the idea that all the 
motive force in our bodies is produced by 
digestion, and all the heat by respiration: 
that is, that both - force and heat - were 
the result of chemical action. Although 
this cannot yet be brought into an algebraic 
formula or a chemical equation, and disputes 
may occur here and there about the expression 
of this truly great idea, yet the idea addresses 
itself so powerfully to our comprehension, and 
finds so powerful an echo in the general knowledge 
we possess of Nature, that its ultimate triumph 
is secure. 
The author considers it as no small security 
for the truth to Nature of his researches, that 
he has been brought, by a different route, to the 
same new field of inquiry as Liebig had already 
d ,,14 opene up. 
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This was the earliest, full recognition of the dynamical 
import of Liebig's chemical theory of vitality, of which I am 
aware. Much of the rest of the treatise was taken up with 
applying this idea to particular vital processes, and the 
message was always clear: the living organism cannot 
manufacture its own power, and even its most vitalistic forces, 
even the Od, are only metamorphoses of the chemical power that 
it ingests in its food and inspires as oxygen. Like Liebig 
and others discussed in this thesis, von Reichenbach would not 
be drawn on the ultimate nature of the ȚŬŲȘŤVŸĚ perhaps they are 
15 
essentially one; perhaps the ad is merely a hitherto unrecognized 
modification of a well-known forcet 6even with regard to the 
positive-negative polarity that the Od seemed to possess, he 
was uncertaint7 he hoped merely, in future researches, to 
conduct comparative experiments on forces and to illustrate 
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whatever relations might exist among them. It would be, 
he modestly declared, for higher authorities to pass judgements 
on the field as a ŴUŬÍŤŸĮĚ
His editor, Gregory, appreciated the difficulties that 
would waylay the theory of Od. It was only just on the fringe 
of respectable science yet, as he pOinted out in his preface, 
there were a few very respectable scientists working on that 
fringe. Faraday was cited as having corroborated von 
Reichenbach's observation of the luminous phenomena associated 
19 
with the magnet, and a comparison was made with the work of 
John W. Draper in New York who, from his study of the sun's 
rays, had suggested the existence of a new ÙÜŮŬŪTŤŲŠŞŨŤŸÕĚ
In Gregory's opinion, "the current of discovery seems to set in 
. . ,,21 
that dl.rectJ.on . 
A larger English publication of von Reichenbach's work 
appeared in 1850, entitled Physico-physioZogical researches on 
the dynamides 01' ÙÜŮŬŪTŤŲŠŞRŤVŸĚ ÜŠŦŪŤWÙVÜŸĚ ŤŨŤȘWŲÙȘÙWXŸĚ heat, 
light;, crystalZization and chemical ŠWWŲŠŤWÙŬŪŸĚ in their 
1 . /; 7 -!-' 22 relations to t ZB ẂŸŠŸĚJorce. The editor was again Gregory. 
Part I vias an improved edition of the 1846 Abstract. Part II 
and the appendices described the further investigations that 
von Reichenb';lch had promised to do since 1845; these latter 
are immensely important for this thesis. 
The first section in the book which merits comment is 
Greqory'n preface. He claimed that the Abstract had been 
well l:ecei ved in England and that he had not met any serious 
criticisms by British philosophers. Of Part II he wrote that 
von Reichenbach had done many comparative experiments on 
odyle and the other imponderables and had established their 
analogies; he had also shown their differences, 
"which leave no choice for the present, 
but that of giving it a distinct place 
and name, although future discoveries 
may possibly enable us to refer all the 
imponderables to a common force. But 
that time is still TÙVWŠŪWĒŸĨĚ
As for the German critics, Gregory claimed that they 
492. 
simply did not understand the proper objects of scientific 
inquiry or the nature of admissible evidence when investigating 
obscure and difficult problems. Had du Bois-Reymond been more 
enlightened on these points, he would have realized that von 
Reichenbach's researches actually supported his own ÙTŤŠVŸÏĚ
In his own preface, von Reichenbach discussed du Bois-
Reymond, suggesting that he had taken his critical cue from 
his teacher, MUller, who had inveighed against Mesmerism or 
animal magnetism in his Handbuch. Von Reichenbach quoted 
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MUller's works. However, MUller had not had him in mind 
because the Handbuch was written before his work became known. 
Moreover, von Reichenbach (and Gregory) agreed with MUller's 
criticism of Mesmerism. Thitherto, animal magnetism had 
been a charade, but nm'1 von Reichenbach believed that a truly 
rigorous approach had been found to those pehnomena which 
had gone under the umbrella of Mesmerism. Indeed, so scientific 
and new was his approach that he could not regard himself as a 
champion of animal magnetism at all; it differed from his 
theory of od as alchemy differed from chemistry. (In this 
respect, therefore, one cannot agree with Garrison's assertion 
that 
"mesmerism •.. was exploited in various 
mystic forms by Linter aZia/ ••• Baron 
Karl von Reichenbach whose concept of the 
odic force still survives in the ouija-
boards and odic telephones of the present 
26 time ") . 
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The kernel of von Reichenbach's theory, as set out in his 
Physico-physiological researches was far from mystic: just as 
magnets, crystals, living organisms (those with nervous systems), 
solar and lunar rays, heat and electricity possess the power 
of exerting particular forces, so does the Od reside in many 
diverse bodies and takes its place as a universally diffused 
natural force. In his own mind, it was a plain consequence 
of induction from his many experiments. As we might expect, 
however, he did admit the appeal of a more grandiose hypothesis 
which smacked strongly of NaturphiZosophie; but he never cited 
the Naturpll1.: losophen or Kant, and mentioned an all-encompassing 
hypothesis on forces only tentatively, preferring to keep his 
ideas close to their empirical foundations. Thus he discussed 
the similarities between his work and Faraday's on the newly 
named phenomenon of 'Diamagnetism', suggesting that they were 
merely "drawing the same vehicle, but by different ropes." 
Faraday had grasped one of "the numerous odyllic threads", and 
with his genius would help discover the ultimate basis of such 
phenomena. Perha1ls magnetism, diamagnetism and odyle would 
be reduced to a common origin - but the proof was still far 
27 distant. 
still, the lure of a grand vision of Nature's forces and 
the intuitive feeling that some monumental unifying law lay 
waiting to be discovered were too much for von Reichenbach's 
customary restraint. His Od would one day be seen in true 
cosmic perspective: 
"It has always been viewed as more or less 
identical with magnetism; but we have seen 
that it has no greater resemblance to that 
force than magnetism has to crystallization, 
crystallization to electricity, electricity to 
chemical attraction, heat to light etc. We 
no doubt have a presentiment of the final unity 
of these imponderables in a higher form; but we 
are still far removed from this much-desired 
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goal of natural science. We cannot yet fill up 
the gap between magnetism and electricity, which 
appears so narrow that we might almost expect to 
reach with our hands from one bank to the ŬWUŤŲHHŸĮĚ
swnmary 
From such writings by von Reichenbach there is no doubt 
that he was a capable experimentalist and appreciated the need 
for experimental proof. Nor can we doubt that he was aware 
of some great unifying principle of force. Neither can ''Ie 
deny the care with which he refrained from generalizing and 
speculating in a field which was rampant already with 
generalizations and exciting speculations. Born and bred in 
the age of NatUl'phi 7.osophie he somehow remained aloof from its 
flighty mentality, and though well acquainted with its 
speculations - such as the unity of forces - he kept his own 
ideas fairly closely to the ground of empiricism. It is 
inaccurate to ask, as one commentator has done, " ••• how a man 
who had shown sharp critical understanding in science could 
29 
wander so far in the field of fantasy". He undoubtedly 
saw himself among those thorough researchers who were 
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investigating force, and in a sense he was truly one of them; 
Liebig was his mentor in physiological dynamics (although 
Liebig did not think much of his '>vork and, to my knowledge, 
never cited him), and Faraday was his model in the physical 
sciences. Yet in another sense he was apart from them: he 
never discussed Helmholtz or Mayer and mentioned only a few 
of the British workers; Grove and Joule were not cited in any 
of his pre-1852 writings. 
In his later years, von Reichenbach stuck resolutely to 
experimenting and writing on his Ode In 1852 he published 
Odisch-Magnetische ŁŲÙŤȚŤŸÕĚin 1854 Der sensitive Mensah und 
1 Od 31. 1856 Od· h....· 32 sein ŒŤŲUŠŸWŤŪĚ sum .e, ln ŸVŠĚ e ŸŲŴŤŸWŤŲẀŪŦŤŪĚ and 
KohieY'gtaube und Aj'tel'IJissenschaft ;3in 1866 his peculiar 
Aphorismen Uber Jenaibilitat und Od34 and in 1867 Die Odisahe 
ÑŬUŤŸĪĚ From a scanty perusal of these treatises one gets 
the impression that, piqued at the world's refusal to take 
him seriously, (Gregory died in 1858 and no-one would take up 
his cudgels in Britain), he retired to his castle of Reichenberg 
and worked away in splendid isolation, even to the extent of 
ignoring the steady stream of works that appeared in the 1850s 
and l860s concerning the correlation and conservation of forces. 
In 1862 he gave a demonstration of his supposed ability to 
photograph objects in total darkness by means of their 'odic 
light' to a group of seven academic scientists in ŁŤŲŨÙŪŸĬĚ he 
himself thought that his demonstration succeeded, but they 
issued a press statement denying it. According to one of his 
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biOgraphers;7 that sounded the death-knell for his scientific 
credibility. 
To the end of his life he denied that a general unifying 
principle of force, so much desired even by him, had been 
found. The Od was his sole raison d'etre, and in a last-
ditch attempt to gain its acceptance he visited the eminent 
physicist, experimental psychologist and philosopher, Gustav 
Fechner (1801-1887). A few months later, von Reichenbach 
died and Fechner wrote an account38of his visit. Though not 
convinced, Fechner was not unsympathetic and frankly admitted 
that he could not detect fraudulence in von Reichenbach's quite 
impressive demonstrations. 
What can an historian make of von Reichenbach's work on 
force? ŸẂŠVĚ it a long day-dream? Or was it a series of 
often thorough, though sometimes bizarre, experiments leading 
him into a fringe area of science which, through the ill-
repute gained for it by Mesmer, would never be accepted as 
a legitimate topic for science, no matter how plausible the 
evidence? As Goethe's saying at the head of WUŸVĚchapter goes, 
"Nothing is more hurtful to a new truth than an old error." 
My own evaluation is that his work had some of the makings of 
a thorough and important research programme and until the 
early l850s was close to the main line of ideas on force and 
energy. Thereafter, he began to build the Od into an obsession 
and neglected the more general aspects of his work. Perhaps 
if he had held an academic post in a German university, with 
professional investigators around him to discuss his ideas, he 
might have left the Od alone. If he had had Helmholtz's 
mathematical expertise, or Mayer's delight for metaphysics, he 
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might have done more on his belief in the fundamental correlation 
of forces and might have earned a reputable place in the history 
of 19 th century studies on force. As it was, he was surely 
one of those natural philosophers who reflected, and in some 
measure contributed to and appreciated the importance of, those 
studies. Perhaps some words by Helmholtz describe his situation: 
"Conscientious workers who are shy at 
bringing their thoughts before the 
public before they have tested them in 
all directions, solved all doubts, and 
have firmly established the proof, are 
at a decided TÙVŠTẂŠŪWŠŦŤĒŸĲĚ
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expressed paraffin's unreactivity with even the strongest 
acids and alkalies, and he recognized at once its potential 
usefulness: "It promises to give table candles a 
satisfactory new material. It can also give better service 
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was a large amount of hypnosis and theatricality in these 
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described his theory in his Mlmoire sur la dlcouverte du 
magnJtiRme animal, Geneva and Paris, P.F. Didot Ie jeune, 
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CHAPTER 16. On the principle of the conservation of 
power as enunciated by Hermann Helmholtz 
(1821-1894) from his work in physiology 
"The first discovery of a new law is the 
discovery of a similarity which has hitherto 
been concealed in the course of natural processes. 
It is a manifestation of that which our forefathers 
in a serious sense described as 'wit'; it is of the 
same quality as the highest performances of artistic 
perception in the discovery of new types of 
expression. It is something which cannot be forced, 
and which cannot be acquired by any known method." 
{Hermann von Helmholtz, in 'On thought in ÜŤTÙȘÙŪŤGŸIĚ
The aim of this chapter is humble. It does not try to 
describe in great detail the work of Hermann Helmholtz on the 
concep.t of force, for a sufficient number of monographs have 
been written already on his life's.work. In any case, I am 
far from confident in my own understanding of his ideas in 
their entirety. My aim is to describe the physiological 
investigations out of which his early ideas on force seemed to 
arise and to discuss, albeit too briefly, the metaphysical, 
a priori reasons he had for believing in the theory of 
conservation. My task will not be original in that other 
scholars have trod the path ŠŨŲŤŠTXŸĚ However, my version has 
relied greatly on my own reading of the primary sources, even 
those which were written long after the 1840s and which might 
seem at first sight utterly irrelevant to the topic in hand, 
and occasionally I have seen fit to mention a fact or suggest 
an interpretation that other scholars (so far as I recall) have 
not. 
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The signs of Helmholtz's polymathic genius appeared early 
in his life. Encouraged by his father who taught philosophy 
and philology and was a friend of the younger Fichte, he 
developed an early interest in philosophy, especially in Kant 
and the elder Fichte, which despite his enormous achievements 
in experimental science, he retained throughout his life. 
Although he wanted to read physics at university, he was sent 
to the Koniglich Medizinisch-chirurgische Friedrich-Wilhelms 
Institut in Berlin to read medicine. Yet he did not regret 
his medical training, for it provided him with a useful pattern 
of thought, a virgin field for scientific discovery and some 
acquaintance with physics and ȘUŤÜÙVWŲXŸĚ
In Berlin his three greatest teachers were Johannes Muller 
in physiology, Eilhard Mitscherlich (1794-1863) in chemistry 
and zoo-chemistry, and Heinrich Gustav Magnus (1802-1870) in 
physics. Muller, \.,rith whom he had most contact, and Hagnus 
were strong proponents of the movement, then arising in German 
universities, which rebelled against the excessive importation 
of metaphysics and sought to investigate living phenomena with 
physico-chemical WŬŬŨŐŸĚ Under their influence, an alliance 
was forged between physicists and chemists on the one hand and 
certain physiologists on the other, and within this spirit 
of cooperation a group of young men formed the PhysikaZische 
GeseZZschaft in Berlin for the discussion of natural phenomena. 
Among the members of this group were Helmholtz, du Bois-Reymond, 
Brucke, Ludwig and other physiologists who were to contribute 
greatly to experimental ÖUQŐÙÕŨŬĲXŸĚ
It is important to realize that whilst this young group 
drew much inspiration from Muller and Magnus, they also departed 
fr.-·: '- I 
" . 
, . 
-, 
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significantly from their scientific precepts. Whereas Mliller 
always believed in the inscrutability, the unique vitality, 
of the organism, these brilliant students chose to treat it as 
a purely mechanistic system. And Magnus, at least for many 
years,regarded the paramount object in physics to be the 
collection of raw data, to the almost total exclusion of 
theorizing. He even regarded experimental and mathematical 
5' physics as separate subjects. Soon his pupils abandoned his 
Baconian approach and showed a readiness to develop hypotheses 
that Magnus (rightly) considered to be beyond the power of 
their data. 
From Magnus, Helmholtz obtained some guidance in mathematics 
and physics. From Muller, he seems to have obtained five 
things worth mention here: 1. The readiness to employ as many 
techniques as possible - chemical, physical, anatomical or 
philosophical - in tackling physiological problems. 2. An 
awareness that scientific theories are only heuristic guidelines 
which must be sacrificed to empirical data; and that one's 
most committed theories should continually be defined more 
precisely. On this latter point he cited Muller's own continual 
efforts to refine his ideas on the activities of the Lebenskraft 
6 
and the conscious soul. 3. A deep understanding of German 
philosophy and a belief that the philosophies particularly of 
Kant and Spinoza were of the utmost importance for science. 
4. An interest in, and an awareness of the enormous complexity 
of, the sense-perceptions. Muller's doctrine of the specific 
energies of nerves was, in his opinion, "a scientific achievement 
whose value I am inclined to consider as equal to that of the 
discovery of the law of gravitation"? 5. An interest in the 
dynamics of the living organism: whether it has its own, 
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inscrutable source of force, or whether there is a strict 
relation between the work and heat it can produce on the one 
hand, and the forms of force - predominantly chemical - that 
it can take in on the other. In brief, the debate between 
vitalism and mechanicism. It was also a question - as 
Helmholtz recalled in a lecture many years later - of the 
possibility of perpetual motion in living VXVWŤÜVŸĚ
This last issue - vitalism versus mechanicism - was the 
first research project that Muller set Helmholtz after he had 
completed his doctoral dissertation in 1842. The particular 
form it took was the debate over fermentation which, due 
largely to Liebig's recent work, was a topic of considerable 
interest. In the late 18th century Lavoisier had recognized 
that the two products of alcoholic fermentation, namely alcohol 
and carbonic acid gas, derive solely from the sugar substrate 
and he attempted to determine the quantitative relation among 
them. His explanation of the process was a purely chemical 
one. So too was that of Berzelius in the 1830s, who, having 
recently enunciated his theory of catalysis; asserted that the 
yeast or fermen·t is a catlyst - that it causes the sugar IS 
decomposition by mere contact with it, much as platinum black 
had been shown by John Davy and Johann D6bereiner (1780-1849) 
to effect a transformation of methane or alcohol into other 
substances. For several years this account was quite widely 
accepted although, as Liebig pointed out, it was no explanation 
at all, inasmuch as the nature of catalytic action itself was 
10 
a total ÜXVWŤŲŸIĦĚ
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In 1836, three researchers, Charles Cagniard de Latour 
(1777-1859) a biologist and physicist in Paris, Muller's pupil 
Theodore Schwann (1810-1882) in Berlin, and FriedriQh Kutzing 
(1807-1893), a botanist and teacher in natural science in 
Nordhausen in Germany, discovered simultaneously and independently 
that yeast comprises minute living organisms, whose life and 
self-propagation seemed to be intimately connected with the 
chemical phenomena of alcoholic fermentation. Schwann also 
performed experiments to follow up a study by Gay-Lussac who 
had shown that well-cleaned grapes or boiled grape juice put 
into a Torricellian vacuum would not ferment, but if a bubble 
of air were admitted then they would. Gay-Lussac concluded 
that the oxygen induced the fermentation, which was therefore 
to be regarded as a purely chemical process. In 1838 
Schwann repeated Gay-Lussac's experiments and showed, further-
more, that if the bubble of air were admitted via a red-hot 
tube, fermentation would not occur. He even showed that 20-
24oc. was the most favourable temperature range for the air to 
permit fermentation - in short, that the conditions favouring 
fermentation are those one usually associates with living 
. 11 
organ1sms. 
In 1839 Liebig published his first counter-blast defending 
the chemical ẂÙŤŴŸÎĚ He did not deny the living nature of 
yeast, but he did deny that the vital activities of yeast itself 
effected fermentation. He proposed instead that an albuminous 
substance (a ferment) exists within living yeast, and that when 
the yeast dies this ferment is released; that the moleculdr 
vibrations in the ferment, which are initiated by contact with 
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oxygen (whose particles, being gaseous, are in continuous 
motion), communicate themselves to the sugar particles which 
disintegrate into the smaller particles of alcohol and water. 
Therefore, with regard to fermentation the life of the yeast 
was merely an epiphenomenon and not a cause. 
This was where Helmholtz came in. Armed with Mitscherlich's 
textbook on organic chemistry and his treatise on fermentation, 
he repeated Gay-Lussac's experiments, devised some of his own 
and published a paper 'On the nature of fermentation and 
. ,13. MOO II ' A h· . 1843 putrefact10n 1n u er s ra ŸẂĚ 1n • This paper had set 
out to support Liebig in arguing against spontaneous generation, 
(a topic which was closely allied to ideas on fermentation), 
but it disagreed with him on the nature of fermentation and of 
putrefaction. (In Liebig's opinion, putrefaction, the dis-
intergration of dead organic matter, was in the same category 
as fermentation, both being due to chemico-mechanical causes). 
Helnlholtz asserted that putrefaction could proceed independently 
of life - as Liebig had; that it offers fertile ground for the 
development of living germs and is itself modifiable by them -
which Liebig had not asserted; and that fermentation is one 
such putrefactive process modified by living germs and 
intimately associated with them - in direct opposition to 
Liebig. His summary was that putrefaction is essentially 
non-vital, but that fermentation resembles vital processes in 
the substrates it uses and in its rates of increase and decrease 
according to the favourableness of its environment. These 
ŲŤŸẀŨWĪĚ seemed to give fresh support to vitalism; consequently, 
they were viewed suspiciously by several of his associates, for 
ME 
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instance by Magnus, who generously invited him to use his own 
laboratory and so employ "methods of investigation that would 
throw more light on the subject than such as a young army-
surgeon living on his pay could provide for UÙÜVŤŨȚĒŸÏĚ
However, it was not until two years later that Helmholtz could 
convince Magnus of the accuracy of his work, for he had to 
begin army service in 1843. Besides, when he resumed his 
physiological researches he took up a different problem - one 
on which Liebig had also worked. 
In 1845 Helmholtz set out to test Liebig's assertion of a 
correlation between the mechanical force and the heat that an 
organism can generate on the one hand, and the chemical forces 
that are entailed in such generative processes. The issue at 
stake in Helmholtz's mind, as he admitted in a lecture in 1891, 
was whether the living organism obeyed the same laws of force 
as did purely mechanical, inqrganic systems, and in particular 
whether the former system obeyed the principle of the 
conservation of vis viva or allowed perpetual motion. That 
these issues were clearly in his mind we may be sure, for 
during his Berlin student days he had read Des Cartes, Newton, 
Leibniz, Euler, Daniel Bernouilli, D'Alembert and other 
mathematicians and had become particularly acquainted with 
Bernouilli's extensive application of Leibniz's concept of 
vis ẂÙẂŠŸĪĚ So far as his ideas on force or vis viva in 
physiology were concerned, he had adhered to the commonly 
adopted explanation of vitality, namely Stahl's,whereby 
physico-chemical forces within the organism were supposed to 
cause its physico-chemical activities, but these were regulated 
by an indwelling life-soul, vital force, or anima. After 
death, the free action of the physico-chemical forces was 
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d . 16 supposed to cause ecomposlon. Helmholtz felt that there 
was something contrary to Nature in this explanation but it 
took considerable effort to state his misgivings in a precise 
form. In 1841 he realized the nature of those misgivings: 
Stahl's theory implied that every living organism could be 
a perpetuum mobiZe. Helmholtz had heard perpetual motion 
discussed by his father (as a purely philosophical issue, we 
might guess) and by his school mathematics teachers; he 
therefore investigated what Bernouilli et aZ had thought and 
began to formulate questions like: "What relations must exist 
among the various natural forces for perpetual motion to be 
possible? And do these relations actually exist?"l7 However, 
as he realized at that time, such questions and the answers 
that the illustrious mathematicians had given up to that time 
had applied only to inorganic mechanisms - indeed, only to 
mechanics and not to the chemical, electrical, magnetic and 
other forces. (This was, as Emile Meyerson points out, 
because everyone believed that all forces were fundamentally 
mechanical, and the need to treat chemical and other forces 
as separate extra-mechanical testing-grounds for vis viva 
. dIS) had not been envlsage . 
As a consequence of studies done on specialized forms of 
force since the beginning of the century ŸĚ on chemical forms 
by Liebig for instance, on animal electricity by a host of 
workers, and on electromagnetism by Ampere and others -
Helmholtz saw his problem between the time of his dissatisfaction 
with stdbl and h.Ls 1847 paper as not only to analyse the 
relations of force in mechanics, but also to extend that 
19 
analysis to all other forms of force. Moreover, since he 
believed by 1845 at the latest that heat was a force or a 
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phenomenon of motion, (he did not try to be more specific), 
it was clear that in studying its relation to the conservation 
of vis viva and perpetual motion he would be helping to close 
the gap between vitalism and mechanicism, since animal heat 
should be as amenable to physico-chemical analysis as ordinary 
heat. Such was the importance, in his own mind, of the 
investigations into muscle action, animal heat and nerve 
transmission that he undertook between 1845 and ȘĦÍĮĪÌŸÕĚ
The above interpretation brings out the full import of a 
passage that F.L. Holmes, in his admirable introduction to 
the 1964 reprint of Liebig's AnimaZ chemistry, quotes from one 
of Helmholtz's 1845 papers: 
"One of the highest questions of physiology 
concerning the existence of the vital force 
itself, namely whether organic life is the 
effect of a self-propagating, purposeful 
force, or the ŲŤVẀŸWĚof forces operating also 
in inanimate nature but modified by the 
particular manner in which they are combined, 
has recently in Liebig's effort to derive 
physiological phenomena from known chemical 
and physical laws been given an especially 
clear and concrete form; namely, whether or 
not the mechanical force and heat created in 
the organism can be derived entirely from 
f . . ,,21 chemical trans ŬŲÜŠWŸŬŪVĚ • 
If Liebig was correct, the muscle's contractions should 
be caused by a detectable change in its composition. Helmholtz 
took two similar frog-leg-muscles, one of which he stimulated 
to ȘJGKUŠẀŸWÙŬŪĚ by an electric current whilst the other \Vas left 
alone. Chemical analysis of the muscles showed that the 
ratio of alcohol-soluble to water-soluble components was 
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greater in the exhausted than in the quiescent one, and that 
chemical transformation had occurred. For a long time this 
experiment was cited as the best evidence for such trans-
formationst 2 indeed, as Holmes says, Helmholtz's experiment 
had risen to the purpose for which Liebig claimed to have 
written his book - to raise well-defined questions which would 
stimulate experimentation along the boundary of chemistry and 
. 1 23 ŮUXVŸŬĚogy. 
Although Helmholtz thus vindicated one of Liebig's ideas, 
he realized then and for the rest of his life that it was only 
a partial vindication. Liebig already believed beyond any 
possibility of doubt that muscle activity was equivalent and 
correlatable with the chemical transformations underlying it 
_ namely, that work and chemical force were correlated and, 
moreover, that the net Kraft in this process was conserved. 
Helmholtz realized that this was an article of faith which, 
though acceptable as a basis for his own as well as Liebig's 
research, was still unproven; and with his caution and 
requirement for testing bright ideas before admitting them 
as true, precepts which he had acquired from Muller, he 
continued to be on his guard against Liebig's enthusiasm. 
This interpretation explains why, for instance, in a paper 
that Helmholtz read before the Royal Society of London in 1861 
on 'The application of the law of conservation of force to 
organic nature' he never mentioned Liebig, even when discussing 
the research that had been done on animal heat and muscle 
act.i\Ti ty. There he det;lared that: 
"As yet, we cannot prove that the work 
produced by living bodies is an exact 
equivalent of the chemical forces which 
have been set in action. It is not yet 
possible to determine the exact value of 
'th f th t't' "24 el er 0 ese quan 1 les •••• 
ŸÍĦĦJÒĚ
Liebig had declared that such a proof had been found in the 
early l840s but, we may surmise, Helmholtz, appreciating that 
that declaration had been an article of faith rather than a 
sober scientific conclusion, considered it not worthy of 
mention. At the end of the 1861 paper Helmholtz did admit 
that the equivalence between animal motion and chemical force 
might yet be proved - by designing experiments in the light of 
his own rigorous, mathematical law of the conservation of 
25 force. (Such a method, he well knew, had always been 
foreign to Liebig.) 
ÙŸŨÜUŬŨWYGVĚwork on muscle led him directly into the 
question of animal heat. In his Animal chemistry Liebig had 
asserted that the entire heat an animal generates comes from 
the chemical energy within its food released during respirative 
combustion (see Chapter 14), despite the inability of Dulong's 
and Despretz's experimental research to account for more than 
about 80% of the heat in this way. Liebig had ridden rough-
shod over their results, but in 1845 he presented a reasonable 
solution to their difficulty. Dulong had based his calculations 
on Lavoisier's heat-values of the direct combustion of carbon 
and hydrogen, whilst Despretz had measured his own values. 
Liebi.g maintained that measurements of direct combustion of 
these elements were unreliable for technical difficulties, and 
he had done indirect measurements instead - by measuring the 
combustion heats ofolefiant gas, alcohol and ether and 
substracting the heat presumed to be due to the hydrogen 
in each compound. With these new figures he redid Dulong's 
and Despretz's calculations, thus obtaining a better fit 
between the calculated and measured animal heats. 
opinion, all discrepancy had been ŤŲŠTÙȘŠWŤTŸĬĚ
In his 
However, not everyone was convinced and Helmholtz was 
one of those who pursued the problem. The average of Liebig's 
new ratios was 0.95 and some of his assumptions, as Helmholtz 
pointed out, were exceptionable. Helmholtz also showed that 
the basic source of all these discrepancies had begun with 
Lavoisier's hypothesis of respiration, whereby the carbon and 
hydrogen of the respirative substrates were supposed to exist 
as separate materials in the lungs. Dulong, Despretz and 
Liebig had accepted this supposition, never doubting that the 
heat of combustion of a nutrient compound should equal the sum 
of the combustive heats of its separate elements. Unfortunately 
no experimentally-determined combustive heats of nutrients 
were available, but from a few measurements on similar 
compounds Helmholtz concluded that the actual heat of 
combustion could be far different from the value based on 
Lavoisier's supposition. Hence, Dulong's and Despretz's 
results did not disprove the chemical theory of animal UŤŠWŸİĚ
So much for the experimental details of Helmholtz's 
research on animal heat. Woven into his second paper of 
that year, 'Bericht aber die Theorie der physiologischen 
W'QI'r7{',)!.:;,.iw·inu.ilu.'n I, wel:e the deeper philosophical and physical 
implications of this research. The second paragraph began 
with his belief that Liebig's work on animal heat "offers 
more of physical interest Lthan of merely physiological/, 
in so far as it is a question of deciding whether animal 
heat arises from the known causes of heat production of 
inorganic nature .... In other words, it was an issue 
of universal significance. That significance was spelled 
out about a third the way through the paper, where he 
acknowledged the work already done on force-equivalents by 
other researchers: 
"We find ourselves, with the question of 
animal heat, in a special field. The 
principle of the constancy of the equivalence 
of force by the arousing of one natural force 
through another, although completely justified 
by logic, and also already utilized as a basic 
premiss of mathematical theories, /here he cited 
Carnot, Clapeyron and Neumanns/, has never been 
fully theoretically enunciated and recognized, 
norempirically demonstrated, if the researches 
done so far are fully representative of it. 
So long as a heat-substance was firmly held to 
be the basis of the phenomena, it was inconceivable 
that this substance could be generated within 
the body. 
But at present the material theory of heat 
is no longer held, and in its place a theory of 
motion is substituted, for we observe that heat 
is derived from mechanical forces, as well directly, 
for example by friction ••• , as also indirectly 
through electrical currents produced by the motion 
of magnets, and through frictional electricity, 
where one cannot imagine a release of latent heat-
substance. If we consdier heat as motion, it is a 
foremost point that mechanical, electrical and 
chemical forces can always produce only a certain 
equivalence of it, regardless of how complex the 
transformation of the one force into the other 
29 
may be". 
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Therein was his programme for the next two years' work 
on force. Holmes has asserted that it was clearly through 
the issues raised by Liebig that Helmholtz perceived the need 
for the thorough study which yielded his famous paper on the 
conservation of energy in ÍĮÏİŸÕĚ With this I agree, but with 
a qualification: we must not ignore Muller's realization of 
the iMportance of animal heat and physiological dynamics; we 
have seen what Muller wrote about these issues in his Handbuch 
and \lie can see how Liebig's and Helmholtz's work followed so 
neatly from his ideas. Nor should we forget that it was 
Muller \-lho put Helmholtz onto this field in physiological 
chemistry in the first place. 
Late in 1845 ŅŸŨÜUŬŨWYĚwas asked to contribute an article 
on animal heat to the NŪȘXÛŨŬŮŸTÙVȘUŤĚÑŠŪTŴŸŲWŤŲŞẀȘUĚder 
medicirtisclzen Wissenschaften, published by the medical faculty 
of Berlin. That article, entitled 'Warme: physioZogische,;l 
(which students of the emergence of the energy conservation 
principle have invariably not mentioned), contained all his 
recent conclusions about animal heat, but more besides. He 
argued that from Hess's law and Lavoisier's principle of the 
conservation of matter, the quantity of heat in Nature must 
be constant; that the heat of an organism must therefore come 
ultimately from without itself, and that since the only 
discernible income for any organism is its food and oxygen, 
its heat production must corne from the latent heat of its 
food. This was a novel and (be it noted especially) a 
theoretical demonstration of the chemical theory of animal 
heat, wnich MUller had only suggested and Liebig had only 
believed in but never proven. Unlike Liebig's intuitive 
belief, it rested on quite unassailable grounds. Continuing 
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his theoretical line, Helmholtz declared that the only 
alternative was to consider organisms as loci of a special 
force, by which natural forces and heat could be generated 
ad inf1:ni tum - an hypothesis which contradicted all known 
laws in mechanics. Here, however, he seemed to encounter 
an unscalable obstacle to his line of reasoning, for he felt 
bound to admit that a contradiction of the mechanical laws 
could not theoretically be objected to if physiologists 
chose to assume that such an enigmatic force characterized 
the living VWŠWŤŸÎĚ In other words, physiologists were free 
to deny any a priori reason for the identity of physical and 
vital forces. 
How and \-Ihen did Helmholtz overcome this last dilemma ? 
Did he overcome it by the time he wrote his 1847 memoire? If 
not, this explains why that memoire was a purely mathematical 
and theoretical one - essentially in the same vein as the 
th 
essays on vis 1,il1(.l by the 18 century mathematicians - and 
cannot by any means be called a physiological approach to 
force. Admittedly, Helmholtz declared in a lecture in 1891 
that he had \-Iritten it "to present the facts for the benefit 
. " 33 b t th t h 1 . d of physiologl.sts; u a e scarce y mentl0ne even the 
word physiology in that memoire shows that he had not yet 
resolved the dilemma of vitality. 
In October 1846 Helmholtz sent a 'Bericht ueber die 
Thp.Ol' if"! TŸŨGĚ phYHio Z.ogisc!he r1lil'meel'saheinun.gen betreffende 
Al'lied.en ... fiij' ] 845' (Report on the work done on the theory 
of ŠŪÙÜŸŨĚ heat for 1845) to the Fortschritte del' Physik, the 
journal of the T'hysikal1:sche ŇŤVŤŨŨĨŠUŠȚWŸÏĚ This report was 
essentially an abstract of his 1845 Encylopaedia article but, 
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as MUller had taught, he had been gradually refining his 
ideas and they now anticipated more closely his 1847 paper. 
The main conclusion of the report was that the kinetic theory 
of heat implied that mechanical, electrical and chemical 
forces must be the equivalents of a single, fundamental type 
of force subsuming all others, and that the confirmation of 
this conclusion was the empirical task of physicists and 
physiologists. 
Throughout the rest of 1846 he experimented on heat evolved 
by active muscle, frequently discussing his ideas with du Bois-
Reymond. He was also formulating the general significance of 
his work in writing, and in February 1847 sent du Bois-Reymond 
a sketch of an introduction to a proposed memoire on force: 
" ••• not because I think it is ready, for 
even in reading it over I see that most 
likely none of it can stand, but because I 
do not yet see how. many times I shall have 
to rewrite it before it is done, and I want 
to know if you think its style will go down 
with the ŮUXVÙĿÙVWVHHŸĪĚ
Du Bois-Reymond declared it had to remain as it was, 
calling it "an historical document of great scientific import 
1 t · .. 36 for al l.me. \vhat. du Bois-Reymond did not see was the 
depth of Helmholtz's dissatisfaction with it, for the problem 
he had hoped to solve conclusively, namely the dynamics of 
life, was still unresolved. That paper, read to the 
PhynikaZische GeneZZschaft on June 23rd 1847 and so enthusiastic-
ally received by its members, must have been in its author's 
own opinion an admission of failure. Its author was, after 
all, a physiologist, and he had failed to solve a physiological 
problem. He had not even started on the empirical verification 
c·--·-- ,._.::Z:U: 9* 
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of the principle which, as we saw above, he had urged 
physicists and physiologists to do. Indeed, it is not 
surprising that when he sent his paper to Magnus, asking him 
to arrange for its publication in Poggendorffs Annalen, 
Magnus objected to its abstract and mathematical character, 
although he recognized the significance of its argument. In 
1871 when Helmholtz delivered his 'In memoriam' on Magnus, 
he generously acknowledged the wisdom of Magnus's standpoint: 
"I must confess that I myself and many of 
my companions formerly thought that Magnus 
carried his distrust of speculation too far, 
especially in relation to mathematical physics • 
... yet when we look around us from the stand-
point which science has now attained, it must 
be confessed that his distrust of the mathe-
matical physics of that time was not unfounded. 
At that time, no separation had been distinctly 
made as to what was empirical matter of fact, 
what mere verbal definition, and what only 
hypothesis. The vague mixture of these elements 
was put forth •.• as axioms of metaphysical 
necessity and postulated a similar kind of 
necessity for the ŲŤVẀŨWVĒŸİĚ
As an instance of the excessive role that hypotheses had 
played in science he mentioned the theories that had been 
promulgated recently on atoms. He did not mention the 
metaphysical idoils on the unity of forces, of which he must 
have heard. Why this omission I cannot imagine; but this is 
a useful place to examine Helmoltz's own epistemology as a 
prelude to examining some details of his 1847 paper. 
Helmholtz's epistemology during the 1840s and l850s 
Helmholtz often asserted the relevance of philosophy to 
a scientist's understanding not only of the world, but also 
of the way he sees the world. The Kantian distinction 
between noumena and phenomena was al\'lays in his mind, Kant's 
influence being discernible throughout his life's work. In 
his physiological studies, particularly of sense-perceptions 
on which he wrote voluminously in the 1850s and 1860s;8 he 
believed he was actually verifying and developing Kant's 
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epistemology; nowhere was this clearer than in the law from 
which he started - MUller's law of specific nerve energies, 
which had shown that man's knowledge of the external world is 
fashioned inescapably by the constitution of his sensory 
organs. Helmholtz's problem was therefore to decide how 
man can have any \'iorthwhile knowledge of the world. The 
way out was by following Kan,t in insisting that the law of 
causality, which is the highest fbrm whereby man relates his 
sense-data one to another, is transcendental and a priori. 
(other categories Helmholtz thought a priori were the 
conservation of matter and the concepts of time and VŮŠȘŤĞŸĲĚ
Such ideas had been in his mind even during his schooldays; 
as he once admitted: 
"My interest in questions raised in the 
theory of knowledge was implanted in me in 
my youth when I often heard my father, who 
was strongly influenced by Fichte's idealism, 
argue with those of his colleagues who favoured 
Kant or ŨŨŤŦŤŨĒŸÕĚ
Although Helmholtz's interest in philosophy had an early 
start, his distaste for metaphysics set in not much later. 
In a lecture in 1855 he proposed that the causal law underlies 
man's belief in external things, a proposition which drew 
charges of plagiarism from the metaphysician Arthur Schopenhauer 
41 (1788-1860) and confirmed his aversion to contemporary 
metaphysics - by which he meant excessive reliance on the 
deductive method, with no regard for its empirical basis or its 
limitations. In an address in 1877 he declared that during 
his student days he had suffered under an extreme spiritualistic 
metaphysic, and that Kant had been the only salvation: his 
Kri-tik del' reinen Vernunft was "a continual sermon against the 
use of the category of thought beyond the limits of possible 
. ,,42 
experlence . Two of Kant's a priori categories that he found 
especially useful were matter and force, for into them could be 
fitted all external things. Whether such things actually exist 
he answered with a frankness that reminds one of MUller: it 
was a question purely for metaphysics and would always be so, 
since idealism and realism were equally self-consistent. 
However, the invariability of matter and force depended on the 
assumption that Nature is lawful, which in turn relied on the 
a priori causal law. 
It is worth emphasizing the role of the causal law in 
Helmholtz's philosophy for, although it seems incontestable to 
most people today, it was at that time generally recognized as 
a strategic command post that had to be won and defended in the 
battle for the right philosophy and the right method for 
investigating natural phenomena. Helmholtz handled it in several 
ways, one of the most interesting in my opinion, (for this did 
not rely particularly on Kant), being the approach via the 
question of general relations; this occurred in a paper on 
'Die neUel'(:H1 For-t;schroitte in der 7'heorie des Sehens' (1868), 
(The recent progress of the theory of vision), where he 
declared that Muller's law led to the realization that the 
only features of reality that man can know are the relations 
among its phenomena: 
"But if what we call a property implies 
an action of one thing on another, then 
a property or quality can never depend 
upon the nature of one agent alone, but 
exists only in relation to, and depends 
on, the nature of some second object, 
which is acted upon. Hence there is really 
no meaning in talking of properties of 
light which belong to it absolutely 
The notion of such properties is a contra-
diction in itself •••• 
These considerations have naturally long 
ago suggested themselves to thoughtful minds; 
they may be found clearly expressed in the 
writings of Locke and Herbart; and they are 
completely in ŠȘȘŬŲŸŠŪȘŤĚwith Kant's philosophy. 
But in former times they demanded a more than 
usual power of abstraction .•.• H43 
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The paramount of these relations was causality. (Let us recall 
that the importance of Locke's analysis of 'relations' and 
'causality' was a main argument in Chapter 1 of this thesis). 
There \v'as much more to Helmholtz's philosophy, particularly 
as it developed in his later XŤŠŲVŸÏĚ But the outline above 
must suffice for the two purposes I have had in mind: 1) To 
show that he was deeply concerned with philosophy, particularly 
with Kant and with the need to reconcile transcendentalism 
and empiricism, and that his philosophy was woven into his 
scientific work. And 2) To provide an adequate background for 
discussing the philosophical content of his 1847 paper. 
pz 
-.1 
523. 
Helmholtz's paper 'Ueber die Erhaltung der Kraft' begins 
as if it is essentially a jeu d'esprit. That is not to say 
that it was not meant to be taken seriously, only that it 
was not solemn or unimaginative. Its opening reminds me of 
the nonchalance to be found in several other of the seminal 
works in natural philosophy - in Plato's Timaeus, in Copernicus's 
own preface to his De revolutionibus, in Galileo's Dialago. 
It seems to say "Let's pretend so and so, then see what will 
pop up". One almost gets the impression, as indeed many men 
did from the Timaaus, De revoZutionibus and Dialogo, that the 
author might not be too worried if his bright idea might not 
stand up to comparison with the real world, for its style is 
that of a philosophical adventure and nothing so prosaic as a 
mere account of things as they seem to be. Perhaps what I 
have just said seems hardly worth saying; yet we must remember 
that in one respect ŅŸŨŲŪUŬŨWYGVĚessay did not touch the real 
world - it did not solve his dilemma over vitality. 
Helmholtz's approach to his subject began not with any 
statements of fact but with two sets of assumptions. Firstly, 
he supposed matter to consist of ultimate particles, whose 
motions and the p}wnomena they produce depend solely on forces 
akin to gravitiLntion emanating from their centres, whose actions 
occur along straiqht lines joining the centres of such 
particles, and whose intensities depend only on distance. Then, 
employing the laws of motion of gross matter,and also assuming 
that all forms of c!1crqy (.:'t'aft being the usual "lord employed) , 
depend upon the motions or positions of particles, the 
ȘŬŪVŤŲẂŸWÙŬŪĚof enl!rgy would hold and perpetual motion would 
45 be ÙÜŮŬËJŸȚĴJÙŞŨŤĚ under any circumstances ŸŨUŠWŤẂŤŲĦĚ
... 
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The second set of assumptions went thus: assume perpetual 
motion to be impossible, and accept Newton's third law of 
motion that action and reaction are always equal and opposite; 
then a series of mathematical deductions leads to the conserv-
f . 46 ation 0 motlon. 
Underlying both approaches was the law of causality which 
Helwboltz did not see any need to defend. That much we can 
grant him, but there were profound problems with his two initial 
sets of assumptions which he did not discuss and which were 
occasions of trouble for his paper's reception. 
The assumption that the only forces in the world are 
central and akin to gravitation was questionable, and Helmholtz 
was probably already a skillful enough mathematician to realize 
it. Moreover, that assumption would have been difficult to 
reconcile with Boscovich's and others' theories, since it took 
no account of repulsive ȚŬŲȘŤŸĚor of forces which might not 
follow an inverse square. Moreover, did he really believe 
that particles (hard, impenetrable and extended) existed? 
After all, they were hardly reconcilable with the mathematical 
philosophies of Boscovich and Leibniz. Or did he mean by 
particle a centre of force? Some years later Clark-Maxwell 
thought he meant the latter and pOinted out its difficulties: 
how can a 'nothing' resist motion? How can it possess mass 
d · t·?4 7 an lner ŸŠĦĚ Helmholtz must have been aware that such 
questions had been put to Boscovich and Leibniz themselves, and 
his silence seems to emphasize his awareness of the unprovability 
of such assumptions. Emile Meyerson has given a useful account 
th 
of how these difficulties were handled in the late 19 and 
th . 48 
early 20 centurles, and although that account does not bear 
==:...------= ....... ĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤĤŸĦŸGĒĦĚ
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on Helmholtz's own thoughts in 1847 it has this one use -
that we can see how the philosophical ambiguities in his paper 
refused to lie down. Helmholtz himself was content not to 
discuss them, probably because he believed Kant had dealt with 
them generally, for instance by asserting the a ppiopity of 
matter and force, and because they would have occupied excessive 
space in his paper. 
As for his set of assumptions based on the impossibility 
of perpetual motion, that had a history of which he was well 
aware and which might be outlined here in so far as it is 
relevant. We have already mentioned the analysis of vis viva 
and the conservation of motion by 18th century mathematicians. 
There had been other well known discussants of perpetual motion: 
Leonardo da Vinci had argued its impossibility19 so had Girolamo 
Cardano (1501-1576) the ÜŠWUŤÜŠWÙȘÙŠŪŸÕĚ Galileo had declared 
that such a motion could not be created by means of simple 
ÜŠȘUÙŪŤVŸŨĚwhether he considered this to be an universal principle, 
or only a characterization of machines below a certain level of 
sophistication, is disputable. A little later, the mathematician 
Simon Stevinus (1548-1620) used the reverse of Galileo's 
argument; taking the impossibility of perpetual motion as self-
evident, he deduced rules for the operation of ÜŠȘUÙŪŤVŸÎĚ As 
we have seen, Leibniz used the principle to demonstrate the 
conservation of v is v·t:va, and Huyghens used it likewise. 
Carnot (1796-1832) used it as the basis for his Reflexions 
sur> l(; pLdnsaner; ŅĴŸHĞUĞÙȘJŸĚ eli l feu (1824) ŸĨĚ and in 1839 Harc 
Sadi 
seguin began with it in his analysis of force and heat. To 
this line, though not in its entirety for he was still un-
aquainted with some of it in 1847, Helmholtz saw himself as 
--- 526. 
adding another weighty argument. However, it is important 
to realize the different statuses that the impossibility of 
perpetual motion had had for these different men. For Leibniz 
it had been a simple corollary to the causal principle, since 
perpetual motion would necessitate an effect greater than its 
ȘŠẀVŤŸÏĚ Huyghens was more cautious; he believed its 
impossibility to be established by a posteriori theoretical 
demonstration for purely mechanical systems, but he was not 
sure about other systems, "as in the employment of the magnet, 
55 there may be some hope". Carnot was emphatic on the issue: 
having described a hypothetical system which 
he added 
"would be not only perpetual motion, but 
an unlimited creation of motive power 
without consumption either of caloric 
or of any other agent whatever," 
"Such a creation is entirely contrary to 
ideas now accepted, to the laws of mechanics 
and sound physics. It is ÙŪŠTÜÙVVÙŞŨŤHHŸĬĚ
For Helmholtz, it seemed to be an experimental truth since he 
mentioned how fruitless the many empirical searches for a 
perpetuum mobile had been and that in 1775 it had been proscribed 
officially by the Paris Academie des ŐȘÙŤŪȘŤVŸİĚ The Academie 
had announced that in future it would not examine "any solution 
of the problems of the duplication of the cube, of the trisection 
of the angle, or the quadrature of the circle, nor any machine 
announced as perpetual ÜŬWÙŬŪHHŸĮĚ (Ironically, this was the 
very year when the Bavarian Academy of Sciences announced a 
title for a prize-essay on whether perpetual motion could 
occur in the living organism. See my chapter on Roget.) 
Actually, as Helmholtz well knew, a succession of negative 
't '1 
results did not constitute a positive demonstration against 
perpetual motion. His argument was therefore unrigorous. 
But that did not matter as it accorded perfectly with the 
epistemology announced at the very start of his essay: 
"The task of the physical sciences is to 
discover laws so that individual natural 
processes can be traced back to, and deduced 
from, general principles. These principles, 
such as the laws of refraction and reflection 
of light and the laws of Mariotte and Gay Lussac 
about the volumes of gases, are obviously nothing 
but generic concepts through which the phenomena 
falling under them are collectively understood. 
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The search for such laws is the task of the 
experimental part of our sciences. The theoretical 
part, on the other hand, seeks to • •• comprehend them 
according to the law of ȘŠẀVŠŨÙWXĒŸĲĚ
It would not be unreasonable to say that he regarded the 
impossibility of perpetual motion as a generic concept - that 
is, as an empirical principle. But from his mentors, Kant 
and Muller especially, he knew the fallibility of empirical 
generalizations. Yet here he was, in a philosophical essay, 
basing his demonstration of the conservation of energy on one 
such fallible generalization! How could he be so inconsistent? 
I have searched the secondary literature on this pOint and 
have found nothin9. Perhaps I am imagining smoke when there 
is really no fire. Perhaps Helmholtz would say that I am 
behaving like a metaphysician. Yet to base a demonstration of 
a universal lmol on d shaky foundation cannot be dismissed. 
(Meyerson dissected his argument on perpetual motion and found 
it ŴŠŪWĦÙŪŦŸÕĚbut that has nothing to do with my point here.) 
528. 
However, there are two plausible explanations in Helmholtz's 
own later writings. In a lecture 'Ueber die Weehselwirkung der 
ÔŠWẀŲÛŲŸȚWŤGĚ (On the interaction of natural forces) in 1854 
he described how, until the previous century, the perpetuum 
mobiZe had been a commonly sought prize, and that the type of 
question asked was how to combine the natural forces so as to 
produce it. Latterly, however, the question had been inverted: 
if perpetual motion be impossible, what are the relations which 
must subsist between natural forces? The justification for 
this inversion was thus not a philosophical one. It merely 
made things easier: 
"Everything was gained by this inversion of 
the question. The relations of the natural 
forces, rendered necessary by the above 
assumption, might be easily and completely 
61 
stated" . 
So the neatness of the result justified the preliminary 
assumption against perpetual motion. 
The second explanation is less plausible as it derives 
from a lecture he gave in 1891, and at seventy years of age a 
man's recollections are suspect. There he described how, 
having become dissatisfied with Stahl's anima, he began to ask 
"What relations must exist among the various 
natural forces for perpetual motion to be 
possible? And do these relations actually 
exist? In my memoire 'The conservation of 
force', my aim was merely to provide a citical 
i t ' f th t' .. 62 exam na 10n 0 ese ques 10ns ...• 
So it seems that the original question about perpetual 
motion was the inverse of the question he actually asked in his 
1847 memoire. Why? Could it be that the answer he found 
to the original question suggested the existence of 
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dynamical relations which were not known to mechanical 
philosophers, but might be possible within living organisms? 
Such an answer would not have been acceptable to his colleagues 
in the Physikalische Gesellschaft. Besides, it would have 
been useless, since it brings one back to asking the original 
question which had apparently made him dissatisfied with Stahl. 
By contrast, if one begins by assuming the impossibility of 
perpetual motion, a much neater answer emerges, for, amongst 
other reasons, a universe of conserved energy or motion is 
bound to be simpler than one generating its own source of motion 
continuously; the difference between the two is, to modify a 
phrase from Koyre, rather like going "from a closed world to an 
indefinite universe." 
All this supports a common contention among historians of 
ideas - that most, if not all, of the primary ideas underlying 
science have been intuitive and have been employed without 
scrupulous analysis of their philosophical validity. As 
Meyerson said of the doctrines of inertia and of the conserv-
f d 6 3 . ht f lrnh 1 ' ations 0 matter an energy, so mlg we say 0 He 0 tz s 
and others' ideas on the impossibility of perpetual motion: 
"it is neither empirical nor a priori; it is plausible." 
Helmholtz would probably have disagreed with this, for if 
ever there was a sclent:i.st (in the modern acceptation of that 
word), the warp and woof of whose \-lork ,'las philosophical and 
carefully rationalized, it was he. Of this, his treatise 
ÖUĹJËJǾŸĜĞWĜĞÙİÍJŲĴĜËUŤĚ upt.n,64 (3 'loIs., 1856-1866) \'las a magnificent 
example; especially in volume III, the text was interspersed 
with frequent appeals to Leibniz, Spinoza and Kant, Locke, Hurne 
and other empiriCists, but rarely to the Naturphilosophen. 
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It was a colossal treatise straddling two worlds - the old, in 
its discursiveness and polymathic erudition; and the new, in 
the elegance and penetration of the experiments and mathematics 
it employed. It is not surprising that even in 1924-25 it was 
published in America, not merely because it had become a classic, 
but also because it was still thought "a model of scientific 
method and logical procedure" and because "the demand for the 
book has not ceased, and will not cease for a long time to come, 
for no new treatise has superceded Helmholtz's work"?5 
Regrettably we have no space here to discuss his work in 
optics, not even how it employed and extended his ideas on 
force, for that would take another chapter. Instead, we should 
conclude by asking what was the reception given to his 1847 
paper. 
said 
We have seen Magnus's attitude. Helmholtz himself 
"I was quite prepared for the experts to say 
simply 'We know all that. What is this young 
doctor thinking about, who considers himself 
called upon to explain it all to us so fully?' 
To my ast.onishment, however, the authorities 
on physics with whom I carne in contact received 
it quite differently. They were inclined to 
deny the correctness of the law, and because of 
the heated fight in which they were engaged 
against Hegel's philosophy of Nature, to treat 
my essay as a fantastic piece of speculation. 
Only the mathematician, Jacobi, recognized the 
connection of my line of thought with that of 
the mathematicians of the previous century ,,66 
poggendorff refused to publish it in his Annalen because 
it was too theoretical. Du Bois-Reymond took it to his 
publisher, Georg Reimar, then engaged in publishing his papers 
on animal electricity; Reimar not only published it but also 
,. 
gave Helmholtz an honararium, a financial recognition rarely 
awarded for such an abstruse work. The younger members of 
the PhysikaZische GeseZZschaft enthused over it; as du Bois-
Reymond remarked: 
"His supporters declared that he had set 
in motion the conservation of another force, 
much more interesting for us, the mind of 
Helmholtz himself,,?7 
Yet they misunderstood Helmholtz's original aim and how 
he had failed to elucidate the dynamics within the living 
organism. They enthused because his paper was so elegant 
and conclusive within the world-view they had defined for 
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themselves, a world-view which was as intellectually confined 
as that of the NaturphiZosophen had been limitless. Du Bois-
Reymond described it in 1842 thus: 
"BrUcke and I pledged a solemn oath to put 
in effect this truth: no other forces than 
the common physico-chemical ones are active 
within the living organism. In those cases 
which cannot at the time be explained by these 
forces, one has either to find the specific 
way or form of their action by means of the 
physico-mathematical method, or to assume new 
forces equal in dignity to the chemical-physical 
forces inherent in matter, reducible to the 
forces of attraction and repulsion"?8 
As we have seen, such a philosophy was alien to their 
teacher, Muller. And though they probably did not realize it, 
it was uncomfortable for Helmholtz and became increasingly so 
as his success in experimental science grew. In a lecture in 
1854, republished unmodified in 1884, where he described the 
emergence of the energy conservation doctrine, having acknowledged 
Mayer as the first to appreciate and express the doctrine 
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correctly, he asked how it might apply to the motions and work 
of organisms. Liebig he acknowledged for giving one answer 
to this in the form of his theory of nutrition. Yet he had to 
admit that 
" we are in possession of no experiments 
from which we might determine whether the 
vis viva of the sun's rays which have disappeared 
corresponds to the chemical forces accumulated 
LIn plants and ŠŪÙÜŠŨŸIĦĚ If this view should 
prove correct, we derive from it the flattering 
result that all force, by which our bodies live 
and move, finds its source in the purest sunlight; 
and hence we are all, in point of nobility, not 
behind the race of the great monarch of China, who 
heretofore called himself the Son of the VẀŪŨWŸĲĚ
What a grand idea, yet how unstable. Helmholtz knew how 
far he was from demonstrating it empirically. In the meanwhile, 
the best he could do was to cling to what he considered the true 
epistemology - essentially Kant's, and employ as many experi-
mental tools as possible in its service - as Muller had taught 
him. To use one of his own favourite quotations: 
"They imagined they knew what they did not 
know, and he at any rate had the advantage 
of not pretending to know what he did not 
know. II 
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Epilogue 
As is well known, there were other major contributors 
to the conservation of energy who have been scarcely mentioned 
in this thesis. I have been tempted to discuss, for instance, 
the work of Julius Robert Mayer, since he was a physician and 
it was a clinical observation, namely the unexpected redness 
of venous blood in sailors on whom he practised blood-letting 
in Java, which led him to ponder the relation between heat and 
work and to elaborate this into a universal principle of Kraft. 
But for me to have written anything worthwhile would have 
necessitated several months of research and would have 
lengthened this thesis excessively. Besides, if I were to 
include Mayer, why not Ludwig Colding, for he would have been 
an equally interesting example of a NaturphiZosophe? 
It might be useful to conclude on b<[o brief points. The 
first is the differentiation·we make today among the concepts 
of force, energy, work and motion, and which makes the principle 
of energy conservation precise and really meaningful. Un-
doubtedly, the concept which emerged in Helmholtz's paper was 
what we today call energy - namely, the capacity a force 
possesses of moving its point of application; it is the capacity 
to do work. The word Kraft covered both our energy and our 
force. Actually, Helmholtz used various terms - Arbeitskraft, 
ŞŤŸŤŦŤŪTŤĚKraft, Spannkraft, meahanisehe Arbeit and Apbeit for 
his fundamental, measurable force. Our modern force, despite 
what modern physics textbooks say, is still a vis oeeulta and 
is essentially the deus in almost any type of machina. The 
word 8nergie carne closer to what we mean by energy, but as we 
saw from Johannes Huller's use of it, this is a refinement 
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that an honest historian would find difficult to defend. 
Such distinctions are critical today; our civilization 
would not be as it is if they had not been made. But they 
were made after the time-span of this thesis. William Clark 
Maxwell, who did much to refine these terms, said of that 
period that: 
"The fathers of dynamical science found a 
number of words in common use expressive 
of action and the results of action such as force, 
power, action, impulse, impetus, stress, strain, work, 
energy. They also had in their minds a number 
of ideas to be expressed, and they appropriated 
these words as best they could to express the 
ideas. The words force, vis, Kraft came most 
readily to hand." 
We may safely say there was no real need felt for any 
rigorous distinctions. On the other hand, there had been a 
long-felt need for a conservation of something. This is my 
second point. Indeed, one is tempted to wonder why the 
phrenologists did not identify a 'conservation bump' in the 
""-.-
human brain, for the history of this dream goes back indefinitly. 
Des Carte's principle of the conservation of motion, which was 
both scientific and theological, illustrates well the deep-
rootedness and therefore antiquity of the conservation urge. 
Perhaps this is one reason why the a priori character of the 
conservation of energy was proclaimed by some philosophers -
not all of them NaUIPph1: losophen - almost from the day of its 
official enunciation. 
It is interesting to note that this apparently constitutive, 
genetiC trait in mankind has existed alongside the equally 
persistent, apparently genetic trait of its antagonist, namely 
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the quest for perpetual motion. Like genuinely genetic traits 
- for instance, haemophilia or sickle-cell anaemia - such 
traits are not refLections of intelligence. As Duhem rightly 
remarked, perpetual motion continued to be sought despite the 
impressive onslaughts against it by men like Des Cartes, Leibniz:, 
Huyghens and Helmholtz; and its seekers were not all fools. 
It has been, and will always be, a shadowy figure lurking in 
the deepest recesses of the human mind. It is a 'philosopher's 
stone' and history shows that man always needs one. Perhaps 
this explains why Volta's ideas on contact electricity were 
accepted without great fuss, although he explicitly mentioned 
the possibility of obtaining an endless supply of electrical 
force apparently from nothing. 
If such be the nature of these great ideas, what are we to 
make of them today? Is the conservation of energy descriptive 
of the noumena, or even of the phenomena, of the world? It 
has never been proven by experiment. Or is it only a useful 
type of abacus? Weighty minds like Mach, Stallo, Poincare 
and Duhem have wrestled with this problem and, need I add? have 
not corne to a consensus of opinion. My own belief is that 
these issues are probably forever irresolvable. What I have 
attempted to contribu"te to them has simply been to corroborate 
other scholars' assertions that the doctrines of the correlation 
of forces and the conservation of energy emerged from several 
directions, one of which was physiology, and to uncover some of 
the hitherto unexplored undergrowth. Clearly, this particular 
direction is still a field for much more historical research. 
The complexi"ty of the problem of force wi thin the living 
organism, both for historians of the subject and even for modern 
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biophysicists and biochemists, has been expressed most beautifully 
in the high Jacobean prose of a 17th century physician. In his 
words may this thesis end: 
"For though wee christen effects by 
their most sensible and nearest causes, 
yet is God the true and infallible cause 
of all, whose concourse, though it be 
generall, yet doth it subdivide itself 
into the particular actions of everything, 
and is that spirit by which each singular 
essence not onely subsists, but performes 
its operation." 
"We are onely that amphibious piece 
betweene a corporall and spirituall essence, 
that middle forme that links those two together, 
and makes good the method of God and nature, 
that jumps not from extreames, but unites the 
incompatible dis-tances by some middle and 
participating na-tures." 
/Sir Thomas Browne, Religio medici, l643.!..7 
